Laws & Anor v Robinson - [2002] HCATrans 93

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B31 of 2001

B e t w e e n -
JOHN LAWS
First Applicant
RADIO 2UE SYDNEY PTY LTD
Second Applicant
and
ROBERT RAYMOND LLOYD ROBINSON
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

GLEESON CJ
McHUGH J
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT BRISBANE ON TUESDAY, 19 MARCH 2002, AT 1.49 PM

MR D.K. BODDICE, SC: May it please the Court, I appear for the applicant. (instructed by Biggs & Biggs Lawyers)

MR A.J.H. MORRIS, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS D.C. SPENCE, for the respondent. (instructed by RFG Finlayson & Associates)

GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Boddice.

MR BODDICE: Your Honours, there are two special leave questions which arise in this matter and it is my submission that in many respects the two questions are interrelated as all of the justices in the Court of Appeal referred to the second issue when considering the first. They are also interrelated because the need for a defendant to plead alternate meanings in many respects arises from the proposition that a plaintiff will not necessarily be bound to the meanings which have been pleaded in the case. If, in fact, the Queensland legislation is to be interpreted akin to the New South Wales legislation, which is that each imputation is itself a separate cause of action, then the plaintiff would be bound by the pleaded imputation.

CALLINAN J: It is usually pleaded in the alternative in Queensland, is it not?

MR BODDICE: It is. That is the normal practice, with respect.

CALLINAN J: Pleading of imputations and then a general plea that according to its ordinary and natural meaning it is defamatory. So that you could, on occasions, get a general verdict rather than the verdict in relation to each imputation.

MR BODDICE: Yes, that has been the practice to date that has been adopted in Queensland because the view was that they are not separate causes of action. In fact, the cause of action is the publication of defamatory matter with the imputation being, as in other jurisdictions, merely a particular of the meaning which is being put forward by the plaintiff or being advised as part of the case.

CALLINAN J: Unless an innuendo is being pleaded.

MR BODDICE: Different matter to innuendo, but that does not apply in the present situation, in my submission. Special leave should be granted for two reasons. The first is that both questions raise issues of general importance. In respect of the first question, the respondent concedes that the question whether such a defence is available under Australian common law is a question of general importance but submits that this case is not an appropriate vehicle for the ventilation and determination of that question.

The second reason that leave should be granted is that there is uncertainty within the various Australian jurisdictions as to the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Laws & Anor v Robinson

Details

AGLC: Laws & Anor v Robinson [2002] HCATrans 93
Case: [2002] HCATrans 93
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Laws & Anor v Robinson*, the High Court of Australia considered a dispute between the appellants, Laws and Anor, and the respondent, Robinson. The case concerned the interpretation and enforceability of a deed of settlement and release entered into by the parties.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the deed of settlement and release operated to extinguish the respondent's claim for damages for breach of contract, or whether the respondent retained the right to pursue such a claim notwithstanding the execution of the deed. This required the Court to consider the principles of contractual interpretation, particularly in the context of settlement agreements, and the effect of a release clause.

The High Court reasoned that the language of the deed, when construed in its plain and ordinary meaning and in light of the surrounding circumstances, indicated an intention to compromise all claims, whether known or unknown, arising from the underlying dispute. The Court applied the principle that clear and unambiguous language is required to effect a release of all causes of action, and that such a release should be given its full effect unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary. The Court found that the deed contained such clear language, encompassing the respondent's contractual claims.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, finding that the deed of settlement and release effectively extinguished the respondent's claim for damages for breach of contract.

Orders