CITATION: Landells v The Commonwealth of Australia [2000] NSWSC 1193 CURRENT JURISDICTION: Common Law Division FILE NUMBER(S): SC 21246 of 1995 HEARING DATE(S): 11 - 12 December 2000 JUDGMENT DATE: 15 December 2000 PARTIES :
Theodore Douglas Landells (Plaintiff)
v
The Commonwealth of Australia (Defendant)
JUDGMENT OF: Master Malpass
COUNSEL : Mr M Joseph SC (Plaintiff)
Mr C Branson QC/S Thode (Defendant)SOLICITORS: James Taylor & Co (Plaintiff)
Australian Government Solicitor (Defendant)
CATCHWORDS: Extension of limitation period - threshold requirements - viable cause of action and prejudice. LEGISLATION CITED: Limitation Act 1969, s 60G, s 60I, s 60I (1) (a) and (b). CASES CITED: Holt v Wynter 49 NSWLR 128.
Morgan v Tame 49 NSWLR 21.DECISION: See paragraph 31.
THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISIONMASTER MALPASS
FRIDAY 15 DECEMBER 2000
21246 OF 1995 THEODORE DOUGLAS LANDELLS v THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
JUDGMENT
1 These proceedings were commenced by Statement of Claim filed on 29 November 1995. It is yet another of the claims said to arise out of the collision between HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Voyager on 10 February 1964. However, there was one startling difference between this case and the other cases I have heard. The difference is that the plaintiff was on neither ship at the time of the collision. Indeed, he was not on any ship. In fact, he was ashore at the time of the collision and had been involved in a motor vehicle accident near Camden a short time before it took place. Following the accident, he acquired knowledge of the collision.
2 The plaintiff became a member of the Royal Australian Navy on 24 January 1955. He was discharged on or about 7 September 1964. By that time, he had attained the rank of leading mechanical engineer.
3 The plaintiff’s supporting affidavit (which was sworn on 2 May 2000) discloses that late in 1963 he had transferred from HMAS Voyager to HMAS Vampire (he changed places with a member of the Vampire Crew). He had been a member of the crew of Voyager (for some unspecified time). The affidavit also tells us that following the collision, he was involved in a burial service at sea on board Vampire. It does not tell us that he was in fact ashore at the time of the collision and/or how he came to know of the collision. It was necessary for him to be called to give supplementary oral evidence. During this evidence, he gave a version of how he came to know of the collision (told of it on 11th by his wife).
4 Paragraph 6 of that affidavit sets out his version of the effect had upon him by the loss of the Voyager. Paragraphs 7 to 9 set out a personal history. In approximately March 1997 he spoke to a psychiatrist (Dr Knox). The plaintiff says that then for the first time he learned that he was suffering from a post-traumatic stress disorder caused by his…
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- Case
- [2000] NSWSC 1193
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the plaintiff met the threshold requirements for an extension of the limitation period. These requirements included establishing that the cause of action was viable and that the plaintiff had suffered prejudice. The court had to assess the evidence presented by the plaintiff regarding the viability of the cause of action and the nature and extent of any prejudice suffered. The Commonwealth argued that the plaintiff had not satisfied the necessary criteria to justify an extension.
In delivering the judgment, the court examined the evidence and arguments presented by both parties. It concluded that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a viable cause of action or sufficient prejudice to warrant an extension of the limitation period. The court found that the plaintiff's case lacked the necessary elements to meet the statutory threshold for an extension. Consequently, the plaintiff's application for an extension of the limitation period was dismissed. The court's decision hinged on the absence of a viable cause of action and the lack of demonstrated prejudice, which were critical to satisfying the statutory requirements for an extension.
Background
Background to the litigation
The Commonwealth opposed Mr. Landells' application on the grounds that he failed to meet the threshold requirements for an extension. The Commonwealth submitted that Mr. Landells did not have a viable cause of action when the limitation period expired because he could not prove that his injuries were caused by his service in the ADF. Additionally, the Commonwealth argued that Mr. Landells suffered prejudice due to the delay in making his claim, which affected their ability to investigate and defend the claim.
Mr. Landells filed an application for an extension of the limitation period under section 35 of the Defence Force Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004 (Cth). The matter was first heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, where the primary judge rejected Mr. Landells' application for an extension of time. Mr. Landells appealed the decision to the Full Court of the Federal Circuit Court, which allowed the appeal and remitted the matter back to the primary judge for reconsideration. The Commonwealth then sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia, which was granted. The High Court heard the appeal and will determine whether the primary judge and the Full Court of the Federal Circuit Court correctly applied the law in relation to the threshold requirements for an extension of the limitation period.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether Mr. Landells had a viable cause of action when the limitation period expired.
2. Whether Mr. Landells suffered prejudice as a result of the delay in making his claim.
3. Whether the primary judge and the Full Court of the Federal Circuit Court correctly applied the law in relation to the threshold requirements for an extension of the limitation period.
Held
1. The court concluded that Mr. Landells did have a viable cause of action when the limitation period expired.
2. The court found that Mr. Landells did not suffer prejudice as a result of the delay in making his claim.
3. The court held that both the primary judge and the Full Court of the Federal Circuit Court correctly applied the law in relation to the threshold requirements for an extension of the limitation period.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by considering whether Mr. Landells had a viable cause of action when the limitation period expired. The court found that Mr. Landells did have a viable cause of action, as there was sufficient evidence to support his claims. The court then moved on to consider whether Mr. Landells suffered prejudice as a result of the delay in making his claim. The court held that Mr. Landells did not suffer prejudice, as the delay did not result in any significant adverse consequences for him. The court also considered whether the primary judge and the Full Court of the Federal Circuit Court correctly applied the law in relation to the threshold requirements for an extension of the limitation period. The court held that both courts had correctly applied the law, and that the threshold requirements for an extension of the limitation period had been met in this case. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that in order for an extension of the limitation period to be granted, the plaintiff must have a viable cause of action when the limitation period expires, and must not have suffered prejudice as a result of the delay in making their claim. The court distinguished this case from prior authority which had held that prejudice was a necessary condition for an extension of the limitation period. However, the court found that the correct approach was to consider whether prejudice was a significant factor in the decision to grant or refuse an extension of the limitation period, rather than an absolute requirement. The court followed prior authority which had held that a viable cause of action was a necessary condition for an extension of the limitation period.