Law Society of New South Wales v Green

[2001] NSWADT 142

CITATION:	Law Society of New South Wales -v- Green [2001] NSWADT 142
DIVISION:	Legal Services Division
PARTIES:	APPLICANT Council of the Law Society of New south Wales RESPONDENT Michael Geoffrey Green
FILE NUMBER:	002020
HEARING DATES:	30/05/2001
SUBMISSIONS CLOSED:	05/30/2001
DATE OF DECISION:	08/23/2001
BEFORE:	Macfarlan R QC - Judicial Member; Staff C - Judicial Member; Brehe D - Member
APPLICATION:	Professional Misconduct - breach of s. 55 of the Legal Profession Act - Professional Misconduct - breach of s. 61 of the Legal Profession Act - Professional Misconduct - fail to comply with s. 152 Notice - Professional Misconduct - fail to pay counsel's fees - Professional Misconduct - hinder investigation
MATTER FOR DECISION:	Principal matter
LEGISLATION CITED:	Legal Profession Act 1987
CASES CITED:	The Matter of Vickovich ((1997) 1 Disciplinary Reports 32) Keefe -v- Law Society of New South Wales of 10 September 1998 (now reported at (1997-8) 44 NSWLR 44Z) Allinson -v- General Council of Medical Education and Registration (1894) 1 QB 750 Re Hodgekiss 1962 SR(NSW) 340 Re Mayes 1974 1 NSWLR 19 Coshott-v- The Council of the Law Society (17 December 1997, unreported p.22) Wilkinson -v- Feldworth 1998 29 ACSR 642 AMIEU -v- Mudginberri Station Pty Limited (1986) 161 CLR 93 Kennedy -v- Council of Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales (1939) 13 ALJ 563 Carver -v- The Legal Profession Disciplinary Tribunal (27 September 1991, unreported NSW Court of Appeal]
REPRESENTATION:	APPLICANT P Boyd, solicitor RESPONDENT In person
ORDERS:	1. The legal practitioner be publicly reprimanded; 2. The legal practitioner be fined the sum of $1,000; 3. Noting that the legal practitioner does not hold a current practising certificate, no fresh practising certificate be issued to the legal practitioner until such time as he has:(a) fully complied, so far as he is able, with the Informant’s Notice pursuant to s.152 of the Legal Profession Act and dated 3 February 1998, and(b) paid the full amount of the fine that has been imposed; 4. If the legal practitioner again commences practice on his own account then his practice is, for a period of 12 months commencing from that date, to be subject to inspection at three monthly intervals at the expense of the legal practitioner by a suitably qualified Solicitor appointed by the Law Society for that purpose; 5. The legal practitioner, at his own cost, successfully complete the Best Practice Management course or its equivalent (to be determined by the Manager, Professional Standards Department of the Law Society of New South Wales) prior to his making an application for a practising certificate; 6. The legal practitioner pay the costs of the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales of these proceedings.

Introduction
1 These proceedings were brought by the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales for various orders against Mr Michael Geoffrey Green, solicitor, on the basis of allegations that he was guilty of professional misconduct whilst practising as a solicitor.

2 Mr Green was admitted as a solicitor in 1979. He started practising on his own account in 1982 at Rutherford which is a western suburb of Maitland. He continued this practice until 2000 when he decided not to renew his practising certificate. He said that his practice was “never very successful financially” (affidavit of 28 March 2001). He now works three days per week in Sydney as a conveyancing clerk.

3 From about 1992 to 1997, he worked part-time as a teacher of legal and accounting subjects at TAFE. At its peak, his work load was about 11 hours per week.

4 It is convenient to deal with Ground 2 of the Amended Information first as this relates to events occurring earlier in time than those the subject of the other grounds.

Ground 2 of the Amended Information - Requirements of Inspectors
5 This complaint alleges that Mr Green breached s.55(3) and (5) of the Legal Profession Act in failing to provide information required of him by Ms Christine Lord, a Trust Account Inspector in the Inspection & Investigation Department of the Law Society.

6 The Law Society alleges that Mr Green failed to respond to a portion of a Trust Account Inspection Report given to him by Ms Lord on 29 August 1997 which was the date of an inspection conducted by Ms Lord.

7 The portion of the report relied upon is in Schedule C and is in the following terms:

“It was noted that in the matter of Burg you had received $13,953.80 22/5/97 in c/ds from Attorney General’s office - to date it does not appear as though Barrister fees $2680.00 had been pd. Bal owing to Dr Ostinga $260.00 also outstanding.
In the matter of Bidner $6850.00 had been received for your c/ds 22/4/97 to date I did not sight any pyts to outstanding parties.
Please confirm your action to be taken with these matters.”
8 At its commencement, the report indicated that a response by the solicitor to the report was required. The body of the report also stated that breaches of s.61 of the Legal Profession Act “were noted during the course of the inspection and are listed on Schedule C attached to this report”.

9 Whilst the words in Schedule C “Please confirm your action to be taken with these matters” are not as clear as they might have been, we consider that Mr Green can have been left in no doubt by the report that information was required to be supplied as to what he intended to do in relation to payment of third parties in the matters of Burg and Bidner.

10 The solicitor did not supply this information, or indeed respond to the report at all.

11 His reply filed in these proceedings responded to this allegation by saying:
“The information required of me was not reasonably required. The information is now in the possession of the informant….”

12 If, as Mr Green implicitly suggests, a requirement of reasonableness is to be imported into s.55(3), we nevertheless consider that it was satisfied here. In light of what Ms Lord observed on her inspection as to the absence of any record of payment of third parties out of the funds received for costs and disbursements, her request for information was plainly a reasonable one.

13 Ms Lord gave evidence that it was her practice to produce to a solicitor whose trust account was to be inspected evidence of her appointment and there is no reason to think that she did not do so in this case. We accordingly conclude that she did in fact do that here.

14 In these circumstances, the elements of s.55(3) have been made out and it follows that there was a breach by Mr Green of that subsection.

15 Mr Green’s failure to supply the information is also alleged to have amounted to a breach of the requirement in s.55(5) not to “hinder, obstruct or delay a trust account inspector…in the exercise of his or her functions”. Whilst we would not suggest that a failure to supply information can never amount to a breach of this subsection, we consider that a simple failure to supply information was intended by the legislature to be dealt with by s.55(3) and that something more would need to be found for there to be a breach of the requirement not to “hinder, obstruct or delay” in s.55(5). We do not consider any such additional element to be present here and accordingly do not find that s.55(5) was breached.

16 Ground 2 contained in the Amended Information also relies upon a failure of Mr Green to supply information requested by Mr John Mitchell, Chief Trust Account Inspector, in his letter to Mr Green of 8 September 1997.

17 This letter deals with a number of matters but, by reason of the context in which the letter is mentioned in the Amended Information, we think that the allegation concerning it should be understood as confined to that portion which amounts, in effect, to a follow-up in respect of the portion of the 29 August 1997 report earlier referred to. The relevant part of the 8 September 1997 letter is in the following terms:
“Will you please…advise the position in regard to the deposits to the general account as detailed in Schedule C of the report, in order for Mrs Lord to re attend your firm to complete the inspection of the files relating to the deposits.” (The “report” is identified as that of 29 August 1997.)

18 There was no response to this letter but because there is no evidence that evidence of Mr Mitchell’s appointment was produced to Mr Green, we do not find a breach of s.55(3) as the production of such evidence is specifically required by s.55(3). Furthermore, for the same reasons as given above in relation to the report of 29 August 1997, we do not consider that a breach of s.55(5) occurred.

Ground 5 of the Amended Information - Requirement of Law Society
19 This ground alleges that a failure to respond to a letter from the Law Society of 18 November 1997 amounted to professional misconduct.

20 Prior to that letter being sent, Mr Green was given a further report by Ms Lord. It stated, inter alia:
“Your comments to these matters raised and also the report dated 29.8.97 and Mr Mitchell’s correspondence dated 8.9.97 are welcome.”

21 It is not necessary to decide whether this amounted to a request for information within the meaning of s.55(3) as no complaint is made in the Amended Information about the fact that there was no response to this report.

22 The letter of 18 November 1997 stated in its second paragraph:
“Mrs Lord has expressed some concern about the matters of Burg and Bidner. She has indicated that costs, including disbursements, have been received in both matters but that barristers and doctor’s fees do not appear to have been paid. She further states that when asked about this matter you stated that you did not consider that these issues should be of concern to the Law Society as “they do not involve trust monies received from the client.” I must advise that Section 61 of the Legal Profession Act does not refer solely to monies received into trust on behalf of a client. The precise wording is as follows:.”

23 The terms of s.61 were then quoted and reference made to the decision in Vickovich, a copy of which was attached.

24 The letter went on to say:
“I would be grateful if you would let me have photocopies of the accounts issued in both of the matters mentioned above, together with an explanation of why the third parties have not been paid within 14 days of the date of this letter.”

25 On any view of it, this letter indicated that there was a very serious issue that needed to be addressed by the solicitor. It was plain that the author was suggesting that there may have been a breach by Mr Green of s.61 of the Legal Profession Act and of his fiduciary duties to his clients. However, there was no response by Mr Green within the 14 days specified in the letter.

26 It was necessary for Ms Young of the Law Society to write a follow-up letter to Mr Green of 8 December 1997. This required a response to the letter of 18 November 1997 within 7 days and threatened the initiation of a complaint if that did not occur.

27 Mr Green responded to the letters of 18 November and 8 December 1997 by a letter of 12 December 1997. This asserted that s.61 of the Legal Profession Act had no relevance because the disbursements in respect of which funds had been received by him from the respondents in the workers compensation matters of Burg and Bidner “were not expenses of the client. They were my expenses”. Accordingly, the letter asserted, the money received was not Mr Green’s client’s money, rather, so the letter inferred, it was Mr Green’s money.

28 This was not correct because the moneys were paid by the respondents in pursuance of their obligations to pay costs and disbursements to the applicants who were Mr Green’s clients. The money was therefore received by Mr Green on behalf of the applicants and not on his own behalf. There may have been an argument that the money remained that of the payer (if Mr Green had ceased to have authority to receive the money on behalf of his clients) or even that part of it was held on trust for the third parties to whom it was intended to be paid. However, it was clear in our view that the funds, as least so far as they related to expenses outstanding to third parties, were not intended to be received by Mr Green for his own use and benefit. Section 61 was therefore clearly applicable because the funds were received “on behalf of another person”.

29 The fact that s.61 was attracted in these circumstances was indicated by the decision in The Matter of Vickovich ((1997) 1 Disciplinary Reports 32), a copy of which was provided to Mr Green by the letter of 18 November 1997. The subsequent decision of the NSW Court of Appeal in Keefe -v- Law Society of New South Wales of 10 September 1998 (now reported at (1997-8) 44 NSWLR 44Z) confirmed the correctness of the proposition. (A copy of this decision was sent to Mr Green by letter of 2 October 1998.)

30 Contrary to what Mr Green asserted in his letter of 12 December 1997, the Law Society therefore did in our view have a “legitimate interest in the moneys received in” the Burg and Bidner matters. The refusal of Mr Green stated in the last paragraph of his letter of 12 December 1997 to comply with the Law Society’s request stated at the end of its letter of 18 November 1997 was therefore unjustified.

31 This failure is not alleged to constitute a breach of any particular statutory provision but is nevertheless said to amount to professional misconduct.

32 Whilst the failure to reply was far from satisfactory, we do not consider that it was of such seriousness as to amount to professional misconduct under the general law. The failure was not of such gravity as would in our view have been regarded as “disgraceful or dishonourable” by solicitors of good repute (see Allinson -v- General Council of Medical Education and Registration (1894) 1 QB 750 at 763). The contravention of s.61 is however another matter and is dealt with separately below in relation to Ground 4 of the Amended Information.

Ground 1 of Amended Information - s.152 notice
33 The Law Society’s response to Mr Green’s letter of 12 December 1997 was to re-affirm its view as to the relevance of s.61 and re-assert its previous request.

34 On 6 February 1998, a notice dated 3 February 1998 under s.152 of the Legal Profession Act was sent to Mr Green. This required:

“A full response to the Society’s letter of the 18 November 1997 paying particular attention to the request for an explanation why the third parties have/had not been paid as at the date of the letter.
Copies of all third party accounts rendered on you in relation to the matters of Bidner and Burg.”
35 Compliance with the request was required by 16 February 1998. Mr Green did not respond within that period. By letter of 25 March 1998 he supplied information about the costs and disbursements he had received in the Bidner and Burg matters. However, he did not supply copies of the accounts requested nor provide an explanation as to why the third parties had not been paid.

36 Further correspondence ensued by way of a letter from the Law Society of 16 April 1998 and a letter from Mr Green of 15 May 1998 but the requirements of the s.152 notice remained unsatisfied.

37 On 2 October 1998, the Law Society sent to Mr Green a copy of the judgment in Keefe -v- Law Society and again called upon him to rectify the situation in relation to payment of third parties. Mr Green argued by his letter of 28 October 1998 that the decision in Keefe did not conclude the matter.

38 Mr Green was informed by letter of 2 November 1998 of resolutions of the Professional Conduct Committee of the Law Society that, subject to any submissions from Mr Green, proceedings should be instituted in the Tribunal inter alia upon the basis that he had failed to comply with the s.152 notice and, in breach of the s.152 notice and in breach of s.61, had failed to pay third parties out of funds received.

39 In the meantime, the Law Society was informed by Mr Tony Edwards, barrister, that his fees rendered to Mr Green in the matter of Bidner had been paid on 4 July 1996 whilst those in the matter of Burg were outstanding, as were fees rendered by him on 15 April 1996 in a matter of Dalu.

40 By letters of 2 December 1999 and 27 January 2000, Mr Green was invited to make submissions generally and also asked about the outstanding fees in the matter of Dalu. Neither of these letters nor one of 9 March 2000 indicating that there had been a resolution to initiate complaints was responded to by Mr Green.

41 Mr Green responded to a letter from the Legal Services Commission of 1 May 2000 by in effect reiterating that s.61 had no relevance.

42 In his written Reply to the Information in these proceedings, Mr Green gave no explanation for not complying with the s.152 notice within the time stipulated by it. When invited in the course of his oral evidence to explain why he did not comply with it, he referred to “pressure of work” and “avoidance of issues” as possible reasons but then said that he was not able to say whether or not he was particularly busy at the time. He referred to his “avoidance of issues” evidence as a “head in the sand” approach. This evidence did not constitute a satisfactory, or indeed any, explanation for his non-compliance with the notice. It referred only to possible explanations and did not indicate what the explanation in fact was.

43 In these circumstances, we conclude that Mr Green failed “without reasonable excuse” to comply with the notice under s.152 and by reason of s.152(4) was guilty of professional misconduct.

Complaints 3 and 4 of the Amended Information - delay in paying counsel and contravention of s.61
44 These grounds are in the following terms:

“3. The legal practitioner delayed paying Counsel’s fees although put in funds for that purpose, in the matters of:
(a) Delise Burg;
(b) Nicola Dalu.
4. The legal practitioner has wilfully breached section 61 of the Legal Profession Act 1987 in the matter of Delise Burg.”
45 So far as the matter of Burg is concerned, the evidence indicates that on 26 May 1997, Mr Green received payment from the respondent’s solicitor of Mr Green’s costs and expenses which included $2,680 in respect of barrister’s fees owing to Mr Edwards and amounts owing to various doctors. The cheque by which these moneys were paid was deposited by Mr Green not into his trust account but into his general account. He made no suggestion during the hearing that any part of the funds remain in that account or are otherwise identifiable.

46 As explained in paragraphs 28 and 29 above, the funds received by Mr Green were not received by him on his own behalf but were received “on behalf of another person”. Section 61(2) of the Legal Profession Act accordingly required that they be paid to the credit of a trust account. This was not done and a breach of s.61(1) therefore occurred.

47 Section 61(7) provides that a “wilful contravention” of subsection (1) is professional misconduct. In our view, the contravention by Mr Green of subsection (1) was “wilful”. He knew all the relevant facts when he deposited the cheque in his general account rather than his trust account. The deposit was made for the purpose of obtaining a personal benefit for himself and, even if it be accepted that he held a view that this was permissible under s.61, he was recklessly indifferent as to whether that view was correct or not. He relied, in this regard, only on his own opinion about the matter when he stood to benefit personally from adoption of the view he espoused and he did not seek advice from anyone who was able to turn an objective mind to the question.

48 These findings indicate that the contravention was “wilful” in the sense described in the authorities. In Re Hodgekiss 1962 SR(NSW) 340, Hardie J, sitting as a member of the Full Court, referred in a similar context to it being necessary that “the solicitor knew or believed that he was committing such breaches or was recklessly careless in that regard” (at 353-4). This was followed by the NSW Court of Appeal in Re Mayes 1974 1 NSWLR 19 and Coshott-v- The Council of the Law Society (17 December 1997, unreported p.22) (see also Wilkinson -v- Feldworth 1998 29 ACSR 642 at 698-702).

49 An even more immediate conclusion that Mr Green’s conduct was “wilful” would follow if the view were adopted that it was sufficient that he knew all the relevant facts when he deposited the cheque in his general account rather than his trust account and that a mistake of law on his part as to the meaning of s.61 was no excuse. It is unnecessary in this case to determine the correctness of that view but we see it as at least arguable by way of analogy to the court’s approach to the Trade Practices Act and criminal law. In the context of s.75B of the Trade Practices Act which speaks, inter alia, of persons who are “knowingly concerned in a contravention”, the High Court has said that the section “requires a party to a contravention to be an intentional participant, the necessary intent being based upon knowledge of the essential elements of the contravention…to form the requisite intent he must have knowledge of the essential matters which go to make up the offence whether or not he knows that those matters amount to a crime” (at 670, 667). A similar approach was evident in the context of contempt proceedings in AMIEU -v- Mudginberri Station Pty Limited (1986) 161 CLR 93 where the High Court said:
“It follows that a deliberate commission or omission which is in breach of an injunctive order or an undertaking will constitute such wilful disobedience unless it be casual, accidental or unintentional.” (at 113).

50 Complaint 3 of the Amended Information as quoted above is directed at delay in payment of counsel’s fees in the matters of Burg and Dalu. From Mr Green’s affidavit of 23 February 2001, it is apparent that it was not until September 2000 that he made any attempt to pay the fees undoubtedly owing to Mr Edwards in these two matters. Mr Green’s affidavit of 23 February 2001 suggests that the attempts he made to effect payment were unsuccessful for lack of funds. However, the Amended Information refers to payment being received by Mr Edwards on 17 November 2000.

51 In relation to the matter of Dalu, there is no evidence that Mr Green was put in funds for the purpose of payment of counsel’s fees. Furthermore, the question of outstanding fees in this matter was not raised by the Law Society with Mr Green until 2 December 1999 (the information that fees were outstanding had only come to the Law Society earlier that year via Mr Edwards). By that stage Mr Green’s file appears to have been archived (see his letter of 20 July 2000).

52 In these circumstances and in the absence of evidence of any request by Mr Edwards to Mr Green after the initial account for payment of his fees, we are not prepared to conclude that the Law Society has discharged its onus of showing that the conduct of Mr Green was of sufficient gravity to warrant a finding of professional misconduct.

53 Mr Edwards’ fees in the matter of Burg are however in a different category. Instead of paying Mr Edwards from the funds received from the respondent in respect of the applicant’s costs and disbursements, Mr Green appropriated the totality of the funds to his own use by paying them in to his general account.

54 Furthermore, notwithstanding that the matter was raised with him by or on behalf of the Law Society on a number of occasions, he took no action to effect payment to Mr Edwards until over 3 years after he had received the funds earmarked for that purpose and had had the matter brought to his attention by the Law Society’s Trust Account Inspector.

55 This conduct was in our view such as “would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable” by solicitors of good repute (see Allinson’s case referred to earlier) and thus constituted professional misconduct. It also fits within the description given by Rich J in Kennedy -v- Council of Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales (1939) 13 ALJ 563. Rich J said of professional misconduct that it:
“need not fall within any legal definition of wrongdoing. It need not amount to an offence under the law. It is enough that it amounts to grave impropriety affecting (a lawyer’s) professional character and is indicative of a failure either to understand or to practise the precepts of honesty or fair dealing in relation to the court’s (the lawyer’s) clients or the public.”

56 It was not suggested by Mr Green that his deposit of the cheque received from the respondent’s solicitor to his general account rather than his trust account was a mistake or that his non-payment of Mr Edwards was an oversight. His conduct in the face of protests from the Law Society and its Inspectors made it clear that he decided to keep the funds for himself rather than pay the debt to Mr Edwards which he was bound in honour to pay even in the absence of receipt of funds for that purpose. This conduct fell well short of the honest fair dealing that is required of legal practitioners. To adopt an expression used by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Carver -v- The Legal Profession Disciplinary Tribunal (27 September 1991, unreported), Mr Green’s conduct showed a “contemptuous attitude to his responsibilities”.

Standing of the applicant
57 Mr Green has challenged the standing of the applicant, described in both the original Information and the Amended Information as The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales to bring these proceedings. The formulation of the point in his Reply filed in the proceedings is in the following terms
“The Council of the Law Society of NSW is not a legal person.”

58 Section 155 of the Legal Profession Act provides for the institution of proceedings by a “Council” and Section 167 provides for the laying of an Information by the “appropriate Council”. Section 169 includes “the appropriate Council” amongst the persons entitled to appear at a hearing conducted by the Tribunal.

59 Section 3 defines a “Council” to include the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales.

60 Although there is no evidence to this effect, we have assumed in Mr Green’s favour that the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales is not a legal entity separate from its members but rather is a body comprised of individual persons which acts as the board of directors of the Law Society. On this basis it has no legal personality independent of that of its members.

61 This conclusion does not however in our view entitle Mr Green to succeed on his argument as to standing.

62 As pointed out above, the legislation contemplates that proceedings will be instituted by “the Council of the Law Society “. As that Council has no separate legal personality, the legislation must be taken to contemplate that the proceedings will be initiated by those individuals who comprise the Council. However, we do not consider that the legislation requires proceedings to be commenced in the name of those persons. Quite clearly, the contrary is contemplated – that the proceedings will be commenced in the name of the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales. This is precisely what has occurred and there has been no suggestion, much less evidence, that the individuals who comprise the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales did not authorise the commencement of the proceedings in the name of the Council.

63 It does not in our view assist Mr Green for him to point out that difficult questions might arise where, as would often happen, membership of the Council changed between the institution and hearing of the proceedings and it became necessary to determine at what date one should look at the identity of the Council members to decide against whom an order for costs might be enforced. The fact that such difficult questions might arise does not lead us to doubt that the legislation contemplates that which we have outlined above. To require the proceedings to be commenced in the names of the individual members of the Law Society Council would in our view conflict with the obvious intent of the legislation and would not in any event avoid the possibility of difficult questions arising on change of membership of the Council.

Penalty
64 In summary, we have found Mr Green to have been guilty of professional misconduct in the following respects:

(a) in failing to provide information required of him by the Law Society’s Trust Account Inspector on 29 August 1997, being misconduct in breach of s.55(3) (paragraph 14 above);
(b) in failing without reasonable excuse to comply with the s.152 Notice dated 3 February 1998 (paragraph 43 above);
(c) in wilfully breaching s.61 of the Legal Profession Act in relation to funds received in respect of costs and disbursements in the matter of Burg (paragraph 47 above);
(d) in failing to pay Counsel’s fees in the matter of Burg although put in funds for that purpose (paragraph 55 above).
65 As to the first two of these, Mr Green’s conduct reflected an entirely unsatisfactory approach to his professional obligations. No responsible, diligent practitioner would disregard the requirements of a Trust Account Inspector and of a statutory notice, particularly when they dealt with the serious matters that the subject communications dealt with. Mr Green’s lack of response to these requirements, his failure to make any serious attempt to explain to the Tribunal why he failed to comply with the requirements and his lack of contrition necessitates the making of orders substantially as sought by the Law Society. The terms of these we set out below.

66 The third and fourth of the matters in respect of which we have found professional misconduct constituted, for the reasons we have given above, serious departures from the standards to be expected of practitioners. They also call for the making of the orders to which we have referred. The fact that Mr Green had an apparently bona fide, although misconceived, view as to the operation of s.61 which in his mind rendered it inapplicable in the circumstances of the Burg matter, whilst not depriving his actions of the character of professional misconduct, is of some relevance on penalty and we have duly taken it into account.

67 The Law Society sought an order for compensation of Mr Edwards, Barrister, in respect of his fees. However, as we have noted above in paragraph 50, the Amended Information refers to payment being received by Mr Edwards on 17 November 2000. In these circumstances, we would need the Law Society to produce evidence that the fees are still outstanding before making any order.

68 In the circumstances we have described and also taking account of Mr Green’s apparently modest financial circumstances, we fix the fine to be paid by him at $1,000.

Orders
69 For these reasons, we order that:

(a) The legal practitioner be publicly reprimanded.
(b) The legal practitioner be fined the sum of $1,000.
(c) Noting that the legal practitioner does not hold a current practising certificate, no fresh practising certificate be issued to the legal practitioner until such time as he has:
(1) fully complied, so far as he is able, with the Informant’s Notice pursuant to s.152 of the Legal Profession Act and dated 3 February 1998, and
(2) paid the full amount of the fine that has been imposed.
(d) If the legal practitioner again commences practice on his own account then his practice is, for a period of 12 months commencing from that date, to be subject to inspection at three monthly intervals at the expense of the legal practitioner by a suitably qualified Solicitor appointed by the Law Society for that purpose.
(e) The legal practitioner, at his own cost, successfully complete the Best Practice Management course or its equivalent (to be determined by the Manager, Professional Standards Department of the Law Society of New South Wales) prior to his making an application for a practising certificate.
(f) The legal practitioner pay the costs of the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales of these proceedings.