Langmeil v Grange

[2013] HCASL 137

LANGMEIL

v

GRANGE

[2013] HCASL 137
A12/2013

1. The applicant and the respondent were married in January 2003 and separated on 21 January 2008.  They have three children together.Following orders made by a single judge of the Family Court of Australia (Bell J), the children live with the respondent father and have supervised time with the applicant mother.

2. On 4 July 2012, the applicant filed an application in the Family Court seeking leave to commence parenting proceedings. It was necessary for the applicant to seek leave because, on 20 October 2010, the Family Court (Dawe J) made an order pursuant to s 118(1)(c) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") restraining the applicant from filing any application under the Act in relation to, inter alia, the children, except by leave of the Court.

3. On 20 July 2012, the Family Court (Dawe J) refused the application for leave. Dawe J noted that the allegations made by the applicant against the respondent, namely that he had physically abused the children, were "strikingly similar" to claims previously made and rejected by the Family Court in earlier proceedings. Her Honour acknowledged that the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) ("the Rules") required the applicant to demonstrate that she had a "reasonable likelihood of success" before leave could be granted, but concluded that the "guiding principle" remained the children's best interests.Given the long history of litigation, Dawe J held that it was not in the children's best interests for leave to be granted.

4. The applicant appealed against the decision of Dawe J to the Full Court of the Family Court (Coleman, Ainslie-Wallace and Ryan JJ). She also made an application to adduce further evidence. On 18 March 2013, the Full Court dismissed her appeal and application. It held that Dawe J's comments concerning the children's best interests were made in the context of her Honour's conclusion that the applicant did not show a "reasonable likelihood of success", as is required under r 11.05(4) of the Rules before leave can be granted.

5. The applicant now seeks special leave to appeal against the Full Court's decision.  The applicant's argument invites this Court to reconsider factual issues determined below. No matter of principle arises and the applicant has not identified any error in the Full Court's decision.  Special leave should be refused.

6. Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.

S.M. Kiefel
4 September 2013 P.A. Keane