Lawson v Department of Natural Resources and Mines - [2002] QLC 95

LAND COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Lawson v Department of Natural Resources and Mines [2002] QLC 095

PARTIES: Janine Rae Lawson
(appellant)
v
Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines
(respondent)

FILE NO: AV2002/0267

DIVISION: Land Court of Queensland

PROCEEDING: Appeal of Jurisdiction under the Valuation of Land Act 1944

DELIVERED ON: 28 November 2002

DELIVERED AT: Brisbane

HEARD AT: Brisbane

MEMBER: Dr NG Divett

ORDER: The appellant has failed to activate the jurisdiction of this Court in as much as the Notice of Appeal is deficient in its completeness. The matter is struck out for lack of jurisdiction, and also for want of prosecution.

CATCHWORDS: Practice and Procedures – satisfying jurisdiction – incomplete Notice of Appeal – jurisdiction not found

APPEARANCES: No appearance by the appellant
Mr R Paterson for the respondent

Background:

This matter relates to an appeal against an annual valuation of land at 119 Crosby Road Albion, and described as Lot 2 on RP 41798, Parish of Toombul. The matter relates to the initial point of determining whether the Court has jurisdiction to determine the unimproved value in accordance with the Valuation of Land Act 1944. At the hearing on jurisdiction on 26 September 2002 there was no appearance by the appellant. Mr Paterson, Principal Legal Officer appeared for the respondent.
On 25 February 2002 the Chief Executive issued a valuation of the subject land at $300,000. Following an objection by the owner the Chief Executive confirmed that figure on 25 June 2002. The appellant then appealed to this Court on 16 July 2002.
By letter of 24 July 2002 the Registrar of the Court advised the appellant that the Notice of Appeal lodged appeared to be defective, and the Registrar issued a form of requisition detailing the particulars of non-compliance with s.45 of the Act. The Registrar advised that unless the appellant remedied the defective Notice within 21 days of the date of requisition, then the matter would be set down to determine whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear the matter. The defects of the Notice of Appeal included, among others, any indication of the alternative unimproved value argued for by the appellant.
There being no response to that requisition by the appellant, the Registrar issued a Court Notice on 23 August 2002, setting down the matter for a hearing on jurisdiction for 26 September 2002. In the event of jurisdiction being found to exist, then the matter of a preliminary conference to discuss the issue was to be undertaken. On 26 September 2002, despite an attempt by the Registrar to contact the appellant by telephone, there was no appearance, or no explanation for lack of appearance by the appellant. In view of that event, Mr Paterson asked for the matter to be struck out, both for non-appearance, and also for lack of jurisdiction.

The Notice of Appeal –

The Notice of Appeal supplied to the Court was found to be deficient in several aspects, in that it lacked any details in respect of:
(a)the date of issue of the decision on objection, and the Chief Executive’s valuation appealed against
(b)the date of valuation and its effect, and the estimate of the unimproved value of the land in the appellant’s opinion
(c)the street name of the property and its property identification number
(d)the real property description of the land and its area
(e)the grounds of appeal by the appellant referred specifically to:
“all of the above information was on my last appeal form”.
However attached to the Notice of Appeal form was a statement by the appellant signaling her dissatisfaction with having to pay extra rates, and the statement continues:
“I am not willing to pay more rates so I insist the valuation of 119 Crosby Road, Albion not be increased.”
By a reasonable understanding of those latter words, it could be interpreted that the appellant seeks for the valuation to remain at its previous unimproved value prior to the current revaluation at 1 October 2001. The record shows that the unimproved value at 1 October 2000 was $260,000.
In respect of any lack of any specific grounds of appeal supporting the appellant’s argument for the maintenance of the previous valuation of the subject land, presumably at $260,000, I note that the appellant refers to “my last appeal form”. While that is totally inadequate in explaining the basis of the grounds of appeal, it infers that the appellant is confusing the separate identity and roles of the Chief Executive and this Court.
This Court has had no previous appeals by the appellant in respect of this property, and it is likely that the appellant is referring to her objection form lodged with the Chief Executive. Of course that has no significance to this Court, which is an independent statutory body, entirely separate from the Chief Executive’s organization. Indeed, the separation of powers defining the separate roles of the judiciary and the Government is the very basis of our free democracy. It is from that separate role of the Court that it sits in judgment on the decisions of the Chief Executive. That assumption is fatal to the appellant’s case in this matter, and there are no stated grounds for the appeal.

Decision:

In seeking guidance in this matter I turn first to the provisions of the Act. The rights of an appellant to appeal against an annual valuation are exercised under s.45 of the Act, and in respect of a Notice of Appeal are specifically covered in s.45(4) and (5) which state:
“45.(4) Such notice shall state the grounds of appeal and the appeal shall be limited to the grounds so stated and the burden of proving any and every such ground shall be upon the owner.
(5) Such notice shall also state the amount which in the opinion of the appellant should be the valuation of the subject land.
Where a defect in a Notice of Appeal is apparent, then s.58 relevantly defines:
“58.(1) Where it appears to the registrar of the Land Court that a notice of appeal filed in the registry does not comply in all respects with the requirements of 56 or is otherwise defective in a material particular, the registrar shall issue or cause to be issued to the appellant a requisition specifying the non-compliance or defect and requiring the appellant to comply in all respects with the requirements of section 56 or remedy the defect, as the case may be, by filing in the registry within 21 days of the date of the requisition an answer to it so that the requirements of section 56 are satisfied or the defect is remedied, as the case may be.
(3) If the appellant does not fully comply with the requirements of the requisition to the satisfaction of the registrar within the prescribed time, the Land Court shall not proceed to hear and determine the appeal unless it is satisfied that the notice of appeal as first filed complied in all respects with the requirements of section 56 and was not defective in any material particular or that, where in its opinion a requisition was properly issued, the requirements of the requisition have been complied with to the extent that, taking such compliance into consideration in conjunction with the notice of appeal as first filed, the requirements of section 56 have been complied with and there is no defect in any material particular.”
Section 56 defines a general appeal and is similar to s.45(4) which deals specifically with annual valuations.
Where an appeal fails to satisfy the Land Court in respect of a defective Notice of Appeal, then s.59 directs:
“59.(1) Where on the hearing of an appeal it appears to the Land Court that a notice of appeal does not comply in all respects with the requirements of section 56 or is otherwise defective in the material particular, the court shall require the appellant to furnish it within seven days with particulars the absence of which constitute the failure to comply with the requirements of section 56 or the defective in a material particular.
(3) If the appellant fails to satisfy the requirements of the Land Court under this section within the prescribed period of 7 days, the Court shall strike out the appeal.”
On the basis of those directions this Court cannot hear the merits of the appeal unless the Notice of Appeal satisfies the provisions of s.45(4) and (5).
In respect of the matter of whether the Notice of Appeal was deficient in referring only to another document not attached specifically to the Notice of Appeal, Mr Paterson draws attention to the decision in JJ Bidner v Valuer-General (1992-93) 14 QLCR 88. In that matter the Notice of Appeal had direct analogy to the current matter, where the learned Member said at page 94:
“In my view, because the grounds of appeal as stated cannot be understood in their own terms, the appellant has not complied with section 21(3). The fact that the grounds can be ascertained by reference to another document, albeit one which was not annexed to the Notice of Appeal and which the Valuer-General was not formally obliged to provide to the Registrar, does not overcome that lack of compliance.”
Section 21(3) as it then was is now s.58.
In Bidner there was a belated response to the requisition from the registrar, some four months after the registrar’s requisition. In that matter the Member found that such late response to the requisition was not seen as grounds for relief from that responsibility. That also provides no relief to the appellant in the current matter for failing to provide any response at all to the requisition of the registrar. In the end the matter of Bidner was struck out for want of jurisdiction.
In the matter of CM Conroy v Valuer-General (1986-87) 11 QLCR 25, the President of this Court considered similar circumstances to those found in the current matter. In Conroy the appellant had referred in her grounds of appeal to an estimate of unimproved value “no greater than the previous valuation prior to the said determination”. The President said at page 27:
“Despite the impressive references to learned authority by the Valuer-General’s counsel, I am not convinced that it is necessary for the amount of the appellant’s valuation to be set out in the Notice of Appeal as expressed in dollar amount terms. … I am of the opinion that it is not necessary for a dollar amount expressed in figures or words to be inserted as the appellant’s valuation. It is sufficient compliance if words are used which indicate either directly or indirectly a specific or definite sum which represents the appellant’s opinion of the unimproved value of the subject land.”
The findings of Conroy can also be followed in the current matter in respect of the actual definitive understanding of the words expressed in the grounds of appeal. The President went on to say in Conroy at page 27:
“In the instant case no such definitive or specific amount is derivable from the words used. The use of the words “no greater than” indicates an upward limit – the former valuation – but below that limit no specific or definite amount can be deduced.”
In the current matter it is inferred that the unimproved value argued for by Mrs Lawson is the value previously determined at $260,000, as demonstrated in her words “the value of my land has not increased …”. However the words “has not increased”, also allows for the possibility that the value may have decreased. The lack of clarity of those words results in a similar lack of specificity as found in Conroy; where it was found that the Notice of Appeal did not fully comply with the Act, and the Court had no jurisdiction to hear that matter.
The matter of failing to provide an appellant’s estimate of the valuation appealed against was also addressed in The National Trust of Queensland v Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources (V96-27), 23 April 1997, unreported. In that matter the appellant had sought relief from having to provide an estimate of the unimproved value, not as a result of an oversight, but as “a strategy to provide a realistic figure for the benefit of the Court” (page 6). The Member rejected that excuse, noting that expedience cannot be used as a means of circumventing the legal responsibilities of the appellant. The appellant in that matter also failed to respond in time to the requisition from the registrar, and the appeal was struck out for want of jurisdiction.
The matter of an appellant failing to provide a statement of the amount argued for in the appeal was also addressed in Schirmer v Valuer-General (1974) 1 QLCR 144, where the Land Appeal Court said at page 146:
“There being no statement of amount whatsoever the same consequences ensue whether the requirement be imperative calling for strict observance or directory calling for substantial observance.”
In respect of the failure of the appellant to appear at the hearing on 26 September 2002, and in the matter of whether the appeal should be struck out for want of prosecution, I turn to guidance from precedent. The matter of lack of a prosecution by an appellant is addressed in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, where a pleading may be struck out under rule 171(1)(a), where the appellant discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence. Where the appellant has failed to appear in accordance with the orders of the Court, as contained in the Court Notice of 23 August 2002, then she is deemed to have failed to disclose any reasonable course of action.
I am also reminded that a matter may also be struck out for lack of prosecution, even if the matter was seen to be inordinately delayed in its prosecution. That was addressed by the Court of Appeal in Tricon Industries Pty Ltd v Abel Lemon & Company Pty Ltd (1998) 2 QdR 551. The Court of Appeal noted that there is an inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action for want of prosecution apart from the rules. (page 552).

Conclusion:

In summarising this matter I find that the appellant has failed to activate the jurisdiction of this Court in as much as the Notice of Appeal is deficient in its completeness. The matter is struck out for lack of jurisdiction, and also for want of prosecution.

NG DIVETT
MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT