Lappin & Menz
[2025] FedCFamC2F 321
•14 March 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Lappin & Menz [2025] FedCFamC2F 321
File number(s): DUC 402 of 2023 Judgment of: JUDGE OBRADOVIC Date of judgment: 14 March 2025 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – De facto relationship of 12 years – Greater earning capacity – Carer responsibilities – Existing student loan – Applicant proposes 50/50 – Respondent proposes no adjustment or 15/85 – Just and equitable considerations Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 90SF, 90SM Cases cited: Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116
Chapman & Chapman [2014] FamCAFC 91
Costello & Langdon [2024] FedCFamC1A 168
Oamra & Williams [2021] FamCAFC 117
Peters & Walker [2015] FamCA 732
Robb & Robb (1995) FLC 92-555
Russell & Russell (1999) FLC 92-877
Stanford v Stanford [2012] HCA 52
Teal & Teal [2010] FamCAFC 120
Trevi & Trevi [2018] FamCAFC 173
Division: Division 2 Family Law Number of paragraphs: 98 Date of hearing: 7 February 2025 Place: Dubbo Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J Kadar Solicitor for the Applicant: Baldock Stacy & Niven Counsel for the Respondent: Mr C Alexander Solicitor for the Respondent: Campbell Paton & Taylor
Table of Corrections 14 March 2025 At paragraph 78 the word “respondent’s” is replaced with the word “applicant’s”. ORDERS
DUC 402 of 2023 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: MR LAPPIN
Applicant
AND: MS MENZ
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE OBRADOVIC
DATE OF ORDER:
14 MARCH 2025
THE COURT ORDERS:
1.That within three months of the date of these orders, the respondent pay to the applicant the sum of $179,048.
2.That other than as provided in Order 1, each party shall be solely entitled to all assets both real and personal in his or her possession at the date of these orders.
3.That other than as provided for in these orders, each party shall be solely responsible for all liabilities in their respective names, and shall indemnify the other party from and in respect of all actions, claims, suits and demands as may be made in respect of such liabilities.
4.That in the event that the respondent does not make the payment in Order 1 by the specified date, then the respondent shall immediately do all things required to sell the property at B Street, City C (“City C property”) as follows:
(a)The City C property shall be listed for sale by way of private treaty with such real estate agent and solicitor/conveyancer as agreed to between the parties, and failing agreement:
(i)With an agent nominated by the President of the Real Institute of NSW; and
(ii)A solicitor/conveyancer nominated by the President of the NSW Law Society.
(b)In the event that the City C property is not sold by private treaty, pursuant to Order 4(a) above, within 6 months of the date of these Orders, then the respondent shall do all acts and things necessary to effect the sale of the City C property by auction within a further period of 6 weeks.
(c)In the event the City C property does not sell by auction, pursuant to Order 4(b) above, then the respondent shall continue to list the property for auction every 6 weeks, with a reserve price of 5% less than that which was set at auction previously, until such time as the property sells.
(d)The proceeds of sale of the City C property shall be paid in the following manner and priority:
(i)To discharge the mortgage to D Bank, Mortgage No. …;
(ii)Payment of any outstanding Land Tax, Council rates, water rates, and other levies and outgoings on the City C property;
(iii)Payment of the real estate agent’s fees and commission on the sale and legal costs associated with the sale; and
(iv)The balance:
A.As to 40% to the applicant; and
B.As to 60% to the respondent.
5.That the orders below have effect from the operative time.
6.That in accordance with s 90XT(4) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“Act”), a base amount of $60,957 be allocated to the applicant out of the respondent’s interest in Super Fund 1 (Member No. …) noting that the respondent’s said interest is held under the member name “Ms Menz”.
7.That pursuant to s 90XT(1)(a) of the Act, whenever a splitable payment become payable in respect of the respondent’s interest in Super Fund 1, the trustee of Super Fund 1 shall pay to the applicant the entitlement calculated in accordance with Pt 6 of the Family Law Superannuation (Regulations) 2001 (Cth) using the base amount allocated in Order 6 and there shall be a corresponding reduction in the entitlement the respondent would have had in Super Fund 1 but for these orders.
8.That, having been accorded procedural fairness in relation to the making of this Order, this Order binds the trustee of the superannuation fund.
9.That the operative time for this order is 4 business days after the date of service of these orders on the trustee of the superannuation fund.
10.Pursuant to s 106A of the Act a Registrar of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia is authorised to execute any document or do any such thing as is required to give effect to these orders in the event of a default of a party to execute such document or do such things as is necessary under these orders.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Amended pursuant to r 10.14(b) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) on 14 March 2025
JUDGE OBRADOVIC:
These are property proceedings arising out of a 12-year de facto relationship between the parties. While the pool is fairly modest, comprising of one real property at City C where the respondent and her son reside, and the respondent’s superannuation, being the two most significant assets, the parties are very much apart in terms of their applications before the Court. Notional addbacks are also the subject of controversy.
The applicant contends that not only should the City C property be sold, and the proceeds split 50/50, but he also contends that there should be a superannuation splitting order, and a number of notional addbacks totalling $119,000, such that the overall split be 50/50.
The respondent’s primary position is that the property adjustment application be dismissed, and in the alternative contends that there should be an overall split of 15% to the applicant and 85% to the respondent. She concedes there should be notional addbacks of $65,000, but no more than that.
As it is not unusual in respect of some matters that come before the Court, the parties’ evidence is so vastly different at first glance that one might fail to grasp they are both referring to the same 12 years they spent together. However, after some testing of the evidence and a number of concessions being made by each of the parties, but particularly the respondent, their respective stories became significantly more aligned.
For reasons which follow, the Court finds that it is just and equitable that orders be made adjusting the property interests of the parties and that the overall adjustment be 40% to the applicant and 60% to the respondent.
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT
Documents relied upon
The applicant relied on the following documents:
(a)Case Outline Document filed 3 February 2025;
(b)Amended Initiating Application filed 10 October 2024;
(c)Financial Statement filed 19 December 2024;
(d)Affidavit of Mr E filed 19 December 2024;
(e)Affidavit of Mr F filed 19 December 2024; and
(f)Affidavit of the applicant filed 20 December 2024.
The respondent relied on the following documents:
(a)Case Outline Document filed 3 February 2025;
(b)Response to Final Orders filed 6 November 2023;
(c)Affidavit of the respondent filed 20 December 2024;
(d)Affidavit of the respondent filed 4 February 2025; and
(e)Financial Statement filed 20 December 2024.
Both parties relied on the Amended Joint Balance Sheet which was handed up on 7 February 2025.
Exhibits
The following documents were tendered in the proceedings:
(1)Exhibit 1 being the Notice to Admit and Notice Disputing a Fact or Document, being at pages 243 to 248 of the respondent’s affidavit filed 20 December 2024.
(2)Exhibit 2 being the document titled ‘Customer Copy Only’ being for the 2023-24 Tax Return for the applicant, at annexure S of the affidavit of the applicant filed 20 December 2024.
(3)Exhibit 3 being a document provided by applicant showing funds said to be withdrawn from his father’s bank account, at page 2 of the respondent’s Tender Bundle.
(4)Exhibit 4 being the requests for disclose and the summary of crypto holding as at 12 February 2024 being a letter from Campbell Paton Taylor to Baldock Stacy & Niven dated 4 November 2024 and letter from Campbell Paton Taylor to Baldock Stacy & Niven dated 5 February 2024, at pages 3 to 6 of the respondent’s Tender Bundle.
(5)Exhibit 5, at pages 71 to 77 of the respondent’s Tender Bundle, being: G Bank transaction listings for periods 1 October 2021 to 20 March 2023 and 21 March 2023 to 11 February 2024; H Bank transaction listing for period 23 March 2017 to 30 October 2023; and H Bank summary 1 March 2023 to 11 February 2024.
(6)Exhibit 6 being Westpac Super Saver Statement 10, page 1of 3, and Statement 17, page 2 of 3.
(7)Exhibit 7 being D Bank, Statement 24 for the respondent.
Witnesses
The applicant was the only witness in his case.
The respondent was the only witness in her case.
RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The overall approach to the determination of an application for property adjustment orders was set out by the High Court in Stanford v Stanford.[1] The High Court recorded three fundamental propositions. The first was the need to identify existing legal and equitable interests; the second was that those interests can only be altered by a principled application of judicial discretion; and the third was that, the requirement that the Court must not make any order, unless it is satisfied that in all of the circumstances it is just and equitable to make the order, requires separate consideration and should not be conflated with the statutory considerations required to be taken into consideration as to what order, if any, should be made.[2]
[1] [2012] HCA 52, see in particular [37] to [42].
[2] Oamra & Williams [2021] FamCAFC 117 at [35].
Such approach was subsequently considered by the Full Court in Bevan & Bevan,[3] Chapman & Chapman,[4] and Costello & Langdon[5] and consistently applied, including to proceedings pursuant to the de facto relationship provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“Act”), namely Part VIIIAB.[6]
[3] [2013] FamCAFC 116 (“Bevan”).
[4] [2014] FamCAFC 91 (“Chapman”).
[5] [2024] FedCFamC1A 168 (“Costello & Langdon”).
[6] See for example Peters & Walker [2015] FamCA 732.
As noted earlier, the considerations in ss 90SM(3) and (4) of the Act should not be conflated.
As such, once the issue of whether it is just and equitable to make any order is resolved, the Court is to then consider the contributions made by the parties as defined in s 90SM(4)(a) to (c), the matters set out in s 90SM(4)(d) to (g) and, in particular, the subjective considerations as to the parties by having regard to the provisions of s 90SF(3) in so far as they are relevant.
The Court is then to consider the justice and equity of the actual orders to be made, in the context of the Court’s obligations to make appropriate orders as provided for in s 90SM(1) of the Act.[7]
[7] See generally Russell & Russell (1999) FLC 92-877; Teal & Teal [2010] FamCAFC 120, but in the context of s.79.
The just and equitable requirement is ‘one permeating the entire process’.[8]
[8] Bevan at [86].
Add-backs
In Trevi & Trevi[9] the Full Court of the then Family Court of Australia held as follows:[10]
[27]The Full Court held in Omacini and Omacini that addbacks fall into “three clear categories”: where the parties have expended money on legal fees; where there has been a premature distribution of matrimonial assets; and “waste” or wanton, negligent, or reckless dissipation of assets.
[28]However, the Full Court also made it clear that an addback does not necessarily occur whenever “a party has expended money realised from the disposition of assets that existed as at the date of separation”, the Full Court describing such a proposition as “unduly simplistic”. An earlier Full Court made the same point, saying that adding back is “the exception rather than the rule”.
[29]The fundamental precept that addbacks are exceptional, reflected in the decisions just referred to, also mirrors what has been said in earlier decisions of the Full Court that, for example, “the Family Court must take the property of a party to the marriage as it finds it” at trial. An important parallel proposition is that the parties do not “go into a state of suspended economic animation” after separation. Thus, reasonably incurred expenditure does not usually come within accepted categories of addback.
[30]Two fundamental premises emerge from Omacini and the authorities preceding it. First, “adding back” is a discretionary exercise. When the discretion is exercised in favour of adding back, it reflects a decision that, exceptionally, in the particular circumstances of a case, justice and equity requires it. The second premise is its corollary: in cases that are not “exceptional” justice and equity can be achieved, not by adding back, but by the exercise of a different discretion – usually by taking up the same as a relevant s 75(2) factor. Indeed, it has been said that the latter is “a course which is, perhaps, technically more correct” than adding back to the list of existing interests in property.
(citations omitted)
[9] [2018] FamCAFC 173 (“Trevi”).
[10] Trevi at [27]-[30].
These principles remain applicable.
FINDINGS
The respondent was born in 1972, in Country J. She is presently 53 years old.
The applicant was born in 1974 in Country K. He is presently 50 years old.
In 1995, the respondent’s only child Mr L (“Mr L”) was born. Mr L is now 29 years old. He has a medical condition and a learning disability. He continues to reside with the respondent.
The parties met in mid-2009, while they both worked and resided in the United Kingdom. At this time, Mr L was residing with the respondent’s family in Country J.
The parties lived together in rental accommodation in the United Kingdom from about mid-2009 to late 2012. During this period of time, the parties equally contributed to rent and their living expenses.
Neither party had any assets of significance at the commencement of their relationship. However, the applicant had at the time of the commencement of the parties’ relationship, and still had at final hearing, a student loan which has never been paid down. At the time, the applicant was employed as a hospitality worker, and the respondent was employed as a health care worker.
While she was living in the United Kingdom, the respondent regularly sent money to her mother in Country J, who was looking after Mr L. The respondent says this was £700 per month. She also says that between late 2009 and late 2012, the applicant regularly contributed $225 per month “to these payments”. The applicant says it was £300. The Court accepts the applicant’s evidence as to the amount he contributed (as opposed to the respondent’s conversion of the sum into Australian dollars).
In late 2010 and mid-2011, the parties travelled to Country J to spend time with Mr L. The respondent otherwise travelled to spend time with Mr L about three times each year while she lived in the United Kingdom. The parties each paid for their own travel.
During 2011 and 2012, the parties had various discussions about their future. The respondent applied for numerous positions in Australia. She ultimately secured a position at City C Hospital to commence in early 2013. The respondent applied for, and was granted a 4-year working visa to Australia.
In late 2012, the parties left the United Kingdom, travelled to Country J where they spent 5 weeks with Mr L, before all three of them embarked upon their move to Australia.
The family settled in City C, where they initially rented a two bedroom unit. The lease was in both parties’ names. The respondent’s sister gifted the parties some furniture. The parties otherwise each purchased some furniture and household goods.
After moving to Australia, the respondent commenced employment at City C Hospital immediately, and was the sole-income earner for the first few months. The respondent has always worked the night shift, that is between 9:30pm to 7:30am 4 days per week, on an alternating roster for 1-2 months, and she works two weekends a month.
Until about April 2012, the applicant was not in paid employment. However, he attended to the home duties and to Mr L’s care during the initial period of settling in. Mr L was enrolled at M School in City C where he completed 2 years of schooling. He graduated at the end of 2013.
During the parties’ relationship, the applicant had a significant involvement with Mr L and his care. He was an integral part of Mr L’s life. Not only did he assist with his basic care when required, he took on a parental role and was significantly engaged in his care and wellbeing. The applicant ran with Mr L twice a week, and he was involved in taking him to other activities over the years, such as sports matches, the local café, the cinema, and for haircuts.
In mid-2013, the applicant started working as a sales assistant initially part-time, and continued working in that field until mid-2016.
In August 2013, the respondent opened up a Westpac saver account (“account #...49”) into which she regularly deposited moneys:
(1)From August 2013, she paid $100 per fortnight into the account;
(2)From August 2014, she paid $200 per fortnight into the account;
(3)From November 2016, she paid $500 per fortnight into the account; and
(4)From October 2017 until February 2022, she paid $750 per fortnight into the account.
It was in significant part due to the applicant’s income and the application of that income towards household and family expenses, that the respondent was able to save much of that money. The respondent did also earn a higher income than the applicant as noted at [64] and [65] below.
In late 2013, the applicant’s mother visited the parties from Country K. During the parties’ relationship, the applicant travelled to Country K on numerous occasions. He also went on holidays with his brother in 2019.
In 2013, the applicant commenced studies in fitness industry qualifications. The cost of the course was initially funded by the respondent by way of a lump sum and then weekly direct debits. By 2019 the applicant had repaid the respondent back the entire sum advanced.
The applicant completed his qualifications in the fitness industry in early 2015, and commenced working in his own business “N Company”. He has remained working in that industry since.
In 2015, the parties together with Mr L, applied for permanent residence in Australia. While their application was initially knocked back, they were granted permanent residence in late 2016. The respondent took on the bulk of the work in preparing the parties’ applications, while the applicant played more of a supportive role. The bulk of the costs associated with the application of approximately $8,000 were paid by the respondent, although there were some financial contributions by the applicant as well.
In 2015, the applicant’s mother passed away and the applicant received an inheritance of $80,000. With the moneys received from the inheritance, the applicant purchased shares, a laptop for his business, paid for some further study, purchased cryptocurrency, and paid for some general expenses for the family. At final hearing, the applicant retained some of those funds in his Country K savings accounts and, in part, in the cryptocurrency holdings.
In late August 2016, the respondent added the applicant to her private health insurance. She met the cost of the premiums.
In June 2017, the parties set up a joint bank account ending in #...08 with D Bank (“the joint account”). Each of the parties would transfer $100 per week into the joint account. The joint account was closed in February 2022. The respondent’s evidence is that she generally used the funds in the joint account to pay council rates each quarter.
In early 2018, the parties purchased B Street, City C. The property was purchased for $439,000. A deposit of $40,000 was paid from savings held in the name of the respondent. The property was registered in the respondent’s name, and the respondent was the sole mortgagee and applicant on the finance. D Bank lent the respondent money to purchase the home (“account #...09”). The mortgage stood at $415,270 at the time of purchase. There was no stamp duty payable.
The mortgage payments were debited from the applicant’s personal account or by way of salary sacrifice. The respondent gives very detailed evidence about the quantum of her financial contributions towards the City C property. During the parties’ relationship, the total mortgage payments made by the respondent were $84,862 including approximately $30,000 by way of salary sacrifice. These repayments reduced the capital debt by approximately $50,000.
From shortly after the City C property was purchased, the applicant transferred $600 every week into the respondent’s D Bank account ending in #...07 (“ account #...07”). The transfers were headed “mortgage”. The respondent disputes that the moneys were used by her towards the payment of the mortgage. These payments totalled $24,000.
In her affidavit, the respondent says that she generally let these funds in #...07 sit as a form of savings, but dipped into them from time to time. She did not consult the applicant about the use of funds. She also says that Mr L contributed $10,000 in June 2020, and that she periodically paid $50 to $100 per month into that account.
In her oral evidence, the respondent however said that the $600 transferred by the applicant each week was used for household expenses.
The respondent also conceded in her oral evidence that on top of the $600 per week contribution, the applicant would purchase groceries for the home and pay for various household expenses, such as streaming services, internet, and gas. The respondent paid the electricity.
The applicant purchased some new furniture and household goods for the family while they lived in the City C property. The applicant paid for a tree surgeon in 2020, and contributed to gardening expenses. At times, the applicant bought clothing for Mr L and the respondent.
In late 2018, the parties together with Mr L, travelled together to Country J on holiday. Over the course of their relationship, the parties travelled together to participate in running festivals, and occasionally on holidays. It was usual practice for them to split the costs of such trips half-half, albeit the applicant might have met the entire cost upfront initially.
In early 2020, the parties became Australian citizens.
In 2020, the applicant’s father passed away, and the applicant received $11,000 by way of inheritance. In December 2020, the applicant purchased Motor Vehicle 1. The vehicle is subject to finance. The applicant retains the vehicle at final hearing.
In 2020, the respondent’s sister and her family lived with the parties in City C for a period of 10-12 months.
The applicant assisted the respondent by sending $3,000 to the respondent’s mother and paying for the respondent’s sister’s children’s private school fees in 2021.
In 2021, the respondent’s mother passed away. The estate is yet to be administered, and there are some debts the estate has, associated with medical costs. It is not clear on the evidence when and how much inheritance the respondent may receive from the estate.
The parties separated in September 2021.
The respondent has since separation, remained living in the City C property with Mr L. She has been responsible for meeting all of the costs associated with the property, bar streaming services which the applicant pays for, but the respondent does not use.
Following separation, the applicant moved into rental accommodation paying $460 per week, after initially staying with a friend for a few weeks. In June 2022, the applicant moved back into the residence of his friend, where he pays board of $800 per month.
On 29 November 2021, the respondent transferred three sums of money as follows :
(1)From account #...07: $4,000 to her sister;
(2)From account #...07: $50,000 to her sister for her late mother’s estate; and
(3)From account #...09: $65,000 to her sister to be held on trust for Mr L.
The respondent concedes that the sum of $65,000 should be notionally added back into the pool. This will be done. She, however, submits that the additional $54,000 should not be so added back. There is no logical or legal reason as to why the payments out of the account are differentiated. The respondent has further conceded that she will get some of the $50,000 and some of the $4,000 back, although she is not sure when nor how much. It is appropriate that the entire $119,000 be notionally added back into the pool. It was money that would otherwise have been available to the parties, and which remains available to the respondent. If the Court is wrong about this, the funds would in any event have otherwise been considered as a financial resource available to the respondent.
After the parties separated and to early November 2024, the respondent paid approximately $84,000 in mortgage repayments, of which some $28,000 was by way of salary sacrifice. These repayments reduced the capital debt by approximately $50,000.
Since the purchase of the City C property, the capital debt on the mortgage has been reduced by just over $101,000. However, the property has significantly grown in value, simply by virtue of market movements resulting in capital growth. The property is now valued at $770,000, some $330,000 more than at the time of purchase. It has equity of approximately $456,000, as opposed to $40,000 at the time of purchase. While these are rough figures only, they do assist in understanding the broader picture.
The parties agreed that their income over the relevant period after moving to Australia was as follows:
Financial Year
(to 30 June)Applicant’s Gross Income Applicant’s Taxable Income Respondent’s Gross Income Respondent’s Taxable Income 2013 0 0 31,006 30,536 2014 24,252 24,136 96,503 96,243 2015 7,600 4,207 95,164 95,423 2016 23,002 13,611 106,290 105,561 2017 32,700 18,469 100,867 96,526 2018 39,666 19,302 113,326 99,256 2019 39,042 16,443 109,445 108,338 2020 78,268 58,992 113,326 106,311 2021 115,154 82,535 115,445 113,918
The parties agreed that post-separation their income was as follows:
Financial Year
(to 30 June)Applicant’s Gross Income Applicant’s Taxable Income Respondent’s Gross Income Respondent’s Taxable Income 2022 89,400 56,524 115,067 113,156 2023 72,790 45,699 135,784 131,401 2024 79,781 45,481 148,934 145,782 DETERMINATION
The respondent’s affidavit was drafted in a way which sought to persuade the reader that the parties’ relationship was in essence one sided and that the respondent was by and large the only person who made any financial and non-financial contributions towards the assets of the parties and the family unit. Her evidence and case were crafted in a way that suggested that the parties kept all their finances separate, that the applicant had little if anything to do with the care of the respondent’s son who has special needs, and that the applicant did little if anything for the benefit of the household or the family in general. Likewise, her case was run on the basis that the applicant’s financial contributions were significantly less than those of the respondent and, as a consequence, that there should be no adjustment to the parties’ property interests.
She did however make numerous concessions in cross-examination, including that the applicant paid for some, but not all, groceries, that the applicant contributed to the care of her son in a way which involved taking him out, paying for recreational activities for him, ensuring he was cared for as required while the respondent was at work, and in general that throughout the parties’ relationship both the applicant and the respondent were actively involved in caring for the respondent’s son. They were a family.
It is likely that the tactics employed by the respondent when preparing and running her case were borne out of a deep sense of hurt, and perhaps anger, arising from the manner in which the parties’ relationship broke down. Fault, however, plays no part in the legal determination of the issues before the Court.
Existing Interests
At final hearing, the parties had the following property:
Ownership Description Value Respondent B Street, City C $770,000 Respondent Mortgage with D Bank ($314,043) Respondent Bank accounts $10,486 Respondent Super Fund 1 $152,393 Respondent Notional Addbacks (withdrawals on 29 November 2021) $119,000 Applicant Motor Vehicle 1 $43,630 Applicant Bank accounts $3,528 Applicant Crypto Holdings $29,274 Applicant Country K bank accounts $27,881 Applicant O Bank (car finance) ($12,848) Applicant Super Fund 2 $418 Applicant Student Loan ($56,270) Total: $ 773,449 Is it just and equitable to adjust the parties’ property interests?
It is not assumed that the parties’ rights or interests should be different to that which already exists.[11] The Court can take into account considerations under s 90SM(4) when determining whether or not it is just and equitable to divide the parties’ property.[12]
[11] Stanford at [40].
[12] Costello & Langdon at [28].
Noting the period of the parties’ relationship, and the myriad of contributions made over that period, the Court is satisfied that it is just and equitable to embark on a division of the parties’ property by way of alteration of their respective interests.
Contributions
The parties lived as a family. They shared their expenses, not only in terms of the outgoings on the City C property, but also their everyday expenses, whether by buying groceries, paying equally for holidays, or the applicant paying the gas while the respondent paid the electricity, there was joint contribution and mutual commitment towards their life together.
In fact, there was significant intermingling of funds by the parties. While the parties each had access to their own earnings, they also had a joint account over many years, the applicant regularly transferred money into the respondent’s account after the purchase of the City C property, and the respondent provided cash to the parties as and when he earnt it, the respondent was the person who took on the responsibility of managing most of the household finances and ensuring there were adequate savings. She did this in part with the moneys which the applicant regularly transferred either into their joint account or into #...07.
The respondent’s financial contributions were overall higher than those of the applicant.
The respondent was always fiscally responsible, and the Court accepts her evidence that she does not like debt. However, the Court does not accept her minimisation of the applicant’s various and significant contributions over the years.
During the relationship, both of the parties contributed to the welfare of the family and to household tasks. The applicant made significant contributions of the Robb & Robb[13] kind.
[13] Robb & Robb (1995) FLC 92-555.
Post-separation, the respondent has remained living in the City C property, which has been a benefit to her, albeit she has met all of the outgoings associated with the property. The applicant has been paying rent. The respondent’s post-separation contributions outweigh those of the applicant.
The contribution based entitlements are assessed as 40/60 in the applicant’s favour.
Future Needs
The parties are similar in age. They are both in good health.
The applicant, as noted earlier, continues to work in the fitness industry. Part of his income in the years when the parties were together, had been received by him in cash, and such moneys were made available for the use of the parties’ household expenses. The applicant’s evidence is that he is no longer receiving such amounts in cash, but that he does from time to time receive some payments in this manner. The difference in the applicant’s gross income and his taxable income is explained by appropriately made tax deductions for expenses associated with the running of his business. There was no suggestion that these expenses are anything but legitimate. As such, it is the taxable income of the applicant which is relevant in terms of his income earning capacity.
The respondent continues to work as a health care worker, and continues to earn moneys in accordance with her earning capacity over the years. What has changed for her is that she no longer seems to be saving as much as she previously was, and in particular during the period that the parties cohabited. The respondent’s earning capacity remains significantly higher than that of the applicant, as it has been historically.
The Court accepts that the respondent will continue to have a commitment to Mr L for the remainder of her life. Whilst Mr L works, receives a disability pension, and is in receipt of NDIS funding, the respondent remains largely responsible for him and for ensuring he lives his best life possible.
While the applicant’s income earning capacity is lower than that of the respondent, the respondent will continue to have the care of Mr L, who will likely not ever live independently.
There will be no adjustment for future needs.
Overall Adjustment
The applicant’s student loan, which he had at the commencement of the parties’ relationship and which has never been paid down, will be quarantined for the purposes of adjusting the parties’ property interests. It is not an insignificant debt. It would not be just and equitable for the respondent to carry any part of this liability.
Excluding the student loan liability for reasons explained, at final hearing the property of the parties consisted of the following:
Ownership Description Value Respondent B Street, City C $770,000 Respondent Mortgage with D Bank ($314,043) Respondent Bank accounts $10,486 Respondent Super Fund 1 $152,393 Respondent Notional Addbacks (withdrawals on 29 November 2021) $119,000 Applicant Motor Vehicle 1 $43,630 Applicant Bank accounts $3,528 Applicant Crypto Holdings $29,274 Applicant Country K bank accounts $27,881 Applicant O Bank (car finance) ($12,848) Applicant Super Fund 2 $418 Total: $829,719
For reasons explained, the applicant will receive a property adjustment of 40% of the pool and the respondent will receive a property adjustment of 60% of the pool.
As such, the applicant will receive assets to the value of $331,888 made up as follows:
Ownership Description Value Applicant Motor Vehicle 1 $43,630 Applicant Bank accounts $3,528 Applicant Crypto Holdings $29,274 Applicant Country K bank accounts $27,881 Applicant O Bank (car finance) ($12,848) Applicant Super Fund 1 $418 Respondent Super Fund 1 (splitting order as to 40%) $60,957 Respondent Payment to Applicant $179,048 Total: $331,888
The applicant will also retain entirely the liability associated with his student debt in Country K, which is $56,270. Therefore, his net property interest is $275,618.
As such, the respondent will receive assets to the value of $497,831 made up as follows:
Ownership Description Value Respondent B Street, City C $770,000 Respondent Mortgage with D Bank ($314,043) Respondent Bank accounts $10,486 Respondent Super Fund 1 (splitting order as to 60%) $91,436 Respondent Notional Addbacks (withdrawals on 29 November 2021) $119,000 Respondent Payment to the Applicant ($179,048) Total: $497,831
Just to make it clear to the parties, without the $119,000 which is being notionally added back, the respondent’s receives $378,831 of the net pool, sans the applicant’s student loan.[14]
[14] This is still a higher percentage (57%) than the applicant’s net position of $275,618 (43%).
The notional addbacks of $119,000 which form part of the respondent’s share of the adjusted property interests, are in part held by her sister and will otherwise, at least in part, be accessible to her in the future when the moneys are repaid by her late mother’s estate. This means, that the respondent will likely have at least some $65,000 readily accessible to her, which she may use towards the payment to the applicant which she will be ordered to make.
The Court is aware that the respondent and Mr L live in the home in City C, and that the home has had some adjustments made to it to suit Mr L’s needs. In an ideal world, the respondent would be able to retain that home. As there is no evidence before the Court as to the respondent’s current borrowing capacity, but noting the equity in the home and the respondent’s earning capacity, the Court infers that the respondent may be able to borrow some, if not all of the funds she may otherwise need to pay out the applicant, and so retain the City C home.
For this reason, the Court will allow the respondent a period of 3 months to organise her financial affairs in a manner which may permit her to retain the City C property, while also paying the applicant, before the property be required to be sold so that the orders can be effected.
The applicant will receive a significant cash adjustment, which may be used by him to fund the purchase of a modestly sized property, or at least as a significant deposit towards such a purchase, or otherwise to utilise the funds in any manner he deems appropriate. It is a sizeable cash injection.
The orders which the Court makes, will also see each of the parties having some superannuation. The parties are both still relatively young, and have at least a decade plus of working life left.
In all of the circumstances, the adjustments the Court makes to the parties’ property interests are just and equitable.
The Court so orders.
I certify that the preceding ninety-eight (98) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Obradovic.
Associate:
Dated: 14 March 2025
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