LASKE & LASKE

[2015] FamCA 204

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

LASKE & LASKE [2015] FamCA 204

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Settlement in relation to marriage –Where both parties owned properties at the commencement of the relationship – Where the wife sold her property to contribute to mortgage payments for the husband’s property – Where the wife assisted to supervise renovations of matrimonial property – Where the parties have three children – Where the wife was the primary care giver – Where the husband is a discretionary beneficiary of a trust – Where the husband claims his father had loaned him a significant sum – Where the husband has had the benefit of living rent free – Where the husband was the primary income earner during the marriage –Where a section 75(2) adjustment is appropriate.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 79(2), s 79(4), s 81

Chorn & Hopkins (2004) FLC 93-204

APPLICANT: Mr Laske

RESPONDENT: Ms Laske

FILE NUMBER: SYC 3912 of 2012

DATE DELIVERED: 27 March 2015

PLACE DELIVERED: Sydney

PLACE HEARD: Sydney

JUDGMENT OF: Aldridge J

HEARING DATE: 25 & 26 February 2015

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Sansom

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Redmond Hale Simpson

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Gilbert

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Haydon Fowler E Jessop

Orders

1. That, within one hundred and twenty (120) days from the date of these Orders, the husband is to pay to the wife the sum of $531 685 and in default thereof, the husband is to take all steps necessary to realise his interest in the property known as and situate at B Street, C Town in the State of New South Wales and being folio identifier … (“the C Town property”) and to pay the wife the sum of $531 685 out of the proceeds.

2. That in the event that the husband is in default of Order 1 above, leave is granted to the wife to apply to the Court, after one hundred and fifty six (156) days from the date of these orders, to join Mr I Laske to the proceedings and to seek the appointment of trustees for sale of the C Town property.

3. That the parties are to take all necessary steps to sell the Country D Timeshare interest and to appoint such agents as may be necessary to effect that sale and to divide the proceeds of sale after the selling costs and repayment of any debts in respect to the Country D Timeshare as to 45 per cent to the wife and 55 per cent to the husband.

4. That the husband is to retain the following:

   (a)       Vintage sedan motor vehicle unregistered;

   (b)       Any interest held in Mr Laske Enterprises Pty Limited;

   (c)       Any interest held in Laske Holdings Pty Limited;

   (d)       Any bank accounts held in his name;

   (d)      Household contents and furniture currently in his possession; and

   (e)      Any interest held in his superannuation fund.

5. That the wife is to retain the following:

   (a)       Japanese motor vehicle registration number …;

   (b)       Any bank accounts held in her name;

   (c)       Household contents and furniture currently in her possession; and

   (d)       Any interest held in her superannuation fund.

6. That each party is to be liable for the debts, which they are presently liable, and shall indemnify the other in respect of any liability thereto.

7. That in the event that either party refuses or neglects to execute any deed, document or instrument necessary to give effect to these Orders, the Registrar of the court be appointed pursuant to s 106A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to execute such deed, document or instrument in the name of the said party and do all acts and things necessary to give validity and operation to the deed, document or instrument upon the Registrar being provided with verification of such refusal or failure by way of affidavit.

8. That all applications and cross applications be and are hereby dismissed.

9. That all issues be removed from the Active Pending Cases List.

10. That all material produced on subpoena shall be returned to the persons or institutions from which they emanated and all exhibits are returned to the person or persons who tendered the same not before fifty-six (56) days from the date of these Orders.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Laske & Laske has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY

FILE NUMBER: SYC 3912  of 2012

Mr Laske

Applicant

And

Ms Laske

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. In these proceedings Mr Laske (“the husband”) seeks orders under s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) against Ms Laske (“the wife”).

2. The parties commenced cohabitation in late 2004 or early 2005, married in 2008 and separated on 7 January 2012. 

3. The husband was born in 1966 and is now aged 47.

4. The wife was born in 1968 and is now aged 45. 

5. The wife was previously married to Mr E.  They had three children who are Mr F born in 1992, Mr G born in 1994 and Mr H born in 1997.  As I said the parties commenced to live together in September 2004, according to the wife, or January 2005 according to the husband.  That difference is, in the terms of the issues to be determined in these proceedings, immaterial. 

6. At the time that the parties commenced living together the husband was an owner of a half share, as tenants in common with his father Mr I Laske, in 8 B Street, C Town (“the C Town property”).  It is agreed between the parties that at the time of the commencement of cohabitation the C Town property had a value of $1 875 000 and thus the husband’s half share was valued at $937 500.  There was no mortgage.

7. The husband had some superannuation benefits together with furniture and household contents at the C Town property where he lived.  He also had an interest in two companies which, it is agreed, now have no value. He was and is a discretionary beneficiary of the Mr Laske Family Trust.

8. At the time of cohabitation the husband was working as a manager in a business which was owned by his father. 

9. At that time the wife was the owner of a property at J Street, Suburb K (“the Suburb K property”).  She had acquired this property in October 2003 using the proceeds of a property settlement with Mr E.  There was a small mortgage (approximately $86 000) over the Suburb K property.  The wife also had household furniture and contents, a superannuation interest and a motor vehicle.

10. At the time the parties commenced cohabitation the three children of the wife by her former marriage lived with her every second week, spending the alternate week with their father.  This continued after the parties lived together.

11. The parties at the time of, or shortly after, cohabitation moved into the Suburb K property.  This was to enable the C Town property to be renovated. 

12. In order to fund the renovations the husband and his father borrowed $300 000 from the ANZ Bank in December 2004 and two further loans of $47 779 and $50 000 in August 2005.  The renovations were concluded in approximately October 2005 and the parties, the wife’s children by the previous marriage and L, born in 2005, moved to live in the C Town property.  

13. The wife ceased work in October or November 2004 when the business that employed her closed down.  She did not again obtain employment until after the parties separated.

14. In 2007 the parties’ second child M was born. 

15. On 11 April 2008 the wife sold the Suburb K property for $711 000 and after payment of the costs of the sale and the mortgage received net proceeds of sale of approximately $605 000 (being $590 710.80 plus the deposit of $14 200).  It had been rented out from time to time for the period the parties moved back to the C Town property until its sale.  The wife’s unchallenged evidence was that the rent that was obtained approximately equalled the outgoings of the property.

16. On 16 April 2008 the wife used $253 565.33 to discharge the mortgage secured over the C Town property. 

17. On 30 April 2008 the wife provided $210 000 to the husband’s father’s company N Pty Ltd (“N”) and $60 000 to Laske Holdings Pty Ltd. 

18. There was no admissible evidence adduced by the wife as to why this occurred.  The evidence of the husband and his father was that the money was paid to those companies to avoid a claim by Mr E.  Although the wife had separated from Mr E and, apparently reached a property settlement with him of some kind (as is evidenced by her receiving the funds that enabled her to purchase the Suburb K property) the settlement had not been finalised in a binding way. 

19. On 10 March 2008 solicitors acting for Mr E served the wife with a Notice of Intention to Start a Case.  The foreshadowed case was a case for leave to commence a property settlement out of time and for a property settlement.  Mr E was seeking a payment of $260 000 and proposed a settlement offer of $200 000.  There was a subsequent meeting on an unidentified date involving lawyers for Mr E and the wife which did not resolve the husband’s claim. He then took no steps to pursue that claim. 

20. It is not disputed by the wife that Mr I Laske, the husband’s father, is extremely wealthy.  Given the timing of the payments, the lack of any identified need for the payment and the wealth of Mr Laske it is more probable than not that the funds were paid to those entities as a response to the claim by Mr E. 

21. The advances were repaid on 16 December 2009 together with $5 000 interest.

22. On 23 May 2009 Mr E passed away and the three children of the relationship between him and the wife commenced to live with the parties full time. 

23. In August 2009 the husband ceased to be employed because his father sold the business.  The husband’s affidavits refer to the sale taking place in August 2010 but the weight of the evidence and his tax returns would seem to indicate that it was the earlier date. 

24. On 14 July 2010 the parties purchased a time share interest in Country D.  The wife paid a deposit of $3 200, a payment of $12 844 on 23 July 2010 and instalments of $1 333.34 a month for 12 months – a total of $32 044.

25. During this period the husband continued to receive significant payments of money notwithstanding he was no longer employed.  The husband’s taxable income disclosed in his income tax returns was:

Year	Income
Year ending 30 June 2004	$73 222
Year ending 30 June 2005	$100 749
Year ending 30 June 2006	$92 677
Year ending 30 June 2007	$114 385
Year ending 30 June 2008	$178 269
Year ending 30 June 2009	$183 637
Year ending 30 June 2010	$178 841
Year ending 30 June 2011	$167 617
Year ending 30 June 2012	$155

(Affidavit of Mr Laske sworn 21 June 2013 at [28])

1. The tax returns indicate that for a number of years his wages as a manager were low and that the bulk of his income came from distributions from a family trust. 

2. From the year ended 30 June 2011 the husband continued to receive payments of the same order per annum from his father but it was his evidence, and his father’s evidence, that these payments were not distributions from a trust but were loans from the father to the husband.  It was the husband’s evidence that they would need to be repaid in due course.  His father’s evidence was that they would be repaid when the C Town property was sold.  As I have said the husband’s father is wealthy and his evidence was he has made significant provision for each of his children although he did say that the payments that he was making to the husband by way of a loan exceeded those that he had made to his other children.

3. Each described the agreement as a handshake agreement but could not recall when and where it had been made. They differed on the terms. The husband said in his affidavit that he had to repay the funds borrowed after March 2012.  In cross-examination, when asked about his income of $155 for the year up to June 2012 he said that his father gave him money when he needed it, that there was a handshake agreement and that he owed his father about $250 000 which he would repay on the sale of the property. The husband did not disclose any liability to his father in his financial statement filed on 21 June 2013 because he understood, he said, that to be a reference to banks or financial institutions. In his financial statement filed on 5 February 2015 the husband disclosed a debt of $215 000 owed to his father, as described in his affidavit.

4. Mr I Laske said that the husband was paid dividends from the trust until March 2012 and that since then he has advanced him money as he has needed it. He said at [7]:

   I do not have any formal arrangement with [Mr Laske] for return of the money I have advanced to him, however, we have an understanding that if the C Town property is sold he will repay me.

   (Affidavit of Mr I Laske sworn 16 October 2013)

5. It is difficult to reconcile this with the husband’s tax returns which show no distributions from the trust after June 2011.

6. In cross-examination Mr Laske said that the loans commenced on the sale of the business in 2009. He then referred to them being dividends. When asked if “they” were repayable, he said that that he was a bit vague on that, that he gave him money as a loan later on, when he sold the business. There was, he said, an agreement later on but could not give a date.

7. The husband has undoubtedly received substantial funds from his father who, as he said, has provided financial assistance. Taking all the above versions into account, it is more likely than not that there is an understanding between the husband and his father that he will only have to repay these sums if the house is sold. In any event, it is unlikely that Mr I Laske would require repayment if that put the husband in a difficult financial position.

8. The wife bought a 4WD for $61 210 in November 2010. 

9. On 7 January 2012 the parties separated when the wife moved out of the C Town property into a four bedroom home which was rented.  At the time she had $86 260.35 in her Westpac Reward Saver Account and $8 400 in her Westpac Choice Account. 

10. In January 2013 the wife moved into a rented home unit.  Until April 2013 Mr F, Mr G and Mr H lived with her.   Mr G moved out in April 2013.  L and M presently spend alternate weeks with each of the parties and stay in the wife’s rented accommodation along with the other children and the wife when they are living with her.  The husband has continued to live in the C Town property.

11. On 9 February 2014 the husband obtained a job.  The husband is a tradesman although he has spent all of his working life working in the business.  He presently receives approximately $1 200 per fortnight. 

12. The wife obtained work earning up to approximately $550 per week gross, although her hours vary.  Her current rent is $720 per week.  She receives some Government assistance and since October 2012 has received $250 per month from the husband as child support.  She has substantially used the funds that she took with her at the time of separation to live on.  At the time of the hearing she had negligible funds in her bank accounts.

13. In 2003 a company owned by Mr I Laske, N, purchased land near Suburb O.  The property was described by the parties as “Property P”.  The property has on it a house and a cabin and was used generally by the Laske family as a holiday home.  The husband formed the view that the development of a boutique resort at Property P was feasible and would be a suitable employment option after the sale of the business.  The intention, according to his father, was for part of the Property P property to be leased to the husband for this purpose.  A number of steps were taken to engage architects and planners to pursue the development of the holiday cabins at Property P and considerable sums of money were spent by, it appears, Mr I Laske’s companies to pursue it.  The husband said that upon the separation of the parties he lost interest in the project and did not pursue it further.  The husband had spent considerable time and effort including frequently traveling to that property to pursue that venture.  It was not submitted that any of the monies spent in relation to Property P should be taken into account in any way. 

14. The significant issue in the proceedings concerned the disbursement of the proceeds of the sale of the Suburb K property.  As has been described earlier the wife received $275 000 back into her bank accounts in December 2009.  The wife asserted without contradiction that from these funds she made the following substantial payments:

Country D Timeshare	$32 000
4WD motor vehicle	$61 300
Loan to her parents (repaid in September 2011)	$20 000
Loan to her cousin (repaid over 6 months)	$6 000
Motor vehicle for Mr G	$8 500
Discharge CBA Bank Loan for  Mr F	$11 632.20
Payment of credit card debt	$6 000

(Affidavit of Ms Laske affirmed 21 June 2013 [61] – [68])

1. The wife then said that she applied $7 425 to braces for Mr G, $6 757.20 to Centrelink for a payment of benefits and $58 000 towards a post separation rent.

2. Taking into account the repayments of the loans these total some $191 614 leaving a total of $83 300 not referred to specifically.  Of these funds the wife said that they were used to reduce her credit card debts with the Suburb Q Credit Union, Westpac and the Commonwealth Bank which were incurred for family expenses, preschool fees for L and M and day to day living expenses of the family.  It seems that both the husband and the wife contributed towards the preschool fees.

3. The wife also asserted that she provided $26 000 directly to the husband from time to time at his request.  She could not say how this sum was arrived at. The husband denied this.

4. The husband submitted that there was approximately $130 000 unaccounted for because he did not include the last four payments. 

5. The fate of the wife’s funds was not a new issue.  On 13 March 2013 the solicitors for the husband forwarded a detailed request for particulars, to the extent of asking how cash withdrawals of $1 000 made in 2008 were utilised.  Frequently, the response of the wife was “applied towards the day to day living expenses of the [Laske] family household” or words to similar effect.  The husband tendered a document which consolidated the requests and the answers and then inserted comments by the husband.  The comments were usually to the extent that the husband did not accept the explanation as to all or part of the sum subject to the particular request.  It is not at all surprising that the wife could not provide the particulars sought by of how she had spent cash withdrawals up to five years ago.

6. In these circumstances, the husband submits that the wife has not established how she has spent at least $130 000 of the proceeds of sale of the Suburb K property.  It follows, he submits, that the financial contribution of the wife to the matrimonial property is $605 000 less $130 000 and not the $605 000 net proceeds of the Suburb K property. 

7. If, on the other hand, as the wife asserts that sum was spent principally on the family and living expenses the contribution is $605 000. 

8. The husband does not submit that some part of the “unexplained” funds is being held somewhere for the benefit of the wife or the children.  Although the husband said that he was told by the wife that she was going to establish a trust fund for the benefit of her children there is no evidence that this was ever done. 

9. The wife tendered her relevant bank statements and credit card statements.  The husband did not point to any transaction in those documents as being one that was obviously not for day to day living expenses or ordinary sums spent during the course of a relationship.  The husband does not point to any expenditure, prior to or after separation, that was obviously not for family or living expenses.

10. When one adds to this the difference between the income of the wife and the rent that she had to pay since separation there is a ready explanation for the fate of the funds held by the wife at the time of separation.

1. Taking all these things into consideration it is more likely than not that the wife applied the proceeds of sale to family and living expenses both before and after separation. Accordingly, I accept her evidence to that effect.

2. It is also to be recalled that it is not the function of the court to audit a marriage and the way the parties spent their funds.

3. It follows that her financial contribution was the full sale proceeds of Suburb K.

Applicable Principles

1. According to guidelines established through a series of leading decisions the court is required to determine the following matters:

   a)The assets, liabilities and financial resources of the parties to the marriage.

   b)Having regard to the breakdown of the marriage if any, is it just and equitable to consider whether the alteration of the parties’ interests in their properties is just and equal.

   c)All relevant contributions of each of the parties.  

   d)The matters in paragraphs (a) – (c) of s 79(4), must be identified and weighed against each other.

   e)The matters in paragraphs (d) – (g) of s 79(4), particularly paragraph (e) which takes up, by reference, the provisions of s 75(2) must be considered and a determination made as to what, if any, alterations should be made to the entitlements of the parties earlier assessed on account of their contributions.

2. An order under s 79 of the Act must not be made unless the court is satisfied in all of the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order.

3. The parties were agreed that the Country D Timeshare property should be sold and divided in the same proportion as the court determines the other property should be divided.  They agreed, therefore, that it should not appear in the parties’ list of assets for division. 

4. The husband is the owner of a vintage sedan valued at $16 500 and the wife currently has a Japanese car (the 4WD having been sold) valued at $14 000.  The parties agreed that each should retain their vehicle and these items should not appear in the list of assets to be divided.  They came to the same agreement in relation to household contents and to their bank accounts, none of which had any sums of significance in them in any event.  Similarly they agreed that their credit card liabilities approximately offset each other and should be excluded. 

5. Therefore the only item of dispute was whether a payment of $11 825 paid from the wife’s bank account for her legal fees should be added back.  It was not disputed that that payment came from what might be described as “matrimonial property”. In accordance with the principles set out in Chorn & Hopkins (2004) FLC 93-204, it is to be added back to the parties’ property. The husband’s legal fees are being paid by his father and need not be considered further.

6. It was also submitted by the husband, without dispute that there should be added to the liabilities $3 400 for the Country D Timeshare.  Thus excluding the properties and liabilities of the parties excluded by agreement the property and liabilities to be considered for division at the time of hearing are:

Assets:
50 per cent share in B Street, C Town	$1 050 000
Wife’s legal fees	$11 825
Total assets:	$1 061 825
Liabilities:
Husband’s debt to the Department of Primary Industry	$9 075
Country D Timeshare	$3 400
Total Liabilities:	$12 475

1. The parties have the following superannuation:

Husband: Laske Superannuation Fund	$68 299
Wife: Colonial Super Retirement Fund	$63 874
Total Superannuation:	$132 173

1. Thus the parties’ total net assets to be considered for distribution are $1 181 523.

Subsection 79(2) of the Act

1. I must first determine whether it is just and equitable that there be an alteration of the property rights of the parties. This must be done by consideration of the relationship, its breakdown, the property held by the parties and the basis on which it was held and used by them. The determination is not to be conflated with the consideration of matters arising under s 79(4) of the Act.

2. In the present case I am satisfied that it is just and equitable to make orders altering the interests of the parties to the marriage to the property held by them.  They are no longer living in a marital relationship.  As the parties are no longer living together in a married relationship the basis on which their property was owned and used has ended. It is appropriate, therefore, that their property interests are altered so as to meet their new needs and circumstances.

Contributions

1. The husband made a significantly greater contribution than the wife to the initial property of the parties.  He introduced real property with a value of $937 500. The wife introduced real property that was later sold realising $605 000.  The other property introduced by each them seems to be similar in amount. 

2. Throughout the marriage the husband was the sole income earner. The fact that much of this income came from trusts controlled by his father does not diminish the contribution.  Also to be taken into account is the contribution made by the husband’s father in letting the parties reside in a property half owned by him not requiring the payment of any rent.

3. The husband provided financial support for the three children of the wife’s previous marriage at the times they were living with her. This was a substantial financial contribution by the husband.

4. For whatever reason it was made, the payment of the wife to N was of benefit to the husband’s father albeit of a very limited nature. 

5. It was not disputed by the wife that the husband’s overall financial contribution was significantly greater than the wife’s.   

6. As was readily conceded by the husband, the wife was the primary care giver to all the children and homemaker and parent.  Nonetheless the husband played a role, including, importantly, the same role as father to her three children of the previous marriage as he did to their children. He was, of course, spending significant time at the business.

7. The wife said that she worked a number of days each year in the business.  The husband’s father agreed that she assisted for a couple of days in the installation of the MYOB payroll system but not otherwise.  I do not think it is of great significance that she may have assisted half a dozen days a year.  

8. The wife played a substantial role in the renovation of the C Town property by overseeing tradesmen, arranging and paying bills and the like. The husband spent time in attempting to develop Property P as a venture for the parties.

9. Since separation the wife has borne the burden of providing the children with a home when they are with her with little assistance from the husband who has had the benefit of residing rent free in the C Town property while the wife has been forced to seek rented accommodation. 

10. The children of the marriage have spent equal time with each parent and each parent has supported them while with that parent. 

11. The appropriate finding is that the non-financial contribution of the wife and, particularly, her contribution to the welfare of the family up to the time of separation, exceeded that of the husband. This is so even taking into account the husband’s parenting of the wife’s children from her earlier marriage because the husband spent a large part of his time working.

12. Taking all these matters into account the financial and non-financial contributions of the parties to the property the subject of these proceedings and to the welfare of the family should be regarded as being 60 per cent to the husband and 40 per cent to the wife. 

Subsection 79 (4) of the Family Law Act

1. It is then necessary to consider whether any adjustment should be made pursuant to the matters raised by s 79(4)(d)–(g) of the Act.

2. I do not consider that any order I make in this matter will have an effect upon the earning capacity of either party. 

3. The parties are in good health. 

4. The wife is earning a limited income as a casual cleaner.  Her hours are variable.  Her sole employment skills consisted of a familiarity with the accounting program MYOB from employment she held prior to the marriage.  The wife did not work throughout the marriage and obviously her MYOB skills need to be updated.  A course identified by the wife to do this would cost some $750 although, as she has said, having regard to her age and experience there is no guarantee of a job at a higher wage although she will do what she can to obtain one. 

5. The husband is presently earning a limited income as well.  His qualifications as a cook are also well out of date although he does have the skills necessary to manage a supermarket.  He gave no evidence as to any attempts by him to seek work in that field or what other work might be available to him. 

6. Taking these matters into account the wife is in somewhat greater need than the husband.  The wealth of the husband’s father cannot be taken into account as a financial resource of the husband although it is more likely than not that the husband’s father would not require the husband to sell the C Town property so as to repay any advances made by him. 

7. Each of the parties shares equally in the care and control of the two children of the marriage who are presently aged nine and seven.  The wife’s children by a previous marriage live with her although they are now all over the age of 18. 

8. As I have said the wife has the obligation to pay rent in order to house herself and the children.  The husband does not have that obligation. 

9. The marriage, including cohabitation prior to marriage, was some seven and a half years.  Whilst not a particularly long period it was long enough for the wife to be out of the workforce to render her work skills less useful. 

10. The court is entitled to take into account any other matter that is relevant. 

11. As I have found, the parties conducted this marriage on the basis that the wife’s property was sold and a significant part of those funds were used to reduce the mortgage on the C Town property.  The husband and the father were thus relieved of having to find, or expend, the income to support the mortgage.  The other proceeds of that property were, as I have said were expended on living expenses for the family.  That is not to say that I find that the wife paid all of the living expenses of the family, but she paid her share from the proceeds of capital.  The husband paid his from income. It was the evidence of both parties that, substantially, they managed their own financial affairs. The difference is that, at the end of the marriage, the wife is without capital and the husband has retained his. 

12. Taking all these factors into account I am of the view that there should be a five per cent adjustment in the wife’s favour.  This percentage of the total means an adjustment of $59 076 in favour of the wife. This is appropriate having regard to the difference in earning capacity, the need to provide accommodation for herself and the children when they are with her and the use of her capital, as opposed to the husband’s for expenditure on family and living expenses.

Conclusion

1. Thus, having regard to the property that is to be divided the subject of these orders, $1 181 523, she is entitled to $531 685.

2. As agreed the parties will otherwise retain the assets and liabilities in their possession and bear the liabilities they have for credit cards.  They will each retain their superannuation.

3. The husband wishes, unsurprisingly, to retain the C Town property.  It was not disputed that he should be given the opportunity to raise the funds if necessary to pay the wife before any orders are made for the sale of the property.  The husband’s father was not a party to the proceedings so orders for sale cannot be made in these proceedings, merely orders requiring the husband to do what he can to realise his interest in the property.  Appropriate orders to facilitate that sale, including the joinder to Mr I Laske to have trustees for sale appointed, can be obtained later if necessary. 

4. Taking all of the above matters into account, I am satisfied that the orders I propose to make are appropriate, that is to say, just and equitable taking into account all of the matters I have discussed under the heading s 79(4) as set out above. The orders meet, as best they can in the circumstances, the obligation under s 81 of the Act finally to determine the financial relationship between the parties and avoid further proceedings between them to the extent possible.

I certify that the preceding ninety (90) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Aldridge delivered on 27 March 2015.

Associate:    

Date:  27 March 2015