Lambie and Guy

[2019] FCCA 1450

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

LAMBIE & GUY [2019] FCCA 1450

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Application for recovery order – applicable principles – orders made for immediate return of child to the father in default of which recovery order to issue.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss.4, 4AB, 60B, 60CA, 60CC; 61DA, 61DB, 62B, 64B, 65D, 65DA, 65DAA, 66, 67Q, 67Z, 68B, 68P, 69ZL

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r.21.15

Cases cited:

Bondelmonte & Bondelmonte (2017) 259 CLR 662
Goode & Goode (2006) 36 Fam LR 422
Habib & Ibrahim [2019] FamCA 116
Marvel & Marvel [2010] FamCAFC 101
Morgan & Miles (2007) FLC 93-343
SS & AH [2010] FamCAFC 13
Stott & Holgar [2017] FamCAFC 152

Applicant: MR LAMBIE

Respondent: MS GUY

File Number: MLC 5371 of 2019

Judgment of: Judge A Kelly

Hearing date: 27 May 2019

Date of Last Submission: 27 May 2019

Delivered at: Melbourne

Delivered on: 30 May 2019

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr McCloskey

Solicitors for the Applicant: Marcou & Associates Pty Ltd

Solicitor Advocate for the Respondent as Duty Solicitor: Ms Ballard

ORDERS

1. Paragraphs 4, 6 and 7 of the order made on 20 May 2019 be vacated.

2. By consent, until further order, the Respondent be restrained whether by herself, her servants, agents or howsoever otherwise from removing, attempting to remove or allowing the removal of the child [X]  born … 2017 (Child) from the State of Victoria.

3. Until further order and pursuant to paragraph 5 of the order made on 20 May 2019, the Child live with the Applicant father.

4. Subject to paragraph 5 of this Order, the Child spend time with the Respondent mother to be supervised by Ms A or such other person and at such times as may be agreed by the parties, provided that the Child shall spend no less than 2 hours per day on 2 days each week and as otherwise may be agreed by the parties in writing.

5. Unless by 7.00pm this day, Monday, 27 May 2019, the Respondent mother does return the Child to the Applicant father at Street B, Suburb C, in the State of Victoria, pursuant to s 67Q of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), (Act) a Recovery Order do issue authorising and directing the Marshal, all officers of the Australian Federal Police and all officers of the Police Forces of all States and Territories of the Commonwealth of Australia, with such assistance as may be required, and if necessary by force:

   (a)to find and recover the Child [X] born … 2017; and

   (b)to deliver the Child to the Applicant father at Street B, Suburb C, in the State of Victoria, or such other place (as is reasonably accessible by the father) as the person effecting such recovery may nominate; and

   (c)to stop and search any vehicle, vessel or aircraft and to enter and search any premises or place in which there is at any time reasonable cause to believe that the Child may be found.

6. Upon any breach of this Order, the persons to whom this Recovery Order is addressed are authorised and directed to arrest the Respondent mother without a warrant.

7. Pursuant to s 68P(3) of the Act, direct that a copy of this Order be provided as soon as is reasonably practicable to:

   (a)the Applicant and Respondent;

   (b)the Registrar or Principal Officer of the Magistrates Court at Melbourne;

   (c)the Commissioner of Victoria Police;

   (d)the Department of Health and Human Services, Victoria.

8. Pursuant to s 67Z(3) of the Act, the Registry Manager of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia is requested to notify the Department of Health and Human Services, Victoria, of the Applicant’s Notice of Risk filed on 17 May 2019.

9. Until further order the parties communicate in relation to the care and welfare of the Child by means of a parenting application such as MyMob or the 2Houses parenting App.

10. The Applicant father and the Respondent mother, their servants and agents be and are hereby restrained by injunction from abusing, insulting, belittling, rebuking or otherwise denigrating one another and from permitting any other person so to do.

11. Both parties must attend, participate in and complete, as soon as practicable, an appropriate parenting orders program (such as, for example, the Stand By Me, Parent Orders Program) or other appropriate course or service (Program) and, further, each party must:

    (a)sign all such documents and do all such acts and things as shall be necessary to enrol in, undertake and successfully complete the Program;

    (b)pay and otherwise be responsible for his/her share of all costs associated with the Program;

    (c)abide by all reasonable requests of any person directly or indirectly responsible for the conduct, administration or facilitation of the Program;

    (d)without affecting the generality of the above requirements – as and when required satisfactorily participate in and complete all recommended parts of the Program (including, but not limited to, some or all of the following: any relevant intake course or process, parent group, children’s group, individual sessions for parents and children, child focused mediation and/or Children’s Contact Service); and

    (e)provide an appropriate certificate of completion of the Program to the solicitors for the other party and to the independent children’s lawyer.

12. Direct that by 4.00pm on Wednesday, 31 July 2019, the Respondent file and serve a Notice of Address for Service, Notice of Risk, Response and any answering affidavit.

13. Pursuant to s.11F of the Act, the parties and the Child attend upon a Family Consultant of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Family Consultant) for the purposes of a Child Inclusive Conference on 3 September 2019 and:

    (a)the party with the care of the Child and the Child to attend at 9.00am; and

    (b)the other party to attend at 10.00am,

    at Level 5, Commonwealth Law Courts, 305 William Street, Melbourne.

14. Pursuant to paragraph 13 of this Order the Family Consultant shall provide a written report to the court and to the parties with such written memorandum to be released no later than 20 September  2019.

15. The matter be adjourned for Mention on 30 September 2019 at 10:00am in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia at Melbourne.

16. Pursuant to ss 65DA(2) and 62B of the Family Law Act1975 (Cth) the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders are set out in Annexure A and these particulars are included in these orders.

AND THE COURT DECLARES:

1. Pursuant to s 68P(2)(a) of the Act, that to the extent that this Order may be inconsistent with an Interim Intervention Order (IVO) that was later made by the Magistrates’ Court at Melbourne on 23 May 2019:

   (a)this Order prevails over and operates according to its terms;

   (b)that Intervention Order is invalid, pursuant to s 68Q(1) of the Act.

AND THE COURT NOTES THAT:

A.Paragraph 5 of the Order made on 20 May 2019, is not inconsistent with the Intervention Order and remains operative as a parenting order according to its terms.

B.Paragraph 9 of the IVO provides that the Applicant father, MR LAMBIE, may do anything that is permitted by the Act.

C.Pursuant to s 68P(2) (b)-(d) of the Act, the court has given a detailed explanation:

(a)to the parties as to how the contact that this Order provides for is to take place;

(b)to the parties of the terms of this Order, their purpose, the obligations which it creates, the consequences that may flow from a failure to obey its terms, its reasons for making this Order and the parties right to apply for a variation or revocation of the Order.

D.Pursuant to s 68P(2)(b)-(d) of the Act, Women’s Legal Service is also requested to provide the respondent with an explanation as to how the contact that it provides for is to take place.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Lambie & Guy is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLC 5371 of 2019

MR LAMBIE

Applicant

And

MS GUY

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Ex tempore Revised from transcript)

1. This is an application for urgent interim parenting orders relating to a child of the parties’ relationship, [X], born … 2017 (Child). 

2. On 17 May 2019, the applicant father filed an initiating application, together with a Notice of Risk, an affidavit in support of an application for a recovery order and s 60I certificate.  By his Notice of Risk the applicant father alleged that the Child was at risk of abuse by the respondent mother by reason of her suffering mental health issues, drugs and alcohol abuse and as suffering serious parental incapacity. 

3. The particulars provided of those matters included contentions that the respondent mother is affected by depression and bipolar conditions together with suicidal ideation.  The applicant further contended that the respondent is a user of ice, together with cannabis (as is her partner).   The applicant contended that the respondent’s partner has convictions for violent criminal conduct, and further contended that the respondent had taken the Child from his care and refused to return her, including that she may have taken the Child out of Victoria to Queensland. 

4. By his affidavit, the applicant deposed as to the circumstances giving rise to his application for relief and the risks that the Child faced.  I point out, at once, that the matters being the subject of his affidavits are in contest by the respondent mother who was assisted in the hearing before me by Ms Ballard, duty lawyer of the Women’s Legal Service.  The Court records its gratitude to that service and its personnel, such as Ms Ballard, for the significant assistance that they rendered to the court in the hearing and determination of urgent parenting matters. 

5. The Child is now little more than 20 months of age and, as the applicant contends, has been living with him for the past eight months since the parties’ separation.  The applicant deposed, as at 17 May 2019, that there were no parenting plans, parenting orders or family violence intervention orders affecting the parties. 

6. According to the applicant’s evidence, he and the respondent had lived together from 2015 to 8 September 2018, at premises in Suburb C.  During that time, the Child was born (on … 2017).

7. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) became involved before the birth of the Child, this being because of the conduct of the respondent’s other child, a son, who is some years older.  The applicant deposed that the matter was returnable before the Children’s Court following [X]’s birth and the result included that each of the applicant and the respondent were to undergo drug-screen tests.  This Children’s Court matter apparently finalised in July 2018. 

8. Following separation on 8 September 2018, the applicant moved with the Child from the parties’ premises and took up residence with the applicant’s sister, Ms A, also in Suburb C.  He deposed that the respondent continued to live at their premises with her son and that the respondent had re-partnered with one Mr D, who was, then, detained in a Queensland jail.  He also deposed that the respondent is originally from Queensland. 

9. The applicant deposed, further, that although the Child was only a year old at the time of separation, he had adopted the practice of taking the Child to the mother’s house to see her on daily intervals so that the Child could spend time with her mother.

10. The matter became more problematic from about March 2018. 

11. The applicant deposed that on 1 March 2018, the mother said she was going on a three-day holiday to Queensland; however, he discovered that the respondent, instead, stayed in Queensland and did not return.  The applicant’s experience was that while the respondent had stated on a number of occasions that she would be returning to Melbourne ‘the next day’, she had not done so.  During that time, the applicant said that he received text messages from the mother, then in Queensland, that she was going to kill herself.

12. In Easter 2019, the applicant’s mother, Ms E, moved from Adelaide to Suburb F so as to assist him in caring for the Child.  The applicant’s mother usually spends time with the Child on each Tuesday, Thursday and also on weekends. 

13. Next, on Friday 3 May 2019, the applicant received a call from the respondent who told him that she had been ejected from a train at Town G, NSW, by reason of her being drunk and affected by marijuana, but that she was returning to Melbourne.

14. The applicant met with the respondent on Saturday, 4 May 2019 in Melbourne and to his observation, considered that she was drug affected.  He also found her speech during a telephone conversation to be slurred.  In those circumstances, the applicant declined the respondent’s initial request that she spend time with the Child.  Following his refusal to the respondent’s request, the respondent together with her partner, Mr D, arrived at the applicant’s home, one of them carrying a knife.  Perhaps understandably, for that reason, the applicant did not allow them access into his home and, in due course, they left.

15. The respondent then deposed that perhaps a week later, he had organised for the Child to spend time with the respondent at a public park near his home.  On this occasion the applicant observed the respondent to be drug affected, erratic and looking dishevelled.  He deposed that the respondent is a user of ice and marijuana.  He also deposed that on this occasion he had supervised the Child’s spend time with her mother, and that he told the respondent that he considered the Child should not be alone in her care until she had, in effect, become “clean” and that he could trust her by the receipt of clean drug screens. 

16. The day before initiating this application, the applicant received a call from the respondent asking if the Child could spend time alone with her at a shopping centre.  He replied that he needed to consider that request.  Shortly afterwards the applicant received a communication from DHHS who enquired as to whether the Child was spending time with her mother.  The applicant deposed that following this discussion:

    I felt bad, so I organised with the mother to see [X] at 6.30 pm to 8.00 pm that night.  She picked her up from my house – she said she understood she had to return her to me. . .  At 8.00 pm, as the mother had not returned [X], I called the mother on her mobile (…) but she did not answer.  I called again, and the mother had blocked my number.

17. The applicant was worried by the mother’s addiction to ice and marijuana, her depression, bipolar condition, and her association with her partner, Mr D, whom he described as being violent. 

18. The applicant further deposed that the Child attends a child-care centre three days per week and that he had discovered that the Child was not at that child-care centre the day following the mother’s spend-time with the Child on 16 May 2019.

19. For those reasons, the applicant explained, when contacted by DHHS on Friday, 17 May 2019, he told them that the mother had not returned the Child.  DHHS said they would call him back, but did not do so.

20. In those circumstances, an urgent application was made to this court.

21. An ex parte application was made before me on Monday, 20 May 2019.  A series of orders were made, including for a recovery order, and that the Child should, live with the father and for the mother’s time to be suspended until further order.

22. Matters thereafter became further complicated when officers of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and Victoria Police, assisting them, sought to execute the recovery order.  It is perhaps unnecessary at this stage to recount the entire history of events which followed the making of that ex parte order.  However, the applicant did file a further affidavit together with an affidavit by his mother, each of which I have considered.  In those affidavits the applicant deposed to receiving the following text messages:

    a)on Sunday, 19 May 2019, at 11.36 am, the respondent sent an SMS text message stating as follows:

    She came back to the mother, [X] [sic], deserves, she came back better than she ever was … We have planned this for eight months. (emphasis added)

    b)on Monday, 20 May 2019, the respondent transmitted text messages to the applicant at two-minute intervals, namely, at 4.09pm and, again, on 4.11 pm as follows:

    Good luck finding us in the wrong State … You’re no one to [X] [sic].  Now u fked up.  Know fk off.

23. On 21 May 2019, the applicant flew to Brisbane so as to assist the AFP in their attempts to execute the recovery order.  He deposed that the AFP had been in contact with the respondent immediately after the making of the recovery order on 20 May 2019, and that they had found, on visiting the mother’s house, that she was not in residence.  The AFP advised the applicant to return to Melbourne. 

24. In the afternoon of 21 May 2019, the applicant had a telephone call with an officer of Suburb H Police Station. 

25. The applicant went to that station intending to collect the Child; however, when he arrived was advised by police that the mother had departed to another police station earlier than day, and at that other police station had secured an interim family violence IVO against the applicant.  In those circumstances the applicant was promptly arrested.  However, he deposed he has not been charged with any crimes and that the arrest warrant related solely to the application for the intervention order which had been made that day. 

26. In all the circumstances, the AFP advised the applicant that they would not execute the recovery order as:

    …they thought there was a family violence intervention order in place (which was incorrect).

27. The following day, Wednesday, 22 May 2019, the applicant received a text message from the respondent as follows:

    Tick, tick, time’s up.

28. The respondent’s application for an IVO was returnable in the Magistrates’ Court on Thursday, 23 May 2019.  On that day an interim IVO was made identifying the respondent, together with the Child, [X], and her older sibling, [J] (the evidence does not at this stage indicate the parentage of [J]) as affected family members.  While the interim IVO enjoined the applicant father from committing any act of family violence, at the same time it expressly provided that the applicant father may do anything that was permitted by a family law order.

29. I interpose that one existing family law order which was in place before the making of the interim IVO was that the Child live with the father and that the mother’s time with [X] be suspended until further order.  It appears that the family violence complaint which resulted in that interim IVO has been adjourned for mention on 28 May 2019.  It would also appear from the terms of the Undertaking of Bail, which was exhibited to the applicant’s further affidavit, that the conditions on which his bail had been granted has now expired with the result that he is, as I understand it, no longer on bail. 

30. The applicant also expanded upon his concerns for the Child’s welfare while in the mother’s care and, perhaps out of concern to make full and frank disclosure to the Court, deposed that he has a criminal record;  however, it appears, on his evidence, to relate to driving matters and possession, in relation to which he has received a community corrections order which was made in 2017 and has expired. 

31. The affidavit of the applicant’s mother, Ms E, deposed as to her observations of her son’s relationship with the respondent, the various problems of family dispute, abuse of alcohol and drugs, and other matters including her relocation to Melbourne from Adelaide in order to provide support.

32. I reiterate that the applicant’s evidence remains untested at present.

Consideration

1. Application is made for parenting orders:  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (Act), s 64B. Part VII of the Act, which concerns the subject Children, has frequently been described as providing a legislative pathway which governs parenting applications and decisions. This pathway includes the objects and principles which underlie Part 7, the need to recognise a Child’s best interests as the paramount consideration in making a parenting order, and the primary and additional considerations which are relevant: see section 60CC; Goode & Goode (2006) 36 FamLR 422, [5-13]; Morgan & Miles (2007) FLC 93-343, [62-71].

1. In Goode & Goode, the Full Court, having set out the legislative pathway to be followed, recognised that the procedure for making interim parenting orders must be necessarily an abridged process where the scope of the inquiry is significantly curtailed.  In those circumstances, the Court cannot be drawn into making findings of fact on an interim hearing and, where possible, should look to other objective evidence which may inform consideration of the Child’s best interests:  see Habib & Ibrahim [2019] FamCA 116 [60].

2. By subsection 65D(1) power is conferred on the Court to make such parenting order as it thinks proper.  In Bondelmonte & Bondelmonte (2017) 259 CLR 662 at [32], the High Court said of section 65D:

   A parenting order made under s 65D involves the exercise of a judicial discretion because it is made by reference to a paramount consideration of a general kind, the best interests of the Child, which involves an overall assessment of a number of other considerations, either statutorily prescribed or considered by the Court to be relevant. The primary considerations in s 60CC(2) are matters to be borne in mind as consistent with the objects of Pt VII. The additional considerations in s 60CC(3) require assessments of the matters there listed by reference to the circumstances of the case. They involve value judgments in respect of which there may be room for reasonable differences of opinion, as does the overall assessment of what is in the best interests of the Child.

3. As I said in the course of argument, the Court must have regard to the best interests of the Child as the paramount consideration in deciding whether to make a parenting order.  In determining the best interests of a Child there are certain primary considerations which the Court must take into account.  By subsection 60CC(2), the Court must consider:

   a)the benefit to the [Child] of having a meaningful relationship with both of [her] parents; and

   b)      The need to protect the [Child] from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to or exposed to abuse, neglect or family violence.

   See ss 4(1) (Abuse); 4AB(1) (Family Violence); 60B(1)(C), 60CC(1) (Determining Child’s Best Interests).

4. In addition, significant amendments effected to the Act by s 66(2)(a) now require that the Court is to give greater weight to the need to protect children from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed, to abuse, neglect, or family. Thus, where the circumstances require the need for protection from harm as prescribed by sub-s 60CC(2)(b) must assume prominence over the Child enjoying a meaningful relationship with both parents as addressed in subsection 60CC(2)(a).

5. Since Goode & Goode, s 69ZL of the Act has been enacted and provides that the Court may give reasons in short form for a decision that it makes in relation to an interim parenting order. Section 69ZL may be understood in the context that an inherent difficulty in the determination of an interim parenting application is that the Court must necessarily proceed on contested evidence. The Court must do so on an interim basis because it is only at the final hearing that that evidence may be tested.

6. For those reasons, any conclusions expressed upon an interim hearing are necessarily couched in, and to be understood as being inherently qualified:  Marvel & Marvel [2010] FamCA 101, [120]: SS & AH (2010) FamCA FC 13, 88. While an exhaustive discussion of the many factors enumerated in section 60CC(2) is not required, I have, in the available time given consideration to them.

7. It must also be recognised further that any allocation of parental responsibility made at an interim hearing is to be disregarded at the final hearing:  section 61DB. 

8. In this application, I had the considerable benefit of the submissions of Ms Ballard, duty lawyer of the Women’s Legal Service, together with those of Mr McCloskey (who did not appear before me when the ex parte order was made on 20 May 2019. 

9. There are already certain parenting orders on foot and those orders pre-dated the interim IVO which was made on 23 May 2019 and is to be adjourned for further hearing on 28 May 2019.

10. Based upon my consideration of the whole of the evidence, I am satisfied that on an interim basis a lesser risk to the Child will be achieved by securing the result that the Child should continue to live with her father until further order.  The respondent and applicant agreed that until further order, the respondent should be restrained from removing, attempting to remove or allowing the removal of the Child from the State of Victoria and upon any breach of such order, the officers of the AFP will be authorised to deal with that issue immediately should it arise. 

11. I will order that until further order, and pursuant to paragraph 5 of the order made on 20 May 2019, that the Child live with the applicant.  I accept the submission of counsel for the applicant that the Child should continue to spend time with the respondent mother, but that that time should be supervised.  I accept the further submission that such spend time with the respondent should be supervised either by the applicant’s sister or such other person (and at such times) as may be agreed by the parties, provided that the Child shall spend no less than two hours per day on two days per week or otherwise as may be agreed by the parties in writing. 

12. I propose to grant a recovery order in qualified terms. It is to be emphasised that a recovery order is an order of last resort and in those circumstances, I will order that unless by 7 pm this day, Monday, 27 May 2019, the respondent does return the Child to the applicant, pursuant to s 67Q of the Act, a recovery order issue for the Child. Ancillary orders will be made for the officers of the Commonwealth of Australia and all states and territories and their police forces render such assistance as may be required and if necessary by force:

    a)      to find and recover the Child and to deliver the Child to the father as such a place as the father and the person effecting such recovery agree to be appropriate;  and

    b)      to stop and search any vehicle, vessel or aircraft and to enter and search any premises or places in which there is at any time, reasonable cause to believe that the Child may be found.

13. Pursuant to s 68P(3) of the Act, I will direct that a copy of this order be provided as soon as is reasonably practicable to:

    a)      the applicant and respondent.

    b)      the registrar or principal officer of the Magistrates Court at Melbourne.

    c)      the Commissioner of Victoria Police.

    d)      the Department of Health and Human Services, Victoria.

14. Pursuant to s 67Z(3) of the Act, the Registry Manager of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia is requested to notify DHHS, Victoria, of the applicant’s Notice of Risk that was filed on 17 May 2019.

15. Consistently with the submissions that have been made by the parties, I will direct that each party enrol in a post-separation parenting program and provide to the other, a certificate of their completion of that course.  Similarly, I accede to the parties’ submissions that reciprocal orders should be made providing for non-denigration, one by the other, pending further order.  It is simply intolerable that parties should exploit text messages or other behaviour as a means of criticising the other when each of them should recognise their primary responsibility as parents of the Child.

16. In the circumstances, I will direct further, that until further order, the parties communicate in relation to the care, welfare and spend time of the Child by means of a parenting application such as MyMob or the 2houses parenting app.

17. Ms Ballard identified the present difficulties which are posed by the respondent’s ability to file material in a relatively brief time.  While Ms Ballard properly recognised the very real seriousness of the present matters before the Court, she sought, on behalf of the respondent, some additional time in which to file that material.  I accept that submission and will direct that by 4 pm on Wednesday, 31 July 2019, the respondent file and serve a Notice of Address for Service, any Notice of Risk, response and any answering affidavit.

18. With a view to trying to reset the parties’ present difficulties, I have made arrangements for a family consultant to consult to them and provide a report pursuant to section 11F of the Act. An appointment for that consultation has been made for 3 September 2019. As emphasised in the course of submissions, it is imperative that the parties attend that consultation in order that a family consultant may assess the present position and make some recommendations as to how matters might be improved moving forward. To that end, the applicant father and Child must attend at the Family Services Section on 3 September 2019, at 9 am, with the respondent mother to attend at 10 am.

19. The matter will be adjourned for mention on 30 September 2019. 

20. The Court will further order, pursuant to section 65DA(2) and 62B of the Act, that the particulars of the obligations created by these orders and the particulars of the consequences that may flow if a person contravenes these orders will be set out in annexure A.

21. Given the making of the IVO on 23 May 2019 following the making of the parenting order on 20 May 2019, and before the making of orders this day, it is necessary to make further orders addressing the requirements of section 68B of the Act. To some extent, those orders are made out of an abundance of caution and I have, in the course of submissions with the parties’ representatives, engaged upon each of the requirements which are set out in this order. The Court will make a declaration pursuant to section 68P(2)(a) of the Act, that to the extent that this Order may be inconsistent with an IVO that was made by the Magistrates’ Court at Melbourne on 23 May 2019, this Order shall prevail over and operate according to its terms and, pursuant to s.68Q(1) of the Act, that intervention order is otherwise invalid.

22. A number of notations shall be made to this Order.  First, that paragraphs 5-6 of the order made on 20 May 2019, are not inconsistent with the interim IVO and remain operative as parenting orders according to their terms.  Secondly, that paragraph 9 of the IVO expressly provides that the applicant father, Mr Lambie, may do anything that is permitted by the Act. Thirdly, pursuant to s.68P(2)(b-d) of the Act, the Court has given a detailed explanation to the parties as to how the contact that this Order provides is to take place and of the terms of this Order, their purpose, the obligations which it creates, the consequences that may flow from a failure to obey its terms, its reasons for making this Order, and of the parties right to apply for a variation or revocation of this Order. Finally, I record my appreciation that Women’s Legal Service may accede to a request pursuant to s 68P(2)(b-d) of the Act to provide the respondent with a detailed explanation as to how the contact that this Order provides for is to take place.

I certify that the preceding fifty-five (55) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge A Kelly.

Date: 30 May 2019