Landt and Thatcher and Anor

[2013] FCCA 1194

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

LANDT & THATCHER & ANOR [2013] FCCA 1194

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Property settlement ─ wife refinances mortgage during relationship to a quantum of about $450,000 ─ wife now bankrupt ─ husband argues that wife has retained the benefit of mortgage loans ─ wife says that monies spent on living and education expenses ─ s.75(2)(O) ─ notional add-backs ─ issues of credit.

Legislation:  

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Federal Circuit Court Rules2001

Federal Circuit Court Regulations

Re: F-Litigants in Person Guidelines [2001] FLC 93-072
Stanford v Stanford (2012) 87 ALJR 74
Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116
Russell v Russell (1999) FLC 92-877
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298

Oriolo & Oriolo (1985) FLC 91-653.
Black & Kellner (1992) FLC 92-287
Weir & Weir (1993) FLC 92-338

Chang v Su (2002) FLC 93-117
Kowaliw & Kowaliw (1981) FLC 91-092

Applicant: MR LANDT

First Respondent: MS THATCHER

Second Respondent: A

File Number: MLC 7558 of 2011

Judgment of: Judge McGuire

Hearing date: 26 June 2013

Date of Last Submission: 26 June 2013

Delivered at: Melbourne

Delivered on: 4 September 2013

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant: Unrepresented

Solicitors for the First Respondent: Unrepresented

Solicitors for the Second Respondent: Unrepresented

ORDERS

1. That within 60 days of the date of these orders the wife pay to the husband a lump sum of $90,000.00.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Landt & Thatcher & Anor is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AT MELBOURNE

MLC 7558 of 2011

MR LANDT

Applicant

And

MS THATCHER

First Respondent

A

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. These are proceedings for property settlement initiated by the husband on his application filed 24 August 2011. 

2. Children’s issues were raised during the course of the proceedings but settled by way of a final consent order made 22 November 2012, providing, inter alia:

   a)that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility for their two children, X, born (omitted) 1998, and Y, born (omitted) 2000;

   b)that the children live with the father;

   c)that the children spend time with the mother each second weekend between Friday evening and Monday morning, together with each alternate Wednesday overnight, half school holidays, and special days.

3. The wife’s son from a previous marriage, A, was apparently joined as a party in these proceedings some time ago.  He was removed as a party.  He gave evidence at the hearing of the financial issues by way of a subpoena issued by the applicant husband for him to attend at court. 

4. The parties were self-represented at the trial.  Accordingly, they were given advice as to procedure in accordance with Re: F-Litigants in Person Guidelines.[1]  I am confident that they each understood the nature of the proceedings and the procedure in court.  Each was invited to seek clarification during the course of the trial, although they were informed that I could not provide legal advice normally the domain of legal representatives.  The parties each conducted the proceedings in a courteous and professional manner and, in my view, cross-examined as to the relevant issues.

   [1] [2001] FLC 93-072.

The husband’s case

1. The husband seeks an order whereby the wife pay him $250,000 “plus $5000 costs”.  His argument accuses the wife of refinancing the mortgage secured by the former matrimonial home on a number of occasions.  He asks me to draw an inference that the proceeds of the loans are either in the possession or control of the wife and perhaps with her older children. 

2. Both parties give evidence as to a previous offer of settlement, originally made without prejudice but now openly disclosed in their materials, by the wife to pay the husband $200,000.

3. The husband alludes to various contributions that he has made and seeks an adjustment under section 75(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”) with emphasis on the discrepancy in the earning capacities of the parties and the fact that he has the primary care of the two children of the marriage.

The wife’s case

1. The wife seeks an order that the husband’s application be dismissed.  She says that there is no property of the parties or either of them to alter or distribute.  She says that the husband has retained a (omitted) caravan and a motor vehicle.  She proposes that each party retain their superannuation entitlements.  The wife is an undischarged bankrupt from February 2012.  The wife deposes, and it appears to be a fact, that the former matrimonial home at Property G was sold up by the (omitted) Bank as mortgagee in 2012.  The wife was the sole registered proprietor of that property.

Background

1. The parties met in 1994 and commenced cohabitation in 1995, together with Ms Thatcher’s six children from her previous marriage.

2. At the commencement of cohabitation the husband had his own home at Property S, which he estimates to have been valued at $85,000 with an equity of about $35,000.  He also owned a business which he says was valued at $45,000.

3. The wife purchased Property G, in 1995.  She used the money from her first marriage settlement of $30,000 to assist with the purchase.  The purchase price then was $135,100.  The original mortgage loan, consequently, was something in excess of $100,000.  The title was placed into the name of Ms Thatcher alone.

4. The parties married on (omitted) 1997.

5. Their children, X and Y, were born on (omitted) 1998 and (omitted) 2000 respectively.  They are now aged 15 and 12 years. 

6. The parties separated in May 2009.  The husband was accused of assaulting the wife’s older daughter.  Charges were later dropped and an intervention order removed.

7. The evidence suggests that the wife remortgaged the Property G home on at least three separate occasions.  Documents provided to the court show a final refinancing with (omitted) Bank with that mortgage being registered against title on 29 April 2009.  The gross mortgage loan was $533,500.  The evidence suggests costs on the creation of the loan, including mortgage insurance, of approximately $20,000.  The figure to pay out the previous mortgagee, (omitted) Pty Ltd, was $445,581.56. 

8. The wife concedes that the clear funds obtained from the final refinancing and in the sum of $90,000 were paid to her son, B. 

9. B has not repaid those monies.  He is apparently now a bankrupt and suffers from alcoholism.  The evidence suggests that B used those funds to purchase an expensive motor vehicle. 

10. At all material times, the wife’s other son, A, was a joint mortgagor with the wife and presumably due to the minimal equity available as security for the mortgagee and the wife’s limited capacity to meet instalment payments. 

11. The husband paid $20,000 into the wife’s mortgage in about 2000 from the proceeds of sale of his home and his pizza shop business.

12. The husband says that he is a (omitted) with an income of approximately $40,000 per annum.  He receives child support from the wife of $72 per week. 

13. The wife is a (omitted).  She has an income of approximately $69,000 per annum.

14. There is no evidence that either party has repartnered.

15. The major issue for the court is to determine the veracity of the wife’s claims that she was required to refinance the mortgage on her home on a number of occasions during the marriage from an initial sum of approximately $100,000 up to the eventual mortgage loan of $533,000. 

16. The wife claims that the finances were essentially kept separate during the course of the marriage.  She says that the husband made little or no ongoing financial contributions over and above the $20,000 paid into the mortgage.  She says that he made little or no indirect contributions to the family unit and that she was primarily responsible for the maintenance of the home and the family, both financially and actually.  The husband disputes these claims and says that he contributed financially and actually to the home and the children, including the wife’s children, who were part of the family unit. He says that his earnings were put generally to the benefit of the family as were the proceeds of sale of his home and business.

17. The court was informed that the wife’s trustee in bankruptcy was properly advised of these proceedings and elected not to take part.

18. Both parties gave evidence and were cross-examined.  They each filed affidavits and financial statements.  The wife’s son, A, gave evidence as a witness of the husband but brought to court on subpoena.  He had previously filed a financial statement when a party to the proceedings.

The relevant law

1. There has been much debate of late as to the proper process of statutory and intellectual consideration for courts in property matters following the decision of the High Court in Stanford v Stanford, [2] and then by the Full Court in Bevan & Bevan.[3]  It was previously generally accepted that there was a three- or four-step process for the court, being:

   a)to identify the property of the parties, including assets, liabilities and resources with superannuation to be “treated as property” for these purposes, and for the court to attribute a value;

   b)to identify and attribute weight to the contributions by or on behalf of the parties to the property pool, including financial and non-financial contributions, and taking into account the contributions as homemaker and parent;

   c)after making any determination as to alteration of interests on the basis of contributions, the court is then to consider whether there be any further adjustment in favour of either party on the basis of the relevant considerations under section 75(2) of the Act;

   d)the court was then to consider, pursuant to section 79(2) of the Act, whether the proposed orders are just and equitable given all relevant circumstances.[4]  It was the justice and equity of the actual orders and not the percentage distribution which the court was to consider. 

   [2] (2012) 87 ALJR 74.

   [3] [2013] FamCAFC 116.

   [4] Russell v Russell (1999) FLC 92-877 at [86,439].

2. Any debate as there may have been until recently rested solely on whether the “fourth step” was indeed a separate step in the intellectual process or simply inherent in the considerations as a whole?

3. The High Court in Stanford, whilst presented with a highly unusual factual platform, has thrown doubt on the apparent simplicity of the “four-step approach”. The Court saw section 79(2) of the Act as requiring an earlier determination as to whether it is, in fact, just and equitable to make any alteration of property interests as between the parties. This determination is not to be conflated with a pathway of simply determining the pool; considering contributions; and then considering section 79(2) factors. Rather, the High Court proposed three “fundamental propositions” to guide trial judges through the section 79 process. The Full Court in Bevan[5] summarises the propositions as follows:

   a)determination of a just and equitable outcome of an application for property settlement begins with the identification of existing property interests (as determined by common law and equity);

   b)the discretion conferred by statute must be exercised in accordance with legal principles and must not proceed on an assumption that the parties’ interests in the property are or should be different from those determined by common law and equity;

   c)a determination that a party has a right to a division of property fixed by reference only to the matters in s.79(4) and without separate consideration of s.79(2), would erroneously conflate what are distinct statutory requirements.

   [5] Bevan, (supra) at paragraph 79.

4. It may be a reasonable observation to make that the Full Court in Bevan have, respectfully, seen Stanford as adding nothing new to long-established jurisprudence.  The crux of the discussion is perhaps best set out in Bevan at paragraph 89:

   In our view, it will be less likely that the separate issues arising under s.79(2) and s.79(4) will be conflated if judges refrain from evaluating contributions and other relevant factors in percentage or monetary terms until they have first determined that it would be just and equitable to make an order.  Ultimately, however, appellate error will not be demonstrated if it is possible to ascertain, either by reference to an express finding or by necessary inference, that the trial judge has given separate consideration to the two issues.

5. Also of relevance for trial judges is the pragmatic observation by the High Court in Stanford:

   In many cases where an application is made for a property settlement order, the just and equitable requirement is readily satisfied by observing that, as the result of a choice made by one or both of the parties, the husband and wife are no longer living in a marital relationship.  It will be just and equitable to make a property settlement order in such a case because there is not and will not thereafter be the common use of property by the husband and wife.  No less importantly, the express and implicit assumptions that underpinned the existing property arrangements have been brought to an end by the voluntary severance of the mutuality of the marital relationship.  That is, any express or implicit assumption that the parties may have made to the effect that existing arrangements of marital property interests were sufficient or appropriate during the continuance of their marital relationship is brought to an end with the ending of the marital relationship, and the assumption that any adjustment of those interests could be effected consensually as needed or desired is also brought to an end.  Hence it will be just and equitable that the court make a property settlement order…

The property pool

1. On the face of it, there is little or no property existing at the date of this hearing, save and except the caravan and motor vehicle in the possession of the husband but with a total value of not much more than $2000. 

2. The wife is an undischarged bankrupt.  Not surprisingly, her financial statement discloses neither assets nor liabilities over and above her furniture and contents.  She has a superannuation entitlement of $32,860. 

3. The husband has a superannuation entitlement of $65,000.

4. The difficulty for the court in this matter and compounded by the parties being self-represented, is the dearth of available or probative evidence so as to establish the pool in the following particulars:

   a)what has happened to the funds obtained by the wife from the various refinancings which seem to amount to some $400,000 over and above the original mortgage at the time of purchase of the home?;

   b)the status of the $90,000 being the proceeds of the final refinancing and which are conceded to have been paid to the wife’s son, B?

5. Not surprisingly, the wife has offered little by way of disclosure and discovery.  She has not provided an affidavit from her son, B.  Her standard response in affidavit material and in evidence in court was to say that the proceeds of the refinancing were used for living expenses and to support her children from her previous marriage, including (omitted) primary school fees.  She says that her son B is an alcoholic and now bankrupt.  These are, of course, all issues of credit and in such determinations of credit the parties may live and die by the evidence that they bring, or do not bring, to the court.  It is within these contexts that principles such as those under Jones v Dunkel[6] become relevant.  That is, it is open for the court to draw a negative inference against a party who chooses not to adduce evidence that might ordinarily be considered relevant, corroborative and available with the inference being that such evidence would not have assisted that party.

   [6] (1959) 101 CLR 298.

6. The husband, in my view, as a layperson, has made an admirable effort to bring evidence to the court by way of subpoena.  In doing so he has managed to establish the various refinancings by the wife during the course of their marriage with the most recent being almost contemporaneous with the separation date.  It is a difficult forensic exercise, though, even for the most experienced lawyer, to locate historical evidence of disbursements of funds where there are no obvious tangible assets and there is a generic response of “living expenses and support of the children”.  In this sense, of course, the husband has an onus of proof where he makes assertions in respect of issues and the wife’s credit.  Nevertheless, the courts have historically been able to react to situations where a party has not voluntarily provided full and open disclosure and simply relied on the other party discharging an onus and a burden of proof.  To put it simply, the Family Law Act makes mandatory the full and frank disclosure between parties to litigation.[7]  It follows that, where the court cannot be satisfied as to the extent of the property pool or a particular party’s property, then it may be less cautious than might be the norm when determining a pool of assets and relevant orders.[8]  In such circumstances, the court is entitled to take a more “robust” view in relation to the necessary findings regarding the financial positions of the parties, including a party’s capacity to meet any proposed order.[9]  In the High Court decision in Chang v Su, CallinanJ, in refusing a special leave application, noted:

   It does not matter what the principle might be seen to be; a court has to do the best it can.  It does the best it can, having regard to the evidence that is adduced, and if the parties are not frank then naturally there is going to be a measure of imprecision about any findings that the court can make.

   [7] Oriolo & Oriolo (1985) FLC 91-653.

   [8] Black & Kellner (1992) FLC 92-287 and Weir & Weir (1993) FLC 92-338.

   [9] Chang v Su (2002) FLC 93-117 at [71] and [72].

7. In summary, and although the court is to usually deal with the property of the parties as it stands at the time of the trial, there are circumstances where disposal of assets and disbursements of moneys during a relationship or post-separation are relevant to the justice and equity of the orders that a court must ultimately make and it is not enough for one party to simply stand mute and say, “You go and find out for yourself; I don’t have to prove your case.”  The obligation to disclose is a positive one.

8. The wife concedes that she achieved approximately $90,000 from the final refinancing and remortgaging of the Property G property.  It is clear that this occurred just prior to the final separation of the parties.  The husband was not a party to the refinancing.  The wife says that she advanced the $90,000 to her son, B.  She concedes that B was an alcoholic suffering from depression at the time.  She concedes that there was no loan document as between B and herself.  Documents obtained by subpoena by the husband suggest that the application to (omitted) Bank for those moneys was in support of an intention of “investment”.  The wife and her other son, A, were the parties to the refinancing and held title to the relevant property as tenants in common.  When the wife was challenged as to why she should borrow $90,000 for investment and not hold the moneys herself, she responded as follows:  “I was not thinking clearly at the time” implying that she may have been suffering some emotional difficulties at the time. However, I find the wife’s evidence in Court under cross-examination to be vague, evasive and generally lacking truth. She did indeed suffer some emotional difficulties resulting in the termination of her employment as a (omitted).  However, this was not until 2011 according to her own affidavit material which states:

   I commenced full time employment in 2006 as a (omitted), and am currently working on a contract basis at (omitted).  The stress that the violent nature of the marriage breakup, the financial burden and the ongoing Court proceedings took a (sic) its toll on me with me not being able to cope with the pressure, and I had a breakdown in March 2011.  I was forced to resign my position as (omitted) at (omitted) on July 29 2011 as I had received three written warnings and had been advised that I was to be sacked on August 1 2011.

1. The husband’s unchallenged evidence is that after separation he received a telephone call from the wife’s daughter C advising him that the wife’s son, A, had purchased his own home and a business.  A is otherwise known to be unemployed.  The implication of the conversation and the inference I am asked to draw is that the wife has been advancing monies to her older children from the various refinancings. Unfortunately the husband’s lack of legal training and skills as a cross-examiner resulted in no real exploration of this issue.

2. Dealing solely with the final refinancing of the former matrimonial home and the receipt of $90,000 from the wife, I am not satisfied that she has given an adequate explanation for advancing this sum to her son, B. I do not accept her excuse on the basis of her own evidence. She does not claim, as she does in respect of earlier refinancings, that the draw-downs were used fro “living expenses and private school fees”. Given the lack of any explanation and the (omitted) Bank document that indicates the purpose of the refinancing to be “investment”, I am satisfied that the wife still has possession or control of these monies. 

3. The wife has not brought B to Court, although the husband clearly put at issue the legitimacy of the alleged advancement of moneys from the final refinancing.  The wife’s evidence, at times, was simply incredible in respect of this refinancing and disbursement of the moneys.  Her subsequent bankruptcy is claimed either as a result of her deliberate or negligent placement of these funds in the hands of her son if indeed this was the case.  I simply cannot accept that the wife would take a further mortgage loan of $90,000 and hand that monies to a son who was experiencing personal difficulties.  I prefer that she has retained control of those monies in some way.

4. Further, and given the now open offer of the wife to settle this matter in 2010 by way of a cash adjustment to the husband of $200,000, I am satisfied that is appropriate to deal with this $90,000, being an asset which either remains available to the wife.

5. The wife’s evidence as to her disbursement of the $90,000 (despite and findings) raises a further problem anticipated in Bevan (supra).  These Courts are at times confronted with a situation where the property pool, either with legal title or equitable interest, has been dissipated or completely disposed of by the time of the trial.  Traditionally, Family Courts have applied a notional “add back” which theoretically returns to a pool of property assets which no longer exist or are no longer in the hands of parties.  A close reading of the judgment in Stanford and Bevin suggests that this might not be the correct approach. I question, however, the pragmatism which often confronts trial judges if such a situation applies. Surely, justice and equity is incompatible with one party dissipating a property pool in their own favour but arriving at the trial claiming that there are no actual assets. To put it simply, there would be no satisfaction in the other party having to address such a situation under section 75(2)(o) and in theory being given a greater percentage of a minimal pool on account of that subsection. To my mind the common justice and equity on occasions demands that there are notional “add backs”. To do otherwise in such a situation as that now before me produces nonsense and thus the Court in Bevan left open such a course of “exceptional circumstances”. The factual platform now before me is one of those situations.  Consequently, I am satisfied that the wife either has available to her the $90,000 from the final refinancing or, alternatively, it should be added back to the pool on account of her wanton, reckless or negligent advancement to her son[10]. To deal with it pursuant to s.75(2)(o) would be to visit an injustice on the husband as there are in reality no other assets to which orders can attach.

   [10] (1981) FLC 91-092

6. It remains for me to determine whether the proceeds of previous refinancings by the wife fit the same category.  At its most abstract, the wife effectively commenced a relationship with a mortgage of slightly more than $100,000, and that mortgage had been refinanced by approximately a further $450,000 before the final refinancing.  The wife’s evidence is that she used these moneys for “living and educational expenses” of the family and the children, including her children from her previous relationship.  Again, I have some difficulty in accepting this bland explanation from the wife.  She herself said that she worked as a (omitted) from 2006.  The husband was in substantial employment during the marriage.  It is agreed that he contributed a lump sum to the mortgage.  The wife’s claims of payment of school fees at (omitted) schools are clearly contradicted by the evidence brought to Court under subpoena by the husband which show that the wife was consistently met with letters of demand from the children’s schools for unpaid fees, and often in substantial amounts.  The husband’s unchallenged evidence is that he himself satisfied a number of school fee demands.  Further, I do not accept the wife’s evidence that the finances of this marriage were kept strictly separate.  I prefer the husband’s evidence that he would contribute to the family expenses and that it was the wife who had the primary control of the financial matters.  The most obvious example of the mixing of finances was the husband making a lump sum reduction of $20,000 from the wife’s mortgage. The relationship continued over some fourteen years. It produced two children and had up to six others in the household. I cannot accept that the marriage endured such a period on the wife’s case which is that the husband used his income for his own personal needs and that she supported the family by regular mortgage refinancings. Such a scenario is inconsistent with the husband contributing a lump sum from the sale of his home and business to the wife’s mortgage.

7. Nevertheless, and even with the benefit of decisions in matters such as Weir & Weir[11] whereupon I can take a robust and non-conservative approach to establishing the asset pool, it is simply impossible to differentiate between money spent on the living expenses of this family and identify with particularity any monies which the wife may have moved to her children (as is suggested by the husband).  Whilst I accept that this was a large family which initially had the wife’s six children from her previous marriage and later had the children of the parties, I find it difficult to accept that between 1995 and 2009, a period of 14 years, the wife was able to increase and dissipate her mortgage by near $450,000.  She adduces no evidence to justify a reasonable expenditure of these moneys.  Consequently, on the basis of being robust and non-conservative I generally accept the husband’s argument that the wife herself or, alternatively, members of her own family have benefited to some degree from the mortgage refinancings, as did her son, B, quite clearly from the final refinancing.

   [11] (193) FLC 92-338

8. I proposed, therefore, to “add back” a sum of $90,000 to the pool in respect of the particular final refinancing.  The only other assets of the parties known to me are the caravan and motor vehicle in the husband’s possession with a combined value of $2200.  I am satisfied that the wife has retained assets of considerable value or benefited herself or by her family from the mortgage refinancings, but I am unable to determine such values.

9. In all of these circumstances and given the length of the marriage and the particular contributions made by the parties, notably a contribution of $20,000 by the husband to the wife’s mortgage, I am satisfied that it is just and equitable to alter the property interests of these parties. 

10. Turning to contributions, I again reject the wife’s claim that the finances of the husband and the wife were kept strictly separate during the relationship.  I prefer the husband’s evidence that he contributed his earnings from his (omitted) business.  I accept that he contributed $20,000 to the wife’s mortgage.  I accept his evidence that the wife was generally in control of the family finances.  The wife has not been a witness as to the truth of her claims that she used the loan moneys to meet the children’s school fees.  To the contrary, she accrued significant arrears of such fees.  Further, I accept the husband’s evidence that he contributed as a homemaker and parent and including to the wife’s children.  For instance, he gave unchallenged evidence as to him taking the children to and collecting them from school.  This was not a short marriage.  It was, at least until 2006, a traditional marriage in which the husband went to work and the wife stayed at home.  The wife concedes that she took at least one international holiday during the marriage.  Generally, I prefer the evidence of the husband as to the financial arrangements during the marriage.

11. The wife entered the marriage with $30,000 from her previous property settlement.  The husband had the equity in his home and from his business both of which were eventually sold.  I consider the initial contributions of the parties to be roughly equal.  Similarly, I consider their contributions during the course of the marriage to be equal given my comments above.  The husband has more lately had the primary care of the children.  However, before the final children’s orders, this was the responsibility of the wife.  She now contributes Child Support.

12. Taking all the relevant factors under section 79(4) of the Act into account, I am of the view that contributions for the parties to this marriage have been equal.

13. The husband now has the ongoing primary responsibility for the care of the children. He does, however, receive child support from the wife. Nevertheless, this is a responsibility which the authorities generally accept should receive some adjustment in favour of the primary parent. Further, the wife’s income from the professional qualifications she achieved by studying during the marriage will bring her a superior income to that of the husband. In all of the circumstances I am of the view that would ordinarily be a further loading in the region of 15 percent of the property pool in favour of the husband on account of the relevant section 75(2) factors.

14. This is, however, one of those unusual matters where my findings in respect of the property pool do not sit easily with a simple mathematical exercise of making percentage determinations on the basis of contributions and section 75(2) factors. The difficulty is that I have found that the wife has benefited in an unknown amount from the mortgage loans obtained during the course of the marriage. The benefits that she has received have been entrenched by her ultimate bankruptcy. As such, she has actually benefited from the loans whilst not being subject to repaying them although, of course, the bank has foreclosed on the loan. I am, however, unable to quantify her benefit in dollar terms. I am able to quantify from the evidence the sum of $90,000 which I have included in the pool of property on the basis of the wife still having control of those monies. In all of the circumstances in taking into account the financial history of this relationship, the contributions, and the relevant section 75(2) factors, I am satisfied that justice and equity is served by the wife making a lump sum payment to the husband of $90,000. I will order accordingly.

I certify that the preceding fifty-three (53) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge McGuire

Date:  4 September 2013