Lambourne v Baker (No 8)

Case [2025] NSWCA 52


Court of Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Lambourne v Baker (No 8) [2025] NSWCA 52
Hearing dates: 27 March 2025
Date of orders: 27 March 2025
Decision date: 28 March 2025
Before: Griffiths AJA
Decision:

Decline recusal request

Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — application for recusal —apprehended bias — application declined

Legislation Cited:

Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 46(4)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 51.58

Cases Cited:

de Robillard v Council of New South Wales Bar Association [2024] NSWCA 298

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63

Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 255 CLR 135; [2015] HCA 20

Lambourne v Baker [2021] NSWCA 229

Lambourne v Baker (No 5) [2024] NSWCA 241

Texts Cited:

Nil

Category:Procedural rulings
Parties: Marc Alan Lambourne (First Applicant)
Glenn Craig Pollett (Second Applicant)
Punters Show Pty Ltd (Third Applicant)
Dallas Matthew Baker (First Respondent)
Todd Cameron Buckingham (Second Respondent)
BetMakers Technology Group Limited (Third Respondent)
12 Follow Pty Limited (Fourth Respondent)
Operis Momentus Pty Limited (Fifth Respondent)
Representation:

Counsel:
MA Lambourne (Applicants) (Self represented)
AP Cheshire SC (Respondents)

Solicitors:
Vintage Law (Respondents)
File Number(s): 2019/00407870
Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

  1. These reasons for judgment deal with the applicants’ application that I recuse myself.

  2. I will briefly summarise the circumstances in which the application has been made, briefly summarise the relevant principles and then explain why I declined to recuse myself.

Background matters

  1. The hearing of the substantive proceeding took place on Tuesday 25 March 2025, before a Court constituted by Adamson JA, Ball JA and myself. The proceedings involve an application by the applicants for a review of orders and decisions made by Price AJA on 25 November 2024. The applicants sought a review under s 46(4) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) and r 51.58 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).

  2. The Court reserved its judgment.

  3. By email dated at 9:41am on Wednesday 26 March 2025 the parties were informed by my associate that judgment would be delivered at 10:15am on Thursday 27 March 2025.

  4. Mr Lambourne, acting on behalf of the applicants, sent an email to my associate at 12:49pm on 26 March 2025. He referred to the fact that judgment would be delivered the following day and proceeded to set out various matters relating to the conduct of the hearing which he contended provided a basis to seek the recusal of Adamson JA and myself. Mr Lambourne formally asked the Court not to hand down its judgment until Friday 28 March 2025 so that he had time to make a formal application for Justice Adamson and myself to recuse ourselves “from any further participation in the hearing, including the publication of the Reasons”.

  5. The parties were notified by an email sent by Justice Adamson’s Chambers at 5:06pm on 26 March 2025 that the Court would hear any application for recusal at 10:15am the following day.

  6. On 27 March 2025, the Court was constituted…

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Details
AGLC
Lambourne v Baker (No 8) [2025] NSWCA 52
Case
[2025] NSWCA 52
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Lambourne v Baker (No 8)*, the applicant, Mr. Lambourne, sought the recusal of Griffiths AJA from presiding over proceedings on the grounds of apprehended bias. The dispute concerned the applicant's assertion that the judge's prior conduct and statements gave rise to a reasonable apprehension that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the questions to be decided.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the applicant had established a sufficient basis to demonstrate apprehended bias, thereby necessitating the recusal of Griffiths AJA. This required the court to consider the objective test for apprehended bias, which involves assessing whether a fair-minded lay observer, knowing the relevant facts, would apprehend that the judge might not decide the case impartially.

Griffiths AJA applied the well-established principles governing applications for recusal due to apprehended bias. The court considered the specific allegations made by the applicant concerning the judge's conduct and statements. Ultimately, the court found that the applicant had not discharged the onus of demonstrating that a fair-minded lay observer would apprehend bias. The court concluded that the conduct and statements relied upon by the applicant did not, when viewed objectively, give rise to a reasonable apprehension of impartiality.

The application for recusal was declined.

Orders

Orders of the court

Decline recusal request

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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