Lambrou v Lambrou
[2023] VSC 90
•2 March 2023
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
TRUSTS, EQUITY AND PROBATE LIST
S CI 2017 00661
BETWEEN:
| CHRISTOS LAMBROU (WHO SUES AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF DESPINA LAMBROU, DECEASED) | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| EMMANUEL GEORGE LAMBROU & ANOR (according to the attached Schedule) | Defendants |
PROPERTY LIST
S ECI 2022 01675
BETWEEN:
| EMMANUEL GEORGE LAMBROU | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| CHRISTOS LAMBROU & ANOR (according to the attached Schedule) | Defendants |
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JUDGE: | Ierodiaconou AsJ |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 19 October 2022 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 2 March 2023 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Lambrou v Lambrou & Anor |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2023] VSC 90 |
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CIVIL PROCEDURE – Surplus funds from mortgagee sale paid into Funds in Court – Application for payment out of Funds in Court – Competing applications for payment out of Funds in Court.
PROPERTY LAW – Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) ss 76, 77 – Morris Finance Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia & Ors [2017] VSC 260.
COSTS – Gross costs order – Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (Vic) r 63.07(2)(c) – Whether appropriate to make a gross costs order in lieu of taxed costs – Gross sum costs order not appropriate in the circumstances.
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| APPEARANCES: S CI 2017 00661 | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr W Rimmer | Moores |
| The First Defendant in person | ||
| For the Second Defendant | Mr N P Jones | Le Brun & Associates |
| APPEARANCES: S ECI 2022 01675 | Counsel | Solicitors |
| The Plaintiff in person | ||
| For the First Defendant | Mr W Rimmer | Moores |
| For the Second Defendant | Mr N P Jones | Le Brun & Associates |
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Summary.............................................................................................................................................. 1
Applications by the administrator and Mr E Lambrou.............................................................. 2
Background......................................................................................................................................... 4
Applicable Principles........................................................................................................................ 7
The administrator’s submissions.................................................................................................. 10
Costs – application for gross sum................................................................................... 15
Mr E Lambrou’s submissions........................................................................................................ 16
Ms Lambrou’s submissions........................................................................................................... 19
Analysis.............................................................................................................................................. 20
Conclusion......................................................................................................................................... 27
HER HONOUR:
Family members are in a heated dispute about almost $1 million paid into Court. The principal protagonists are brothers Christos and Emmanuel George Lambrou. Emmanuel’s former wife, Melissa Joanne Lambrou, is another party in the dispute.
Christos is the administrator of the estate of Despina Lambrou, deceased (the ‘deceased’). The mortgagee sold the property.[1] The net sale proceeds (the ‘funds’) were paid into Court by the mortgagee. They are held in Common Fund No.1, Account 86332 (the ‘Account’).
[1]The property was located at 1 Urie Lane, Flemington (the ‘property’).
I shall refer to Christos as the ‘administrator’, and Emmanuel Lambrou as ‘Mr E Lambrou’. The deceased is their mother. I shall refer to Melissa Lambrou as “Ms Lambrou.”
Summary
The administrator be paid the following amounts, to be deducted from the funds held in the Account:
(a) $552,000.00 pursuant to his entitlement to the judgment debt under paragraphs 2(a) and 5(c) of the 21 June 2019 orders of the Honourable Justice McMillan (the ’21 June 2019 orders');
(b) $7,715.67 pursuant to his entitlement to interest on the judgment debt under paragraphs 2(b) and 5(c) of the 21 June 2019 orders;
(c) $183,576.38 pursuant to his entitlement to further interest on the judgment debt for the period from and including 22 June 2019 to 19 October 2022;
(d) interest on the judgment debt for the period from and including 20 October 2022 to the date of judgment;
(e) $26,204.12 in payment of the costs invoiced by Estate Advantage in connection with preparing the property for sale pursuant to his entitlement under paragraph 5(a) of the 21 June 2019 orders; and
(f) $1,453.00 in payment of the costs invoiced by Prompt Locksmiths in connection with obtaining possession of the property pursuant to his entitlement under paragraph 6 of the 21 June 2019 orders.
The following sums be retained in the Account until further order:
(a) $61,702.42, being the estimate of the administrator’s entitlement to costs pursuant to the 21 June 2019 orders;
(b) $8,880.10, being the estimate of the administrator’s entitlement to costs pursuant to the orders of Judicial Registrar Irving made in Court of Appeal proceeding no. S API 2019 0095 on 28 October 2022;
(c) $15,919.60, being the estimate of the administrator’s entitlement to costs pursuant to the orders of the Honourable Justice Keogh made in proceeding no. S CI 2017 00661 on 17 March 2021;
(d) $10,768.31, being the estimate of the administrator’s entitlement to costs pursuant to the orders of the Court of Appeal made in proceeding no. S EAPCI 2021 0032 on 30 March 2021; and
(e) $44,000.00, being the estimate of the administrator’s costs of proceeding to taxation.
Applications by the administrator and Mr E Lambrou
This judgment determines competing applications for payment out of the Funds in Court. The applications are made in two related proceedings. The first proceeding is long-running.[2] By an amended summons filed on 1 June 2022, the administrator made his application for payment out in that proceeding. The second proceeding is solely concerned with the application for payment out.[3] By originating motion filed on 10 May 2022, Mr E Lambrou made his application in the second proceeding.
[2]S CI 2017 00661 S CI 2017 00661 Christos Lambrou (Who sues as representative of the estate of Despina Lambrou, deceased) vs Lambrou, Emmanuel George & Ors.
[3]S ECI 2022 01675 Lambrou, Emmanuel George vs Lambrou, Christos & Anor.
On 7 June 2022, Keith JR ordered that the related proceedings be heard and determined together. I made orders on 10 August 2022 that the affidavits filed in each proceeding may be relied upon in the related proceeding.
Other Matters of the orders made on 10 August 2022 in the related proceedings described the applications.
The administrator’s application is summarised as follows:
By his amended summons filed on 1 June 2022, the plaintiff seeks that some of the funds held in Funds in Court, in particular Common Fund No.1, Account 86332, (the ‘Account’) be released to him. The approximate balance of the Accounts as at 2 June 2022 is: $998,955.35.
The plaintiff seeks the following payments:
a. the judgment debt of $552,000.00;
b. interest;
c. costs of Estate Advantage to prepare the property for sale;
d. costs of $1,453 of locksmiths;
e.plaintiff’s costs on an indemnity basis for his application determined by McMillan J on 21 June 2019 for possession and sale of the property, the stay application before Keogh J and the unsuccessful appeal before the Court of Appeal; and
f.plaintiff’s costs on a standard basis for the application refusing an extension of time for appeal, and for this application.
Mr E Lambrou’s application is summarised as follows:
By his originating motion filed on 10 May 2022, the plaintiff seeks that some of the funds held in Funds in Court, in particular Common Fund No.1, Account 86332, (the ‘Account’) be released to him. The approximate balance of the Accounts as at 2 June 2022 is: $998,955.35.
As at the date of this judgment, the Funds in Court in the Account are $998,955.35.
Background
In a ruling published on 30 March 2021, the Court of Appeal described the circumstances to date. I repeat the Court of Appeal’s summary of the circumstances below.
On 24 February 2017, Despina Lambrou, by her administrator, State Trustees Limited, commenced a proceeding against one of her sons, Emmanuel (the applicant in this Court). In that proceeding, Mrs Lambrou sought to set aside a subdivision of her home — which subdivision was alleged to have been done at the initiative of Emmanuel. She also sought relief in relation to what was alleged to be the misappropriation of proceeds of a sale by Emmanuel, then acting in his capacity as her administrator. Additionally, she sought an order setting aside a transfer of lot 2 of the subdivision, which had been made to Emmanuel and his then wife (the second respondent in this Court), and which she alleged had been made in circumstances that were unconscionable and/or the product of undue influence.
Following the death of Mrs Lambrou in November 2017, her other son, Christos (the first respondent in this Court), obtained a grant of administration of her estate, and assumed the conduct of the proceeding she had commenced.
On 28 May 2018, Christos obtained summary judgment in relation to part of the proceeding, and a counterclaim previously filed by Emmanuel was struck out.
On 2 August 2018, the remaining disputes between the parties were resolved at a mediation. The terms of settlement required the applicant and his former wife to pay the sum of $552,200 to the estate (‘the settlement sum’). In the event of default, Christos was entitled to apply for judgment on terms which included the giving of vacant possession of the property to Christos for the purposes of its sale, with the proceeds of the sale then being applied to pay the settlement sum or any outstanding balance.
The terms of settlement contained mutual releases. For their part, Emmanuel and his former wife released Christos, personally and in his representative capacity, from all claims pursuant to part IV of the Administration and Probate Act 1958 (‘the Act’). Similarly, Christos gave a release for any claim he might have under part IV of the Act.
On 27 August 2018, the original proceeding was dismissed, with liberty reserved to Christos to apply for judgment in the event of default as contemplated by the terms of settlement.
Emmanuel and his former wife subsequently defaulted on the terms of settlement.
On 3 June 2019, Christos filed a summons for judgment in accordance with the default provisions contained in the terms of settlement. That application came on for hearing on 21 June 2019 before McMillan J. On that date, her Honour made various orders, including an order that Emmanuel and his former wife deliver up to Christos vacant possession of the property for the purpose of sale.
Pausing there, paragraphs 2-8 of the 21 June 2019 orders are as follows:
2.The defendants pay the plaintiff:
(a)$552,000.00; and
(b)$7,715.67, being interest from 2 May 2019 to date at the judgment rate as determined by the Penalty Interest Rates Act 1983 (Vic).
3.The defendants forthwith deliver up to the plaintiff vacant possession of the property at 1 Urie Lane, Flemington, Victoria, being the land described in Certificate of Title Volume 11400 Folio 293 (‘the property’) for the purposes of its sale.
4.Upon obtaining vacant possession, the plaintiff be at liberty to sell the property.
5.The proceeds of sale of the property be deposited into the trust account of the plaintiff's solicitor and disbursed by him as follows:
(a)firstly, in payment of the agent's commission, advertising expenses and any other costs and charges (that may be recommended by the agent) incurred in making the property ready for sale;
(b)secondly, in payment of legal costs of the sale;
(c)thirdly, in payment of the sums required to be paid by the defendants pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 6 of these orders;
(d)fourthly, the balance then remaining to the defendants.
6.The defendants pay the plaintiffs costs of and incidental to this application and possession and sale of the property on an indemnity basis.
7. The defendants’ oral application for a stay be refused.
8. The plaintiffs summons filed 3 June 2019 otherwise be dismissed.
Returning now to the chronology of the Court of Appeal ruling:
Emmanuel and his former wife did not leave the property or comply with the orders of McMillan J.
On 5 September 2019, Emmanuel filed an application for leave to appeal the orders of McMillan J, together with an application for an extension of time (the application for leave to appeal being out of time).
On 29 October 2019 Irving JR refused Emmanuel’s application for an extension of time, and ordered him to pay Christos’ costs of the application on a standard basis.
On 21 January 2020, Christos obtained a warrant of possession, enabling the sheriff to enter the property and cause possession of it to be taken for the purposes of sale in accordance with the orders of McMillan J. The warrant was provided to the sheriff in late January 2020 for the purposes of execution, and the execution date was set for 3 April 2020.
The sheriff attended the property on 12 March 2020 and served a notice to vacate on Emmanuel. By this time, Emmanuel had separated from his wife and she no longer resided at the property. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the sheriff’s office, however, deferred execution of the warrant, and the warrant was not executed in 2020. Emmanuel continued to reside at the property.
On 16 December 2020, Christos obtained orders extending the time for execution of the warrant for a period of one year.
The sheriff has now resumed the execution of warrants. A final notice to vacate the premises was given to Emmanuel, with an execution date of 19 March 2021.
On 15 March 2021, Emmanuel filed a summons seeking, amongst other orders, an order for the setting aside of the warrant, an order for the staying of the warrant and an order setting aside the terms of settlement.
In support of his application, Emmanuel filed an affidavit in which he asserted that he was coerced into signing the terms of settlement. Additionally, he contended that the release of the estate from any claim by him under part IV of the Act was invalid and contrary to the provisions and purposes of the Act.
In that proceeding, the Court of Appeal refused to give leave to Mr E Lambrou to appeal the orders disallowing his application to stay a warrant of possession. The Court of Appeal opined the following:
Having considered the material afresh for ourselves, we see no error in his Honour’s conclusion. With respect, his Honour was plainly correct when he rejected Emmanuel’s contentions that the provisions or purpose of the Act somehow prevented parties not under any disability from entering into terms of settlement which provided mutual releases for any claims made under the Act. For completeness, we should interpolate that no part IV claims have been made under the Act by any of the parties to this proceeding, and that any such claims are now statute barred.
Additionally, we would observe that even if it were not possible for parties not under disability to provide releases with respect to claims under part IV of the Act (and the releases of those claims provided for in the terms of settlement were set aside), this would have no effect on the terms that required Emmanuel to pay the settlement sum with a sale of the property to occur in default of compliance with that obligation.
In any event, as the primary judge observed, the warrant for possession of the property was not based on the terms of settlement. It was based upon, and enforces paragraph 3 of the orders made by McMillan J on 21 June 2019 (namely, that Emmanuel and his former wife deliver up to Christos vacant possession of the property for the purposes of its sale). Those orders bind the parties as res judicata.
There being no merit in Emmanuel’s application for leave to appeal, it must be refused. We would also refuse it (and, as a consequence, any application for a stay) on the basis of delay. The warrant of possession was issued in January 2020. As a result of the pandemic, the warrant was not executed in 2020, and the applicant had the benefit of being able to remain living in the property. During that time, he took no step to set aside the terms of settlement or the warrant. Instead, he chose to wait until the eleventh hour and issued an application for a stay some four days before the sheriff was due to execute the warrant. In the circumstances, the applicant could not expect any court to grant him the relief he sought at first instance.
The application for leave to appeal will be refused. It follows that there is no basis for this Court to order any stay.
The warrant of possession was executed by the Sherriff on 31 March 2021.[4]
[4]Affidavit of Christos Lambrou sworn on 19 May 2022, [42] (‘Christos 19 May 22 affidavit’).
On 16 August 2021, the Commonwealth Bank (the ‘Bank’), as mortgagee, required delivery up of the subject property.[5] This followed earlier demands by the Bank.
[5]Exhibit CL-1 to the Christos 19 May 22 affidavit, 230-231.
On 30 October 2021, the subject property was sold by the Bank. Settlement was effected on 29 November 2021.[6] Title of the subject property was transferred to the new registered proprietor on 29 November 2021.[7]
[6]Christos 19 May 22 affidavit, [64].
[7]Certificate of Title provided to Chambers by way of email from the administrator’s solicitors on 10 August 2022.
On 22 December 2021, the Bank’s solicitors paid the net sale proceeds into Court.[8]
[8]Christos 19 May 22 affidavit, [66].
Applicable Principles
Mr E Lambrou relies on s 76 of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) (‘TLA’). Sections 76(1) and (2) provide:
76 Procedure in case of default in payment of moneys secured
(1)If default is made in payment of the principal sum interest or annuity secured or any part thereof or in the performance or observance of any covenant express or implied in any such mortgage or charge and continues for one month or such other period as is therein expressly fixed, the mortgagee or annuitant may serve on the mortgagor or grantor of the annuity and such other persons as appear by the Register to be affected notice in writing to pay the money owing or to perform and observe the covenants (as the case may be).
(2)Where money secured by any such mortgage is made payable on demand a demand in writing pursuant to the mortgage shall for the purposes of this Act be equivalent to serving the notice aforesaid.
…
Section 77 of the TLA is applicable:
77 Power of sale under a mortgage or charge
(1)If within one month after the service of such notice or demand or such other period as is fixed in such mortgage or charge the mortgagor grantor or other persons do not comply with the notice or demand the mortgagee or annuitant may, in good faith and having regard to the interests of the mortgagor grantor or other persons, sell or concur with any other person in selling the mortgaged or charged land or any part thereof, together or in lots, by public auction or by private contract, at one or several times, and for a sum payable in one amount or by instalments, subject to such terms and conditions as the mortgagee or annuitant thinks fit, with power to vary any contract for sale and to buy in at any auction or to rescind any contract for sale and to resell without being answerable for any loss occasioned thereby and with power to make such roads streets and passages and grant and reserve such easements as the circumstances of the case require and the mortgagee or annuitant thinks fit, and may make and sign such transfers and do such acts and things as are necessary for effectuating any such sale.
(2)An instrument of transfer by a mortgagee or annuitant expressed to be in exercise of the power of sale and in an appropriate approved form may be accepted by the Registrar as sufficient evidence that the power has been duly exercised.
(3)The purchase money received arising from the sale shall be applied—
(a)firstly in payment of all costs charges and expenses properly incurred incidental to the sale and consequent on such default;
(b)secondly in payment of the moneys which are due or owing on the mortgage or charge;
(c)thirdly in payment of moneys owing under or in respect of subsequent mortgages and charges in the order of their respective priorities;
(d)fourthly in payment of the residue (if any) to the mortgagor or into the Supreme Court under the provisions so far as they are applicable of section sixty-nine of the Trustee Act 1958 and the rules referred to therein, or if the sale is made by a mortgagee and the land is charged with a subsequent annuity or if the sale is made by an annuitant, in payment of the said residue into an account on deposit at interest in an authorised deposit-taking institution within the meaning of the Banking Act 1959 of the Commonwealth in the joint names of the annuitant and the Registrar to satisfy the accruing payments of the charge and subject thereto for the benefit of the parties who are or become entitled to the residue of the deposited money.
(4)Upon the registration of any transfer under this section all the estate and interest of the mortgagor or grantor of the annuity as registered proprietor of the land mortgaged or charged shall vest in the purchaser as proprietor by transfer, freed and discharged from all liability on account of such mortgage or charge and (except where such a mortgagor or grantor is the purchaser) of any mortgage charge or encumbrance recorded in the Register subsequent thereto and the title of the purchaser shall not be impeachable on the ground that no case had arisen to authorize the sale or that due notice was not given or that the power was otherwise improperly or irregularly exercised but any person thereby damnified shall have his remedy in damages against the person exercising the power, and for the purposes of Part III the purchaser shall be deemed to have dealt with the registered proprietor of the land.
Section 69(1) of the Trustee Act 1958 (Vic) (‘Trustee Act’) is applicable:
69 Payment into court by trustees
(1)Trustees or the majority of trustees having in their hands or under their control money or securities subject to a trust may pay the same into court; and the same shall, subject to rules of court, be dealt with according to the orders of the Court.
…
I adopt the following principles stated by Derham AsJ in Morris Finance Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia & Ors:[9]
[9][2017] VSC 260 [30]-[34].
Under the Torrens System, on the sale of a mortgaged property, the mortgagee holds the surplus on trust for the subsequent unregistered mortgagees and chargees, and the beneficiaries of that trust (being the chargees in this case) can follow the monies and uphold an equitable interest in them.
A charge is a security whereby real or personal property is appropriated for the discharge of a debt or other obligation, but which does not pass either an absolute or a special property in the subject of the security to the creditor, nor any right of possession, but only a right of realisation by judicial process in the case of non-payment of the debt.
The requirements for the creation of an equitable charge are:
(a)an intention to create a charge;
(b)if over land, the presence of writing;
(c)the existence of definite ascertainable property, including future property, over which it is contemplated that the charge will exist; and
(d)where consideration is necessary, consideration.
The general rule on the question of priority as between two equitable interests in land is that the first in time, all other things being equal, is entitled to priority. The claimant who is first in time may lose their priority by any act or omission which had or might have had the effect of inducing a claimant later in time to act to their prejudice.
The holder of the earlier equitable interest can be postponed only if, for some special reason arising out of the relationship of the parties or their conduct, the equities are not equal. Where the equities are equal, the time factor is dominant. The court seeks the best equity, but in the absence of special circumstances, holds that the best equity is in the person whose interest was first created.
The administrator’s submissions
The administrator’s central submissions follow.
The only question for determination is the amount to which each interested party, including Mr E Lambrou, is entitled to from the funds. The funds should be paid out in accordance with the 21 June 19 orders and certain other consequential orders in the administrator’s summons. The orders for payment of the funds should be made in the first proceeding. The second proceeding should be dismissed or struck out. Mr E Lambrou seeks relief already sought by him in the first proceeding.
The 21 June 19 orders were a result of a summary judgment in 2018 against Mr E Lambrou and Ms Lambrou in favour of the deceased for $552,000.00 (judgment debt), interest on the judgment debt of $67,601.09, and costs. The judgment debt related to an amount that Mr E Lambrou admitted he had used for his own purposes from a sale of a related property (3 Lee Street, Flemington) at a time when he was an administrator appointed by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) for the deceased.
Following mediation between the administrator, Mr E Lambrou, and Ms Lambrou on 2 August 2018, terms of settlement were executed.[10] The terms of settlement are key. In clause 1, Mr E Lambrou and Ms Lambrou agreed to pay into the deceased estate the sum of $552,200.00 by 2 May 2019 or upon settlement of the sale of the property. Clause 2 provides that payment is to be secured by a charge over the property. Clause 3 applies if Mr E Lambrou and Ms Lambrou breach the terms of settlement, which they did. Clause 3(a) provides for interest to be calculated according to the Penalty Interest Rates Act 1983 (Vic). Mr E Lambrou and Ms Lambrou breached the terms of settlement. The administrator then made an application to Court. This led to the 21 June 19 orders.
[10]Exhibit CL-1 to the Christos 19 May 22 affidavit, 5-8.
Paragraph 2 of the 21 June 19 orders require Mr E Lambrou and Ms Lambrou to pay the administrator the judgment debt plus interest. Interest was calculated from the date of default to the date of judgment, consistent with the terms of settlement and Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic). Interest was only determined up to the date of order. It did not exclude the entitlement to interest pursuant to the settlement agreement.
Paragraph 4 of the 21 June 19 orders provided for mortgagee sale by the Bank.
Paragraph 6 of the 21 June 19 orders provided that the administrator’s costs of the application be paid out of the proceeds of sale.
Accordingly, it is only after the deductions above, that the net sale proceeds paid into Court can be distributed.
The Court is functus officio in respect of: the amounts specified in paragraphs 2(a) and (b) of the 21 June 19 orders, the categories of payment in paragraph 6, and the entitlement to be paid those amounts from the net sale proceeds under paragraph 5(c).
Although the property was ultimately sold by the mortgagee, the administrator should nonetheless be entitled, under paragraph 5(a) of the 21 June 19 orders, to be paid the costs and charges in making the property ready for sale.
Further orders should be made that the administrator be paid from the funds:
(a) pursuant to paragraphs 3(a) and (b)(v) of the settlement terms, further interest on the judgment debt;
(b) the costs of his application for the 21 June 19 orders; and
(c) from Mr E Lambrou’s share of the residue proceeds of the sale, the administrator’s costs of and incidental to his appeal, application for stay and appeal of the unsuccessful stay application.
In respect of liability for costs, Mr E Lambrou, not Ms Lambrou, should bear the costs of his unsuccessful application to the Court of Appeal to overturn Keogh J’s orders refusing his stay. Keogh J awarded the estate the costs of that application on an indemnity basis. On 30 March 2021, the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal and ordered Mr E Lambrou pay the estate’s costs on an indemnity basis. Mr E Lambrou requested a further three weeks in the property. His request to defer execution of the warrant was not agreed. The administrator offered to pay for short term accommodation for two months, but there was no response to that offer. Mr E Lambrou did not vacate the property or rather threats were made that he would re-enter it. The warrant was executed on 31 March 2021.
At paragraph 43 of his affidavit, the administrator deposes he took possession and arranged for the locks to be changed. Somehow, Mr E Lambrou managed to come back into the property a number of times. The locks were changed and installed. Text messages and emails were sent to him. By letter dated 7 April 2021 sent to Mr David Rubinic of Biggin & Scott Real Estate, Mr E Lambrou stated, amongst other things, that he was not prepared to sign the necessary legal documents to effect the sale.[11] This is evidence of him failing to cooperate to enable the property to be sold in an orderly fashion that would benefit all parties, including himself.
[11]Christos 19 May 22 affidavit, [47]; Letter from Emmanuel George Lambrou to David Rubinic dated 7 April 2021 contained in Exhibit CL-1 to the Christos 19 May 22 affidavit, 44-45.
The deceased estate is owed money by Mr E Lambrou and Ms Lambrou. It has not been paid. The administrator has exercised rights consistent with its charge on the property and the judicial determination for sale of the property to recover monies due. Mr E Lambrou’s delays, obfuscation, and intimidation has resulted in the diminishment of the shares in the estate held by both himself and Ms Lambrou.
The administrator deposes in paragraph 51 of his affidavit that on entering the property it was discovered it was in a very difficult condition for the effective sale of the property. As evident from the photographs, the property was left in an unclean and untidy state which resulted in an amount of about $26,000.00 for cleaning up of the property and removal of rubbish. The Court must make a finding on the cleaning costs reasonably incurred because the 21 June 19 orders do not specify the cleaning budgets. They provide that those costs be deducted from the proceeds of sale.
In paragraph 54 of his affidavit, the administrator recounts how he engaged Estate Advantage to attend to the task of disposing of perishable items, packing and storing furniture, cleaning, maintenance and preparation of the property for sale. These costs underpin the invoices the administrator relies upon.
In paragraph 63 of his affidavit, the administrator deposes as to the Bank issuing a demand for possession so the property could be sold. The administrator had no choice but to comply with the demand as a matter of fundamental property law. Mortgagee rights are paramount and they have statutory priority. Any attempt to thwart the Bank in obtaining possession would have resulted in further litigation to which the estate was party. The Bank had a lawful right to issue the demand. The deceased estate had no lawful right to maintain possession. The administrator gave possession to the Bank. The Bank ultimately sold the property.
Interest on the judgment debt against Ms Lambrou is a contractual and statutory right in accordance with the settlement terms at paragraphs 3(a) and (b)(v), and s 101(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic). To the extent she has an equitable entitlement to limit her liability for any amounts by virtue of Mr E Lambrou’s conduct, she has a right to indemnity and contribution against only him.
Section 77(3) of the TLA contains a cascading order of payment of costs. First, the mortgagee pays itself its debt, then it pays out subsequent mortgagees, and then if the funds are not exhausted, any surplus is paid to the mortgagors. As soon as the mortgage debt is exhausted, if the mortgagee is holding any surplus monies, they become a trustee of those monies.[12]
[12]Bofinger & Anor v Kingsway Group Limited & Ors (2009) 239 CLR 269, 287-288 [35].
The mortgagee is not required to make a decision themselves if there are competing claims to the surplus of funds. Pursuant to s 77(3) of the TLA, the monies can be paid into Court pursuant to the Trustee Act. Accordingly, it was lawful for the Bank to pay the surplus funds into Court.
The 21 June 19 orders do not mention the Bank’s entitlement to proceeds. It is implicit that the proceeds to which reference is made are net proceeds. There could be no other interpretation. The Court had no power to interfere with the mortgagee claim on the gross proceeds. Paragraph 3 of those orders provided the administrator was at liberty to sell the property and conferred the power on the administrator to do so. In any event, the Bank did that. The administrator’s liberty to sell was not an obligation to do so. The fact the funds were paid into Court had their origin in a mortgagee sale is irrelevant for the purposes of this application.
Once the funds are paid into Court, then the administrator is entitled to apply for payment. His application is supported by the 21 June 19 orders, which refer to the sale of the property, and because there are surplus proceeds.
Section 77(3)(d) of the TLA provides that mortgagor entitlements are affected by any equities in the money. The Court must regard the administrator’s equitable entitlements because they are a charge on the property.
As to the terms of settlement: they contemplate sale by the administrator and the distribution of proceeds in the way now contemplated by payment of funds out of Court. The sale was delayed because of Mr E Lambrou’s refusal to co-operate. He cannot now rely on his own wrongdoing to escape the effects of the settlement agreement or allege he is not bound. The prevention principle is applicable. In Victoria, the duty to co-operate is an implied contractual term. Mr E Lambrou had a duty to cooperate to bring about the intended sale. The evidence shows his actions and inactions after the terms of settlement were executed, and after the 21 June 19 orders, led to the Bank taking the property over and selling the property, as they were entitled to do. Mr E Lambrou cannot now rely on his own failure to cooperate.
As to the submissions about the administrator intending to put money in his own pocket, there is no evidence of that. The administrator has duties regarding the administration of the deceased estate.
Costs – application for gross sum
The administrator seeks a gross (lump) sum of costs to be paid from Mr E Lambrou’s share of the proceeds of sale. This is an appropriate exercise of the Court’s power under s 65C(1) of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (‘CPA’) to further the overarching purpose in s 7 of that Act. The taxation process would not commence until February 2023. The administrator’s legal costs for it would be about $44,000.00.[13]
[13]Affidavit of James Llewellyn Dimond sworn on 6 September 2022 (‘Llewellyn 6 September 22 affidavit), [12].
This is a case for exercising power pursuant to r 63.07(2)(c) of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (Vic) (the ‘Rules’) to avoid a taxation and determine a gross sum.[14]
[14]Foudoulis v O’Donnell (No 2) [2020] VSC 343, [86]-[88] (Mukhtar AsJ) (‘Foudoulis’).
There are two orders for indemnity costs and a bill of costs has been done on that basis. There is evidence from a costs consultant: with certificates of some taxed bills of costs.[15] It would promote the obligations in the CPA and bring the proceeding to an end. It would ensure that any equity left is maximised for those entitled to it. The circumstances are that Mr E Lambrou has persistently refused to comply with the settlement terms and the 21 June 19 orders.
[15]The administrator has four bills of costs prepared that can be provided for assessment.
Alternatively, the amount specified in those bills of costs should be retained in Court pending taxation of costs. This would be in the interests of justice because it would mean applications do not need to be made for freezing orders or the like.
The administrator is not suggesting that any funds to which Ms Lambrou is entitled should be used or applied to pay Mr E Lambrou’s costs. The only costs order with which Ms Lambrou should be encumbered is the 21 June 19 orders.
Mr E Lambrou’s submissions
Mr E Lambrou’s central submissions follow.
The funds deposited by the Bank acting as mortgagee in possession are retained unlawfully and in contravention of his rights as a fee simple proprietor in the property. Under the Torrens system, transfer of property ownership by registration confers indefeasible title to the proprietor save for fraud: s 40 of the TLA. Both he and Ms Lambrou were registered proprietors of the property at the time of the mortgagee sale.
Contrary to the requirements of the TLA, the funds were not deposited by a trustee, nor did they fall under the scope and coverage of the Trustee Act. Retaining the funds in Court has deprived Ms Lambrou and himself of the funds. They have a right to the funds under s 77(d) of the TLA. Officers of the Court owed a duty of care to make reasonable inquiries about the nature and origin of the funds prior to their acceptance. They did not perform that duty.
The applications should be determined solely with reference to ss 76 and 77 of the TLA.
The application by the administrator is legally invalid and should be dismissed. After mediation, there was a legally binding contract between the parties. He attempted to sell the property but the market was not right. Subsequently, the administrator moved to enforce the terms of the contract. He obtained a warrant of possession. The administrator then obtained possession of the property. The administrator made no attempt to sell the property or obtain a valuation.
The Bank allowed him to keep possession for 18 months despite my default on the mortgage. They knew the property had good value. The purpose of s 76 of the TLA is stated in the chapeau – the procedure in case of default by the mortgagor.
Section 77(1) of the TLA refers to the mortgagee acting “in good faith”. This means following a transparent and proper process, and obtaining a proper valuation. There was no sworn valuation, no advertising. They appointed an agent who had no expertise and was a personal friend of the solicitor.
Section 77(3) says how the purchase money received should be applied. The administrator was not a person in s 77(3). Section 77(3)(a): there was no charge at all. There was an amount owing to the Bank which was paid. Section 77(3)(d): the Bank was not a trustee. There was not a trust and so the funds were unlawfully obtained.
The 21 June 19 orders do not apply. Those orders were the authentication of the contract between the parties. The administrator dishonoured the contract. He made no reasonable attempt to sell the property. He did not have a lawful right to give the house away.
The 21 June 19 orders do not allow the property to be sold according to statute. It was not ordered that the property could be seized by, or handed over to the Bank. It was not ordered the Bank could sell the property. If that proposition is accepted, the Bank could not sell the house. As a matter of law, the Court could not make an order stripping him of his proprietary right. He had the right to come and go as a legitimate proprietor. The 21 June 19 orders could not preclude him from doing so as it is contrary to the property statute.
There is no order striking down the rights conferred on the mortgagor by the Torrens title system of indefeasible title and under statute. There could not have been a court order as a matter of law that displaced his rights as a mortgagor.
The construction of the TLA does not confer any right whatsoever on the administrator for the funds he is claiming. On the other hand, s 77(d) confers the right to the funds to the mortgagors provided that there is compliance with all other provisions of the TLA. In this case, as all other provisions have been complied with, the priority of payment of the funds must be to the mortgagors.
The orders sought by the administrator should not be made. The administrator’s application should be struck out. The administrator lives overseas, had no part in looking after the deceased, and was estranged from her. In reality, it is an order for the administrator personally. He wishes to pocket the money.
The administrator’s claim to funds is factually and legally incorrect. The funds that he admitted to using were part of a family agreement which the administrator was not privy to. He was preparing a counterclaim against the administrator until advised otherwise by his then lawyer because of the statute of limitations. The summary judgment made no finding of dishonesty against him.
The administrator breached his duties. If the Court decided to award the claim made by him, he would walk away with a sum that exceeds the value of the estate. He dishonoured the terms of settlement and as a consequence failed to comply with the 21 June 19 orders. He took possession of the property in March 2021. In August 2021, he gave the property to the Bank. The Bank subsequently conducted a fire sale and sold the property for at least $500,000.00 less than its true value.
He believes he is entitled to $300,000.00 from the sale proceeds. He is penniless and reliant on Austudy and some assistance from La Trobe University. He lives in a room at La Trobe University. He is 63 years old. He faces anxiety and distress over his future and has lost his family and finances.
Ms Lambrou’s submissions
Ms Lambrou’s central submissions follow.
The funds should be disbursed. Interest is running at about $151 a day according to the administrator’s calculations. The funds are being diminished at a rapid rate.
The property was not sold by the administrator but by the Bank. The way the property was sold is not relevant to compliance with the 21 June 19 orders. It is appropriate that funds be disbursed in accordance with the 21 June 19 orders.
Ms Lambrou consents to the administrator’s proposal to assess costs now on a gross (lump) sum basis. If they are not, and there is a taxation process, it will take time. The administrator says it will cost about $40,000.00 in further legal costs for taxation. The costs of taxation will outweigh the benefit.
Ms Lambrou consents to the judgment sum being deducted from the funds held in Court.
Ms Lambrou does not agree with deducting more than $26,000.00 from the funds for cleaning. Those costs should be deducted from any amount payable from the funds to Mr E Lambrou. She relies on the administrator’ affidavit evidence regarding the cleaning required. Ms Lambrou vacated the property on 19 July 2019. Ms Lambrou deposes that when she vacated the property she left it in a clean state and did not leave any rubbish. After that, Mr E Lambrou resided there until he moved out in April 2021. She returned to assist Mr E Lambrou with cleaning but did not live there.
The costs incurred by changing locks and engaging the locksmith were caused entirely by Mr E Lambrou’s conduct and not by Ms Lambrou. She had vacated the property by then. Accordingly, the locksmith costs should be deducted solely from the share of Mr E Lambrou.
Ms Lambrou vacated the property and took no steps to prevent the administrator taking possession. Mr E Lambrou refused to give up possession and so the administrator was unable to obtain possession. Ms Lambrou required Mr E Lambrou vacate the premises so it could be sold and he refused to do so: see Exhibit ML-4 containing a letter from her solicitors to Mr E Lambrou dated 17 August 2020. It says that the administrator is entitled to recover possession and penalty interest is accruing. It refers to the occupation delaying sale of the property. The letter states it is unacceptable that Mr E Lambrou remain in occupation when a sale is inevitable. Mr E Lambrou responded to the letter on the same day by email.[16] He says, amongst other things, that he will not vacate the property.
[16]Exhibit ML-5 to the affidavit of Melissa Joanne Lambrou sworn on 16 June 2022.
The evidence is that Mr E Lambrou refused to leave the premises and continued to reside at the property. He continued to occupy the property after being served with the warrant for possession. Ms Lambrou was powerless to have Mr E Lambrou comply with the order.
In the circumstances where interest is claimed by the administrator, and she cannot object to the claiming of that interest, it is just and fair that the interest that has been incurred from the date she vacated the property, being 19 July 2019, be deducted from Mr E Lambrou’s share of the funds held in Court, and if that is insufficient she pay the remainder. It creates no prejudice to the administrator to deduct the appropriate amount of interest from Mr E Lambrou’s share of the funds.
Analysis
Mr E Lambrou relied on many of his affidavits. They have been read. It is unnecessary to reiterate their contents. There are mostly irrelevant to the issues in dispute here. Mostly they deal with issues already ventilated and decided in other rulings.
First, the Bank properly paid the surplus net proceeds of the sale property into Court. It is common ground that there was a mortgage over the property, and it was in default. Despite demand, the default was not remedied.[17] In the circumstances, as mortgagee of the property, the Bank had the right to sell the property. Mr E Lambrou’s suggestion that the Bank had no such right because he was a registered proprietor of the property must be rejected in those circumstances. Section 77(1) of the TLA expressly provides a mortgagee with the power of sale.
[17]Christos 19 May 22 affidavit, [63]; Letter of Demand dated 16 August 2021 contained in Exhibit CL-1 to the Christos 19 May 22 affidavit, 230-231.
Section 77(2)(d) provides for payment of the residue, if any, of the sale proceeds into Court under s 69 of the Trustee Act. Section 69(1) of the Trustee Act provides that trustees may pay monies subject to a trust into Court. Mr E Lambrou’s submission that the Bank was not a trustee and unlawfully paid the funds into Court is rejected. The surplus net sale proceeds held by the Bank were trust monies held as a trustee.[18]
[18]Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 269, 287-288.
Mr E Lambrou’s submission that Court officers owed a duty of care to make reasonable inquiries about the nature and origin of the funds prior to their acceptance is rejected. There is no such duty. Moreover, as already outlined, statute permits payment into Court in the circumstances here.
Mr E Lambrou’s submission regarding the legality of the administrator’s application is rejected. The administrator has properly made his application in the first proceeding.
Mr E Lambrou’s submission that the Bank breached an obligation to sell the property in good faith in breach of s 77(1) is rejected. It is a speculative submission based on his assertions about misuse of a personal friendship, lack of advertising, and selling the property below market. This proceeding is certainly not the vehicle to make allegations against the Bank’s conduct. The Bank is not a party to this proceeding.
Mr E Lambrou’s submission that the administrator should not have permitted the Bank to take possession misses the mark. To the extent he is suggesting there is non-compliance with the procedure in s 76, this too misses the mark. The issue is that the Bank had security, in the form of the mortgage. The loan payments were in default and despite demand, had not been remedied. The Bank did not require the consent of the administrator to take possession of the property and sell it: ss 77(1) and 78 of the TLA. However, by co-operating with the Bank in providing possession and preparing the property for sale, the administrator reduced further costs being incurred by the Bank having to take compliance action.
Second, s 77(3) is applicable regarding application of the purchase money received from the sale of the property. Section 77(3)(a) provides that the purchase money shall be applied firstly in payment of all costs charges and expenses properly incurred incidental to the sale and consequent on such default. The administrator is accordingly entitled to those expenses. These are detailed below.
Section 77(3)(b) states that second priority is in payment of the monies due and owing on the mortgage. This has been applied by the Bank.
Section 77(3)(c) refers to payment of monies owing under or in respect of subsequent mortgages and charges in the order of their respective priorities. The administrator had a charge over the property. Clause 2 of the terms of settlement secure payment of the sum of $552,000.00 (the ‘settlement sum’) by charge over the property.
Third, by clause 3 of the terms of settlement, the parties agreed that the administrator would be entitled to orders if Mr E Lambrou and Ms Lambrou did not pay the settlement sum by 2 May 2019 or upon settlement of the sale of the property. The agreed orders included interest at the judgment rate determined by the Penalty Interest Rates Act 1983 (Vic) from the due date to the date of payment, and orders for judgment of the settlement sum together with interest, costs associated with obtaining judgment, possession and sale, and that “the net proceeds of sale after payment of costs and associated with sale be paid to the plaintiff in satisfaction of the outstanding balance of the settlement sun, interest thereon and default costs, together with the balance then remaining to be paid to the defendants”. Mr E Lambrou and Ms Lambrou did not pay the settlement sum. Consequently, the administrator made an application to Court and obtained the 21 June 19 orders.
Given this finding, it is unnecessary to address the administrator’s submission on the prevention principle.
Fourth, the 21 June 19 orders are partially applicable.
By paragraph 2 of the 21 June 19 orders, Mr E Lambrou and Ms Lambrou were required to pay the settlement sum and $7,715.67, being interest (at the penalty rate) from 2 May 2019 to the date of judgment. It is common ground this has yet to be paid. I accept the administrator’s submission that the Court is functus officio in respect of paragraph 2 of the orders.
As the settlement sum was secured by a charge over the property, it must be deducted from the sale proceeds as a charge. So too the penalty interest. This includes the calculation of $7,715.67. It will include a further sum for the period after the 21 June 19 orders to date. Such a deduction ought be made given that the penalty interest is for the outstanding settlement sum. Further, by paragraph 3(a) of the terms of settlement, Mr E Lambrou and Ms Lambrou agreed interest ought accrue at the penalty rate. By paragraphs 3(b)(i) and (v), they agreed that the administrator was entitled to orders that such interest be deducted from the net sale proceeds.
Paragraph 5 of the 21 June 19 orders dealt with how the proceeds of sale of the property ought be disbursed. They envisaged that the administrator would sell the property and accordingly, refer to disbursement from the trust account of the plaintiff’s solicitor. Accordingly, they do not expressly refer to the deduction by the mortgagee. The sale by the mortgagee means paragraph 5 does not apply. I reject the administrator’s submission that it should apply. However, paragraph 3 of the terms of settlement, which is to similar effect, continues to apply.
I accept the administrator’s submission that he is entitled to deduct the costs and charges in making the property ready for sale regardless of whether it was sold by the mortgagee or him. Pursuant to paragraph 3(b)(iv) and (v) of the terms of settlement, the administrator is entitled to orders for Mr E Lambrou and Ms Lambrou to pay the administrator’s costs associated with obtaining judgment, possession and sale (‘default costs’), and for those to be deducted from the net sale proceeds, together with the settlement sum and interest. The default costs include the costs in paragraph 6 of the 21 June 19 orders. That is, the administrator’s costs of and incidental to the application and possession and sale of the property on an indemnity basis.
Paragraph 6 of the 21 June 19 orders is applicable. It refers to the sale of the property, and the orders envisage sale by the administrator. I am satisfied, on the basis of the administrator’s affidavit, that the administrator incurred costs in respect of the sale of the property. I accept the administrator’s submission that the Court is functus officio in respect of paragraph 6 of the orders.
Fifth, Mr E Lambrou’s submission regarding the administrator intending to pocket the funds personally are without any evidentiary foundation and scandalous.
Sixth, Mr E Lambrou’s submission that the administrator breached his duties by not selling the property directly must be firmly rejected. The terms of settlement did not oblige the administrator to sell the property. By paragraph 3(b)(iii) of the terms of settlement, in the event the payment of settlement sum was not made by a specific date, the administrator was entitled to orders for sale of the property. The administrator was not obliged by the 21 June 19 orders to sell the property. He had liberty to do so.
Seventh, whilst I am sympathetic to Ms Lambrou’s personal circumstances, neither the 21 June 19 orders nor the terms of settlement differentiate between her and Mr E Lambrou. Any share that she has in the net sale proceeds is not quarantined. The deductions must be from the whole of the net sale proceeds, not just the share of Mr E Lambrou.
Eighth, I accept the administrator’s evidence that the following costs incurred in obtaining possession and preparing the property for sale are properly and reasonably incurred:
(a) $26,204.12 invoiced by Estate Advantage in connection with preparing the property for sale;[19] and
(b) $1,453.00 invoiced by Prompt Locksmiths for securing and resecuring the property.[20]
[19]Christos 19 May 22 affidavit, [54], [67(c)]; Invoice Number INV-0133 of Estate Advantage (tendered at trial on 19 October 2022).
[20]Christos 19 May 22 affidavit, [55], [67(d)].
Evidently, the property was in a filthy state, and needed to be cleaned. Locks needed to be changed when Mr E Lambrou re-entered the property, despite the warrant of possession.
Based on the analysis above, these costs must be deducted from the net sale proceeds.
Ninth, Mr E Lambrou was ordered to pay legal costs in:
(a) this proceeding, for the costs of his application for the 21 June 2019 orders and for the possession and sale of the property;
(b) this proceeding, for his application for a stay of the proceeding;
(c) Court of Appeal proceeding S APCI 2019 0095; and
(d) Court of Appeal proceeding S EAPCI 2021 0032.
Ms Lambrou was ordered to pay legal costs in this proceeding, for the costs of Mr E Lambrou’s application for the 21 June 2019 orders and for the possession and sale of the property.
The administrator sought that costs be fixed, relying on Foudoulis v O’Donnell (No 2).[21] In that authority, Mukhtar AsJ stated:
Ordinarily the quantification or assessment of costs is a matter for the Costs Court as the specialist court, and trial Judges readily defer to that Court. But, a trial Court has the power under s 65(2)(c) of the Civil Procedure Act ‘to award a party costs in a specified sum or amount’ if to do so would further the overarching purpose of facilitating ‘the just, efficient, timely and cost effective resolution of real issues in dispute’. In addition, rule 63.07(2)(c) empowers the trial Court to order that a party in whose favour a costs order is made shall be entitled to ‘a gross sum specified in the order instead of taxed costs’. The purpose of that rule is to avoid the expense, delay and aggravation involved in protracted litigation arising out of taxation. Although that makes it especially suitable for complex and large scale litigation, it is not to be so confined. It gives the Court the ability to apply a much broader brush than is entailed in a taxation process. It is based on costs on the standard basis on an estimate that is logical, fair and reasonable, for which the Scale of Costs can provide assistance.[22]
[21][2020] VSC 343.
[22]Foudolis, [17].
In that case, neither party sought an order for costs to be taxed. His Honour held that above all, it would give finality to the case to make a gross sum costs order.[23] That is not the case here. Indeed, prior to the conclusion of the hearing of this application, and certainly prior to determination, Mr E Lambrou indicated he would appeal this judgment.
[23]Ibid, [22].
Importantly, it is neither appropriate nor efficient to fix the costs of applications and proceedings not before me. The 29 October 2019 Orders made by the Court of Appeal in proceeding S APCI 2019 0095 provide that costs are ‘to be taxed in default of agreement’. The other costs ought also be taxed in default of agreement.
However, an amount covering an estimation of these costs ought be retained in Court. This is appropriate given the liability for costs is a consequence of Court orders. Further, on Mr E Lambrou’s own evidence, he is impecunious, and the administrator is unlikely to be paid those costs save from the net sale proceeds. The estimates for the costs are given by James Llewellyn Dimond in his affidavit sworn on 6 September 2022. Mr Llwellyn estimates the costs to be as follows:
(a) $61,702.42 for the costs incurred in this proceeding relating to Mr E Lambrou’s application for the 21 June 2019 orders;
(b) $15,919.60 for the costs incurred in this proceeding relating to Mr E Lambrou’s application for a stay in this proceeding;
(c) $8,880.10 for the costs incurred in Court of Appeal proceeding S APCI 2019 0095; and
(d) $10,768.31 for the costs incurred in Court of Appeal proceeding S EAPCI 2021 0032.
Further, Mr Dimond estimates the costs of taxation to be $44,000.00.[24] This amount should also be held in Court pending taxation.
[24]Llewellyn 6 September 22 affidavit, [6].
Conclusion
The administrator is able to deduct the judgment debt and other expenses from the net sale proceeds that he has claimed relating in his application. An amount will be retained in Court for the administrator’s legal costs incurred to date, and those to be incurred upon taxation.
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
| S CI 2017 00661 | |
| BETWEEN: | |
| CHRISTOS LAMBROU (WHO SUES AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF DESPINA LAMBROU, DECEASED) | Plaintiff |
| - v - | |
| EMMANUEL GEORGE LAMBROU | First Defendant |
| MELISSA JOANNE LAMBROU | Second Defendant |
| S ECI 2022 01675 | |
| BETWEEN: | |
| EMMANUEL GEORGE LAMBROU | Plaintiff |
| - v - | |
| CHRISTOS LAMBROU | First Defendant |
| MELISSA JOANNE LAMBROU | Second Defendant |
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4
0