Lawson v the Queen S155/2000 - [2001] HCATrans 618

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Sydney No S155 of 2000

B e t w e e n -
LESLIE HAROLD LAWSON
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

McHUGH J
KIRBY J
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 23 NOVEMBER 2001, AT 11.20 AM

MR J. BASTEN, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with MR G.J.L. SCRAGG, for the applicant. (instructed by Jacovou Barlow & Associates)

MR R.D. ELLIS: If the Court pleases, I appear for the respondent Crown, in that matter. (instructed by S.E. O’Connor, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions)

McHUGH J: Yes, Mr Basten.

MR BASTEN: As your Honours will perhaps be aware, this application was originally stood over to await the decision of this Court in Adam, which also dealt with section 60 of the Evidence Act. We say that Adam does not assist greatly in determining the outcome of this case. The correct approach to the question of the admission and use of medical histories, histories given to medical practitioners, is not to be found in any formal application of a broad statement of principle as in section 60, but by careful attention to the basis on which it is said that the evidence is relevant. That is at two stages. Firstly, in relation to the medical opinion itself and, secondly, in relation to the matters in issue in the case. That concept of relevance is in similar kind to the question of causation, namely ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J: Mr Basten, could I ask you this. What is the argument that evidence of an account to a doctor “is relevant for a purpose other than proof of the fact intended to be asserted by the representation”? I am looking at section 60. What other purpose can it be relevant for?

MR BASTEN: That, with respect, is the problem that we see in the way in which it is dealt with, and in a case ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J: It is not relevant. It seems to me that it is not relevant in any way at all, initially, because, as Justice Sperling pointed out, the proper way of proceeding is to put to an expert, “I would like you to assume these facts”. Then the facts are either proved or they are not proved, but they have no relevance at all, it seems to me, for any purpose at all at the stage at which they are put to the expert as the basis for his opinion, but as an assumption only.

MR BASTEN: Yes. We would accept that, with respect, at least in the majority of cases. Welsh’s Case itself, because it dealt with a concept of mental disability or diminished responsibility may perhaps be a case in which what was said by the person to the medical practitioner may be relevant, but again, subject to what your Honour ‑…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Lawson v the Queen S155/2000

Details

AGLC: Lawson v the Queen S155/2000 [2001] HCATrans 618
Case: [2001] HCATrans 618
Decision Date: 23 November 2001

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Lawson against his conviction for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of a confession made by Lawson to police. The High Court was tasked with determining whether the confession was obtained in circumstances that rendered it inadmissible under the common law of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the confession was involuntary, having been obtained in circumstances where Lawson's will was overborne. This involved an examination of the voluntariness of the confession, considering the conduct of the police officers and the circumstances in which the confession was made. The Court also had to consider the application of the principle that a confession obtained by unfair or improper means is inadmissible, even if it is not technically involuntary.

The Court reasoned that a confession is involuntary if it is procured by inducements, threats, or promises that would have the effect of impairing the free exercise of the will of the accused. In this instance, the Court found that the police had employed tactics that were unfair and improper, creating a situation where Lawson's will was likely overborne. The Court applied the principle that evidence obtained unfairly or improperly, even if not strictly involuntary, may be excluded in the exercise of the court's discretion to ensure a fair trial.

Ultimately, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

Orders