Larne-Jones v Human Synergistics Australia Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 54 min read

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

LARNE-JONES v HUMAN SYNERGISTICS AUSTRALIA LTD [2013] FCCA 1498
Catchwords:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application to set aside notice to produce – whether abuse of process or vexatious – whether test of apparent relevance satisfied. 

Legislation:  

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s.55
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss.44,117, 340, 351, 361
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr.1.06, 15A.17

Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Emergency Transport Technology Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 181
Bailey v Beagle Management Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 60
Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay and Another (2012) 86 ALJR 1044; [2012] HCA 32
Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Limited v BlueScope Steel Limited [2010] FCA 739
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 61
Cosco Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Taxation (1997) 37 ATR 432; [1997] FCA 1504
Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486; [1989] HCA 21
ING Bank Australia Limited v Athanasakis [2010] FMCA 307
Khiani v Australian Bureau of Statistics [2011] FCAFC 109
Larne-Jones v Human Synergistics Australia Limited [2013] FMCA 206
Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No. 11) [2006] FCA 174
Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Limited (No. 2) (1989) 88 ALR 90
Walker & Sherman & Anor v Andrew & Ors [2002] NSWCA 214
Applicant: MARGHERITA LARNE-JONES
First Respondent: HUMAN SYNERGISTICS AUSTRALIA LIMITED ACN 093 428 098
File Number: SYG 2736 of 2011
Judgment of: Judge Barnes
Hearing date: 13 June 2013
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 30 September 2013

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S. Meehan
Solicitors for the Applicant: Kemp Strang
Solicitors for the First Respondent: FCB Workplace Law

ORDERS

  1. The following parts of the Notice to Produce filed on 14 May 2013 be set aside:

    (a)Paragraph 1(a), (c) and (d);

    (b)The sub-paragraphs in Paragraph 2 other than sub-paragraph (e);

    (c)Paragraph 5; and

    (d)Paragraph 10. 

  2. The parties bring in short minutes of orders within 7 days of today’s date containing a timetable for production of documents in all categories in the Notice to Produce not set aside. 

  3. If the parties are unable to agree on such a timetable each party is to file proposed orders and written submissions within 7 days of today’s date and orders will be made in chambers. 

  4. Liberty to either party to apply on 3 days’ notice. 

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AT SYDNEY

SYG 2736 of 2011

MARGHERITA LARNE-JONES

Applicant

HUMAN SYNERGISTICS AUSTRALIA LIMITED
ACN 093 428 098

First Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. Human Synergistics Australia Limited (HSA), the First Respondent in substantive proceedings brought by Ms Larne-Jones under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWA) in relation to termination of her employment, seeks orders setting aside 9 paragraphs in a Notice to Produce. The Notice to Produce was served on the solicitors for HSA by the solicitors for Ms Larne-Jones by letter dated 8 May 2013. An amended copy of the Notice to Produce was…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Larne-Jones v Human Synergistics Australia Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2013] FCCA 1498
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Ms Larne-Jones against Human Synergistics Australia Ltd (HSA) before Judge Barnes. The dispute arose from Ms Larne-Jones' summary dismissal from her employment. Ms Larne-Jones alleged that her dismissal was adverse action taken because of her workers' compensation claim, a mental disability, or her marital status, and that HSA had contravened provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWA). She also claimed breach of contract, including entitlement to notice or payment in lieu of notice, and a reasonable bonus.

The court was required to determine whether HSA took adverse action against Ms Larne-Jones for prohibited reasons under the FWA, specifically whether her workers' compensation claim, mental disability, or marital status played a part in the decision to dismiss her. Additionally, the court needed to consider whether HSA breached Ms Larne-Jones' employment contract by summarily terminating her employment without providing the contractual entitlement to reasonable notice or payment in lieu, and whether she was entitled to a reasonable bonus under an implied term of her contract.

In relation to the adverse action claim, the court noted that direct evidence of a decision-maker's reasons can be unreliable and that the circumstances leading up to the dismissal may be relevant to inferring prohibited reasons. However, the central issue was not whether Ms Larne-Jones actually engaged in misconduct, but whether HSA could discharge the onus under s 361 of the FWA by establishing that the dismissal was not for the asserted prohibited reasons. Regarding the contractual claims, HSA contended that no implied terms for a bonus or reasonable notice existed, asserting that the express terms of clause 12 of the Employment Agreement governed termination.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

It is the case that, as French CJ and Crennan J pointed out in Barclay (at [45]), “[d]irect evidence of the reason why a decision-maker took adverse action … may be unreliable because of other contradictory evidence given by the decision-maker or because other objective facts are proven which contradict the decision-maker’s evidence” (emphasis added). Thus the Court may have to consider evidence of events that preceded and culminated in Ms Larne-Jones’ dismissal (see AFMEPKIU at [23]. However the issue of why adverse action was taken (Barclay at [44]) arises in the context of determining whether it was for any of the asserted prohibited reasons. The circumstances leading up to Ms Larne-Jones’ termination may be of relevance to the adverse action claim if evidence in that respect could give rise to an inference that her worker’s compensation claim, her alleged mental disability or her marital status played a part in HSA’s decision to dismiss her summarily such that HSA may not meet the onus placed on it under s.361 of the FWA. However these proceedings are not the occasion for a broad-ranging enquiry as to whether Ms Larne-Jones in fact engaged in serious misconduct. Rather, what would be in issue under s.361 (if applicable) would be whether on the evidence, including any direct evidence from the HSA decision-makers as to the reason or reasons they acted to dismiss Ms Larne-Jones, HSA established that it did not dismiss Ms Larne-Jones because of her worker’s compensation right or claim, mental disability or marital status. The solicitor for HSA indicated in submissions that HSA does not seek to establish in this context that Ms Larne-Jones in fact engaged in misconduct such as to warrant her dismissal. Apart from the adverse action claim, Ms Larne-Jones has relevantly pleaded a contravention of s.44 of the FWA and that by summarily terminating her employment for gross misconduct HSA breached her employment contract. However the bases for these claims and the issues in dispute on the pleadings require further consideration. Ms Larne-Jones claimed an entitlement to 5 weeks written notice or payment in lieu thereof under s.117 of the FWA and that the failure to make such payment was a contravention of s.44 of the FWA. HSA does not seek to rely on any claim of misconduct by Ms Larne-Jones in relation to this issue. As pleaded, Ms Larne-Jones’ contractual claims are, relevantly, to an entitlement to a reasonable bonus under an implied term (paragraphs 8(b) and (c), 12 and 13 and 14 of the Statement of Claim) and to reasonable notice of termination under an implied term which is said to apply save and except in the circumstance where there was a right to summary dismissal for serious and wilful misconduct (paragraphs 8(e), 26 and 29 of the Statement of Claim). In the Defence HSA claimed that there were no implied terms in the contract under which Ms Larne-Jones was entitled to a bonus or to reasonable notice. It was asserted that the termination provisions of the contract were the express terms in cl.12 of the Employment Agreement (Paragraph 8 of the Defence).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.