Law Society (ACT) v Bangura

[2024] ACTSCFC 1

SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

FULL COURT

Case Title:

Law Society (ACT) v Bangura

Citation: 

[2024] ACTSCFC 1

Hearing Date: 

23 August 2024

Decision Date: 

30 October 2024

Before:

Mossop J, McWilliam J & Ainslie-Wallace AJ

Decision: 

(1)    Amadu Bangura is struck off the Roll of Legal Practitioners in the Australian Capital Territory.

(2)    The Respondent is to pay the Applicant’s costs of the application.

Catchwords: 

LEGAL PRACTITIONERS – APPLICATION FOR REMOVAL FROM THE ROLL OF LEGAL PRACTITIONERS – Criminality – whether practitioner is a fit and proper person to practise law – where criminal conduct related to willingness to engage in dishonesty over sustained period – where any insight belated – where practitioner’s subjective circumstances not causative of dishonesty – defect of character established – unfitness indefinite – practitioner’s name removed from Roll of Legal Practitioners

Legislation Cited: 

Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) ss 26, 27, 431

Cases Cited: 

A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2004] HCA 1; 216 CLR 253

A-G (Qld) v Legal Services Commissioner; Legal Services

Bangura v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2020] NSWCA 138

Commissioner v Shand [2018] QCA 66 Childs v Walton [1990] NSWCA 41

Council of Law Society v Zhukovska [2020] NSWCA 163

Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Bandarage [2019] ACTSCFC 1

Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v Giles [2020] ACTSCFC 1

Law Society of New South Wales v Bannister [1993] NSWCA 157

Law Society v Walsh [1997] NSWCA 185

Legal Practitioner v Council of the Law Society of the ACT [2015] ACTCA 20

Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Palumbo [2005] WASCA 129

New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins [2001] NSWCA 284; 52 NSWLR 279

Prothonotary of Supreme Court of New South Wales v Da Rocha [2013] NSWCA 151

Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Thomson [2018] NSWCA 230

Re Weare [1893] 2 QB 439

The Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v Hoyle [2020] ACTSCFC 3

The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Kearns [2011] NSWCA 394

Ziems v The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW (1957) 97 CLR 279

Parties: 

Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory ( Applicant)

Amadu Bangura ( Respondent)

Representation: 

Counsel

D Moujalli ( Applicant)

A Martin ( Respondent)

Solicitors

Thomson Geer ( Applicant)

Martin Lawyers ( Respondent)

File Number:

SC 468 of 2023

THE COURT:

The Application

1․The Council of the Law Society of the ACT (the Applicant) seeks an order that the name of Amadu Bangura (the Respondent) be removed from the Roll of Legal Practitioners (the Roll) in the Australian Capital Territory on the basis that the Respondent is not a fit and proper person to be a legal practitioner of the Supreme Court.

The Court’s power

2․The proceeding invokes the Court’s inherent and protective powers in relation to legal practitioners.  A person may be admitted as a lawyer if the Supreme Court is satisfied that the person is “fit and proper” and on that satisfaction, the person becomes an officer of the Supreme Court (Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) ss 26 and 27). Although there is no express statutory power to remove or suspend a practitioner, the power is preserved to the Supreme Court through its inherent jurisdiction “in relation to the control and discipline” of the legal profession. This includes the incidental power of suspension from practice or removal of a person’s name from the Roll in a proper case: Ziems v The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW (1957) 97 CLR 279 (Ziems) at 290-1.

The issue for determination

3․The action of the Applicant and the Court’s role is protective of the public and of the reputation of the profession. It does so by the maintenance of its high standards and maintaining public confidence in the legal profession: Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v Giles [2020] ACTSCFC 1 (Giles) at [115]. The protective role extends beyond ensuring that the public is protected from further defaults by the particular practitioner but acts as an example and deterrent to other practitioners against similar conduct: Law Society of New South Wales v Bannister [1993] NSWCA 157 (Bannister) at 7-8. Personal misconduct, or conduct not in the course of practising the profession, may be sufficient to warrant a finding that a person is not fit and proper: Ziems at 290; A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2004] HCA 1; 216 CLR 253 (A Solicitor) at [20]

4․Thus, the principal question for this court is whether the Respondent is presently a fit and proper person to be a lawyer of the Supreme Court upon whose roll the practitioner’s name presently appears: Ziems at 298. In Re Weare [1893] 2 QB 439 at 448 Lopes LJ said of this task:

To my mind the question which the Court in cases like this ought always to put to itself is this, is the Court, having regard to the circumstances brought before it, any longer justified in holding out the solicitor in question as a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the important duties and grave responsibilities which belong to a solicitor? That appears to me to be the question which the Court always has to answer when a matter of this kind comes before it.

5․For reasons that follow, we have determined that the Respondent is not a fit and proper person and that his name should be removed from the Roll.

Applicable principles

6․The legal principles relevant to this matter were not in dispute and have been set out in this jurisdiction in cases such as Giles at [115]-[123] and Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Bandarage [2019] ACTSCFC 1 (Bandarage) at [142]-[149].

7․The question of fitness to practise is the same whether the Court is acting in its inherent jurisdiction, or following a recommendation made by the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, pursuant to s 431 of the Legal Profession Act 2006: Bandarage at [16], citing A Solicitor at [15]. It is a question to be decided at the time of hearing, rather than when the misconduct was engaged in: A Solicitor at [21].

8․In making its assessment, the Court considers the whole circumstances. Not every finding of misconduct (personal or professional) justifies, or requires, a conclusion that removal from the Roll is the appropriate order: A Solicitor at [15]. Of significance to the present case, the mere fact of a criminal conviction is not necessarily an answer to the question of whether a person is fit and proper, but as was said in Ziems (at 288 per Fullagar J, 298 per Kitto J), the circumstances on which the conviction is based may reveal defects of character which are incompatible with membership of the legal profession.

9․Relevantly here, in relation to conduct occurring outside the practice of law, such conduct may indicate a present unfitness to practice where the practitioner’s behaviour would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful and dishonourable by members of the profession of good repute and competency: The Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v Hoyle [2020] ACTSCFC 3 at [19], citing Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Thomson [2018] NSWCA 230 at [12]-[18].

10․In that regard, the present case is fundamentally concerned with the practitioner’s honesty.  The authorities make clear the importance of honesty and integrity to the practice of law.  In New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins [2001] NSWCA 284; 52 NSWLR 279 (Cummins), the NSW Court of Appeal explained the public interest in ensuring those who practise as lawyers are held to the highest standards of integrity; not only with their clients’ confidences, and the reliance their professional colleagues place on their word, but because the judiciary must have confidence in those who appear before it.  Spigelman CJ (with whom Mason P and Handley JA agreed) stated at [19]-[20] (emphasis added):

19. Honesty and integrity are important in many spheres of conduct. However, in some spheres significant public interests are involved in the conduct of particular persons and the state regulates and restricts those who are entitled to engage in those activities and acquire the privileges associated with a particular status. The legal profession has long required the highest standards of integrity.

20. There are four interrelated interests involved. Clients must feel secure in confiding their secrets and entrusting their most personal affairs to lawyers. Fellow practitioners must be able to depend implicitly on the word and the behaviour of their colleagues. The judiciary must have confidence in those who appear before the courts. The public must have confidence in the legal profession by reason of the central role the profession plays in the administration of justice. Many aspects of the administration of justice depend on the trust by the judiciary and/or the public in the performance of professional obligations by professional people.

11․The above extract was cited with approval in this jurisdiction in Legal Practitioner v Council of the Law Society of the ACT [2015] ACTCA 20 at [94].

12․Thus, a conviction for an offence involving dishonesty has been commonly found to render a practitioner unfit for the high degree of trust and confidence which the courts, members of the profession, clients and the public are entitled to place in a person endorsed by the court as a fit and proper person for admission to the profession: see for example, Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Palumbo [2005] WASCA 129 at [26]; The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Kearns [2011] NSWCA 394 at [20]; A-G (Qld) v Legal Services Commissioner; Legal Services Commissioner v Shand [2018] QCA 66 at [58]-[60].

13․Part of considering the whole circumstances also includes considering the subjective circumstances of the practitioner that may have operated on the conduct, and which may still be informative at the time the decision about fitness comes to be made.  The caution to be applied is that while a practitioner’s circumstances may be unfortunate and evoke sympathy, they should not detract from the core purpose of public protection: Giles at [116] and the authority there-cited.

14․An order for the involuntary removal of the name of a practitioner from the Roll is made only because the probability is that the solicitor is permanently unfit to practise, or at least unfit for a period of indefinite duration: Bandarage at [149]; Council of Law Society v Zhukovska [2020] NSWCA 163 at [99].

15․The Applicant bears the onus of establishing (in the sense of actual persuasion) that the solicitor is likely to be unfit to practise for the indefinite future: Zhukovska at [100], [115]. However, where the practitioner has manifested a serious character flaw that would justify removal, it is for the practitioner to affirmatively satisfy the court that the unfitness was, or is, of limited duration: see Bandarage at [149] and the authorities there-cited. In that way, the evidential onus shifts.

16․Whether the practitioner has expressed true contrition may be a significant factor in determining the appropriate relief in the circumstances.  The significance was described in Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Da Rocha [2013] NSWCA 151 (per Ward JA at [34], approving Childs v Walton [1990] NSWCA 41 per Samuels JA) as being that where the protection of the community is the paramount interest, any contrition that is accepted as honest may indicate that no occasion for protection exists. However, while a practitioner’s expressed intention not to reoffend is relevant, it carries little weight unless accompanied by an understanding of the wrongfulness of the conduct which is the subject of concern: Law Society v Walsh [1997] NSWCA 185 at 42.

17․Each case turns upon a close consideration of its own facts: A Solicitor at [37]. Where the application is made relying on the Court’s inherent jurisdiction, the Court decides the facts for itself: Bandarage at [17].

Facts

18․The facts set out below were not contested and are the factual findings on which the Court proceeds to make its assessment.

19․The Respondent was admitted as a lawyer on 14 December 2012.  He remains on the Roll although is no longer practising.  Following his admission, he worked in a solicitor’s practice from 20 August 2014 until 10 March 2016.  The Respondent worked at various other firms before starting a practice on his own in 2018.  He was also registered as a migration agent.  That registration was cancelled on 18 September 2018 for a period of 5 years and has not since been renewed.

20․The conduct which led to this action was not done in the course of the Respondent engaging in legal practice but, rather, arises from an event which occurred in his private life.

21․On 16 March 2015, the Respondent was involved in what seemed to be a minor motor car accident.  At the scene the driver of the other car involved gave the Respondent $2,000 to cover the damage to his car.

22․On 5 May 2015, lawyers acting on the Respondent’s instructions lodged an insurance claim for damages for personal injuries to the Respondent arising from the accident.  The Respondent claimed that he was suffering from pain in his right hip and back, severe headaches, shock, anxiety, depression, and fear and phobia about cars.  He said he was self-employed but because of his injuries, was unable to return to work. He claimed he had pain as well as a restriction of movement in his right hip.  He claimed $700,000 in damages.

23․Following the lodging of the claim, the Respondent attended a number of doctors to assess his injuries and in those appointments, maintained his claim to injury and further claimed he could not sit for more than 20 minutes at a time due to the pain.

24․As it turns out, nothing could have been further from the truth.

25․On 27 June 2017, the Respondent was arrested and charged with attempting dishonestly to obtain a financial advantage.  He pleaded not guilty. The hearing took place in the NSW Local Court and occupied some 10 hearing days.

26․The Respondent was convicted and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of nine months.

27․The Respondent appealed both conviction and sentence to the District Court of NSW, maintaining his innocence of the charge.  The hearing took place over two days and on the third day Judge Payne dismissed the appeal and found the Respondent guilty of the charge.  Her Honour resentenced the Respondent to one year and nine months imprisonment to be served as an intensive corrections order together with 240 hours of community service.

28․On 6 March 2020, the Respondent commenced proceedings in the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of NSW seeking to have the sentence imposed by Judge Payne quashed.  The summons was heard on 7 July 2020 and dismissed with costs: Bangura v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2020] NSWCA 138.

Criminality and duration of the conduct

29․The Respondent’s denial of his criminality resulted in the use of at least 14 days of court time.  In the Local Court the presiding Magistrate said that his evidence was, at times, “just plain dishonest”.  She made findings that the Respondent had made false representations to the doctors who examined him for the purposes of preparing reports and to assessors from the insurance company about his inability to work.  In this regard, the presiding Magistrate said that the Respondent’s counsel challenged those doctors on the accuracy of their notes taken during the assessment, with the Respondent claiming he had no recollection of what occurred.  She expressed significant disquiet as to the basis on which the Respondent instructed his counsel to make those challenges.

30․In the District Court of NSW, the Respondent again maintained his innocence and denied any false statements or exaggeration of his condition.  In the course of the judgment dismissing the Respondent’s appeal, Judge Payne set out the contents of a number of the Respondent’s telephone calls with his solicitor, which the police had intercepted and the contents of which had been played in the Local Court.  When the Respondent was told by his solicitor that the insurance company was assessing his claims that he could not work and that the records of the Law Society of New South Wales (NSW Law Society) showed him working at a particular firm, the Respondent denied the fact.  The Respondent said to his solicitor:

… the requirement is I still need to maintain my practising certificate. That is not to say I'm presently working with them. That's all.  

31․Immediately after the conversation with his solicitor, the Respondent called the firm by whom he was shown to be employed and said to the person who answered the phone there that if someone called wanting to know whether he worked there, they were to say, “I will have to get back to you on this one, I’m not sure”.

32․Judge Payne said, referring to this conversation, that it illustrated that the Respondent well knew that he was working and when he told doctors and other people that he was not, he was dishonest.

33․On 7 July 2020, following the dismissal of the Respondent’s summons seeking review by the NSW Court of Appeal, the Respondent wrote to the NSW Law Society notifying it of the Supreme Court decision and saying that while he remained “dissatisfied” with the outcome, he respected the decision. 

34․The Respondent obtained legal representation to make submissions to the NSW Law Society that, notwithstanding the conviction, he remained a fit and proper person.  In those submissions, it was said that while the Respondent agreed he instructed a solicitor to make the claim of damages on his behalf, he merely signed the claim form.  The submissions also raised separate unrelated criminal proceedings against the solicitor who made the claim on the Respondent’s behalf in what appears to be a clear attempt to distance the Respondent from the making of the fraudulent claim.  Other parts of the submission leave no doubt that at that point, the Respondent was far from admitting to all of his criminality.

35․The Respondent did not say in his evidence why on 7 July 2020 he respected the decision of the Supreme Court. In the circumstances of this case, it is a reasonable inference that it was because all of the avenues by which he could continue falsely to claim his innocence had been exhausted.  The language of Shellar JA (Gleeson CJ and Handley JA agreeing) in Bannister at 12 is apt, in that the Court cannot be satisfied that the practitioner’s “candour and contrition are any more than a virtue borne of present necessity and the inevitability of close scrutiny”.

36․The comprehensive submissions for the Applicant set out a litany of lies told by the Respondent to various people and authorities in pursuit of this extensive dishonesty.  What is recorded above is a summary.

The Respondent’s personal circumstances

37․The Respondent was born in Sierra Leone in West Africa.  In the course of defending his family home from rebels during the civil war, his father and two other relatives were murdered.  The Respondent fled to Australia via a refugee camp in Guinea before being brought to Australia on a Humanitarian Visa in 2004. 

38․The Respondent learned English and attended school, completing his Higher School Certificate in 2007.  He attended university and received a Bachelor of Arts/Law in 2012.  He completed a graduate diploma in late 2012.  In 2014, he commenced a Master of Laws, which he completed in 2015.

39․He was admitted as a practitioner of the Supreme Court of the ACT in December 2012.  In 2014, he was registered as a Migration Agent.  In 2018, he commenced his own firm and practised in migration, criminal and family law.

40․In relation to his claim for damages and what followed, the Respondent said (at [35] of his affidavit sworn on 27 May 2024 for the purpose of these proceedings):

What followed on from here however, was a series of serious and disgraceful mistakes committed by myself in which I now say that the only explanation and motivation I had for engaging into such acts was as a result of my untreated serious mental health condition at the time.

41․The Respondent said that he knew the accident caused minimal injuries to him and said that he made false claims of pain and other injuries.

42․Pausing here, the statement that the Respondent’s dishonesty resulted from an “untreated” mental health condition does not give an entirely accurate account.  The report from Dr Ahmed, the Respondent’s treating psychologist, shows that she commenced treating him in February 2012 and had diagnosed the Respondent with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, anxiety and depression. He had been receiving treatment for those conditions from 2014, although she noted that between 16 March 2012 and 19 November 2014 and between 25 February 2015 and 11 July 2017 he was not attending for therapy or taking his medication.

43․However, relevantly to his dishonest conduct, he attended for treatment and resumed taking his medication from July 2017 until at least September 2020 (being the relevant period over which the charge was brought, heard, determined, appealed and ultimately dismissed).

44․Certainly then, at the time of the initial dishonest conduct the Respondent was not attending therapy nor was he taking his medication, but while the court cases were on foot, right up until their ultimate conclusion, he was having regular attendances on his therapist and taking his prescribed medication.

45․Dr Ahmed said:

It is my opinion the Mr Bangura’s was suffering from of Major Depressive Disorder, Generalised Anxiety Disorder and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder which was untreated at the time of his offending behaviour.  Part of his psychological symptoms is sleep disturbances, interrupted sleep, problems with memory and concentration, spells of terror and panic, uncertainty low self esteem and helplessness which has a negative impact on affective decision making. I believe, the lapse in treatment, and Mr. Bangura not taking his medication, affected his behaviour at the time of the offending and made it difficult for him to assess the correct course of action in the situation he was in which contributed towards his offending behaviour.

46․She added that the Respondent was aware that a future lapse in treatment can result in negative consequences, and he will attend regular medical and psychological sessions.

47․We do not doubt Dr Ahmed’s clinical assessment, nor her opinion as to how the Respondent’s mental health symptoms might affect him.  However, even accepting that it might have had an impact on his initial decision to make a dishonest claim, it does not explain away, in the face of regular therapy and medication, the Respondent’s continued dishonesty throughout that time.  In short, Dr Ahmed’s report does not establish a causal connection between the Respondent’s mental health issues and his criminal conduct, or to put the matter bluntly, that his mental health conditions would cause him to lie.

48․In his evidence to the Court, the Respondent said that he has continued to receive treatment for his mental health condition in Sierra Leone where he is presently living.  He said he is seeing his family doctor and a nurse practitioner once per month for cognitive behaviour therapy and medication.  Dr Jabba, the Respondent’s treating doctor noted that he has seen some “remarkable improvement” in the Respondent’s reported symptoms and he has reduced the dosage of his medications.   Ms Koroma, the nurse practitioner, said that the Respondent is engaged in their Intensive Outpatient Anxiety and Stress Management Program which requires attendance three days each week for one hour.  She noted there had been great progress in the Respondent’s condition.

49․While it is obviously in the Respondent’s interests to continue to receive treatment for his mental health conditions, given that we have found a lack of causal connection between his conditions and his criminal offending, it is difficult to give this matter significant weight.

50․The Respondent says that while living in Sierra Leone he is living in his family compound and his accommodation and other needs are met.  He said that he assists the community, working at a homeless shelter and teaching English to children.  He helps elderly people with their shopping.

51․In the Respondent’s affidavit he refers to his work at university and later in supporting and assisting his colleagues and citizens of West Africa for which some of his referees praise him.

52․A number of character references were before the Court and we accept that they demonstrate that he is valued and held in high regard by the community. A number of them commented that his offending appears to be out of character.  We accept the submission of counsel for the Applicant that, at least in relation to the references from lawyers, it is not altogether clear that the Respondent told them not only that he was charged with attempt to obtain a financial advantage by deception, but that his conduct also involved repeatedly lying to courts over a period of five years, an obviously important point.  Nonetheless, his professional colleagues speak well of the Respondent.

53․The Respondent agrees that at the time his practising certificate was cancelled in NSW in December 2020, he was not a fit and proper person but argued that, in the time since then, he has changed and is presently fit and proper.

54․Counsel for the Respondent, Mr Martin, in his helpful, perceptive and balanced submissions, accepted the extent and gravity of the Respondent’s conduct and accepted that the Respondent’s conduct was deplorable. 

55․Mr Martin submitted that the Respondent’s conduct in not seeking a renewal of his practising certificate in NSW shows an acceptance of his conduct.

56․Mr Martin’s submissions focussed on the future, and he observed that the Respondent was still young, 37 years old, and that in the time that has passed since his dishonest conduct, his character has reformed to the extent that, with professional supervision, he could practise in a limited fashion.  It was submitted that the Respondent has developed insight into his conduct, although he conceded that it only developed or commenced to develop in 2020. 

57․Mr Martin submitted that there is still work to be done by the Respondent in terms of his mental health before he could resume the practice of law, and it was submitted that he needs a couple of years of therapy to assist him fully with his rehabilitation. He submitted that if he was suspended from practice for two years it would foster that process.  In that time, it was said, the Respondent would return to live in Australia where his ex-wife and children are living and engage in a rigorous treatment regime such as was suggested by Dr Ahmed. 

Discussion

58․The sanction under consideration in this case is the most serious protective order this Court may make.  Unless the Court is satisfied that the reason for unfitness is permanent, or at least of indefinite duration, other protective orders will usually be appropriate.  A practising certificate might be capable of being suspended or conditioned; the exclusion from admission to the legal profession itself is absolute.

59․The Respondent’s conduct here was neither isolated, nor of short duration.  It went on for years.  The offence itself was one of dishonesty and, combined with what followed, may be likened to an attempt to pervert the course of justice.  It demonstrates a defect in character incompatible with membership of the legal profession, for the reasons expressed in Cummins (see above at [10]).

60․Those who do not conduct themselves according to these high standards must expect severe sanctions.  However, the Court is not punishing the practitioner for the conduct comprised in the offence itself, or its aftermath.   We have already said that the concern of such a proceeding is to protect the public and the maintenance of the highest standards of the legal profession.   

61․Here, the Respondent coupled personal dishonesty in the offence itself with a course of conduct that displayed further dishonesty in the course of the appeal and the further application seeking review which he pursued.   In that respect, he has shown scant regard for the system of justice, of which he was a part, which relies in great measure on being able to trust the word of lawyers who appear within it.

62․We accept that the Respondent has expressed contrition and remorse, but, as his counsel said, it only came about belatedly in 2020.  We also accept that in the time since 2020, he has been working within his community and assisting those who need help. 

63․However, the dishonesty with the compounding lies to professionals and to the court, which commenced in pursuit of monetary gain, was prolonged and persistent.  Even at a time when his sentence had been reduced to a sentence that was to be served other than by fulltime custody, the Respondent continued to assert his innocence and sought the conviction be quashed in the Court of Appeal.  His attempt to suborn the person at the solicitor’s office where he worked to lie on his behalf only makes his conduct all the more egregious.

64․We are of the view that the defect in character is of a kind that brings the Respondent within the realm of indefinite unfitness, such that nothing short of removing his name from the Roll of Legal Practitioners in the ACT is sufficient to fulfill the protective role of the Court.  Although we accept the Respondent’s submission that it is open to the Court to suspend the practitioner from practice, it is worthy to note the comments of Dixon CJ in Ziems at 286 (with similar comments made by McTiernan J at 287), to the effect that even in cases where that course was available, it is probably better in most cases to allow the practitioner to re-apply at a subsequent time and offer positive evidence of the grounds upon which he then claims to be re-admitted.

Conclusion

65․We will order the Respondent’s name be removed from the Roll.  Mindful of his relative youth and relative inexperience as a lawyer, it is important to record that this outcome does not prevent the Respondent from seeking employment as a non-lawyer under the supervision of a solicitor (subject to any relevant statutory approvals) to better place him to re-apply to be admitted to the legal profession, sometime in the future.

66․The Applicant sought the costs of the application.  It need hardly be said that orders for costs are discretionary and the purpose of such an order is compensatory.  In this case, there is no reason to depart from the ordinary consequence that costs follow the event.

Orders

67․For the above reasons, the Court makes the following orders:

(1)Amadu Bangura is struck off the Roll of Legal Practitioners in the Australian Capital Territory.

(2)The Respondent is to pay the Applicant’s costs of the application.

I certify that the preceding sixty-seven [67] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Court.

Associate:

Date: