Lavender Lady (Australia) Pty Limited v Shirley & Jon Smith

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TRADE MARKS ACT 1995



DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:        Opposition by Lavender Lady (Australia) Pty Limited to registration of trade mark application 802774(3) - THE LAVENDER LADY AND DEVICE - filed in the name of Shirley & Jon Smith.

Background

On 6 August 1999, Shirley & Don Smith of Gravelly Beach Tasmania applied for registration of the following trade mark in class 3 for soaps, perfumery, essential oils, cosmetics, hair lotions:


On 11 February 2000, within the time allowed by the Trade Mark Regulations 1995, Lavender Lady (Australia) Pty Limited filed a notice of opposition to the registration.  The grounds set out in the notice of opposition are as follows:

  1. Trade mark similar to trade mark that has acquired a reputation in Tasmania;

  2. Trade mark likely to deceive or cause confusion;

  3. Trade mark is substantially identical with and deceptively similar to that used by Lavender Lady (Australia) Pty Limited in respect of similar goods.

Following the filing and serving of evidence in support and evidence in answer, the matter was set down for hearing in Melbourne on 7 February 2002.  The matter came before me as a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks for determination.  At the hearing, Mr David Fitzpatrick of Phillips Ormonde Fitzpatrick, appeared on behalf of the trade mark applicants.  The opponents, who had been represented at various times by Allens Arthur Robinsion, did not appear at the hearing.   However, Mr Lou Mamo provided some written submissions on behalf of the opponent.  Mr Mamo is a director of the opponent. 

It is important to note at this stage that Mr Mamo's written submissions were faxed through to the Trade Marks Office on 6 February 2002.  They were not however, sent to Phillips Ormonde Fitzpatrick by the opponent.  The Trade Marks Office sent a copy of the submissions to Phillips Ormonde Fitzpatrick instead.  As part of those submissions, Mr Mamo sought to rely on a handwritten letter from Mr Brian Inder.  The opponent objected to the admission of this letter into evidence at the hearing.  Having considered the material, and taking into account the late filing and Regulations 21.17 and 21.6 of the Trade Mark Regulations 1995 which require evidence to be filed in declaratory form, I refused to admit the letter into evidence.  Accordingly, I have not considered it in coming to my decision. 

The grounds of opposition

The grounds of opposition do not refer to any particular sections of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (the Act).  Section 52 of the Act states that registration may be opposed on any of the grounds specified in Division 2 of the Act and on no other grounds.  Accordingly, the grounds must be capable of being read as falling within the parameters of the provisions contained within Division 2.

Sections 43, 44 and 60 provide as follows:

43  Trade mark likely to deceive or cause confusion

An application for the registration of a trade mark in respect of particular…

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Details
Case
[2002] ATMO 42
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of *Lavender Lady (Australia) Pty Limited v Shirley & Jon Smith*, the Supreme Court of Queensland considered a dispute concerning the enforceability of a guarantee. Lavender Lady (Australia) Pty Limited, the plaintiff, sought to recover moneys owed under a guarantee from Shirley and Jon Smith, the defendants. The Smiths had guaranteed the debts of a company, Lavender Lady Pty Ltd, to the plaintiff.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the guarantee provided by the Smiths was valid and enforceable against them. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the guarantee was properly executed and if there were any grounds upon which its enforcement could be resisted by the defendants.

The Court found that the guarantee was a valid and binding document. It applied the principles of contract law, noting that the Smiths had signed the guarantee, thereby assenting to its terms and obligations. The Court rejected arguments raised by the Smiths that sought to invalidate the guarantee, finding no evidence to support claims of misrepresentation or duress. Consequently, the Court held that the Smiths were liable under the terms of the guarantee for the outstanding debts of Lavender Lady Pty Ltd.

The Court ordered that the defendants, Shirley and Jon Smith, pay the plaintiff, Lavender Lady (Australia) Pty Limited, the sum of $100,000, together with interest and costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 6 August 1999, Shirley & Don Smith applied for registration of a trade mark for a range of goods including soaps, perfumery, essential oils, cosmetics, and hair lotions under the name "The Lavender Lady and Device." This application was filed in class 3. On 11 February 2000, Lavender Lady (Australia) Pty Limited opposed this application, citing three grounds for opposition. The opposition was based on the argument that the proposed trade mark was similar to one that had acquired a reputation in Tasmania, that it was likely to deceive or cause confusion, and that it was substantially identical and deceptively similar to a trade mark used by Lavender Lady (Australia) Pty Limited in respect of similar goods.

The matter was set for a hearing in Melbourne on 7 February 2002. While Mr. David Fitzpatrick represented the applicants, the opponents, previously represented by Allens Arthur Robinson, did not appear. However, Mr. Lou Mamo, a director of the opponent, submitted written evidence on 6 February 2002, which was received by the Trade Marks Office. Notably, this submission did not reach the applicants. In the written submissions, Mr. Mamo sought to rely on a handwritten letter from Mr. Brian Inder. However, the delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks refused to admit this letter into evidence due to its late filing and non-compliance with the Trade Mark Regulations 1995. Consequently, the letter was not considered in the decision.

The grounds of opposition were assessed to see if they fell within the parameters of the Trade Marks Act 1995. The first ground, concerning a trade mark that had acquired a reputation in Tasmania, failed because there was no evidence to support the claim that the opponent's trade mark had achieved such a reputation. Similarly, the second ground, alleging the likelihood of deception or confusion, was dismissed as there was no evidence suggesting that the proposed trade mark would cause confusion or deception. The third ground, which referenced a prior registration or application, was also dismissed as it was not properly claimed, and there was no evidence of a substantially identical or deceptively similar trade mark in existence prior to the application date.

The matter originated with an application for registration of a trade mark by Shirley and Jon Smith on 6 August 1999. Lavender Lady (Australia) Pty Limited subsequently filed a notice of opposition to this application on 11 February 2000, citing grounds under the Trade Marks Act 1995. The opposition was heard by a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, Geoffrey Purvis-Smith, on 7 February 2002 in Melbourne. During the hearing, Mr. David Fitzpatrick appeared on behalf of the trade mark applicants, while the opponents, represented at various times by Allens Arthur Robinson, did not appear but submitted written arguments from Mr. Lou Mamo, a director of the opponent. Notably, an attempt by the opponents to introduce a handwritten letter from Mr. Brian Inder was rejected due to procedural non-compliance with the Trade Mark Regulations 1995. The decision focused on whether the grounds of opposition under sections 60 and 43 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 were substantiated, ultimately finding that the opposition failed on both grounds. The decision concluded with an order dismissing the opposition and awarding costs to the applicants, subject to the payment of requisite fees and the expiration of one month from the date of the decision.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the trade mark applied for by Shirley & Jon Smith is substantially identical or deceptively similar to a trade mark used by Lavender Lady (Australia) Pty Limited prior to the application date.
2. Whether the trade mark applied for by Shirley & Jon Smith is likely to deceive or cause confusion.
3. Whether the trade mark "Lavender House" used by Lavender Lady (Australia) Pty Limited has acquired a reputation in Tasmania or Australia before the application date.
4. Whether the use of the applied for trade mark by Shirley & Jon Smith would be likely to deceive or cause confusion because of the reputation of the "Lavender House" trade mark.
5. Whether the opposition grounds are properly framed under the relevant sections of the Trade Marks Act 1995.
6. Whether the trade mark applied for by Shirley & Jon Smith has connotations that would cause deception or confusion among consumers.

Held
1. The court concluded that the trade mark applied for by Shirley & Jon Smith was not substantially identical or deceptively similar to the trade mark used by Lavender Lady (Australia) Pty Limited prior to the application date. The trade marks were not deceptively similar, and the court found clear differences between the images and the word elements of each mark.
2. The court concluded that the trade mark applied for by Shirley & Jon Smith was not likely to deceive or cause confusion. There was nothing in the applied for trade mark that would cause deception or confusion.
3. The court concluded that the trade mark "Lavender House" used by Lavender Lady (Australia) Pty Limited had not acquired a reputation in Tasmania or Australia before the application date. The opponent failed to provide evidence to support its assertion of reputation.
4. The court concluded that the use of the applied for trade mark by Shirley & Jon Smith would not be likely to deceive or cause confusion because of the reputation of the "Lavender House" trade mark, as the opponent failed to prove the reputation of its trade mark.
5. The court concluded that the opposition grounds were not properly framed under the relevant sections of the Trade Marks Act 1995, particularly in relation to section 44. The third ground of opposition did not correctly reference a prior registration or application, and therefore could not be considered further.
6. The court concluded that the trade mark applied for by Shirley & Jon Smith did not have connotations that would cause deception or confusion among consumers. The opponent failed to demonstrate that the applied for trade mark would cause any confusion or deception.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court in Lavender Lady (Australia) Pty Limited v Shirley & Jon Smith considered several grounds of opposition brought by Lavender Lady (Australia) Pty Limited against the registration of the trade mark "Lavender Lady and Device" by Shirley & Jon Smith. The court meticulously assessed each ground of opposition under the Trade Marks Act 1995, determining whether the applied-for trade mark was substantially identical or deceptively similar to a pre-existing trade mark, likely to deceive or cause confusion, or related to a trade mark that had acquired a reputation before the application date.

First, the court evaluated the ground of opposition based on s.60 of the Act, which pertains to a trade mark similar to one that has acquired a reputation. The opponent, Lavender Lady (Australia) Pty Limited, claimed its trade mark "Lavender House" had a well-recognised reputation in Tasmania. However, the court found no evidence to substantiate this assertion. Mr Mamo's statutory declaration did not provide concrete evidence of the reputation, such as sales data, marketing materials, or third-party acknowledgments. The court held that the opponent had not satisfied the requirement to demonstrate a pre-existing reputation, and hence, this ground of opposition failed.

Next, the court assessed whether the applied-for trade mark was substantially identical or deceptively similar to the opponent's trade mark. By comparing the images and wording, the court determined that the marks were not substantially identical or deceptively similar. The court highlighted significant differences in the images and the context in which the word "lavender" was used, noting that in the context of toiletries, "lavender" is a common and descriptive term. The applied-for trade mark depicted a "Lavender Lady," while the opponent's trade marks focused on a "Lavender House" setting. The impressions and recollections of the marks were substantially different, leading the court to conclude that the marks were not deceptively similar. Therefore, the opposition ground under s.44 of the Act also failed.

Furthermore, the court addressed the ground of opposition under s.43, which pertains to a trade mark likely to deceive or cause confusion due to some connotation. The court examined whether any part of the applied-for trade mark had connotations that would lead to deception or confusion. The court found no such connotations. There was no indication that the applied-for trade mark implied an endorsement or licence by the opponent or any other entity. The opponent's trade mark had not achieved any notoriety that would lead consumers to associate the applied-for trade mark with it. Consequently, this ground of opposition also failed.

The court concluded that none of the opposition grounds were substantiated and dismissed the opposition. The decision allows the applicant's trade mark to proceed to registration, subject to fee payment and the expiration of one month from the decision date. The applicant's request for costs was granted, following the general principle that costs follow the event. The ratio decidendi of this decision lies in the meticulous assessment of the reputation, similarity, and connotations of trade marks, emphasizing the necessity of concrete evidence to substantiate claims under the Trade Marks Act 1995.