SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Application)
LANG & ORS v AUSTRALIAN EXECUTOR TRUSTEES LTD & ORS
[2013] SASC 171
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Anderson
12 November 2013
SUCCESSION - FAMILY PROVISION - CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING APPLICATION - TREATMENT OF PARTICULAR APPLICANTS - GRANDCHILDREN AND OTHERS
APPLICATION OUT OF TIME - PRINCIPLES
Application by four grandchildren to claim a benefit from their grandfather's estate. The plaintiffs claim they have been left without adequate provision for their proper maintenance, education, or advancement. The summons was issued by the plaintiffs on 10 September 2012, and the time limit for a claim to be made was 28 October 2010. The plaintiffs' application was therefore made out of time.
The plaintiffs submitted reasons for the application being made late. These included lack of knowledge about the will of their grandfather, lack of knowledge about the time limit in which to make a claim and discouragement by and fear of the second defendant, their uncle.
Held: Application refused. Plaintiffs unable to satisfactorily explain the length of delay in making the claim. Onus on plaintiffs not discharged.
Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA), referred to.
In re Gusket [1947] VLR 212; Ansett v Moss [2007] VSC 92, applied.
In the Estate of Barry (1974) 9 SASR 439; Hoffman v Hoffman (1909) 29 NZLR 425, discussed.
LANG & ORS v AUSTRALIAN EXECUTOR TRUSTEES LTD & ORS
[2013] SASC 171Civil
ANDERSON J.
Introduction
This is an application, out of time, by four grandchildren in respect of the estate of their grandfather to claim a benefit pursuant to the provisions of the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA) (“the Act”). The applicants are the grandchildren of Hans Fetzer who died on 21 August 2009. Probate was granted on 28 April 2010. Pursuant to s 8(1) of the Act any claim for a benefit in relation to the estate of the late Mr Fetzer had to be made by 28 October 2010. The summons issued by the plaintiffs was filed on 10 September 2012.
The will provided for Mr Fetzer’s children Peter Hans Fetzer, Sonia Heidi Lang (“Heidi Lang”) and Angela Fetzer in a number of different ways including the distribution of the assets of trusts he controlled, specific gifts of property, forgiveness of any loan or debts owing by Sonia Heidi Lang, and an equal share of the balance of the estate for each child. The will gave monetary gifts to two persons specified as “friends”, Janine Ida Moore and Peter Lyall Bacchus, in the sum of $25,000 each. It provided property, or the benefit of his interest in a property, for his partner Erica Deirdre Schultz. In regards to other family trusts in which Mr Fetzer had a beneficial interest he directed a payment of $500,000 be made to Sonia Heidi Lang (taking into account a forgiveness of a loan of $600,000 he made to her), and $100,000 to each of Sonia’s children, the four plaintiffs, upon reaching the age of 25. The…
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- AGLC
- Lang v Australian Executor Trustees Ltd [2013] SASC 171
- Case
- [2013] SASC 171
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the grandchildren could provide sufficient justification for the delay in making their claim and whether they had a potentially good claim under the Family Provision Act. The court had to consider the reasons given by the grandchildren for the delay, including their lack of information about the will, discouragement by family members, and intimidation by their uncle. Additionally, the court needed to assess the strength of the grandchildren's claim, considering the evidence provided and the amount of money already distributed among the beneficiaries.
The court found that the grandchildren were unable to satisfactorily explain the delay in bringing their claim. While the court believed that the grandchildren had genuine concerns about family conflict and their uncle's attitude, these concerns did not justify the delay. The court also found that the grandchildren had not overcome the burden of showing that they had a potentially good claim. The evidence provided by the grandchildren was contested, and the court found it difficult to determine whether they had been left without adequate provision for their proper maintenance, education, or advancement. The court concluded that the grandchildren had already been provided with $100,000 each and that the testator had considered many people, including the grandchildren, when making his will.
The court ultimately refused the application, finding that the grandchildren had not discharged the onus of providing sufficient reason to justify an extension of time. The delay was significant, and the grandchildren had not shown any new facts or circumstances that would warrant an extension. The court also considered the potential prejudice to the defendants in finalising the estate, which would involve a complicated trial and accounting exercise. The court found that the grandchildren had not established a potentially good claim and therefore denied their application.
The court's decision was grounded in the principle that applications for extensions of time under the Family Provision Act must be justified by sufficient reason. The grandchildren failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for their delay and did not establish a potentially good claim. The court's refusal of the application was based on the lack of justification for the delay and the contested nature of the grandchildren's evidence regarding their claim under the Act. The final order of the court was that the application was refused, and the grandchildren were unable to bring their claim outside the statutory time limit.
Orders
Orders of the court
Held: Application refused. Plaintiffs unable to satisfactorily explain the length of delay in making the claim. Onus on plaintiffs not discharged.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: ANDERSON J
Although she gave evidence when called by the plaintiff and was cross-examined, the fourth defendant was a reluctant party in giving evidence. She was represented by Mr Jappe who really took no part in the proceedings other than indicating that they were prepared to abide the decision of the Court.Consideration The plaintiffs were aware generally of the provisions of the will within a few weeks of their grandfather’s death. There were discussions within the family about their dissatisfaction on hearing that their cousins had received four times the amount provided for them. They were told by their mother, the fourth defendant, who took a pragmatic view, that they should effectively be grateful for what they got. The real reason that they did not take any action, it seems, was because they did not realise that there was a time limit running. It appears that they appreciated that they may have had rights to take action but they did not seek any advice and took no action until out of time by about two years. It was put on their behalf that they were discouraged because of the overbearing and belligerent attitude of their uncle, the second defendant. However, despite his unsatisfactory evidence and my impression that he gave evidence to suit himself there is no evidence that he made any relevant threats direct or indirect which could have caused the plaintiffs any concern in relation to the bringing of an action. I assessed him to be a bully and to some extent a bluff merchant. His threats were not to be taken seriously as it was his manner of asserting himself and I believe that is how the plaintiffs viewed him. As against the plaintiffs there is the fact that, although apparently apprehensive of their uncle and possibly for good reason, nothing really changed in the time between their grandfather’s death and the time in which they made their application. There are no new facts or circumstances. It was not a case like Barry where there was an honest ignorance by the claimants of their rights. I do not accept that the factor which changed and caused them to issue the application was their added maturity because of the effluxion of time. By the date of their grandfather’s death the first three plaintiffs had been adults for some years and were not naïve in the ways of the world. Those same considerations do not apply necessarily to Chloe but she was cared for by her mother. One assumes that her mother looked after her interests. There is no suggestion that her mother specifically discouraged her from taking any action. This is aside from her mother’s general advice to all the plaintiffs that they should be grateful for what they got. I do not consider that Chloe, because she was in the care of her mother, should be looked at differently. The defendants are prejudiced in their finalisation of the estate as any action by the plaintiffs would involve a complicated trial and possibly a particularly complicated accounting exercise in relation to the administration of the trusts of the deceased. There is nothing before me at the moment to assist in relation to that accounting exercise and I have to assume that there is only $250,000 or one-quarter of one-third of that available for distribution on a successful claim.Conclusion