Lawlor v Perez
[2022] VSC 590
•4 October 2022
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
JUDICAL REVIEW AND APPEALS LIST
PRACTICE COURT
S ECI 2022 03401
| MARK LAWLOR | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| ARMANDO CHRISTIAN PEREZ | Defendant |
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JUDGE: | O’Meara J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATES OF HEARING: | 27 September 2022 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 4 October 2022 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Lawlor v Perez |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2022] VSC 590 |
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Refusal by Prothonotary to accept for filing an originating motion seeking discovery from rapper ‘Pitbull’, together with associated affidavit – Proposed proceeding allied with action sought to be brought against Hollywood actress, ‘Ruby Rose’ – Whether proceeding so commenced would be irregular or an abuse of process of the Court – No direction made to accept the documents for filing.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | In person |
HIS HONOUR:
Mr Lawlor sought to file with the Court –
(a) an originating motion dated 25 August 2022; and
(b) a supporting affidavit of the plaintiff dated 25 August 2022.
The originating motion states the following relief or remedy sought –
Under Section 32.07 Discovery from non-party of supreme court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015.
I’m seeking to confirm the song “I feel good” By the artist Armando Christian Perez, stage name “Pitbull” has reference to Ruby Rose impersonating a judge at Broadmeadows magistrates court in 2017. That court being based in Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
I ask to confirm that the lyrics from the song “I feel good”, lyrics stating: “Put on a jacket ‘cause these diamonds give you chills” refer to:
1) Diamonds in the song refer to Ruby Rose.
2) Jacket in the song refers to Ruby rose wearing a black robe/jacket/cloak, black covering of some sort to disguise her Hollywood distinguishable features, I.E: neck tattoos, Personal appearance.
3) These references are reference in regard to Ruby Rose impersonating a judge in a real court case I was involved in, in 2017.
I’m seeking Armando Christian Perez reveal his knowledge/documentation about Ruby Rose impersonating a judge at Broadmeadows Magistrates court and if, if any documents are of existence that are, or have been in his possession, or may still be in his possession, if not, his knowledge on any documentation that existed, or might now be of non existence, relevant to this preliminary discovery which allowed him to release the song “I feel good” referencing Ruby Rose impersonating a judge.
In substance, Mr Lawlor seeks that Armando Christian Perez, a.k.a a rapper named or styled ‘Pitbull’, be ordered to make non-party discovery in connection with certain songs that, Mr Lawlor claims, confirm that a Hollywood actress named ‘Ruby Rose’ impersonated a magistrate sitting at Broadmeadows on 11 October 2017.
In that connection, Mr Lawlor deposes, among other things, that –
(a) ‘Ruby Rose the Hollywood actor’ impersonated ‘a judge at Broadmeadows Magistrates’ Court’ on 11 October 2017, in the course of which she is said to have issued a court order comprising an undertaking;
(b) ‘Ruby Rose’ had ‘half her head shaven’ and ‘wore a black robe of some sort … tight up to her chin to cover her neck tattoos’;
(c) Mr Lawlor has been involved in various other events and complaints, including on 21 February 2018 when ‘Sandra Bullock the Hollywood actor’ is said to have been ‘present at a court case I was involved in at Broadmeadows Magistrates’ Court … because of me’;
(d) ‘the famous artist Pit-bull’ released a song entitled ‘I Feel Good’ on 20 August 2021, certain lyrics of which are said to refer to ‘Ruby Rose impersonating a judge on the 11.10.17’; and
(e) court documentation states that ‘a judge M. Grinberg’ issued an undertaking on ’15.11.2017’, although the undertaking is said to have been in fact ‘issued by a female on the 11.10.2017’ (ie, by ‘Ruby Rose’).
On 31 August 2022, Mr Lawlor was advised that his documents had been rejected for filing. Relevantly, the Court email stated –
Dear Mr Lawlor, The Prothonotary has reviewed your affidavit and there remains no evidentiary basis for seeking leave from the court to compel Armando Christian Perez to produce knowledge/documentation about Ruby Rose impersonating a Judge at Broadmeadows Magistrates Court. There appears no plausible grounds to conclude that Mr Perez may have any knowledge of events in the Magistrates Court in 2017 and therefore any application under Rule 32.07 is doomed to fail. Your originating motion in its current form is rejected from being issued pursuant to rule 28A.04 of the Supreme Court rules on the basis that there is still insufficient nexus between the song, “I feel good” and the events in Broadmeadows Magistrates Court in 2017. I again, therefore refused to seal the originating motion. Kind regards, Prothonotary Ratcliffe
The rejection evidently occurred pursuant to r 27.06(1) and/or r 28.04A(2) of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (‘the Rules’). The language in those rules is very slightly different, however the import is the same: documents may be refused for filing if they are irregular or would stand to constitute an abuse of the process of the Court.
By email dated 1 September 2022, Mr Lawlor sought ‘a formal decision in regard to my Supreme Court application’. In substance, he sought that the Court direct that the Prothonotary accept the documents.[1]
[1]Cf., rr 27.06(3) and 28A.04(5) of the Rules.
The question of whether the documents ought be received was referred to me sitting in the Practice Court.
Mr Lawlor sought a hearing. In light of the exceptional circumstances, his request was granted.
The hearing proceeded with respect to the documents to which I have referred, but also in respect of the allied endeavour of the plaintiff to file a generally indorsed writ directed to Ruby Rose Langenheim a.k.a ‘Ruby Rose’. The present reasons should be read together with my reasons in respect of that matter.[2]
[2]Lawlor v Langenheim [2022] VSC 591.
I should say that immediately prior to the hearing, Mr Lawlor sought to file a sequence of further material –
(a) by email sent at 2:33pm on 26 September 2022, Mr Lawlor attached a summons seeking substituted service against ‘Ruby Rose’, an associated affidavit dated 26 September 2022, a summons seeking substituted service against ‘Julia Love’ and a further affidavit dated 26 September 2022;
(b) by email sent at 2:37pm on 26 September 2022, Mr Lawlor attached a slightly amended version of his proposed generally indorsed writ directed to ‘Ruby Rose’ together with overarching obligations and proper basis certificates dated 25 September 2022;
(c) by email sent at 2:39pm on 26 September 2022, Mr Lawlor attached a different version of his originating motion in respect of ‘Pitbull’,[3] together with an associated affidavit dated 25 September 2022 exhibiting, among other things –
[3]Perhaps the most significant of the changes was to re-orient the proposed application for non-party discovery to be made pursuant to r 32.03 of the Rules.
(i) an email sent by the plaintiff to ‘[email protected]’ dated 12 October 2017 (some parts of which are redacted);
(ii) the result of a Google search for the lyrics to ‘I Feel Good’ by ‘Pitbull’;
(iii) certified extracts of entries made in the register of the Magistrates’ Court at Broadmeadows on 30 August 2017, 11 October 2017 and 15 November 2017; and
(iv) the result of a Google search for the lyrics to ‘Can’t Stop Us Now’ by ‘Pitbull’ and Zac Brown; and
(d) by email sent at 2:42pm on 26 September 2022, Mr Lawlor attached an originating motion seeking discovery from ‘Julia Love’ in order to identify a defendant, together with a supporting affidavit dated 26 September 2022 that, among other things, deposes to events relating to the plaintiff’s hearings at Broadmeadows Magistrates’ Court in 2017 and states that the court documentation in respect of those hearings is ‘fraudulent and a lie’.
I raised the further material with Mr Lawlor at the commencement of the hearing, and confirmed that it had not been received as having been filed. Mr Lawlor confirmed that he wished it to be considered in connection with the present issues.[4]
[4]Transcript (‘T’) 1-2.
The present issue is whether the rejected documents are irregular or would constitute an abuse of the process of the Court.
I am conscious of the point at which the issue falls for consideration.[5] I am also conscious that in some exceptional cases – particularly, perhaps, in circumstances in which the relevant documents might be said to be irregular – the Court might determine that it is more efficient and productive to receive them.[6]
[5]Cf., LG (a pseudonym) & Anor v The Public Advocate [2021] VSC 583, [23].
[6]Re Klement [2011] VSCA 40 and Djime v Le [2016] VSCA 105.
In respect of abuse of process, however, in UBS AG v Tyne, Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ stated –
The varied circumstances in which the use of the court’s processes will amount to an abuse, notwithstanding that the use is consistent with the literal application of its rules, do not lend themselves to exhaustive statement. Either of two conditions enlivens the power: where the use of the court’s procedures occasions unjustifiable oppression to a party, or where the use serves to bring the administration of justice into disrepute.[7]
[7](2018) 265 CLR 77, 83 [1]. See also, [45]. Cf., Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 507, 518-519 [25].
In Staats v United States of America, Deane J considered a proposed writ and statement of claim by which an applicant sought to pursue a claim in conspiracy against the United States of America and the Commonwealth of Australia, and also to subpoena documents from the Director-General of ASIO. In that connection, his Honour stated –
The rule of law which permeates our system of government requires that all persons have access to the courts of the land. That principle is at its most important in a case where proceedings against government and those exercising governmental power are involved.
…
Nonetheless, considerations of justice, the interests of plaintiffs themselves and the public interest combine to require that there be procedures for insuring that a court can prevent the institution or maintenance of frivolous or vexatious proceedings. The interests of justice demand that a defendant (and those who are alleged to have acted unlawfully on behalf of a defendant) be protected from the cost, time and personal stress involved in defending such proceedings. The experience of those involved in the administration of justice in this country is that a plaintiff who persists in bringing hopeless proceedings is commonly convinced of the righteousness of his or her cause and will suffer increased stress, damage to health and, commonly, financial ruin if proceedings which are clearly foredoomed to fail are not halted at the outset. The public interest demands that court time and facilities, particularly the very limited time and facilities of this Court, are not devoted to pointless and misconceived litigation to the detriment of genuine disputes.[8]
[8](1992) 66 ALJR 793, 793 (‘Staats’).
His Honour thereafter referred to the effect of the relevant High Court rule as being to prevent the institution of proceedings that are vexatious in the sense in that ‘it can be seen that they cannot succeed’ and emphasised that such a power must be exercised with ‘great care and in only a clear case’.[9]
[9]Ibid.
In that instance, upon a careful consideration of the material placed before the Court and the applicant’s oral submissions, his Honour formed the ‘firm and clear view’ that the proposed action ‘would not enjoy any prospect of success’. In so doing, his Honour indicated that ‘any formal defects in the framing of the process did not influence me in declining that it issue’.[10]
[10]Staats (n 8) 794. See also, Re Skyring’s Application (No. 2) (1985) 59 ALJR 561 and Sykes v The Governor-General (1995) 69 ALJR 884.
In the present instance, it will be evident that Mr Lawlor’s endeavour to obtain non-party discovery from ‘Pitbull’ and pursue a claim against ‘Ruby Rose’ are related. Understandably, perhaps, the various points made in his written material and oral submissions tended to overlap, albeit that I have necessarily had to determine the issues in respect of the rejections of his different material separately.
In any event, in the course of submissions Mr Lawlor explained that –
(a) the alleged incident in which ‘Ruby Rose’ impersonated a magistrate at Broadmeadows on 11 October 2017 and issued an undertaking in respect of him constituted ‘a clear violation of human rights’[11] and the court documents from Broadmeadows were ‘falsified and fraudulent’;[12]
(b) nonetheless, he did not look into appealing that undertaking and evidently had no objection to it;[13]
(c) albeit that the events concerned were said by him to have been the result of corruption and a ‘sickening’ cover up involving ‘other organisations’, and an ‘illegal’ donation of money to the government and ‘Prime Ministers, deputies and a billionaire’.[14]
[11]T9.
[12]T13.
[13]T15.
[14]T22. Albeit that Mr Lawlor acknowledged that he did not know who the persons were behind the claimed incident in which ‘Ruby Rose’ impersonated a judge: T12.
Mr Lawlor’s proposed claim against ‘Ruby Rose’ is addressed in further detail in connection with the rejection of the documents associated with it. However, it is presently sufficient to say that having given the matter very careful consideration I cannot see how those allegations could ever either be accepted or result in any relief being ordered by the Court (particularly in respect of an undertaking that was not the subject of any timely appeal; nor is it seemingly objected to even now).
As described, Mr Lawlor’s proposed proceeding seeking non-party discovery from ‘Pitbull’ is sought to be brought in aid of his claim against ‘Ruby Rose’. As I have determined that the latter would be an abuse of process, I cannot accept that Mr Lawlor’s proposed proceeding against ‘Pitbull’ should be received, as that would be to receive documents in aid of an abuse of process.
In any event, Mr Lawlor sought to address the connection between the songs said to have been released by ‘Pitbull’ and the events at Broadmeadows said to have involved ‘Ruby Rose’ and then identify the document or documents of which he seeks discovery from a non-party, namely ‘Pitbull’.
In respect of the songs, Mr Lawlor acknowledged that ‘it’s going to be hard for me to explain just how this works’ and then sought to link certain highlighted lyrics in the songs to –
(a) ‘Ruby Rose’ wearing a robe at the Broadmeadows Magistrates’ Court on 11 October 2017;
(b) an email sent by Mr Lawlor to ‘[email protected]’ on 12 October 2017 suggesting, among other things, that a drinking fountain be installed at Broadmeadow Magistrates’ Court; and
(c) the reference to ‘M Grinberg’ in one of the certified court extracts dated 15 November 2017 (which Mr Lawlor says is ‘falsified and fraudulent’).[15]
[15]T17-20.
None of the lyrics concerned refer directly to Ruby Rose, Broadmeadows Magistrates’ Court, ‘M Grinberg’ or the absence of a drinking fountain. Indeed, I am entirely unable to make the connection evidently made by Mr Lawlor between the lyrics concerned and the alleged events.
Further, albeit that Mr Lawlor seems to suggest that the lyrics concerned betray the knowledge of ‘Pitbull’ that ‘Ruby Rose’ impersonated a magistrate at Broadmeadows on 11 October 2017, the true suggestion made is evidently of a considerably wider kind. That is, links are sought to be established between the lyrics concerned and therefore the ‘knowledge’ of ‘Pitbull’ of, at least, the alleged activities of ‘Ruby Rose’ on one date, an email sent by Mr Lawlor on another date and the allegedly false certified extract bearing a yet further date. The connections concerned are much too remote for me to follow or, indeed, accept that they could ever be established.
More generally, I fail to see how elusive references in a rap song or songs said to have been released years after those alleged events could ever stand to establish that such events could be more likely than not to have occurred.
As to the documents sought, Mr Lawlor asked, rhetorically, whether there were any documents that ‘allowed him [ie, ‘Pitbull’] to release this song’[16] and, in that connection, identified the undertaking entered into by him which he says is now unable to be located.[17]
[16]T4.
[17]T8.
For my part, however, I am quite unable to see how it could be or even be anticipated that ‘Pitbull’ might have the missing undertaking that, after all, is not one of the things said to be referenced in the lyrics to which I was referred.
Finally, in addition to all of the above, I am conscious that non-party discovery is an intrusive process that is not lightly ordered and that it is in this instance sought to be deployed against a non-party likely resident of another country.
In all the circumstances described, and having given Mr Lawlor’s oral submissions and material very careful consideration, I am firmly of the view that there is no basis upon which a Court could or ever would be satisfied that any such non-party discovery ought be ordered against ‘Pitbull’. Indeed, like Deane J in Staats, I consider the presently proposed application to be hopeless.
As I have identified, there are some rare and exceptional circumstances in which an abuse of process will be evident and established such that the Court must refuse to receive the documents concerned in order to protect its own processes as well as the integrity of the administration of justice. For the reasons which I have endeavoured to explain, I consider the present instance to be one of those rare and exceptional cases.
It follows that I must decline to direct the Prothonotary to receive the documents proposed for filing by the plaintiff.
For completeness, I should note that Mr Lawlor requested that I consider and perhaps make a direction that his proposed proceedings be referred to the Victorian Bar Pro Bono Scheme. I told him that I would make enquiries within the Court. I am informed that such a step can be taken only if the person concerned has a proceeding on foot. The effect of the present determination is that no such proceeding should be issued out of the Court. It follows that no such order can be made.
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