Lander, B.T. v Mitson, F.J

[1988] FCA 534

.

CATCHWORDS

Constitutional Law - Whether provisions of s.10 of the Crlmes Act ( C D ) are inconsistent with the provisions of s.37 or s.73 of the Legal Practitioners Act (S.A.).

Search Warrant - whether warrant should be granted to search

premises of Law Society or of Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee in view of provlslons of s.37 and s.73 of Legal

Practitioners Act (S.A.) and if granted whether it should be

executed - meaning of word "evidence" in s.lOB of the Crimes Act

( C D ) - whether warrant too wide In its terms.

NOS. SA G 12, 13, 1 4 , 15, 24 and 25 of 1988

BRUCE THOMAS LANDER and OTHERS and FREDERICK	JOHN HITSON and
OTHERS
LAW SOCIETY OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA and FREDERICK	JOHN MITSON and
OTHERS
FORSTER, J. ADELAIDE
28 SEPTEHBER 1988

?

. .

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA	) )
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY )
)
GENERAL DIVISION	)

No SA G 12 of 1988

No SA G 13 of 1988

No SA G 14 of 1988

No SA G 15 of 1988

No SA G 24 of 1988 No SA G 25 of 1988

BRUCE THOMAS LANDER and OTHERS

and

FREDERICK JOHN MITSON and OTHERS

LAW SOCIETY OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
and

FREDERICK JOHN MITSON and OTHERS

MINUTES OF ORDER

JUDGE MAKING ORDER	FORSTER J.
WHERE MADE	ADELAIDE
DATE OF ORDER	28 SEPTEMBER 1988
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The applications numbered G12, G13, G14, G15, G24 and

G25 of 1988 be dismissed.

2. (a) The documents and other things seized pursuant to

the warrant from the Complalnts Committee and the	Law Society and
held in the custody of	this Court should, with the exceptlon of

. 2 .

those mentioned in the reasons as subject to legal	professional
privilege, be released to the respondents within	fourteen days.

(b) Those documents mentioned ln the reasons to be

subject to legal professional privilege	be	released to MS J.A.
Whyte within fourteen days.

3 . The costs of all six applications are to be considered

- Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36

of the Federal Court Rules.

.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )

)

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY	)
)
GENERAL DIVISION	)

No SA G 12 of 1988 No SA G 13 of 1988 No SA G 14 of 1988 No SA G 15 of 1988 NO SA G 24 Of 1988

No SA G 25 of 1988

BRUCE THOMAS LANDER and OTHERS

and

FREDERICK JOHN MITSON and OTHERS

LAW SOCIETY OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

and

FREDERICK JOHN MITSON and OTHERS

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

C O M : FORSTER J.

Upon the application of Ian Alexander McDougall a

Detective Station Sergeant of the Australlan Federal Police made

to Nick Stan Manos the Chief Stipendiary Magistrate in South

Australia in his capacity as a Justice of the	Peace, a	search
warrant was granted by Mr.	Manos pursuant to s.10 of the	Crimes

Act (Cth) 1914 to four named Federal Police Officers. The

warrant authorised the four offlcers "with such assistance, and

by such force	a s is necessary and reasonable, to	enter at	any
time the said place, and	to seize the said things".	The	"said
place" is earlier	in the warrant recited to be	"premlses at	33

. 2.

Gilbert Place, Adelalde ... particularly that part of those

premlses occupled by the Legal Practitioners Complalnts Commlttee of South Australia or occupled by MS. Joan A. Whyte, or wherever in those premises of the Law Society of South Australia the

documents and things as speclfled hereln In paragraph	6 as sought
to be seized may be located	In the State of South Australla".

The premlses at 3 3 Gilbert Place are occupled by the Law

Society of South Australia	("the Law Society") a body corporate
whose powers and obligations are	set out In Part I1 of the Legal

Practitioners Act 1981 (S.A.) ("the Act") and also by the Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee ("the Complaints Commlttee") a body separate from and independent of the Law Society established

by Divlslon I of Part VI of the Act. MS. Joan Whyte 1s the

Secretary of the Complaints Committee and she also carries out

i some functions and duties particularly with respect to legal

practitioners trust accounts as a servant of the Law Society and she does Law Society work as well as Complaints Commlttee work from the same office.

The members of the Complalnts Committee being deslrous

of challenging the validity of the search warrant instituted

three separate proceedings. The first sought an injunction

against the four police officers named in the warrant restrainlng them from further executing, relying upon or acting pursuant to the warrant. The second clalmed an order directed to the four

named police officers calling upon them to show cause why they

should not be prohiblted from further executing, relying upon or

acting pursuant to the warrant. The third was an application

under the Administrative Decislons Judiclal Review Act (1977) seeking a review of the decision of Mr. Manos to grant the search warrant at all or In its terms. The Law Society issued applications in similar but not identical terms to each of the

three applications of the Complaints Commlttee except that the

Law Society's application under the Administratlve Decisions Judicial Review Act also sought an order directing the four named officers who were joined as respondents together wlth Mr. Manos

to refrain from entering the premises and from in any way acting

pursuant to the warrant. At the hearing the four police officers

were added as respondents to the proceedings under the

Administrative Decislons	Judicial	Review	Act taken by the
Complaints Committee.

All six sets of proceedings raised similar points and I

ordered that all six be heard together and counsel for the

Complaints Committee and counsel for the	Law Society presented
one argument in respect of all three	of the applications made by
their respective clients.

Since it was said that the applications involved a

matter arising under the Constitution or involving its

interpretation I directed that appropriate	notices pursuant to
6 . 1 8 8 of the Judiciary Act	1903 be given to the Attorneys-General

of the Commonwealth and of the States and of the Northern

Territory. Service of such	notices on all Attorneys-General was
proved and acknowledged but	no Attorney-General expressed a wish

to intervene in the proceedings or apply to have them removed to

the High Court. On the contrary all said they wished to take no

. 4 .

part In the proceedlngs.

The reason why the search warrant was sought was that it

was suspected that some or all of the members	of a flrm of legal
practitioners ("the firm") had committed offences of	conspiracy

to prevent or defeat the execution or enforcement of the Income Tax Act (19861, of conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth, and

offences against the Income Tax Assessment Act (1936) and the

Taxation Administration Act (1953). Upon application by counsel appearing on behalf of the firm I ordered that the partners in

the firm be ~olned in all proceedings as applicants and that

publication of the firms	name and the names of the	partners	be
suppressed.

The Complaints Committee had been investigating a

complaint that country a branch of the firm had acted

unconscionably towards one of Its client's. The Commlttee

collected evidence which raised a prlma facie case that a particular cllent and other clients had been subjected to a scheme concerning costs which had the effect of diminishing the

taxable income of the members of the firm. It is unnecessary at

this stage to set out details of the scheme but it is fair to say

that there was prima	facle	evidence	of	offences under the
provisions of	the	Legal	Practitioners	Act concerning trust

accounts, of offences of conspiracy and of offences against	the
Income Tax Assessment Act and the Taxation	Administration Act.

During the investigatlon the Complaints Committe amassed

a number of documents relating to the complaint and among them

are the file notes and correspondence of MS. Whyte with	respect
to the complalnt includlng correspondence	with the firm, letters
to counsel, trust ledger sheets and trust	ledger sheets of the
firm.

The Law Society also held files with respect to the

firm. These were trust account inspection files created in the

ordinary course of trust account inspection pursuant to Division V of Part I11 of the Legal Practltioners Act and reports of a special supervisor appointed pursuant o s . 4 4 of the Act which is contained in Division IX of Part 111.

The warrant was duly executed and documents seized both

from the Complaints Committee and the Law Society. The seized

documents are now in the custody of this	court awalting the
outcome of these proceedings.

Section 10 of the Crimes	Act is as follows:-
"Search warrant

10. If aJustice of the Peace is satisfled by

information on oath that there is reasonable ground for

suspecting that there is	in any house, vessel,	or
place-

anything with respect to which any offence	against
any law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory	has

been, or is suspected on reasonable grounds to have,

been, committed;

anything as to	which there are reasonable	grounds
for belleving that it will afford	evidence as	to

the commission of any such offence; or

anything as to which there is reasonable ground for

belleving that it is Intended to be used for the

purpose of committing any such offence,

he may grant a search warrant authorizing a y constable

named therein, with such assistance as he thinks

necessary, to enter at any time any house, vessel, or place named or described in the warrant, if necessary by force, and to seize any such thing whlch he may find in the house, vessel, or place."

The main point argued with respect to documents held by the Complaints Committee was based on s.73 of the Act whlch is as follows:

"73. (1) Subject to subsection ( 2 ) , A member of the

Committee or a person employed or engaged on work related to the affairs of the Committee shall not

virtue of his office or position except -	divulge information that comes to his knowledge by
(a) in the course of carrying out the duties of his office or posltion;

Or

(b) as may be authorlzed by or under	this Act.
Penalty: Five thousand dollars.

( 2 ) A person referred to in subsection (1) may

divulge information referred to	in that subsection to -
(a) the Council;

(b) a committee or person to whom the Council has

delegated its power to appoint an inspector

pursuant to Division	V of Part 111;
and

(c)	an inspector appointed pursuant to that Division."
It was argued that in so far as the warrant authorised

the seizure of	documents despite the provisions of	5 . 7 3 it	is
invalid.

It seems clear to me that documents may amount to

information within the meaning of that word as used in s.73.

The next question 1s whether a person dlvulges something

by submitting to an apparently legal search. I have had some

difficulty with this aspect of the matter and have finally	come
to the conclusion that "divulge" necessarily lmports some	active

step by the person dlvulging. I do not thlnk that entirely

passive conduct, that is to say, a failure to reslst the

execution of the warrant can amount to divulging. I point to the

definition of "divulge" in the Shorter Oxford Dlctionary -

"1.	To make publlcly known; to publish
2 . To declare or tell	openly (something private or

secret); to disclose, reveal

3.   To make common, impart generally."

Section 73 may well enjoin a relevant person from

assisting the execution of a search warrant, but it seems to me

that the warrant can be executed according to its terms without

it coming Into conflict with the terms of s.73. The warrant

authorises entry to the premises, search and seizure at any time. It might be executed at night or at sometime when neither Ms.

Whyte nor any other person employed or engaged	in work related to
the affairs of the Complaints Committee	was present. In those

circumstances, quite apart from what I take to be proper

interpretation of the	word	"divulge", there would be no
possibility of a conflict between the terms of the	warrant	and
6.73.

I do not think that 5.10 of the Crimes Act when it

authorises the grant of a search warrant is inconsistent with the

provisions of s.73 of the Act so as to give scope for the

a .

operation of s.109 of the Constltutlon.

So far as the Law Society is concerned, and the

documents seized from it, a somewhat simllar argument is raised

based on s.37 of the Act whlch 1 s as follows:

“ 3 7 . (1) No approved auditor	OK inspector employed	or
appointed to make any	audit OK	examination of any

accounts of a legal practitioner OK firm of legal

practitioners f o r the purposes of thls Dlvision shall

(otherwise than is permitted or KeqUlKed by or under

this Act) communicate any matter of which he is

informed or which comes to his knowledge in the course of the audit or examination to any person except in the course of his report; and if he contravenes this

provision he shall (In addition to the penalty provided

by this section and in additlon to any llability he may

incur to the legal practitioner or firm of legal

practitioners) be sub~ect	to the same liabilities to a
client OK cestui trust of the legal practitioner	OK

firm of legal practitioners as those to which the legal practitioner OK firm of legal practitloners would be

subject if he or they divulged such matters.

( 2 ) Neither the Society, nor any officer or

employee of the Society, shall divulge any informatlon

disclosed in a report furnished to the Society under

this Division except -

(a) for the purpose of confidential consideration of

the r port by the Counci 1 ;

O K

(b) in the performance of a duty.

( 3 ) A person who contravenes or fails to comply

with a provision of	this section shall in addition	to
any other penalty or punishment	to which he may be

liable, be gullty of an offence and liable to a	penalty
of not more than five thousand dollars.

It is argued that a warrant Issued under s.10 of the

Crimes Act is in conflict wlth s.37. An elaborate argument was put by counsel for the Law Society that s.10 of the Crimes Act

takes its place in the context of the general law and that s . 3 7

is part of that general law and constitutes a barrier to the

operation of a warrant issued under s.10 of the Crimes Act. It

is also argued that passive compliance or rather non-obstruction of a search warrant amounts to dlvulging of or communication of information contained in the documents seized. For somewhat

similar reasons to those concerning	s.73 I do not accept this
latter argument.

First I should point out that the first injunction

against communicating is directed to an "approved audltor or

inspector" and refers to any matter of	which he is informed	or
which comes to his knowledge in the course	of the	audit or

examination. Even if the Secretary of the Law Society or its

President handed over documents to those executrng the warrant

this could hardly	be a communlcating by an approved auditor or
inspector.

So far as the Law Society and its officers and employees

are concerned for somewhat simllar reasons to those applying to

s.73 I am of opinion that the second injunction directed to them with respect to divulging any information disclosed in a report is in no conflict with the provisions of s.10 of the Crimes Act

authorising the grant of a search warrant. The two sections are

directed to quite different ends. Section 10 enables a search warrant to be granted and s.37 forbids the communication or

divulging of certain information which as I have said must

involve a positive voluntary act.

I am quite unable to see that s.10 of the Crimes Act

and s.37 of the Legal Practitioners Act are inconsistent withln the meaning of s.109 of the Constitution. If the sectlons were inconsistent no doubt 5.109 of the Constitutlon should, to the

extent of the inconsistency, provide that 5.10 should prevail.

Acceptance of the argument of counsel for the Law Society that

s.37 constitutes a barrier to the operation of a warrant	issued
under s.10 necessarily involves acceptance of the	proposltion

that there is a conflict or inconsistency between the two

sections and as I have said I am	unable to accept that this	IS
so.

The arguments based on s.73 and s.37 of the Act must In

my view fail.

It was argued that the word "evldence" in s.lO(b) of the

Crimes Act must mean admissible evidence.	It was put that any
document which did not	constitute admissible evidence could not

be seized. I do not accept thls argument. The sub-section says

"as to which there are reasonable grounds for believing that	it
will afford evidence".	Hr. Hanos was satisfied that there was

reasonable ground for suspecting that at 33 Gllbert Place

[documents] were to be found as to which there were reasonable

grounds for believing that they would afford evidence. A pollce	officer or other official who is engaged in executing a search
warrant can hardly be expected to decide correctly what may be complicated questions of the admissibility of evidence. It is sufficient, in my view, ~f there are reasonable grounds for
believing that a document will constitute vldence. I am
fortified in this view by the words of Mason J. as he then was,
in Baker v. Campbell (1983) 153 C.L.R. 52 @ p.82

.

11.

"I doubt whether the expression 'will afford evidence'

in par.(b) denotes 'evidence whlch wlll be admitted at a subsequent trlal' or 'admlssable evidence' In the

strict sense of that	term."
A substantial argument was	raised and adopted by all

counsel for the applicants that the	warrant In its terms was too
wide.

It is necessary to set out brief particulars of the

conduct alleged against some at least of the	members of the firm.
When a client was to recelve a fairly large sum of money by	way

of judgment or settlement	he would be asked to	sign an agreement
to pay a particular sum for sollcltor and	cllent costs on	the
basls that party and party costs	would be	recovered from the

other side. The client was then told that If the sollcltor and client costs were taxed they would amount to considerably more than the amount agreed to be paid. However the solicitors would

accept the amount agreed to be paid for solicitor and client

costs provided the client was prepared to ]oln in a cheque

swapping operation or pay the solicitors the solicitor and client

costs in cash. If cheque swapping were to occur there would be

two debits in the trust account ledger annotated as "settlement"

or "settlement moneys". In neither case would there be any

account for solicitor and client costs prepared and the	amount
received would be shared between the	partners and not declared as
income for income tax purposes.

The search warrant recites that Mr. Manos is satisfied

by information on oath that there 1 s reasonable ground for

. 12.

suspecting that there are at 3 3 Gilbert Place certain things

being originals or copies of a very wide range of buslness records including letters, books of account, computer hardware and software and many other classes. Without setting out the

terms of paragraph 6 of the warrant in full it is sufficient	to
say the net is cast very wide indeed so that it is dlfflcult	to

imagine any business records that are not Included. The llst

concludes with the phrase -

"...and other business records, documents or things of,

or which pertain to, arise out of, are connected wlth

or relate to the affairs of one or more of ..."

There then follows a list comprising the firm's service company, a unit trust bearing in its name the initlals of the firm and

then the eight individuals who are members of the firm.

Paragraph 7 of the warrant after the list of names I

have mentioned concludes -

"... whether acting alone, with one or more	of the other
persons or entities, or under the firm name, or for	OK

with or through one	OK more	of the individuals named
hereafter."

Then follows paragraph 8 in the following terms:

"- David Paul BORG

- Christopher T.M. NOLAN

- or other individuals where any one or more of the

following indicia are present:

(a)	In respect of any indlvldual or company where an examination of trust ledger OK other trust accounting records indicates that more than one debit has been recorded in the name of that individual OK company as a settlement payment;
(b) an authority OK agreement has been signed by	an

individual in which the individual agrees to the payment of a fixed sum by way of solicitor/cllent costs;

(c) there is no bill of costs in relation to a file to cover solicitor/client costs;

The recital goes on -

"as to which there are reasonable grounds for bellevlng

that the same will afford evidence as to the commission

of the following offences and in respect to whlch there are reasonable grounds for believing that the same will

afford evidence that the following	offences have been
committed by:. . ."

There follows a list of the partners of the firm and a llst of offences each of which falls into one of the categories I have mentioned above.

The most substantial argument as to excessive width is

based on the use of the word "or" after the firm name in the

second to last line of paragraph 7. If the word "or" is used in

a disjunctive sense lt is argued that all business records

connected with the firm and its members are sought and not just

those connected with the affairs of "B" and "N" and any other

clients who might meet the indicia set out in sub.p. (a), (b) & (c) of paragraph 8 . I think that this argument is correct but I

consider that in the context	of this warrant the word "or" should
be	read as "and" or conjunctively. The warrant starts by
referring to a very wide field of documents. The	whole field is
limited by the first part of paragraph	7 to documents relating to

the affairs of one or more of the two companies and the eight

partners whether acting alone, whether with one or more of the

other persons or entities or under the firm name. The offending

word "or" then follows. It is plain to me that what is intended

is a further delimitation of the scope of the warrant so as	to
authorise the search for and seizure	of documents relating to the

affairs of the two companies and eight partners whether acting in combination or not for "B" and "N" and other clients where any

.

14.

one or more of the lndlcla mentioned in sub.p (a), (b) & (c) are

present. The context	of this warrant creates one of those cases
in which "or" should be read as "and".	The first argument in my
view fails.

It is also argued that indlcia (b) and (c) are too wide

but no crlticism is made of indicium (a). It is said, and no

doubt rightly, that many prudent and scrupulously honest

solicitors obtain authority from clients agreeing to the charging

of a fixed sum for solicitor and client costs. It is also sald

that many scrupulously honest solicitors do not make any charge

for solicitor and client costs in some matters. This to is no

doubt correct. At flrst I considered that indlcia (b) and (c)

were too wide and necessarily indicated no improprlety and

necessarily indicated no crlminal conduct at all. Further

consideration has led me to the view that this earlier opinion

was incorrect. The framer of the warrant knew from MS. Whyte's

report that the three indicia occurred in some of the matters in

which it was suspected that a scheme to avoid income tax by

cheque swapping or payment in cash had been Indulged in by the

members of the firm. Rather than seek to search for and seize

documents relating to all plaintiffs who have recovered damages either by judgment or settlement the warrant	sought only the
documents only relating to "B" and "N" and such other clients	to
whom the indicia or one	or more of them applied.

It is now my view that the warrant is not too widely drawn because of the terms of the indicia.

.

. 15.

Counsel for the firm and Its partners raised an argument

based upon the affidavlt of Sergeant McDougall sworn 11 January 1988. In paragraph 10(n) of that affldavit Sergeant McDougall swears that he said to Mr. Manos at the time of applylng for the

warrant "I will bear s.73 In mind and all we will be asklng is

the location of the documents".

Counsel argued that either Sergeant MCDOugall deceived

Mr. ManOS into granting a warrant authorising search and seizure

when he said that he only wanted to ascertaln the locatlon of

documents or that Mr. Manos was wrong to grant a warrant whlch

authorised more than was apparently belng asked for and that In

either event the warrant was bad. I do not accept these

arguments. It seems to me that Sergeant McDougall havlng

referred to s.73 which as has been seen forblds a member of the Complaints Committee or a person employed or engaged on work

related to the affairs of the Committee divulging informatlon,

was simply assuring Mr. ManOS that he	would seek no divulging of
information beyond the location of documents.	It would be absurd
for a police officer, experienced enough to reach the	rank of
Sergeant, when seeking the granting	of a warrant authorising

search and seizure to say that he really wished to do neither.

In any event if he wished to know only the location of the documents he might well have ascertained this wlthout any warrant

at all.	Mr. Manos who is a most experienced Magistrate and would
not I suppose have granted a	warrant if he had gathered from

Sergeant McDougall that search and seizure was not sought. He

must, I think, have interpreted	what Sergeant McDougall said in
the way in which I have done.

S

<

* . 16.

The question of legal professional privllege was ralsed

in argument. It should be pointed out that Mr. Burr the

President of the Law Society ralsed no claim of such prlvilege when the Law Society documents were taken, indeed the documents were handed over by Mr. Burr. Ms. Whyte from whom documents in

the custody of the Complaints Commlttee were taken raised a claim

of such privllege with respect to certain documents seized.

Those documents are listed in p.lO(a)(iii) of Ms. Whyte's

affidavit sworn on 11 March 1988. I list them hereunder -

"1 . copy letter dated 13 August 1987 from Legal

Practitioners Complalnts Commlttee to MC A.J.
Besanko of counsel.

2 .   copy letter dated 27 August 1987 from Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee to Mr A.J. Besanko of counsel.

3.   copy letter dated 4 September 1987 from Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee to MC A.J. Besanko of counsel.

4 .   copy letter dated 9 September 1987 from Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee to Mr A.J. Besanko of counsel.

5 .   copy letter dated 30 September 1987 from Legal

Practitioners Complaints Committee to MC A.J.

Besanko of counsel.

6.   copy letter dated 6 November 1987 from Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee to MC A.J.

Besanko of counsel.

7.   letter

dated 4 January 1988 from Mr A.J. Besanko of counsel to Legal Practitioners

Complaints Committee.

8.	copy letter dated 18 January 1988 from Legal
Practitioners Complaints committee to Mr A.J.

Besanko of counsel.

9.	copy letter dated 19 January 1988 from Legal
Practltioners Complaints Committee to Mr A.J.

Besanko of counsel.

10.	letter dated 21 January 1988 from MC A.J. Besanko of counsel to Legal Practitioners Complalnts Commlttee.
11. letter dated	2 2 January 1988 from Mr A.J.

Besanko of counsel to Legal Practltloners

Complaints Committee.''

These letters and copies of letters as described appear to me to be obviously protected by legal professional privilege.

I point out that the guidelines on the execution of search

warrants on lawyers' premises published on 7 November 1986 are

not applicable in the present clrcumstances. Ms. Whyte's claim

is on behalf of the Complalnts Commlttee as a client not in	her
capacity as a solicitor.

No claim for privilege on behalf of the firm's clients

or any of them has been ralsed by sollcltors or counsel for the

firm and its partners.

In these circumstances I am unable to say that the

possibility that there may exlst any documents with respect to

which legal professional privilege may be claimed, apart from the

documents mentioned in MS. Whyte's affidavit invalidates the

search warrant.

In my view all six applications fail and must be

dismissed.

The documents and other things seized pursuant to the

warrant from the Complaints Committee and the Law Society and

held in the custody of this Court should, with the exception of

those mentioned in p.lO(a)(iii) of Ms. White's affidavit, be

released to the respondents. The documents mentioned in

p.lO(a)(iil) should be released to Ms. Whyte. In order to

enable the applicants to apply for a stay if they are minded to appeal I order that the documents be released to the respondents and to Ms. Whyte as appropriate fourteen days from this day unless otherwise ordered.

I will hear counsel as to costs

I certify that this and

the17 preceding pages	are
a true copy of the	Reasons
for Judgment of	Mr Justice

Forster.

Associate: U/"?+

Dated:  Z%/ lq(W

Counsel for the first applicants in MK J.J. Doyle, Q.C.

G12, G13 & G24 (Solicitor-General) with
Mr A.J. Besanko

Solicitor for first applicants in	MS Joan A. Whyte
G12, G13	& G24

Counsel for the first	applicants in	Mr B.M. Debelle, Q.C. with
G14, G15	& G25	Mr R.C. White

Solicitors for the first applicants	Finlaysons
in G14, G15	& G25

Counsel for the second applicants in Mr E.P. Mullighan, Q.C.

G12, G13, G14, G15, G24 & G25 with Mr T.C. Evans

Solicitors for the second applicants O'Laughlln Robertson and

in G12, G13, G14, G15, G24 & G25	then Baker O'Laughlin
Counsel for the respondents in	Mr R. Richter, Q.C. with

G12, G13, G14, G15, G24 & G25 Mr G.R. Niemann

Solicitors for respondents in G12,	Australian Government
G13, G14, G15, G24 & G25	Solicitor
Dates of hearing	16 & 17 June and 19 July 1988
Place of hearing	Adelaide