Langbein v Teynissen; Langbein v Vinning
[2014] ACTSC 180
•21 July 2014
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | Langbein v Teynissen & Anor; Langbein v Vinning & Anor |
Citation: | [2014] ACTSC 180 |
Hearing Dates: | 16 July 2014, 17 July 2014 |
DecisionDate: | 21 July 2014 |
Before: | Ashford AJ |
Decision: | Judgment and costs for the Plaintiff |
Category: | Principal Judgment |
Catchwords: | DAMAGES – General Principles – Measure and remoteness of damages in actions for tort – Measure of damages – Personal injuries |
Parties: | SC 24 of 2012 Donna Langbein (Plaintiff) Andrea Teynissen (First Defendant) Insurance Australia Limited (Second Defendant) SC 139 of 2014 Donna Langbein (Plaintiff) Adam Vinning (First Defendant) Insurance Australia Limited T/as NRMA Insurance (Second Defendant) |
Representation: | Counsel: Mr C Ryan (Plaintiff) Mr D Wilson (Defendants) |
| Solicitors: Maliganis Edwards Johnson (Plaintiff) HWL Ebsworth (Defendants) | |
File Numbers: | SC 24 of 2012; SC 139 of 2014 |
Issues
The plaintiff claims damages of each defendant in respect of personal injury sustained by her in two motor vehicle accidents. Liability is not in issue and thus the claim becomes one for assessment of damages.
The defendants dispute the quantum of any such assessment and raise causation of any disability the plaintiff may suffer as a result of injury as an issue.
Background
Plaintiff’s background
The plaintiff is a married woman presently aged 41 years. She lives with her husband and three sons. Her first child, Mitchell, was born in September 1991. He was found to be autistic and has epilepsy. As a consequence he required a lot of care throughout his childhood. He attended special schools. He required 24-hour, seven days a week care. He was violent and hard to control at times. He is now aged 23 years and has apparently developed into a young man who has developed living skills to the extent that he now maintains a simple job for two days a week. Whilst he has a requirement still for family assistance, he is also assisted by a carer on other days, who assists him in learning skills such as cooking, managing his money, and other lifestyle matters.
Her second and third children were born in 1997 and 1999. The older boy is in the army and the younger child is in Year 9. Prior to 2008 the plaintiff worked part‑time for a period at Baker's Delight and also did some casual house cleaning. She also worked for a time in the post office. In April 2008 she was employed as a teacher's aide at Malkara School, the school where Mitchell had been a pupil. She worked with autistic and special needs children.
This was a demanding job which involved the plaintiff attending to all the care needs of the children, including toileting, feeding, playing, reading, and generally interacting with and managing the children in her care. It seems many of the children had problem behaviour and some of them were violent. Clearly this was a demanding job and one which required her to be very involved in the children's care, and did involve her active participation.
Prior medical problems
The plaintiff's evidence was that prior to 2009 she experienced transient and episodic back pain, for which she took over‑the‑counter medication. In July 2007 she suffered an incident of back pain for which she attended her general practitioner. She could not recall any particular cause for the pain. She did some exercises and took some pain medication, and she continued her daily activities. She also experienced the occasional headache from time to time.
The first motor vehicle accident
On 24 February 2009 the plaintiff was driving her motor vehicle to work along Yamba Drive at Mawson. Traffic was fairly heavy and the plaintiff was stationary in traffic. The motor vehicle behind her, driven by the first defendant, failed to stop and collided with the rear of her vehicle. It appears a third vehicle collided with the motor vehicle behind her. She was jolted and said she hurt her shoulder and neck. Police attended the scene. An ambulance was not called. The plaintiff drove from the scene of the accident to her workplace. However, she then went home.
The plaintiff attended her general practitioner about two days after the accident. At that time she said she was also experiencing pain in her back. The notes of the plaintiff's general practitioner do record an attendance on 26 February 2009 following a motor vehicle accident. Dr Lee's report of that attendance notes the plaintiff had attended complaining of mild neck and shoulder discomfort. It noted the history of this being a low-speed accident, and it was observed the plaintiff did not appear to have suffered any ongoing serious injury.
The plaintiff returned to work on 4 March 2009, performing her usual duties for 31 hours per week. However, she said she had problems with work in that she found it difficult to get down to the children's level, to sit on the floor and do things of that nature because of her back, and she had difficulty with the heavier aspects of lifting and needed assistance at times. She described her pain as occurring once a week/fortnight for which she took over-the-counter pain medication.
Prior to the first motor vehicle accident the plaintiff said she performed most of the household and family chores with some assistance from family as needed, but following the accident it was her evidence she had difficulty with the heavier tasks and required more assistance. It does not appear she attended a general practitioner again until after the second motor vehicle accident.
The second motor vehicle accident
The second accident occurred on 16 March 2011. The plaintiff was very close to her home and driving a motor vehicle when a motor vehicle driven by the second defendant came through a give way sign on the plaintiff's left-hand side and impacted with her motor vehicle, forcing it to the other side of the road. The airbags were deployed. The vehicle began leaking. The plaintiff and her son, who was the front seat passenger, were able to get out of the vehicle. Police, ambulance and fire brigade were called. The vehicle was extensively damaged at the front left-hand side. The plaintiff’s husband was called and took photographs, which were tendered as exhibit A.
On impact, the plaintiff said her body was jolted forward and the seat belt tightened. She felt pain in her neck, shoulder and back. She told the ambulance crew she did not need treatment. She walked home and made an appointment to see her general practitioner that day. The general practice records, "Motor vehicle accident this morning. Shaken. Able to walk home. No pain, no bruising. Limb movements full, with no pain."
The plaintiff was off work for about three days and then resumed normal work. It was her evidence that following the second motor vehicle accident she was unable to perform many activities she had previously performed at home, such as vacuuming, cleaning the bathroom and carrying heavy shopping, and her husband now undertakes many of those tasks. She said that the pain in her neck and shoulder did resolve after a few weeks; however, she continues to experience back pain, which she now describes as being a continuous pain in the low back.
It was the plaintiff’s evidence that this affected her ability to perform her work duties as well, and she was unable to participate in any activity involving running, jumping or bending. She continued to work normal hours at Malkara School, nevertheless, until July 2012; that is about 16 months following the second accident. It appears that from the time of the second motor vehicle accident until January 2012, a period of 10 months, the plaintiff attended her general practitioner for a variety of complaints, but no record was made of any back, neck or shoulder pain in those attendances.
In January 2012 the plaintiff attended her general practitioner complaining of severe back pain. A CT scan and x-ray of the back were performed. This reportedly shows a transitional vertebral body with some degenerative changes, L2-3 disc degenerative disease, and no other specific finding. The plaintiff attended physiotherapy and took pain relief tablets. Her general practitioner did not refer her to any specialist assessment. This situation continued to July 2012 when the plaintiff reduced her work hours to 4 days a week, which she said was because of back pain. In February 2013 she reduced her hours to 3 days. She continued with physiotherapy.
In November 2013 the plaintiff received a cortisone injection to her back, with no relief except of a transitory kind. In March 2014 she resigned from Malkara School and took up employment at Namadgi School for two days a week as a teacher's aide. This did not involve her working with bigger children but supervising one small boy in preschool, and the plaintiff says that she is able to cope with this work, albeit with continuing back pain. She no longer has physiotherapy, but attends hydrotherapy three days a week, which she said affords some relief of back pain at the time, but only until she gets out of the water. She continues to take pain medication such as Tramadol and Panadol.
Medical material
The plaintiff has tendered reports of Dr G. Griffith, surgeon, of 3 August 2012; physiotherapist, Mr C. Boland; Dr Le Leu, an occupational physician, of 6 July 2013; and Dr J. Bentivoglio, orthopaedic surgeon, dated 31 October 2013. The defendant relies upon Dr G. Stubbs, orthopaedic surgeon, of 19 April 2012 and 12 February 2014; Dr Lee, the general practitioner, of 2 May 2013; Dr D. Samuel, psychiatrist, of 1 October 2013; and Dr S. McBurnie, occupational physician, dated 20 February 2014. Each of the medical practitioners obtained a history of the plaintiff’s involvement in two motor vehicle accidents and of her work history.
Dr Griffith recorded the plaintiff to have suffered low back pain on the day of the first motor vehicle accident, which had never resolved and which had worsened following the second by the vehicle accident. Following examination and sighting of x-rays and a CT scan of the lumbar spine, he came to the opinion of the plaintiff suffered the following injuries in the first motor vehicle accident: (1) nervous shock, now resolved; (2) acute musculoligamentous strain of the cervical and cervicodorsal soft tissue, largely resolved; (3) cervicogenic occipitofrontal headache, largely resolved; and (4) acute musculoligamentous strain of the lumbar region, slowly resolved.
Following the second motor vehicle accident Dr Griffith diagnosed: (1) persistent bilateral cervicodorsal myalgia; (2) persistent upper lumbar myalgia at the site of prior spondylosis; and (3) persistent left-sided sacroiliac arthralgia. He thought the underlying degenerative disease essentially stable, and the symptoms to be slowly resolving. This assessment, of course, was performed some two years ago.
It would appear Dr Stubbs believed there should be further resolution of symptoms with no major pathological cause for the symptoms.
Dr Le Leu recorded the plaintiff to have always had a little back pain with no specific incident, and that she had become aware of back pain following the first accident. He recorded her to say she had recovered completely from the first accident, with just occasional back pain, but the pain was severe following the second accident. He recorded her to have difficulties with household chores and to require assistance. He sighted x-rays and CT scans of January 2012 and he thought there to be discal degeneration.
Dr Leu recommended no lifting, carrying, pushing or pulling greater than five kilograms, and no repetitive back bending or twisting; those restrictions attributable more to the second accident. He thought in five to 10 years the plaintiff may need to transfer to a more sedentary job. His report does not really assist me in determining the extent of any disability the plaintiff may have, and it appears any limitations he places upon her are modest indeed.
Dr Bentivoglio recorded the plaintiff to advise of a back injury in the first motor vehicle accident and that she had no prior back problem. In the second motor vehicle accident he noted she had re-injured her back and had some neck and arm problems, but those latter injuries had resolved. He sighted the CT scans. He noted her back symptoms were always present, of fluctuating severity, and that she was unable to perform many of her pre-accident domestic activity. He thought she had sustained a significant damage to her lumbar spine as a result of the second accident.
However, noting the CT scan was performed some three years following initial injury, and noting an abnormality at L1 and 2, he thought it impossible to now say if that abnormality was present at the time of the second motor vehicle accident or was from the first motor vehicle accident, or not. He did not think her to require any aggressive forms of treatment, and thought physiotherapy may assist. He diagnosed gross degenerative changes at L1 and 2.
Dr Stubbs saw the plaintiff on two occasions. At first examination he noted some occasional pre-injury back pain. From the first motor vehicle accident he noted the plaintiff to have needed the occasional analgesic, but following the second accident her complaints of low back pain were ongoing and required regular medication, and that she required assistance with household activity. He reviewed the CT scan which had been performed. He thought there to be longstanding degenerative changes shown. He thought her presentation to be that of a fairly typical degenerative symptomatology and some radiological changes dating back to birth which were not active and not the source of pain. He did not think her to require assistance, except from family, and thought her fit to work as a teacher's aide.
At a second consultation in February 2014 Dr Stubbs noted the plaintiff had reduced her working hours because her back was continually sore and that she continued to take pain medication. His clinical examination was much as previously, except that he did note some discomfort with straight leg raising, but not associated with mechanical instability. He reviewed other medical reports which had been obtained. He ruled out any possibility of an old compression fracture of L1 and 2, as was postulated by Dr Bentivoglio. In respect of the change in presentation in straight leg raising, he thought this reflective of being a natural variation, worse some days than others, but on the whole his opinion is largely unchanged.
Dr Stubbs assessed each motor vehicle accident equally in terms of contribution, although he appears to believe the second motor vehicle accident was of about the same impact as the first, although that does not appear to be the case, as clearly the airbags did deploy in the second motor vehicle accident and the car was pushed for some distance.
Dr Samuel is a psychiatrist whose examination did not reveal the plaintiff to be suffering any psychological disability.
Dr McBurnie recorded the plaintiff’s involvement in two motor vehicle accidents. She made a note of pre-existing back complaints described as, "Occasional lower back discomfort which did not require treatment." In respect of the first motor vehicle accident, she noted a complaint of low back pain and over-the-counter pain relief with one day off work. In respect of the second accident, she noted low back pain with some neck pain. She recorded the plaintiff to have had physiotherapy and pain relief, and that she had not been reviewed by any specialists.
The plaintiff reported back pain to be constant and at varying intensity, with no radiation of pain. Following examination and review of the CT scan and x‑rays, Dr McBurnie thought the first motor vehicle accident had caused mild symptoms, which were increased from the second accident. She thought changes on L2 and 3 were marked and longstanding, but she thought the findings on imaging were not related to either accident. She thought the plaintiff fit for her usual work. She attributed 5 per cent of all disability to pre-existing conditions, 15 per cent to the first motor vehicle accident, and 80 per cent to the second. She did not think the plaintiff to require domestic assistance due to accident-related symptoms.
All in all it seems to me the medical opinion is to the view that the plaintiff has clear radiological evidence of pre-existing degenerative disease. The preponderance of opinion is to the effect that there may well have been some aggravation of those changes in the first motor vehicle accident, and I accept also that there was some musculoligamentous strain-type injury of the cervical and lumbar spines in that first accident, which largely resolved over a short period of time, only necessitating the plaintiff take occasional over-the-counter pain medication and without need for medical consultation or intervention.
The second motor vehicle accident, of course, seems to me to have been a more severe impact which aggravated those pre-existing changes and rendered them symptomatic once more. The plaintiff attended for physiotherapy treatment and again took pain medication. She modified her activities. Radiological studies confirm the degenerative changes. By August 2012 Dr Griffith thought the condition to be resolving slowly.
The plaintiff appears to have become preoccupied with those motor vehicle accidents. She was off work for very short periods after each accident; one or two days after the first accident, and only a few more days after the second. She continued the same employment and I accept she may have avoided some of the heavier aspects of her role and sought more help. This was the situation at home as well. Despite attending her general practitioner in 2011 on a number of occasions, no record is made of any back complaint.
The plaintiff describes her pain levels at being eight to nine out of 10. That appears to me to be something of an exaggeration. Such a level of intractable pain would, to my mind, cause any sufferer to seek urgent medical attention, to regularly see a general practitioner, or to seek referral to a specialist or the like. The plaintiff's general practitioner does not appear to believe there to be a need for any referral or treatment. The plaintiff gave her evidence in a straightforward and undemonstrative manner. She did not appear uncomfortable to an observer, but I accept she may well feel pain and take medication as required.
I felt the plaintiff to be placing a gloss on her evidence, and I make those remarks in the light of the unremarkable pathology commented upon by medical reporters, who whilst broadly supportive of there having been aggravation of pre-existing degenerative changes, by and large conclude the plaintiff to be fit for most of her pre-injury work duties and for her household activities, whilst accepting her to require some assistance in the heavier or more arduous duties. The plaintiff maintained her employment with no change in working hours for more than a year following the second accident.
I should here mentioned the plaintiff's husband, who also gave evidence. Again, I thought him a straightforward and undemonstrative witness, who was clearly doing his best to assist his wife, and who continues to be supportive of his family. His evidence was that before the first motor vehicle accident he did little to assist his wife with duties at home. That has now changed and he and his sons have become much more proactive and supportive of their mother.
Assessment of damages
General damages
This leads me to an assessment of damages. Counsel for the defendant submits the first motor vehicle accident was a trivial incident and ought not sound in general damages. The plaintiff was off work for a day or so. The symptoms of neck, shoulder and back pain largely resolved and she continued in her full employment for some two years, until the second accident. Counsel for the plaintiff assesses general damages and $20,000, with interest of $1600.
It is submitted that prior to the first accident the plaintiff was fully independent and able to work and care for her family, and following that event there was a reduction in her abilities. I accept the plaintiff had some injury, albeit minor, in the first motor vehicle accident, which caused her to visit her general practitioner, take some time off work, and that she did experience some neck, shoulder and back pain the latter being musculoskeletal soft tissue-type injury; but I am of the opinion she recovered fairly quickly following this event and continued her normal social and recreational life with little disruption. In assessing general damages in respect of the first motor vehicle accident, I am prepared to assess such general damages in the sum of $10,000, including interest.
The second motor vehicle accident was a more severe impact, but again there was little time off work and initially little in the way of treatment, until the plaintiff began to attend for physiotherapy and the like. There was an attendance upon the general practitioner and x-rays and CT scans were taken later. This impact seems to me to have aggravated the pre-existing degenerative condition of the plaintiff's back, and as well likely caused some musculoligamentous-type injury for neck, shoulder and lumbar area.
Counsel for the defendant assesses general damages in respect of the second motor vehicle accident at around $35,000. Counsel for the plaintiff assesses general damages at $80,000 with $2400 in interest. The medical material which I have reviewed is in agreement as to the existence of those pre-existing degenerative diseases of the lumbar spine. Opinions differ as to the effect of the second motor vehicle accident on those degenerative conditions. As noted, I accept the plaintiff did sustain some musculoligamentous-type injury of her neck and shoulders, and the effect of those injuries lingered for a period of time. However, the plaintiff freely admits recovery in respect of those matters.
However, it seems to me more probable than not the plaintiff also suffered musculoligamentous soft tissue injury to her lumbar area at the time of that second motor vehicle accident, and of course some acceleration or some aggravation of those degenerative conditions. Over time the nature of such injuries is for gradual resolution, and I am of the view that this has occurred. As noted, there was also aggravation of the pre-existing degenerative condition of the lumbar spine in that second accident.
Whilst the plaintiff may have modified her lifestyle activities following the second accident, nevertheless she was able to maintain, to all intents and purposes, her normal life and work activities, although I accept she did require physiotherapy from time to time and over-the-counter pain medication in the initial stages. The situation continued for a substantial period of time without the need for further medical attention. In that regard, in relation to the second motor vehicle accident, I am prepared to assess general damages at $60,000, inclusive of interest.
Past out-of-pocket expenses
Unfortunately, the parties have been unable to reach any agreement in relation to out-of-pocket expenses at all. On the material available I accept the plaintiff’s past out-of-pocket expenses in respect of the first motor vehicle accident to be the sum of $1047.18.
In respect of the second motor vehicle accident in relation to past out-of-pocket expenses, the defendant assesses there to be no loss. I accept the assessment made by the plaintiff of the sum of $3960.72 as past out-of-pocket expenses in respect of the second motor vehicle accident.
Future out-of-pocket expenses
In relation to the first motor vehicle accident, counsel for the defendant submits there to be no loss; counsel for the plaintiff assesses these at $4000. Having reviewed the medical evidence in relation to the first motor vehicle accident, I do not accept there to be any need for future out‑of-pocket expenses in respect of the first motor vehicle accident.
In relation to the second motor vehicle accident in respect of future out‑of‑pocket expenses, I accept that from time to time the plaintiff may have a requirement to attend her general practitioner, for physiotherapy or hydrotherapy, and to require pain medication as a result of injury in the second motor vehicle accident. She presently attends hydrotherapy at the school, and this is apparently of little utility as she says that once out of the water, there is little benefit. Physiotherapy from time to time may be of use to her, and there is medical support for that contention. I accept that she does also require pain medication at times, and visits to a general practitioner.
Counsel for the defendant submits the sum of $1000 to be the cost of such treatment in the future; counsel for the plaintiff submits the sum of $36,000 to be required. In relation to an assessment of such expenses, I accept the sum of $10,000 to be an adequate amount in respect of future out-of-pocket expenses in respect of the second motor vehicle accident.
Past economic loss
At the time of the first motor vehicle accident the plaintiff was employed as a teacher's aide at Malkara School, working 31 hours per week. She went off work on the day of the accident and was off work for a few days only. Her wage was $617 net per week at that time. Counsel for the defendant submits the plaintiff had no past economic loss from this accident; the plaintiff submits a loss of $5220 and interest at $800. As well, it is submitted by the plaintiff that there is a past loss of superannuation of $803.88, with interest of $100. Clearly there was some wage loss occasioned by the period of work. To that end I am prepared to assess this at $3000 in respect of past economic loss resulting from the first motor vehicle accident.
In relation to past economic loss on the second motor vehicle accident, this becomes a little more complex. The reasons for the plaintiff reducing her work hours appear to me to be multifactorial. Counsel for the defendant submits there was no actual economic loss; counsel for the plaintiff submits that figure should be $20,880 with $2000 in interest and $3515.52 in lost superannuation. The plaintiff was off work following the second motor vehicle accident for a short period of time only. At the time of the second injury her net weekly earnings was $666.70 per week.
This situation did not change for some time. Indeed, it was not until July 2012, some 16 months after the second accident, that she reduced hours to four days a week; and then in July 2013, to three days a week. In March 2014 she changed schools and reduced hours to two days a week. Each of these reductions in hours of course reduced her income. The plaintiff said the reason for such reduction in hours was because of what she described as almost unremitting back pain. As previously noted, I am not satisfied that the problems experienced by the plaintiff post the second motor vehicle accident can all be attributed to that motor vehicle accident.
Accepting the plaintiff to have some difficulty with the heavier aspects of the work activities because of back pain, clearly she did not feel a requirement for treatment other than some massage, physiotherapy and pain medication. The medical opinions believe her fit for the work she performed as a teacher's aide. Albeit that she may have required some assistance from time to time, she did receive assistance, it seems, and I am prepared to assess past economic loss in relation to the second motor vehicle accident, inclusive of superannuation and interest, in the sum of $15,000.
Future economic loss
Counsel for the defendant submits the plaintiff has no future economic loss as a result of the first motor vehicle accident; counsel for the plaintiff submits the loss to be $15,000 and $2310 in superannuation. It is now over five years since that first accident. This was a low impact motor vehicle accident. It occasioned little in the way of time off or medical treatment. From the material before me I am not satisfied the plaintiff has any continuing economic loss as a result of that first motor vehicle accident.
In relation to future economic loss in respect of the second motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff's present earnings two days a week are $197 net per week. Counsel for the defendant submits this is not a true reflection of her earning capacity. Dr Le Leu was of the opinion that in five to 10 years the plaintiff may need to transfer to work of a more sedentary nature and the restrictions placed on her work capacity were really that she should not engage in heavy lifting, carrying, pushing or pulling activities as a result of the degenerative condition. He listed numerous work he thought she would be capable of performing. Some of those are unrealistic, given her past occupational history and training.
Dr McBurnie thought the plaintiff fit for her usual work. It was submitted by counsel for the defendant that the plaintiff has chosen to reduce her work activity as a lifestyle choice, in particular to be able to spend time supervising her son, Mitchell, at times when his carer is not in attendance. From the evidence of the plaintiff and her husband, however, I do accept that Mitchell is now a quite capable young man who, whilst needing some supervision and assistance, does not have the need for full-time supervision from the plaintiff to the extent that he may have required previously as a small child. Nevertheless, I accept the plaintiff is not presently employed to her full capacity, having regard to the medical evidence to which I have referred previously.
Counsel for the plaintiff submits the plaintiff’s future economic loss to be in the order of $135,000 with $30,790 in superannuation, submitting that the plaintiff is presently working to capacity. In the present circumstances it is difficult to quantify any real loss of work the plaintiff may have as a result of that second motor vehicle accident. It therefore seems to me that it is appropriate to calculate her loss as a buffer rather than by calculating an indeterminate loss of future earning capacity. To that end I assess an appropriate amount at $40,000 including superannuation and interest.
Past domestic assistance
In relation to the first motor vehicle accident the plaintiff assesses the cost of past domestic assistance at $23,305.78 plus interest of $3000; the defendant assesses no loss. The plaintiff's evidence was that pre-motor vehicle accident 1 she basically did all the house work, shopping and gardening, and shared the cooking with her husband. Following that motor vehicle accident she said she could not do the heavier aspects of housework such as vacuuming, all the shopping and the like, and her husband began to assist.
Clearly, over time the plaintiff expected both her husband and her sons to assist her. However, that may well have been from her realisation that they were not sharing the family workload in any event. I do not accept that any need for domestic assistance for the plaintiff arose as a result of the first motor vehicle accident, given the paucity of supportive evidence.
The plaintiff assesses past domestic assistance in relation to the second motor vehicle accident at $93,223.12 with $9000 interest. The plaintiff makes this calculation based on a need for assistance somewhere in the vicinity of eight hours a week at around $50 an hour. I believe this to be a vastly inflated estimate of the plaintiff's past needs. The defendant conceded the rate to be $35 per hour, but makes no other concession. Having regard to the plaintiff’s domestic arrangements, I accept that the heavier aspects of cleaning and shopping required assistance for her but at most, this would only be for a few hours a week. I am prepared to make an estimate of the requirement and assess this as a figure of $10,000.
Future domestic assistance
Given my preceding comments, I do not accept the plaintiff to have any need for future domestic assistance as a result of the first motor vehicle accident.
The defendant assesses future domestic assistance in relation to the second motor vehicle accident at $10,000; the plaintiff assesses it at $45,000 on the basis of four hours a week for life. Given the natural progression of the degenerative changes and their effect on the plaintiff, it is my view that any need for domestic assistance arising from the second motor vehicle accident is very small. To that end I am prepared to assess a global figure by way of a buffer at $12,000.
Orders
The orders of the court are:
(i) Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff as against the defendant in the first action in the sum of $14,047.18.
(ii) Verdict and judgment as against the defendant in the second action in the sum of $150,960.72, making a total sum of $165,007.90.
(iii) Defendants to pay plaintiff’s costs.
| I certify that the preceding sixty one [61] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of her Honour Acting Justice Ashford Associate: Elizabeth Sutton Date: 29 July 2014 |
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