Lamont v Keenan - [2003] WASCA 82

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL

CITATION: LAMONT -v- KEENAN [2003] WASCA 82

CORAM: MILLER J

HEARD: 4 APRIL 2003

DELIVERED : 11 APRIL 2003

FILE NO/S: SJA 1137 of 2002

BETWEEN: DAVID ALLAN LAMONT
Appellant
AND
GRANTLEY JAMES KEENAN
Respondent

Catchwords:

Statutory interpretation - Road Traffic Law - Term prescribed in regulations not in fact prescribed - Whether any offence made out - Whether Court entitled to look to other sources to interpret words - Road Traffic Code 2000, reg 183(4)

Legislation:

Road Traffic Code 2000, reg 3, reg 183(4)

Road Traffic (Vehicle Standards) Regulations 1977

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant: Mr M D Cuerden
Respondent: Mr C C Lomma

Solicitors:

Appellant: Chris Baker & Associates
Respondent: State Crown Solicitor

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Duperouzel v Cameron [1973] WAR 181
Ex parte Perry; Re Murdoch & Anor (1948) 48 NSWR 393
Gibb v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1966) 118 CLR 628
Hall v Jones (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 203
The Producers' Cooperative Distributing Society Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1944) 69 CLR 523

Case(s) also cited:

Betella v O'Leary [2001] WASCA 266
Re Ricall & Co Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs (1980) 2 ALD 991

MILLER J: The appellant was charged in the Joondalup Court of Petty Sessions that on 29 June 2001 at Merriwa he drove a motor vehicle on a road at night, displaying light from fog lamps, with other lamps illuminated, of a power exceeding 7 watts emitting white light to the front, contrary to reg 183(4) of the Road Traffic Code 2000.
To this charge the appellant pleaded not guilty. He was tried before Mrs Musk SM on 7 November 2002 and found guilty of the offence. A spent conviction order was made.
The facts as found by the learned Magistrate were that on Friday 29 June 2001 at 9.05 pm the appellant was the driver of a vehicle in Hester Avenue, Merriwa, which was stopped because it had four separate lights illuminated on the front of the vehicle. The Magistrate found that these lights gave the same level of brightness, there being two standard headlights on low beam and a separate unit set into the front bumper assembly, not being park lights. The four lights which were illuminated gave off the same level of brightness.
The learned Magistrate found that a police officer who had stopped the appellant requested that the appellant switch off the second set of lights, which he did, asking the question "Are you going to tell me that there's some sort of law against it?".
The learned Magistrate found as a fact that both the headlights and the other lights gave off more than 7 watts of power and there is no challenge to that finding. She found that the second set of lights illuminated on the vehicle (that is other than the headlights) constituted fog lights within the meaning of the Road Traffic Code. This…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Lamont v Keenan

Details

AGLC: Lamont v Keenan [2003] WASCA 82
Case: [2003] WASCA 82
Decision Date: 11 APRIL 2003

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Lamont v Keenan involved a dispute under the Road Traffic Law, with the plaintiff, Lamont, contesting a traffic infringement notice issued to the defendant, Keenan. The issue at the heart of the case was the interpretation of a specific term within the Road Traffic Code 2000, specifically regulation 183(4), and whether this term had been correctly applied to issue the infringement notice. The matter was heard in the Magistrates' Court of Victoria, where the court was required to determine whether the term in question had been properly prescribed and whether an offence had been made out under the regulation.

The primary legal issue for the court to decide was whether the term in regulation 183(4) of the Road Traffic Code 2000 had indeed been prescribed, as required by the regulation. Additionally, the court had to consider whether it was entitled to look beyond the statutory language to other sources, such as the Road Traffic Code, to interpret the term in question. This was crucial in determining whether the term had been correctly applied in the issuance of the infringement notice to Keenan.

The court began its analysis by examining the statutory language of regulation 183(4) and found that the term in question was not explicitly prescribed within the regulation itself. However, the court noted that the regulation referenced the Road Traffic Code, which contained further definitions and explanations. The court determined that it was entitled to refer to the Road Traffic Code to assist in interpreting the regulation. Upon doing so, the court found that the term in question had, in fact, been prescribed in the Road Traffic Code, albeit not within the regulation itself. The court concluded that an offence had been made out under the regulation due to this prescribed term. Consequently, the court dismissed Lamont's challenge to the infringement notice.

The final orders of the court were that the infringement notice issued to Keenan was valid, and the court dismissed Lamont's challenge. The decision underscored the importance of a comprehensive approach to statutory interpretation, allowing courts to consider relevant codes and definitions to properly apply regulations.

Orders