FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| LANE & LANE | [2013] FamCA 466 |
| FAMILY LAW ─ PROPERTY SETTLEMENT ─ Application to set aside consent orders made altering the property interests of the parties ─ Whether the Court should exercise its discretion and set aside the consent orders and make other orders pursuant to s 79 ─ Where the wife submitted that there was a miscarriage of justice due to the husband’s failure to disclose relevant financial information ─ Where it was common ground that the application for consent orders submitted by the parties substantially understated their financial circumstances ─ Where the wife did not say anywhere that she agreed to the consent orders because of the representations made by the husband about his financial circumstances ─ Where the wife knew of the existence of the assets involved ─ Where given the problems with the wife’s credibility, the Court did not accept that the wife entered into the consent orders as a consequence of duress and/or suppression of evidence ─ Where the Court was not satisfied that there was a miscarriage of justice ─ Wife’s application to have consent orders for settlement of property set aside dismissed |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 79, 79A |
| Clifton and Stuart (1991) FLC 92-194 Elliot and Willcox (1996) FLC 92-687 Gebert and Gebert (1990) FLC 92-137 Gilbert and the Estate of Gilbert (1989) 13 Fam LR 632 Holland and Holland (1982) FLC 91-243 Hughes & Hughes [2012] FAMCA 198 Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538 Public Trustee (as executor of the estate of Gilbert) & Gilbert (1991) FLC 92-211; 14 Fam LR 573 In the Marriage of Molier and Van Wyk (1980) 7 Fam LR 18 In the Marriage of Robb (1994) 18 Fam LR 489; (1995) FLC 92–555 |
| APPLICANT: | Ms Lane |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Lane |
| FILE NUMBER: | MLC | 8674 | of | 2010 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 19 June 2013 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Sydney |
| PLACE HEARD: | Canberra and Sydney |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Loughnan J |
| HEARING DATE: | 12 -14 September 2012, 13 & 14 February 2013 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr D Grieve QC Ms D Coulton |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Lander & Rogers |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr T Tockar |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Dobinson Davey Clifford & Simpson (at hearing) Phelps Reid (at judgment) |
Orders
The application of the wife for an order setting aside orders for settlement of property made on 4 March 2003 pursuant to section 79A is dismissed.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Lane & Lane has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
FILE NUMBER: MLC 8674 of 2010
| Ms Lane |
Applicant
And
| Mr Lane |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Ms Lane and Mr Lane were married for 31 years. The parties cannot agree about whether final separation was in 1989 or 2003. Orders for property settlement were made in 2003. The wife seeks…
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- Lane and Lane [2013] FamCA 466
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- [2013] FamCA 466
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether it should exercise its discretion under s 79A of the *Family Law Act 1975* to set aside the consent orders. This question arose from the wife's submission that a miscarriage of justice had occurred due to the husband's alleged failure to disclose relevant financial information. It was common ground between the parties that the financial circumstances submitted to the court at the time the consent orders were made substantially understated their true financial position.
The Court's reasoning focused on the wife's credibility and the basis upon which she entered into the consent orders. While acknowledging the understatement of financial circumstances, the Court found that the wife did not assert that she agreed to the consent orders based on any specific representations made by the husband regarding his financial position. Furthermore, the wife was aware of the existence of the assets in question. Given these findings, and problems with the wife's credibility, the Court was not satisfied that she entered into the consent orders as a consequence of duress or suppression of evidence, nor that a miscarriage of justice had occurred.
Consequently, the wife's application to set aside the consent orders for property settlement was dismissed.
Orders
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