Lauren Kay George v William John Fletcher as trustee for the Bankrupt Estate of Lauren Kay George

[2013] HCASL 209

LAUREN KAY GEORGE

v

WILLIAM JOHN FLETCHER AS TRUSTEE FOR THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF LAUREN KAY GEORGE & ORS

[2013] HCASL 209
B67/2012

1. In 2006, the applicant became bankrupt on her own petition and the first respondent was appointed her trustee in bankruptcy.  In 2008, the first respondent commenced proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia against the applicant.  He sought declarations that title in a property of which the applicant had been the registered proprietor had vested in him upon the applicant's bankruptcy.  The applicant claimed that beneficial title to the property was held by her son.

2. On 27 July 2011, Burnett FM found in favour of the first respondent.  His Honour rejected the applicant's claim that she had declared a trust over the property in favour of her son upon his birth in 1997.  His Honour made a general adverse credibility finding against the applicant, and did not accept as genuine various documents which the applicant claimed evidenced the establishment of the trust.   His Honour found that these documents were fabricated in late 2007, by which time the property had already vested in the first respondent.

3. On 25 October 2012, the Full Court (Siopis, Jessup and Katzmann JJ) upheld Burnett FM's decision regarding the property.  Burnett FM's factual findings, including the adverse assessment of the applicant's credit, were open to him.  Their Honours held that remarks Burnett FM had made about the applicant's credibility in an earlier proceeding gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in respect of the decision on appeal.  However, although the applicant was aware of her right to object, she did not raise the point for nearly two years.  She had thus waived her right to object.

4. The application for special leave does not raise any point which would cast doubt on the decision below.  It concerns the application of settled principle to the facts of this case, and no question arises to warrant the grant of leave.  Special leave is refused.

5. Pursuant to r 41.11.1 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application with costs.

S.M. Kiefel
13 December 2013 P.A. Keane