Lawrance v Macarthur Legal Centre
[2008] FMCA 1420
•15 October 2008
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| LAWRANCE v MACARTHUR LEGAL CENTRE & ORS | [2008] FMCA 1420 |
| HUMAN RIGHTS – Disability discrimination – sex discrimination – victimisation – sexual harassment. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE– Summary dismissal – no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the claim – frivolous or vexatious – abuse of process – where claims by the applicant against certain respondents have been dismissed in earlier proceedings – whether evidence ambivalent – where allegations inherently incredible – application dismissed as vexatious and an abuse of process against various respondents – vexatious litigant. |
| Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) s.17A Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s.46PO Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) ss.4, 5, 12, 15, 29, 42, 43, 122 Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) ss.5, 6, 14, 26, 28A, 28B, 28L, 94, 105, 106 Disability Services Act 1986 (Cth) s.7 Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s.6C Mental Health Act 1990 (NSW) Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) s.31A Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 rr.13.10, 13.11 |
| Lawrance v The Commonwealth of Australia & Ors [2006] FMCA 1792 Lawrance v The Commonwealth of Australia & Anor (No 5) [2007] FMCA 1934 Lawrance v Commonwealth of Australia & Ors [2007] FMCA 1478 L v Commonwealth of Australia & Ors [2008] FMCA 658 Lawrance v Watson & Ors [2008] FMCA 984 Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 720 Pridmore & Ors v Magenta Nominees (1999) 161 ALR 458 Horvath v Commonwealth of Australia [1999] FCA 504 Watson v Gardiner (1993) 112 ALR 289 Lawrance v The Commonwealth of Australia & Ors [2007] FMCA 1408 Ramsey v Skyring (1999) 164 ALR 378 |
| Applicant: | AROHA LAWRANCE |
| First Respondent: | MACARTHUR LEGAL CENTRE |
| Second Respondent: | MARGARET PANTALL |
| Third Respondent: | THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES |
| Fourth Respondent: | GUARDIANSHIP TRIBUNAL (NSW) |
| Fifth Respondent: | THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA |
| Sixth Respondent: | DEPARTMENT OF FAMILIES, HOUSING, COMMUNITY SERVICES AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
| Seventh Respondent: | CRS AUSTRALIA |
| Eighth Respondent: | COLIN THOMSON |
| Ninth Respondent: | MICHAEL PASFIELD |
| Tenth Respondent: | MARILYN MOORE |
| File Number: | SYG 3139 of 2007 |
| Judgment of: | Scarlett FM |
| Hearing dates: | 16 & 17 September 2008 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 17 September 2008 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 15 October 2008 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Appeared in Person |
| Counsel for the First and Second Respondents: | Mr Dixon |
| Solicitors for the First and Second Respondents: | Kennedys |
| Counsel for the Third and Fourth Respondents: | Mr Moorhouse |
| Solicitors for the Third and Fourth Respondents: | I.V Knight, Crown Solicitor |
| Counsel for the Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Respondents: | Ms Watson |
| Solicitors for the Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
| Eighth and Tenth Respondents | No Appearance |
ORDERS
The title of the sixth respondent is changed to Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs.
The application is summarily dismissed as against the first and second respondents under the provisions of rule 13.10(a).
The applicant is to pay the first and second respondent’s costs.
The application is summarily dismissed as against the third and fourth respondents as a vexatious proceeding under rule 13.10(b)
IN THE ALTERNATIVE the application is summarily dismissed as against the third and fourth respondents as an abuse of the process of the Court under rule 13.10 (c).
The applicant is to pay the third and fourth respondent’s costs.
The application is summarily dismissed as against the fifth, sixth and seventh respondents as a vexatious proceeding under the provisions of rule 13.10 (b).
IN THE ALTERNATIVE the application is summarily dismissed as against the fifth, sixth and seventh respondents as an abuse of the process of the Court under rule 13.10(c).
The applicant is to pay the fifth, sixth and seventh respondents’ costs.
The application is summarily dismissed as against the ninth respondent under the provisions of rule 13.10 (a).
The applicant is to pay the ninth respondent’s costs.
Any proceeding instituted by the applicant against the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs or CRS Australia may not be continued without the leave of the Court.
The applicant may not institute any proceeding against the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs or CRS Australia without the leave of the Court.
Leave granted to amend return date on the service copy of the application in respect of Eighth Respondent
The Application is listed for further Mention on Wednesday 19 November 2008 at 10:15am before Scarlett FM in Court 7B.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 3139 of 2007
| AROHA LAWRANCE |
Applicant
And
| MACARTHUR LEGAL CENTRE |
First Respondent
| MARGARET PANTALL |
Second Respondent
| THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES |
Third Respondent
| GUARDIANSHIP TRIBUNAL (NSW) |
Fourth Respondent
| THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA |
Fifth Respondent
| DEPARTMENT OF FAMILIES, HOUSING, COMMUNITY SERVICES AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
Sixth Respondent
| CRS AUSTRALIA |
Seventh Respondent
| COLIN THOMSON |
Eighth Respondent
| MICHAEL PASFIELD |
Ninth Respondent
| MARILYN MOORE |
Tenth Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(As corrected)
Application
This is an application by eight of the ten respondents for summary dismissal of the applicant’s claim against them under s.46PO of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986, in which she asserts that she has been discriminated against by their conduct in a number of ways. The first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and ninth respondents ask the Court to give judgment in their favour against the applicant under the provisions of s.17A(2) of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) and rule 13.10 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 on the bases that in each case:
a)the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting that part of the proceeding applying to the particular respondent;
b)that the claim for relief is frivolous or vexatious; and
c)that the claim for relief is an abuse of the process of the Court; and
d)in the case of the first and second respondents, Macarthur Legal Centre and Margaret Pantall, the claim is beyond the Court’s jurisdiction.
The sixth and seventh respondents, the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, and CRS Australia, also seek orders under rule 13.11 (3) that:
a)any proceeding instituted by the applicant in relation to those respondents may not be continued without leave of the Court; and
b)that the applicant may not institute any proceeding against those respondents without leave of the Court.
The eighth respondent, Colin Thomson, has not been served and it is unnecessary to consider any claim against him at this stage. The applicant has filed an affidavit of service in respect of the tenth respondent, Dr Marilyn Moore, but Dr Moore is not a party to the application for summary dismissal. Accordingly, I do not propose to consider any part of the applicant’s claim against Dr Moore for the purpose of these proceedings.
The first respondent, Macarthur Legal Centre and the second respondent, Margaret Pantall have the same representation. Ms Pantall was employed by the Macarthur Legal Centre as Principal Solicitor at the time the applicant claims the discrimination arose.
The third respondent, the State of New South Wales, and the fourth respondent, the Guardianship Tribunal, have the same representation. For convenience, they will be referred to as “The State respondents”.
The fifth respondent, the Commonwealth of Australia, the sixth respondent, the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (the word “Housing” was added to the Department’s title after these proceedings commenced and I will make a formal order acknowledging that change of title), the seventh respondent, CRS Australia, all have the same representation. For convenience, they will be referred to as “The Commonwealth respondents”.
In her application, the applicant claims that she has been discriminated against by the conduct of the respondents in placing their pens to or in their mouths, granting guardianship orders, contacting a relative, contacting friends and employers of the applicant, entering the applicant’s places of dwelling, interfering with the applicant’s property and belongings, administering involuntary treatment to the applicant, placing the applicant under surveillance and observation in her places of dwelling and elsewhere, disclosing information about the applicant to the community and others, and in providing or participating in the provision of diagnostic and assessment services and other disability services and CRS programmes to the applicant.
The claims against Macarthur Legal Centre and Margaret Pantall
The applicant claims that the Macarthur Legal Centre has committed unlawful discrimination against her under sections 4, 5, 12, 15, 29, 42, 43 and 122 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 and sections 5, 6, 14, 26, 28A, 28B, 28L, 94, 105 and 106 of the Sex Discrimination 1984. She seeks a written apology and damages, including exemplary damages.
The applicant claims that Margaret Pantall has committed unlawful discrimination against her under sections 4, 5, 12, 15, 29, 42 and 43 of the Disability Discrimination Act and sections 5, 6, 14, 26, 28A, 28L and 94 of the Sex Discrimination Act. She seeks a written apology and damages, including exemplary damages.
The applicant’s claims are set out in four affidavits, filed on 10th October 2007, 30th October 2007, 15th November 2007 and 26th June 2008.
The applicant alleges that she has been imputed with a psychiatric impairment or a mental illness when in fact she has no such impairment or illness. She claims to have been administered involuntary medical treatment from April 2003 until at least 10th October 2007, the date of her first affidavit. She states:
I have never been told why I am being given involuntary treatment, who exactly is administering it, what laws are involved, what has happened to my rights, and who has consented to its administration.[1]
[1] Applicant’s affidavit filed 10.10.2007 at paragraph [7]
The applicant goes on to state that she had never known that she was being imputed with a psychiatric impairment until she read the Disability Services Act 1986 (Cth) for the first time in 2003 or 2004. She states that she has never been present when things like disability services, surveillance, involuntary treatment, entering people’s properties and disclosing information has been discussed. She claims that:
I have never, ever been present during such conversations and I believe I have been kept deliberately in the dark, and prevented from knowing about these things.[2]
[2] Applicant’s affidavit filed 10.10.2007 at [10]
The applicant claimed that she had been studying a 6 month course in November 2003 but ceased halfway through “after realising that involuntary treatment was actually hindering or obstructing normal cognitive functioning”.[3] She goes on to allege that this treatment has in fact occurred since January 1994.
[3] Applicant’s affidavit filed 10.10.2007 at [11]
The applicant claims that her sister-in-law, who is not a party to this proceeding:
…made two phone calls pretending to be an employee of Anglicare whilst I was providing telephone advice at Macarthur Legal Centre.[4]
[4] Applicant’s affidavit 10.10.2007 at [20]
The applicant goes on to claim:
Macarthur Legal Centre was also, I allege, involved in these telephone calls occurring and in imputing to me a psychiatric impairment or a mental illness.[5]
[5] ibid
The applicant claims that her sister in law and a number of other named individuals have never observed any abnormality in her conduct or communication, including “all the employees at Macarthur Legal Centre”.[6]
[6] Applicant’s affidavit 10.10.2007 at [21]
The applicant alleges that she was receiving Part III Disability Services Act services and programmes during her employment at Macarthur Legal Centre. She says:
I did not know this at the time, and assumed that my rights were the same as everyone else’s. The terms and conditions of my employment were unlawfully discriminatory because they imputed to me a psychiatric impairment which I did not and do not in fact have.[7]
[7] Applicant’s affidavit 10.10.2007 at [23]
The applicant claims that she suffered from discrimination and had her duties altered after she made a formal complaint about Margaret Pantall, and she was eventually dismissed on 29th November 2001, two months before the expiration of her 6 month contract of employment.
The applicant complains in paragraph 24 of her affidavit about various employees of the Macarthur Legal Centre. She made specific complaints about Margaret Pantall:
(a)her “pen and chupa chup conduct”;
(b)her “erratic and disorganised method of showing me how to work in the telephone advice sessions”;
(c)her “requirement that I send a letter each week to clients of the Centre who remained incommunicado with the Centre”; and
(d)her “providing me with incorrect advice on the application of the Child Support Act and law”.
The applicant goes on to explain Margaret Pantall’s “pen conduct”, saying:
During the interview for the position, Margaret Pantall briefly and unobtrusively raised her pen to her mouth and dropped it. I did not think or understand her to be engaging in this conduct deliberately, and I did not view it as conduct of a sexual nature.[8]
[8] Applicant’s affidavit 10.10.2007 at [25]
The applicant then goes on to refer to having been given the file of a developmentally delayed women who had been sexually assaulted. It is a matter of some concern that the applicant has chosen to reveal the name of the young woman who was a client of the legal centre. I do not propose to reveal the name of the young woman, but it is unacceptable for the applicant to have breached the privacy of the woman concerned. The applicant is, or was, a lawyer by profession and should have known better.
The applicant describes how the young woman gave a graphic account of the assault, which involved oral sex. The applicant goes on to say:
Several days after I had been handed this file, and as I read it and dealt with the file, Margaret Pantall spent several days ostentatiously and loudly sucking on a chupa chup lollipop. She did this throughout the day, for several days, sitting down and walking around with the lollipop protruding from her mouth and noisily slurping.[9]
[9] Applicant’s affidavit 10.10.2007 at [27]
The applicant complains that this behaviour occurred frequently in her presence, saying:
Her conduct was abnormal.[10]
[10] Applicant’s affidavit 10.10.2007 at [28]
The applicant deposes that she did not think at the time that Margaret Pantall’s conduct was anything to do with her, even though she found Ms Pantall’s conduct to be “extraordinary”, although she complains of having been isolated in the workplace by the other employees.
The applicant goes on to depose that she had no idea in 2001 that she was on a CRS programme or was in receipt of Disability Services Act diagnostic and assessment services, nor did she have any understanding that she was being imputed with a psychiatric impairment. However, she goes on to conclude:
Such a programme would explain the coincidence of Margaret Pantall’s chupa chup conduct and my reading of the (name suppressed) file.[11]
[11] Applicant’s affidavit 10.10.2007 at [30]
The applicant claims that Ms Pantall has tried giving advice on her or her circumstances, without her knowledge or consent. The applicant complains that such conduct would amount to unlawful discrimination and victimisation. The applicant claims that Ms Pantall’s “pen and chupa chup conduct” amounts to sexual harassment and sex discrimination in employment.
The applicant complains that her dismissal from the Macarthur Legal Centre occurred because she was being imputed with a psychiatric impairment. She goes on to claim:
I allege that Macarthur Legal Centre employees participated in the provision to me of DSA services and programmes, and were responsible for the administration of and conduct of DSA services, in conjunction with CRS Australia, DFaCSIA and the State of New South Wales.[12]
[12] Applicant’s affidavit 10.10.2007 at [41]
The applicant goes on to say that she does not know the identity of the person who has, and has been, consenting to her being administered involuntary treatment.
The balance of the affidavit, from paragraphs 44 to 88, refers to other matters.
The applicant’s affidavit filed on 30th October 2007 is quite lengthy, running to some 151 paragraphs and a number of annexures. Only paragraph 136 and an annexure, being a copy of a letter to a
Dr McMurdo, is not a party to these proceedings.
In paragraph 136, the applicant complains that Margaret Pantall and
Dr Moore were the first people to have engaged in the conduct of putting pens in their mouths. The applicant expresses the view that this conduct by Ms Pantall and others:
…was engaged in deliberately, was conduct of a sexual nature, and was conduct engaged in in order to or by way of imputing to me a psychiatric impairment.[13]
[13] Applicant’s affidavit filed 30.10.2007 at [136]
The applicant has annexed to her affidavit a copy of a 14 page letter to Dr McMurdo. At page 11 of that letter she refers to having become unemployed:
Because my job as a lawyer was terminat4d when I refused to accept a unilateral change in my duties after three months of employment, requiring me to make all the tea and coffee during community education sessions run by staff at Macarthur Legal Centre.
The applicant’s affidavit filed on 15th November 2007 consists of 225 paragraphs. The applicant’s complaints about Macarthur Legal Centre can be found in paragraphs 123, 125, 168, 206 to 215, 217, 218, 219, 220, 222 and 225. Much of the material repeats what is contained in the applicant’s affidavit of 10th October 2007.
The applicant complains that the respondents have imputed to her a psychiatric impairment in employment and elsewhere by the provision of DSA services.[14]
[14] Applicant’s affidavit filed 15.11.2007 at [123]
The applicant first became aware that she was being administered involuntary treatment from April 2003 “in a manner that made it manifest that such treatment was being administered…”[15]
[15] Applicant’s affidavit 15.11.2007 at [125]
The applicant referred to her earlier allegation that her sister in law and another person:
…made telephone calls to me whilst I was working at Macarthur Legal centre, during which they each pretended to be someone else.[16]
[16] Applicant’s affidavit 15.11.2007 at [168]
The applicant says that:
No court has ruled that complaints by me against Macarthur Legal Centre are vexatious or lacking in merit.[17]
[17] Applicant’s affidavit 15.11.2007 at [206]
The applicant refers to her employment at Macarthur Legal Centre in paragraphs 207 to 213. The applicant complained that there was no handover of files when she arrived and Margaret Pantall asked her to start answering telephones for legal advice sessions. She goes on to say:
I allege that I was treated by Macarthur Legal Centre as though I had a psychiatric impairment, but I did not know this, and I did not understand or appreciate that this was happening at the time.[18]
[18] Applicant’s affidavit 15.11.2007 at [215]
The applicant complains that the refusal by an employee at Macarthur Legal Centre named Anne Gillian to “communicate normally” with her and Margaret Pantall’s refusal to train her properly, “in addition to Margaret Pantall’s pen conduct and her chupa chup consumption”[19] were examples of her being imputed with a psychiatric impairment.
[19] Applicant’s affidavit 15.11.2007 at [217]
The applicant makes this allegation:
The Centre, I allege, was determined to treat me as though I had a psychiatric impairment and that was the only reason, I allege, that I was ever offered employment there.[20]
[20] Applicant’s affidavit 15.11.2007 at [218]
The applicant repeats her complaint that she was administered involuntary medical treatment designed to hinder or obstruct normal cognitive functioning during her employment at Macarthur Legal Centre. The applicant refers to having realised in April 2003 that she had been administered this treatment and states:
I started to look back in time, and to wonder if I had ever been treated with such treatment prior to April 2003. I allege that this occurred during my employment at Macarthur Legal Centre.[21]
[21] Applicant’s affidavit 15.11.2007 at [222]
The applicant complains that Macarthur Legal Centre’s response (filed on 29 October 2007) indicates that she is being imputed with a psychiatric impairment. The respondent opposes the orders sought, and asks that the application be dismissed with costs. The grounds of the oppositions are set out as:
(1)The applications have no merit.
(2)The applications are vexatious. In 2006 this Court refused the applicant leave in exactly the same allegations.
(3)The incidents referred to occurred in 2001. The applicant has occasioned excessive delay in bringing these actions.
The reference to the refusal of leave in 2006 relates to a decision by Smith FM where he refused leave to join the Macarthur Legal Centre and Margaret Pantall in other proceedings (see Lawrance v The Commonwealth of Australia & Ors[22]).
[22] [2006] FMCA1792
The applicant states:
The conduct of employees of Macarthur Legal Centre was abnormal, the employment practices were not normal, and the provision of disability services is clearly evidence of the existence of an imputation of a psychiatric impairment…
…No explanations or rational response have been provided to explain the incidents raised by me, and the provision of Part III DSA services to me is the logical conclusion to draw from the available evidence.[23]
[23] Applicant’s affidavit 15.11.2007 at [225]
In her affidavit filed on 26 June 2008, the applicant sets out some 114 paragraphs, only two of which refer to Margaret Pantall or the Macarthur Legal Centre. At paragraph 49, the applicant refers to the “pen conduct” engaged in by Margaret Pantall, saying:
I am horrified at the pen conduct and at the lewd nature of this conduct. It is not something I find remotely amusing or tolerable. I find it horrifying, insulting, offensive and unwelcome. I am horrified at the idea that I may have been discussed in lewd terms e.g. in terms of something like oral sex. I am horrified at being discussed in this way if indeed that has occurred. However, I am also horrified at the idea of being discussed in any other sexually specific manner, regardless of what might be referred to.
At paragraph 80 of that same affidavit, the applicant states that she did not know during her employment that she was being provided with DSA services and did not understand that she was being treated by employees as though she had a psychiatric impairment.
The applicant’s claims against the Macarthur Legal Centre and Margaret Pantall, its former Principal Solicitor, are inherently incredible.
The applicant’s claim is based entirely on retrospective interpretation of events that occurred in 2001. The applicant bases her claim on an allegation that without her knowledge or consent and she was imputed with a psychiatric impairment and received involuntary medical treatment whilst she was employed by the Macarthur Legal Centre. She alleges that she was employed for the very purpose of being treated in that way. She claims to have been unaware of this behaviour at the time, in 2001, but in April 2003 formed the view that this is what had happened and was still happening. She complains that the actions of Margaret Pantall in placing a pen to her mouth on one occasion and in sucking on a Chupa Chup lollipop had sexual connotation aimed at her, and were a part of the program by the Macarthur Legal Centre and its employees to impute to her a psychiatric impairment. Part of the conduct of the Macarthur Legal Centre, the applicant claims, was to facilitate or arrange in some way for two people not employed by the centre, one being her sister-in-law, to telephone her at the Centre and pretend to be someone else.
The applicant’s case is based entirely on surmise and supposition, without being supported by the slightest evidence whatsoever. The applicant has not led or suggested any evidence to show:
(1)How the Macarthur Legal Centre and Ms Pantall engaged in conduct designed to impute to the applicant a psychiatric impairment;
(2)How the program of involuntary medical treatment was carried out during the applicant’s employment with the Macarthur Legal Centre;
(3)How the actions of a person in placing a pen in or near her mouth, albeit briefly and one occasion only, or sucking on a lollipop, constitutes sexual harassment or lewd behaviour;
(4)What possible purpose the Legal Centre could have in arranging for people not employed by the Centre, including the applicant’s sister in law, to make bogus telephone calls to the applicant whilst she was at work; or
(5)What possible motive the Macarthur Legal Centre or Margaret Pantall could have for engaging in a conspiracy of this nature.
The applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting her claim against the first and second respondents. The claim has no merit and should be summarily dismissed with costs.
The claims against The State of New South Wales and The Guardianship Tribunal
The applicant claims that the third respondent, the State of New South Wales, has committed unlawful discrimination against her under sections 4, 5, 29, 42, and 43 of the Disability Discrimination Act and sections 5, 6, 26, 28A, 28L and 94 of the Sex Discrimination Act.
The applicant seeks orders that the State of New South Wales is to:
(a)disregard any enduring guardianship instrument should such an instrument exist;
(b)cease contacting the applicant’s relatives and friends;
(c)cease entering into the applicant’s places of dwelling;
(d)cease administering involuntary treatment to the applicant;
(e)cease interfering with, damaging and stealing the applicant’s property and belongings;
(f)cease placing the applicant under surveillance and observation;
(g)cease disclosing information about the applicant; and
(h)cease providing specialist disability services to the applicant.
The applicant also seeks a written apology and damages, including exemplary damages and aggravated damages.
The applicant claims that the Guardianship Tribunal has committed unlawful discrimination against her under sections 4, 5, 29, 42 and 43 of the Disability Discrimination Act and sections 5, 6, 26, 28A, 28L and 94 of the Sex Discrimination Act.
The applicant seeks orders that the Guardianship Tribunal:
(a)is to revoke guardianship orders made in relation to her; and
(b)provide her with a written apology.
The applicant also seeks damages, including aggravated damages and exemplary damages.
The applicant’s claims are set out in her four affidavits filed on
10th October 2007, 30th October 2007, 15th November 2007 and
26th June 2008. Her claim is that she has been imputed with a psychiatric impairment or a mental illness when in fact she has neither.
The applicant alleges that she does not know the identity of the person who has, and has been, consenting to her being administered involuntary treatment. She states in her first affidavit:
I do not know whether this has occurred via the making of guardianship orders. I have never appointed a guardian nor authorised another to sign on my behalf, and the provisions of s.6C of the Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) have not been complied with. I allege that the Guardianship Tribunal has made guardianship orders in relation to me, without my knowledge or consent, and in so doing it has performed a function for the purposes of a Commonwealth law or programme: The Disability Services Act 1986 (Cth).[24]
[24] Applicant’s affidavit 10.10.2007 at [42]
The applicant goes on to depose that she is not and has never been the subject of an order, either a community counselling order or a community treatment order under the Mental Health Act 1990 (NSW).
The applicant also refers to her claim that she has been the subject of involuntary medical treatment as a result of an unlawful application of the Guardianship in paragraphs 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32 of her affidavit filed on 15th November 2007. She also complains that this is an act of victimisation by the State of New South Wales.[25]
[25] Applicant’s affidavit 15.11.2007 at [117]
This claim forms the basis of the applicant’s claim against both of the State respondents.
The State respondents rely on the affidavit of Elizabeth Mee filed on 23rd April 2008 in support of their claim that the applicant makes the same allegations with respect to the conduct of both of these respondents as she has done in earlier proceedings before this Court.
In Lawrance v The Commonwealth of Australia & Anor (No 5)[26] the applicant had claimed that the State of New South Wales had committed unlawful discrimination against her by the administration of involuntary medical treatment. She claimed that she had been treated as though she had a psychiatric impairment. On 30th November 2007 Smith FM delivered judgment in this matter, finding that her application failed at its factual foundations and dismissed the application with costs.
[26] [2007] FMCA 1934
The applicant has commenced other proceedings in which she has made the same allegations against one or both of the State respondents.
In Lawrance v Commonwealth of Australia & Ors, SYG 2109 of 2006, commenced on 22nd June 2006, the applicant named the State of New South Wales as the seventh respondent. The applicant claimed that she was being imputed with a psychiatric disability by the Commonwealth of Australia, the State of New South Wales and the Guardianship Tribunal. In an interlocutory decision handed down on 26th October 2007, Turner FM dismissed an application for joinder of the Guardianship Tribunal[27].
[27] [2007] FMCA 1478
The application was listed for hearing on 12th to 15th May 2008. At the time of the hearing of these proceedings judgment was reserved.
The applicant commenced proceedings on 6th November 2006 against nine respondents. The State of New South Wales was named as the fifth respondent. The applicant made the same claim against the State of New South Wales and sought similar orders as in the present proceedings.
On 22nd May 2008, Cameron FM handed down a judgment refusing an application to bring proceedings out of time, dismissing the proceedings and refusing an application to join the New South Wales Guardianship Tribunal (L v Commonwealth of Australia & Ors[28]).
[28] [2008] FMCA 658
The applicant commenced proceedings on 26th February 2007 against some nine respondents, naming the State of New South Wales as fifth respondent and the NSW Guardianship Tribunal as sixth respondent. The applicant made essentially the same claim against both of the State respondents as she has done in the present case. On 21st July 2008 Cameron FM delivered judgment dismissing the application against all nine respondents under the provisions of rule 13.10 (Lawrance v Watson & Ors[29]). His Honour noted that the proceedings before him, and earlier proceedings, shared the common, underlying factual allegations:
(a)the applicant is being imputed with a psychiatric disability;
(b)for which she is receiving involuntary treatment;
(c)following orders granting the NSW Guardianship Tribunal powers to consent to such treatment;
(d)pursuant to which orders a guardian or responsible person consented to such treatment being administered to the applicant without her knowledge; and
(e)the respondents to the proceedings are engaged in a “program” by which this conduct is directed to the applicant.[30]
[29] [2008] FMCA 984
[30] Lawrance v Watson & Ors at [73]
His Honour found:
What can be decided is that she has no claim against the Guardianship Tribunal. No proceedings have been taken in that Tribunal seeking a guardianship order, or any other order. She is not on the record of that Tribunal. She has no basis to consider that the Guardianship Tribunal has, in any way, interfered with her legal rights. The claim against the Guardianship Tribunal is a clear abuse of process. There is no claim. Her claim must be dismissed.[31]
[31] Lawrance v Watson & Ors at [78]
In respect of the other respondents, other than the first respondent, his Honour held:
The duplication in allegations and factual assertions and the requirement placed by the applicant on the various respondents to meet all these proceedings is vexatious. Consequently, even if they had reasonable prospects of success, the proceedings would be dismissed as against all the respondents other than the first respondent on the basis that they are vexatious.[32]
[32] Lawrance v Watson & Ors at [80]
His Honour then went on to hold:
The multiplicity of proceedings against the same parties raising the same issues is also an abuse of process of the Court. This finding provides an additional basis for the conclusion that the proceedings should be dismissed at this stage.[33]
[33] Lawrance v Watson & Ors at [81]
It is now clear that the applicant’s claim against the State of New South Wales has been dismissed after a final hearing by Smith FM in Lawrance v Commonwealth of Australia & Anor (No 5).
Similarly, the applicant’s claims against the Guardianship Tribunal and the State of New South Wales have been dismissed as an abuse of process by Cameron FM in Lawrance v Watson & Ors.
Clearly, the applicant’s claims against the State of New South Wales and the Guardianship Tribunal in the present matter cannot succeed. They have already been decided unfavourably to the applicant in earlier proceedings and consequently, the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting her claim against either respondent, and the application is open to be summarily dismissed under rule 13.10.
However, the State respondents seek further findings, that the applicant’s claim against them is a vexatious proceeding and an abuse of the process of the Court. I will deal with those claims shortly.
The claims against the Commonwealth of Australia, CRS Australia and the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs
The applicant claims that the Commonwealth and the other two bodies (the Commonwealth respondents) committed unlawful discrimination against her under sections 4, 5, 15, 29, 42 and 43 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 and sections 5, 6, 14, 26, 28A, 28B, 28L, 94, 105 and 106 of the Sex Discrimination Act. She seeks orders that the Commonwealth respondents are to:
(a)cease providing services and programmes under the Disability Services Act 1986 to the applicant including involuntary medical treatment, observation and surveillance services; and
(b)cease entering her places of dwelling and contacting her friends, relatives and others.
The applicant also seeks a written apology and damages, including aggravated damages and exemplary damages.
The applicant’s claims are set out in her four affidavits that she has filed in these proceedings. She alleges that she has been imputed with a psychiatric impairment or a mental illness, when in fact she has neither.
The Commonwealth Respondents rely on the affidavit of Dale Jennifer Watson filed on 26th May 2008 in support of their submission that the applicant’s claims are materially identical to claims made by the applicant in earlier proceedings.
In Lawrance v Commonwealth of Australia & Anor (No 5)[34], the Commonwealth of Australia was the first respondent, the Secretary, Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (as the department then was), was the third respondent, and the General Manager, CRS Australia was the fourth respondent. The applicant’s amended application filed on 28th November 2006 shows that the applicant alleged the same discrimination and sought the same remedies as she does in her present application.
[34] supra
After a hearing on 8th and 9th August 2007, Smith FM delivered judgment on 30th November 2007, dismissing the application against all respondents.
In L v Commonwealth of Australia & Ors[35], the Commonwealth of Australia was the first respondent, the Secretary, the Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs was the third respondent and the General Manager, CRS Australia was the fourth respondent. The applicant’s application, filed on 6th November 2006, alleged the same discrimination and sought the same remedies as she does in her present application.
[35] supra
On 22nd May 2008, Cameron FM delivered judgment, refusing an application to bring the proceedings out of time and dismissing the proceedings against all respondents.
In Lawrance v Watson & Ors[36], CRS Australia was the third respondent, the Department of Family & Community Services & Indigenous Affairs was the fourth respondent and the Commonwealth of Australia was the ninth respondent. The applicant’s application, filed on 26th February 2007, alleged the same discrimination and sought the same remedies as she does in her present application.
[36] supra
On 21st July 2008 Cameron FM delivered judgment, dismissing the application against all respondents under the provisions of r.13.10.
The applicant’s claim against the Commonwealth of Australia has been dismissed after a final hearing by Smith FM in Lawrance v Commonwealth of Australia & Anor (No 5).
The applicant’s claim against all three Commonwealth respondents was dismissed by Cameron FM in L v Commonwealth of Australia & Ors.
The applicant’s claim against all three Commonwealth respondents was summarily dismissed by Cameron FM in Lawrance v Watson & Ors. It is of no consequence that there is a slight difference in the title of the respondents the Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and CRS Australia. The applicant named the secretary of one entity and the general manager of CRS Australia as respondents rather than the bodies themselves in Lawrance v Commonwealth of Australia & Anor (No 5) and L v Commonwealth of Australia & Ors. Nothing turns on that point.
The fact is that the applicant has made the same claim against all three Commonwealth respondents in three different proceedings and it has been dismissed on each occasion. The applicant’s claims against those same three respondents in the matter before me clearly cannot succeed, as they have already been decided against her. The applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting her claims against the three Commonwealth respondents and her application is open to be summarily dismissed under rule 13.10(a).
The Commonwealth respondents seek further findings that the application be dismissed as vexatious and as an abuse of the process of the Court. Those claims will be dealt with in due course.
The claims against Michael Pasfield
The applicant claims that Dr Pasfield committed unlawful discrimination against her under sections 4, 5, 15, 29 and 43 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 and sections 5, 6, 14, 26, 28A, 28B, 28L and 94 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984. She asks for orders that Dr Pasfield is to cease all communication in relation to her with the Commonwealth of Australia, the State of New South Wales and others.
The applicant seeks a written apology and damages.
The applicant’s claims against Dr Pasfield are contained in her affidavits filed on 10th October 2007 and 30th October 2007.
In her affidavit of 10th October 2007, the applicant claims that she has been imputed with a psychiatric impairment or a mental illness but in fact she has neither. She claims to have been administered involuntary treatment on 4th April 2003 or in the first week of April 2003.
The applicant deposes:
Michael Pasfield is a former colleague of mine from my employment at the Social Security Appeals Tribunal in 1992-1997. I was a full-time member and he was a part-time medical member, a psychiatrist. During my SSAT employment I never once thought or suspected that Michael Pasfield was imputing to me a psychiatric impairment. I have never held a conversation with him about my health or personal circumstances. I once mentioned to him that I had to send in a tax return, as we both sat at Newcastle station waiting for a train after hearings. I allege that Michael Pasfield imputed to me a psychiatric impairment during my SSAT employment and subsequently. Since around 2003, the sound of his laughter has been artificially transmitted into my environment by disability service providers.
14.I was never conscious or aware of being laughed at by him or anyone else during my SSAT employment, nor of inhuman or degrading or humiliating treatment. If any of these things have occurred, it has been without my knowledge or awareness. If I had been aware of any of these things occurring, I would have made formal complaints and I would not have stayed working at the SSAT.[37]
[37] Applicant’s affidavit filed 10.10.2007 at [14] – [15]
The applicant annexes to her affidavit copies of:
(a)her letter to Dr Pasfield of 28thAugust 2004;
(b)Dr Pasfield’s reply dated 13th September 2004; and
(c)Her letter to him dated 1st October 2004.
The applicant’s letter of 28th August 2004 runs to seven pages and asks him about any possible involvement he might have in recent and ongoing attempts to assess her for a psychiatric disorder. The letter goes on to refer to the applicant’s workplace difficulties at the Social Security Appeals Tribunal and the Refugee Review Tribunal, matters of a sexual nature, her concerns that she might be under surveillance, her concerns about misinformation, emanating from CRS Australia, the Department of Family and Community Services, the NSW Department of Health or Dr Pasfield himself, her request for police assistance, and a complaint to the Judicial Commission of NSW about a Magistrate.
The applicant informed Dr Pasfield that she did not consent to medical treatment and “if you are responsible or in any way involved in health care being administered to me, please cease immediately”. The applicant requested copies of any medical records that Dr Pasfield may have held in relation to her.
Dr Pasfield replied, saying, inter alia:
I know nothing at all of what you describe and am quite surprised that you now write to me about matters of which I have no knowledge. I am unable to assist you in these matters. Your puzzling suggestions that I may hold medical records about you or may have been involved in some way with your health care have no foundation in fact.[38]
[38] Letter dated 13 September 2004 forming part of annexure B to applicant’s affidavit 10.10. 2007.
The applicant’s letter to Dr Pasfield of 1 October 2004, in which she refers to Dr Pasfield’s “touch of paranoia” in withholding his address. The letter accused Dr Pasfield of not telling her the truth in denying any knowledge and asserting:
I have recently learned, to my great shock that I have been (wrongly) imputed with psychiatric conditions, varying from schizophrenia, a manic, bipolar or unipolar disorder, a dissociative disorder, and a paranoid personality disorder.
The applicant’s letter goes on to say:
I am telling you this only because it is a possibility that you have had some sort of involvement in any psychiatric work in relation to me (obviously without my ever realising it).
In her affidavit filed on 30th October 2007, the applicant refers to
Dr Pasfield at paragraph 93 saying that she had never spoken to him about her health.
The applicant’s two later affidavits make no mention of Dr Pasfield.
The applicant has filed two submissions in reply to the applications for summary dismissal. The first, filed on 5th May 2008, makes no mention of the applicant’s claims against Dr Pasfield at all. The second, filed on 8th September 2008, merely reiterates the applicant’s claim against him:
7. I allege that Michael Pasfield has committed acts of victimisation in his alleged participation in the provision of Disability Services Act 1986 (Cth) (DSA) services and programmes.
The above paragraphs set out the totality of the evidence upon which the applicant relies. In short, she believes that Dr Pasfield is in some way responsible or involved in her being imputed with a psychiatric impairment and receiving involuntary medical treatment. She complains that since 2003 the sound of his laughter has been artificially transmitted into her environment by disability service providers, but she does not say why, or how. Her correspondence with him was met with a flat denial of any knowledge, let alone any involvement.
The applicant opposes the application for summary dismissal and refers the Court to the decision of Rares J in Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd[39], where his Honour was considering an application for summary judgment under s.31A of the Federal Court Act 1976, which is expressed in similar terms to s.17A of the Federal Magistrates Act.
[39] (2006) 236 ALR 720
Rares J held at [44]:
In a case to which s.31A applies, where there is a real issue of fact to be decided in the sense identified in the above principle, and possibly, where there is a real issue of law of a similar kind, it is obviously appropriate that the matter goes to trial.
His Honour went on to say at [45]:
I am of opinion that in assessing what reasonable prospects of success are for the purposes of s.31A, the court must be very cautious not to do a party an injustice by summarily dismissing the proceedings where, in accordance with the principles in Hocking (1947), contested evidence might reasonably be believed one way or the other so as to enable one side or the other to succeed. As soon as the evidence may have such an ambivalent character prior to a final determination, I am of opinion that then, as a matter of law, at that point there are reasonable prospects of success within the meaning of s.31A.
However, the evidence sought to be led by the applicant cannot be said in any way to have an ambivalent character. There is not a shred of evidence at all in support of the applicant’s outlandish claim. The applicant has made an allegation without any support whatsoever, based on a retrospective consideration of events that have occurred in the past, and has arrived at an inference that is fanciful and inherently unbelievable.
The applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting her claim against Dr Pasfield and the application will dismissed in relation to him.
Frivolous or vexatious; abuse of process
The State respondents seek orders that the application against them is vexatious and an abuse of the process of the Court and should be dismissed for that reason.
They further seek orders under r.13.11 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules:
(a)that any proceedings instituted by the applicant against the State of New South Wales or the Guardianship Tribunal may not be continued without the leave of the Court; and
(b)that the applicant may not institute any proceedings against the Guardianship Tribunal without the leave of the Court.
The Commonwealth respondents also seek orders that the application against them should be dismissed as vexatious. They, too, seek orders under r.13.11:
(a)that any proceedings instituted by the applicant in relation to the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and CRS Australia may not be continued without the leave of the Court; and
(b)that the applicant may not institute any proceedings against those respondents without the leave of the Court.
The State applicants submit that the applicant’s claims against them are frivolous and vexatious because:
(a)they are obviously untenable and cannot succeed; and
(b)the same general claims are being made, or were sought to be made, against the State of New South Wales and the Guardianship Tribunal in other proceedings brought by the applicant in this Court, including in proceedings which have been dismissed.
They claim that the applicant’s claims constitute an abuse of process, having regard to:
(a)the applicant’s claims and evidence fail to disclose any specific acts or conduct for which the State of New South Wales or the Guardianship Tribunal are responsible;
(b)the applicant’s claims are obviously untenable and cannot succeed and have been made or sought to be made in other proceedings, including proceedings which have been dismissed;
(c)on the applicant’s own admission she is not aware as whether or in what manner the State of New South Wales is providing the alleged disability and other services, and whether the Guardianship Tribunal has made guardianship orders in respect of her;
(d)the primary focus of the proceedings is unrelated to either of the State respondents; and
(e)the applicant has been informed on multiple occasions that the Guardianship Tribunal has no record of any orders being made in relation to her.
Similar arguments are made on behalf of the Commonwealth respondents.
In Pridmore & Ors v Magenta Nominees[40], R.D. Nicholson J said at [24]:
A “reasonable cause of action” means a cause of action with some chance of success, when considering the allegations of fact contained in the challenged pleading alone. The terms “vexatious” and “frivolous” have been used interchangeably: The Atlantic Star [1974] AC 436 at 464-8. “Frivolous” has been held to be apt to describe proceedings in which the plaintiff’s claim is so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed: Burton v Bairnsdale Shire (1908) 7 CLR 76 at 92. “Vexatious’ has been held to be apt to describe an action which is a sham and which cannot possibly succeed: Willis v Earl Beauchamp (1886) 11PD 59 at 63.
[40] (1999) 161 ALR 458
Proceedings can be regarded as vexatious if, irrespective of the motive of the litigant, they are so obviously untenable, or manifestly groundless, as to be utterly hopeless. They must also have been habitually and persistently instituted by the litigant. The persistent institution of proceedings for the purpose of re-agitating the questions already determined points to a situation in which a party has frequently and without reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings in the Court (Horvath v Commonwealth Bank of Australia[41] per Weinberg J at [98], [102]).
[41] [1999] FCA 504
Proceedings which unnecessarily duplicate proceedings already pending or determined have been held to be incapable of serving a legitimate purpose (see Walton v Gardiner[42], per Brennan J at 312):
They are simply vexatious or oppressive in the sense that they impose on the respondent party an unnecessary injustice, that is to say, a burden other than and additional to the burden necessarily imposed on a party to litigation instituted on reasonable grounds for the purpose of obtaining relief within the scope of the available remedy.
[42] (1993) 112 ALR 289
In Lawrance v Watson & Ors[43] at [80] and [81] held that the duplication of allegations and factual assertions against various respondents meant that those proceedings were vexatious as against those respondents. The multiplicity of proceedings against those parties was held to be an abuse of process.
[43] supra
The applicant has commenced proceedings on five prior occasions, all alleging the same complaints and seeking essentially the same remedies.
The State of New South Wales, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (however described) and CRS Australia (however described) have been respondents to each application. The Guardianship Tribunal has been a respondent to two of these applications, and the applicant has sought unsuccessfully to join The Guardianship Tribunal as a respondent on three occasions, in Lawrance v The Commonwealth of Australia & Ors (No 4)[44] (per Smith FM at [29]), L v Commonwealth of Australia & Ors[45] (Turner FM), and in Lawrance v Commonwealth of Australia and Ors[46](Cameron FM). In his decision, delivered on 22nd May 2008, Cameron FM found that the allegations against a number of the respondents, including the Commonwealth of Australia, the Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs “should be considered to be vexatious” (at [93]).
[44] [2007] FMCA 1408
[45] supra
[46] supra
In Lawrance v Watson & Ors, Cameron FM delivered judgment on 21st July 2008, dismissing the application. His Honour said at [90]:
The fact that these proceedings will be dismissed pursuant to r. 13.10 is based on a conclusion that, on the evidence adduced by the applicant in these proceedings only, she has no reasonable prospects of success and, to the extent that she ventilates in these proceedings the same assertions as she ventilates against the second to ninth respondents in other proceedings, these proceedings are vexatious and an abuse of the process of the Court.
CRS Australia, the Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, the State of New South Wales, the Guardianship Tribunal and the Commonwealth of Australia were the third, fourth, fifth, sixth and ninth respondents respectively.
It is also a matter for consideration that in L v Commonwealth of Australia & Ors an affidavit of Linda Sengstock was filed on 30th May 2007. In this affidavit, Ms Sengstock deposed that she was the Manager of the Business Services Unit of the Guardianship Tribunal of New South Wales. She set out in her affidavit how she had conducted a number of searches of the Tribunal’s records. She deposed that none of her searches indicated that:
(a)the Tribunal had any record of the applicant ever having been a client of the Tribunal;
(b)the Tribunal had ever received any application in respect to the applicant; or
(c)the Tribunal had ever conducted any hearing with respect to any application for guardianship or any other application with respect to the applicant.
The State of New South Wales, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, and CRS Australia are all before the Court for the sixth time as a result of essentially the same application by the applicant, seeking to relitigate claims that have already been dismissed.
The Guardianship Tribunal is before the Court as a respondent for a third time, and the applicant has made unsuccessful attempts to join the Tribunal as a respondent in three other proceedings.
The various claims against these respondents have all been dismissed, either after a final hearing or on the basis that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting her claim.
The applications against these respondents, by their repetition of a claim that has already been decided and by the lack of any reasonable cause of action, are vexatious and an abuse of process and should be dismissed as such.
Vexatious litigant
Both the State respondents and the Commonwealth respondents seek orders from the Court under rule 13.11 that any proceeding instituted by the applicant against them may not be continued without the leave of the Court and that the applicant may not institute any proceeding against them without the leave of the Court.
In order to make those orders, the court must be satisfied that the applicant habitually and persistently and without reasonable grounds institutes vexatious proceedings against the aggrieved parties.
In Ramsey v Skyring[47] Sackville considered the effect of O.21 r.1 of the Federal Court Rules, which is in identical terms to rule 13.11(1) of the Federal Magistrate Court Rules. His Honour held that “habitually and persistently” implies more than “frequently” (at [55]).
[47] (1999) 164 ALR 378
All of the applicant’s proceedings in this Court commenced since 2006. The State of New South Wales, the Commonwealth of Australia and the two other Commonwealth respondents have been brought to court by this applicant on six occasions over that comparatively short time. I am of a view that this meets the test of “habitually and persistently” as set out in rule 13.11. The vexatious proceedings must have been commenced in this Court, so I am unable to consider proceedings in any other court.
I am not satisfied that I should make such an order in respect of the Guardianship Tribunal at this stage. It has been a respondent on two occasions only, although the applicant has sought to join the Tribunal in three other proceedings, all without success.
On the other hand, the State of New South Wales has been a respondent on six occasions. In this proceeding and in one earlier proceeding a finding has been made that the proceeding is vexatious in respect of the State of New South Wales. I propose to make an order under rule 13.11(3).
The Commonwealth respondents do not seek an order as it applies to the Commonwealth of Australia. They do, however, seek such an order in respect of the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and CRS Australia. In each case, the two instrumentalities have been brought to court six times in two years. In two previous proceedings, Cameron FM has found that the proceedings have been vexatious in respect of the two instrumentalities. A similar finding has been made in this proceeding.
I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make an order under rule 13.11(3).
Residual proceedings
The application will be dismissed as against all of the respondents except the eighth respondent, Colin Thomson, and the tenth respondent, Marilyn Moore. Consequently, they will become the first and second respondent for the remainder of this proceeding.
Mr Thomson has not been served, although an affidavit of service has been filed in respect to Dr Moore. It would seem to be appropriate to allow a further period of time of 28 days so that the applicant may attempt to effect personal service on that respondent.
The matter will be listed for directions after that date.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and forty-one (141) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Scarlett FM
Associate: A.L. Coutman
Date: 15 October 2008
CORRECTIONS
Order 12 has been amended to read:
Any proceeding instituted by the applicant against the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs or CRS Australia may not be continued without the leave of the Court.
Order 13 has been amended to read:
The applicant may not institute any proceeding against the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs or CRS Australia without the leave of the Court.
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