Lajmanovska and Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations
[2007] AATA 1655
•10 August 2007
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2007] AATA 1655
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No N2006/2549
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION ) Re MARIKA LAJMANOVSKA Applicant
And
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT & WORKPLACE RELATIONS
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Ms Robin Hunt, Senior Member Date10 August 2007
PlaceSydney
Decision The decision under review is affirmed.
...................[Sgd]......................
Ms Robin Hunt
Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
SOCIAL SECURITY - Compensation preclusion period – analysis of compensation agreement – economic loss component less than 50% - consideration of special circumstances – harsh operation of legislation – decision affirmed.
Social Security Act 1991
Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634
Secretary to Department of Family and Community Services v Allan [2001] FCA 1160
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Banks (1990) 23 FCR 416; 20 ALD 19; 12 AAR 38; 56 SSR 762
Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1
Re Groth and Department of Social Security (1995) 37 ALD 797
Dranichnikov v Centrelink [2003] FCAFC 133
Green and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1990) 21 ALD 772
Ivovic v Director General of Social Services 3 ALN N95
Kertland v SDFaCS (1999) 95 FCR 64
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Smith (1991) 30 FCR 56
Director-General of Social Security v Hales (1983) 78 FLR 373; 47 ALR 281
Secretary, Department of Social Security & McFetrish [1998] AATA 12920
Re Secretary to the Department of Social Security and a’Beckett (1990) 12 AAR 212; 21 ALD 79; 26 FCR 349.
Re Secretary, Department of Social Security and Hill (1995) 2(1) SSR 9
Re Colaiacolo and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1985) (Decision No. 2109, 24 April 1985)
Re Krzywak and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1998) 15 ALD 690
Re Secretary, Department of Social Security v Winterbotham (1990) AATA 6499
David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1992] HCA; (1992) 175 CLR 353
Pavey and Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul [1987] HCA 5; (1987) 162 CLR 221
REASONS FOR DECISION
10 August 2007 Ms Robin Hunt, Senior Member Summary
1. Mrs Lajmanovska has suffered some misfortunes which have left her with impediments that make it difficult for her to work at present and possibly into the future. In 1979, she fell from a train and suffered injuries. She subsequently received disability support pension (DSP) starting on 16 March 1989 and continuing until other events intervened. On 18 November 2000, while still receiving DSP, she was knocked down by a motor vehicle and was later compensated for her injuries. It was not until 2006 that Mrs Lajmanovska agreed to and received an amount of damages for injuries sustained in the 2000 accident. Receipt of the award resulted in the application of a preclusion period preventing Mrs Lajmanovska from continuing to receive the disability support pension for a period. Mrs Lajmanovska argues that she should not be precluded from receiving the pension because of special circumstances that exist in her case. Having considered her circumstances I have decided that although the treatment of her award for social security law purposes may be harsh, I am unable to find special circumstances allow the exercise of the discretion to disregard some or all of the compensation payment. This means the review has not resulted in a successful result for Mrs Lajmanovska.
Background
2. Mrs Lajmanovska is seeking review of the decision made by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (SSAT) on 11 December, which affirmed a Centrelink decision that she was not entitled to disability support pension for a period in consequence of receipt of payment by way of compensation. A Centrelink officer decided that Mrs Lajmanovska was precluded from receiving a disability support pension from 18 November 2000 to 22 August 2003. The decision was affirmed by an Authorised Review (ARO) before again being reviewed and affirmed by the SSAT. Mrs Lajmanovska does not say that the preclusion period was wrongly calculated but asks that the compensation payment to her should be disregarded in full or in part because of her special circumstances so that the preclusion period is shortened.
Issue
3. The issue before me is whether there are special circumstances in Mrs Lajmanovska’s case, pursuant to section 1184K of the Social Security Act 1991, which would allow some of her compensation payment to be disregarded. If I found special circumstances applied in her case so as to permit some of her compensation payment to be disregarded, this would result in shortening of the applicable preclusion period.
Legislative Framework
4. Compensation is defined in section 17(2) of the Act as meaning:
(a) a payment of damages; or
(b)a payment under a scheme of insurance or compensation under a Commonwealth, State or Territory law, including a payment under a contract entered into under such a scheme; or
(c)a payment (with or without admission of liability) in settlement of a claim for damages or a claim under such an insurance scheme; or
(d)any other compensation or damages payment;
(whether the payment is in the form of a lump sum or in the form of a series of periodic payments and whether it is made within or outside Australia) that is made wholly or partly in respect of lost earnings or lost capacity to earn resulting from personal injury.
5. Section 17(3), paragraphs (a) and (ab) of the Act provide, in part, that the compensation part of a compensation payment is 50% of the payment if the payment is made in settlement of a claim that is related to an injury and the claim is settled by consent judgment or otherwise. The subsection reads, in part:
17(3) …, for the purposes of this Act, the compensation part of a lump sum compensation payment is:
(a) 50% of the payment if the following circumstances apply:
(i)the payment is made (either with or without admission of liability) in settlement of a claim that is, in whole or part, related to a disease, injury or condition; and
(ii)the claim was settled, either by consent judgement being entered in respect of the settlement or otherwise; or
(ab) 50% of the payment if the following circumstances apply:
(i)the payment represents that part of a person’s entitlement to periodic compensation payments that the person has chosen to receive in the form of a lump sum; and
(ii)the entitlement to periodic compensation payments arose from the settlement (either with or without admission of liability) of a claim that is, in whole or in part, related to a disease, injury or condition; and
(iii)the claim was settled, either by consent judgement being entered in respect of the settlement or otherwise; or
(b)if those circumstances do not apply – so much of the payment as is, in the Secretary’s opinion, in respect of lost earnings or lost capacity to earn, or both.
6. The provisions for calculating a preclusion period are contained in section 1170 of the Act and particularly subsections (4) and (5), which provide:
1170(4)The number of weeks in the lump sum preclusion period in relation to a person is the number worked out using the formula:
Compensation part of lump sum
Income cut-out amount
(5)If the number worked out under subsection (4) is not a whole number, the number is to be rounded down to the nearest whole number.
7. Subsection 1184K(1) of the Act permits the Secretary (or Tribunal) to treat the whole or part of a compensation payment as not having been made if the Secretary thinks it appropriate in the special circumstances of the case. Disregarding a part of the compensation payment will in effect reduce the length of the preclusion period. Mrs Lajmanovska argues that her compensation payment should be disregarded as special circumstances apply in her case. This is the only issue in dispute.
Consideration
8. The parties agree that previously Mrs Lajmanovska was receiving disability support pension from 16 March 1989. While she undoubtedly received a lump sum of compensation after the car accident, her solicitor argues that the usual 50% apportionment of the agreed compensation payment is not appropriate in her case. Mrs Lajmanovska’s solicitor suggested that her case rested on an understanding of her special circumstances. The applicant attended a tribunal hearing but did not give evidence. There is no dispute that Mrs Lajmanovska received compensation for her injury and that the amount was settled by consent. The letter of 4 July 2006 from the insurer’s solicitor to the applicant’s solicitor confirms the parties came to an agreement and explains it is a “compromise on all heads of damage”, with $20,000 allowed for economic loss.
9. As I understand it, the argument is that, Mrs Lajmanovska had been disadvantaged financially for a lengthy period due to her injuries before the latest accident. She was a welfare recipient for many years before the motor vehicle accident and compensation payment. She therefore suffered no economic loss in the usual way because she had not had the opportunity to work before as well as after the accident. While the above letter from the insurer’s solicitor confirmed the agreed settlement sum and set out that it was a compromise incorporating a general cushion for both past and future economic loss, Mrs Lajmanovska claims this was not an accurate reflection of the position. She had suffered no past economic loss, having been on the pension. She made no claim for past economic loss and this is shown in a copy of her claim form at T10, 42ff. Mrs Lajmanovska’s solicitor argues that it follows that the agreed award should not be treated as comprising a 50% component for economic loss.
10. It was put to me that she has no “cushion” to fall back on not having had the opportunity to work before she was injured again. While most persons who receive compensation were working before a mishap, which resulted in an award of damages, Mrs Lajmanovska was not in this position. She was already on social security benefits before she suffered the latest setback. She is still unable to work and it is unlikely she will be able to work again.
11. Section 17(3) of the Act set out above applies in this case. This has the effect that, unless Mrs Lajmanovska can provide evidence of special circumstances to justify the disregarding of part of her award, the compensation part of the lump sum compensation payment made to Mrs Lajmanovska is 50% of the total payment. This is because the payment was made in settlement of a claim that is related to an injury. The resulting preclusion period must then be calculated by the respondent in accordance with section 1170(4). The applicant has not suggested that the calculation was wrong except in the respect to the allocation of 50% rather than a lesser amount due to special circumstances.
12. I may disregard the whole or part of the compensation payment under section 1184K if and only if special circumstances apply. The policy behind having a preclusion period was explained by Heerey J in Secretary to Department of Family & Community Services v Allan [2001] FCA 1160 as:
... The basic policy, understandably enough, is that there should not be "double dipping". People should not receive social security payments for loss of earnings where they have received compensation for that same loss of earnings from another source.
13. Mrs Lajmanovska may not be double dipping in the sense described by Justice Heerey but there are other difficulties in the way of reducing the preclusion period in her case. The legislative formula must be adhered to unless special circumstances are demonstrated.
14. Section 17(3) is similar to earlier legislative provisions which have been considered by the courts. Justice von Doussa in the case of SDSS v Banks 23 FCR 416; 20 ALD 19; 12 AAR 38; 56 SSR 762, handed down in 1990, held that section 152 of the 1988 Act, a predecessor to the current section 17(3), was “an arbitrary formula” designed to determine the compensation part of a lump sum payment by way of compensation. His Honour therefore restored the original decision of a delegate to apply the 50% rule to calculate the preclusion period in a case although the agreed terms described part of the payment as allocated to a particular purpose. Justice von Doussa held the tribunal was in error in excluding from the 50% apportionment that portion of the settlement specified in the award as redemption of future medical expenses.
15. In making this finding, Justice von Doussa referred to the second reading speech for the Bill, which introduced the Social Security Amendment Act 1988 (Act No 58 of 1988). The passage His Honour set out related to new measures introduced to overcome a perceived mischief where settlements of lump sum compensation were manipulated to obscure the economic loss component in a compensation payment. The measure was contained in former section 152(2)(c)(i) and is similar to the current provision in section 17(3) set out above. In my view, the present provision is no less arbitrary than the former section 152.
16. This means no part of the agreed settlement amount can be disregarded by way of characterisation before the application of the 50% rule. As outlined above, only section 1184K of the Act gives the Secretary a discretion to disregard all or part of the compensation payments and this applies only in the ‘special circumstances’ of a particular case. The discretion is available only in these circumstances.
What Are Special Circumstances?
17. Although ‘special circumstances’ is not a term defined in the Act, its meaning has been considered many times by the tribunal and the courts. Justice Toohey, in Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1, stated:
An expression such as “special circumstances” is by its very nature incapable of precise or exhaustive definition. The qualifying adjective looks to circumstances that are unusual, uncommon or exceptional. Whether circumstances answer any of these descriptions must depend on the context in which they occur. For it is the context which allows one to say that the circumstances in one case are markedly different from the usual run of cases. This is not to day that the circumstances must be unique but they must have a particular quality of usualness that permits them to be described as special.
18. The Beadle decision was the subject of an appeal heard by Bowen CJ, Fisher and Lockhart JJ. Their Honours gave examples of circumstances which would clearly constitute special circumstances and others which were “more difficult” to determine. They stated:
We do not think it is possible to lay down the precise limits or precise rules. The matter is one for the Director-General bearing in mind the purpose for which the power is given. The phrase “special circumstances”, although lacking precision, is sufficiently understood in our view not to require judicial gloss.
19. In Re Groth & Department of Social Security (1995) 37 ALD 797, Deputy President Forgie said that it must be borne in mind, when considering whether there are ‘special circumstances’, that the purpose of the provisions is to ensure that a person is not paid from two sources in respect of the same period of time. She continued:
Therefore, there will be special circumstances if the circumstances are such that it is unreasonable, unjust or inappropriate not to treat whole or part of a compensation payment as not having been made…
20. This decision was also the subject of an appeal heard by Kiefel J. Her Honour observed:
… it would require something to distinguish Mr Groth’s case from others, to take it out of the usual or ordinary case… it would of course follow that if one were to conclude that something unfair, unintended, or unjust had occurred that there must be some feature out of the ordinary.
21. Again, in Dranichnikov v Centrelink [2003] FCAFC 133, the Federal Court held at [66] that for a finding of special circumstances to be made:
...what is required will be circumstances which distinguish the case in consideration from the usual case. There will be a requirement that the circumstances are such that takes the case out of the ordinary...
22. Justice Hill (Kiefel & Hely JJ concurring) said, in Dranichnikov, concerning the “unusual, uncommon or exceptional” reference:
“[65] The Full Court in Beadle comprising Bowen CJ, Fisher and Lockhart JJ, however, was of the view that it was not possible to lay down precise rules as to what constituted special circumstances under the then s 102(1)(a) of the Social Security Act 1947 (Cth). Their Honours point out that the question whether there were special circumstances was one for the decision maker (in that case the Director-General) bearing in mind the purpose for which the power was given. The reference to the first instance decision from which the words “unusual, uncommon or exceptional” come was not actually affirmed by the Full Court.”
23. In the present case, the purpose for which the power was given is explained in the second reading speech cited above as preventing manipulation of the apportionment of agreed settlement sum and the effect, as found by von Doussa J in Banks, is an arbitrary application of the 50% rule. It is only possible to disregard part of the settlement if special circumstances are shown. These must be out of the ordinary. In addition, in cases such as Green and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1990) 21 ALD 772, a series of factors that might be considered concerning the exercise of the discretion were discussed. The tribunal referred to the earlier case of Ivovic and said:
“In Ivovic v Director General of Social Services 3 ALN N95 the Tribunal identified a number of principles which could be applied in deciding whether special circumstances existed to warrant the exercise of the discretion contained in s156 of the Act. In that decision, which concerned the liability of the Applicant to repay an amount of sickness benefit paid to him, the Tribunal commented at N97.
·the use of the word "special" is "intended to allow the decision maker the fullest opportunity to consider the particular circumstances of each case";
·"hardship is a relevant consideration" but regard must be had to the way in which the hardship arose;
·there must exist "factors which justify the making of an exception in whole or in part to the principle of liability which the Act otherwise establishes";
·the decision maker must have regard to whether, by exercising the discretion in a particular case he/she will be "achieving or frustrating ends or objects which are conformable with the scope and purpose of the Social Security Act"; and
·"the decision maker must be prepared to respond to special circumstances of any particular case by reason of which strict enforcement of the liability created by the section would be unjust, unreasonable or otherwise inappropriate."
24. These factors, while only an indication, have since been taken into account in later tribunal cases. Justice Merkel in Kertland v SDFaCS (1999) 95 FCR 64 considered the operation of the discretion under former section 1184 and remarked that it might be exercised to overcome a harsh outcome. Justice Merkel made reference to findings of Justice von Doussa about the statutory scheme under the 1947 Act in Banks, as well as in the cases of Secretary, Department of Social Security va'Beckett (1990) 26 FCR 249 and Secretary, Department of Social Security v Smith (1991) 30 FCR 56. Justice Merkel noted that Justice von Doussa observed in Banks that it was understandable that the legislature adopted an arbitrary formula in respect of lump sum payments made in settlement of a claim. He added that it was in the very nature of an arbitrary provision that it could possibly entail "a degree of unfairness in a particular case". This did not produce a result favourable to the applicant in that case.
25. As Merkel J noted, in that context, that von Doussa J considered the precise role of the discretion under former section 152 in Smith where he referred, with approval, to a number of decisions. One was in Re Ivovic and Director-General of Social Services (1981) 3 ALN N95 where the Tribunal stated that use of the word "special" is intended to allow the decision-maker the fullest opportunity to consider the particular circumstances of each case. Merkel J also noted that in Smith, von Doussa J rejected a contention that the circumstances of the case should be confined to matters which are external to the operation of the statutory scheme. His Honour made the point, with which Merkel J agreed, that a distinction cannot meaningfully be drawn between matters external to the operation of the scheme and matters which are the product of the strict application of the scheme. Merkel J noted that Justice von Doussa suggested (at 62) that the operation of the legislative provisions and facts peculiar to a particular person cannot be considered in isolation from the operation of the provisions.
Does Mrs Lajmanovska Have Special Circumstances?
26. Mrs Lajmanovska’s reasons for seeking a reduction in the preclusion period includes her inability to earn over a lengthy period due to her severe injuries dating back to 1979, and her not making any claim to the insurer for past economic loss. Her solicitor also pointed out that her claim for future economic loss was just a buffer or cushion claim because it was plain that she was unlikely to return to work, not having worked since 1989 and now having additional impairments. Mrs Lajmanovska did not tell the Tribunal about her present position other than by way of furnishing medical reports which describe the continuing effects of her injuries.
27. Mrs Lajmanovska’s solicitor communicated with Centrelink and formed the impression that Mrs Lajmanovska would not be expected to repay any monies to Centrelink. On or about 13 June 2006, the solicitor sought an estimate of the amount which would be applied on a settlement of $150,000. On 19 June 2006, Centrelink wrote to him that the preclusion period in the event of such a settlement would operate from 18 November 2000 to 13 December 2002. Centrelink estimated the repayment amount at $22,488.12. On 26 June 2006, however, Centrelink notified the solicitor that Mrs Lajmanovska would be required to repay $30,443.16. Ultimately, after this correspondence took place, the actual settlement increased to $200,000 and the resulting preclusion and repayment increased.
28. While it is apparent from the compensation claim form and correspondence between solicitors that the actual amount of economic loss contemplated in the settlement was $20,000, the discretion to disregard part of the payment made to an applicant turns only on special circumstances. As I have already pointed out, the application of the 50% is arbitrary apart from the discretion available under section 1184K.
29. What amounts to special circumstances varies from case to case but some threads remain the same. Generally some form of hardship is established. By contrast, the present case hinges not on any particular hardship but depends on the harsh outcome to Mrs Lajmanovska where it is apparent that her settlement award took little account of economic loss as there was none.
30. Mrs Lajmanovska did not point to any details of financial hardship or inform the Tribunal about such circumstances as ownership or not of any property. She did not tell the Tribunal whether she had personal or family problems or any other kind of problem apart from having been a social security recipient for some years as a result of previous difficulties presumably arising from her earlier injuries in 1979. While it is possible the applicant is in financial distress, she did not give any evidence to this effect.
31. The medical reports before me show she suffers from medical and mental health problems which might otherwise qualify her for disability support pension. Medical reports before me indicate that Mrs Lajmanovska has a 20% impairment of her back as a result of the motor vehicle accident as well as deficiencies in her lower limbs. Dr J E C Bentivoglio furnished a report to this effect on 26 November 2001. More recently, on 7 June 2006, Dr Katherine Nemeth produced an incapacity and disability evaluation report. This report shows that Mrs Lajmanovska has improved since surgical intervention by Dr J E C Bentivoglio but that she still has problems with memory loss and cognitive symptoms as well as physical limitations. She needs help at home with household tasks. She also has various medical treatments which are expensive. Dr Nemeth concludes that she is not fit for employment and has deteriorated since the motor vehicle accident. Dr C Costa provided a report on 14 June 2005 and another on 30 June 2005. Dr Costa also found Mrs Lajmanovska was totally and permanently unfit for work and that she suffered permanent loss of function. Using the combined values tables, he found 29% whole person impairment. He also detailed treatment costs and suggested various continuing treatments for Mrs Lajmanovska.
32. In my view, the financial and medical circumstances of the applicant do not take her outside of the ordinary run of cases. In Director-General of Social Security v Hales (1983) 78 FLR 373; 47 ALR 281, Justice Sheppard of the Full Federal Court indicated why financial difficulties were not usually special circumstances when he stated:
The legislation provides for the payment of a variety of benefits to different classes of people who will usually have one thing in common: they will be impecunious and in straitened circumstances.
33. Mrs Lajmanovska’s financial situation does not set her apart from the usual types of situation. However, I am mindful of the harsh effect on Mrs Lajmanovska of the arbitrary rule under section 17(3) when it is obvious that the $20,000 awarded under this head is far short of the 50% applied under the section. Mrs Lajmanovska was already disadvantaged as a long term recipient of the DSP and also had very limited prospects of earning in the future when she was injured in 2000.
34. Looking at Mrs Lajmanovska’s circumstances globally, I consider her situation is unusual, exceptional or uncommon when compared to other recipients of social security assistance. The harsh effect on her of the application of the 50% rule when she clearly suffered negligible economic loss and made no claim for past losses brings her case out of the ordinary. This is not a situation where Mrs Lajmanovska is double dipping as she suffered virtually no economic loss and the correspondence between solicitors shows that only $20,000 was agreed for this purpose. I find no suggestion of manipulation as it is true that Mrs Lajmanovska was unable to work for many years. It follows that exercise of the discretion in her favour does not offend the reason behind the introduction of the 50% rule.
35. The Guide to Social Security Law (Version 1.125) states the policy position in relation to the 50% rule and the special circumstances discretion. At Chapter 4.13.4.10, Overview of the Application of the Special Circumstances Provisions it states:
When special circumstances should NEVER be applied
Special Circumstances should NEVER be applied in the following situation:
·If the delegate does not agree with the legislation. This is contrary to the intention of Parliament and is illegal, or
·Where the only special circumstance is the legal deduction from both a social security payment and a DVA payment, or
·where the only special circumstance is the perceived unfairness of the 50% rule, or
·if the sole factor if that the person or their partner’s reason for receiving a CAP was different to the reason the compensation was paid.
[Emphasis added]
36. On this basis, the policy guidelines about the legislation clearly state that the unfair application of the 50% rule is not a ground giving rise to special circumstances. I am bound by policy unless I find cogent reasons to act otherwise. See the often cited judgment of Brennan J in Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634. I do not consider there are valid reasons in the present case to overcome policy.
37. In this matter, Mrs Lajmanovska’s claim was resolved and settled without admission of liability, for a lump sum. In my view the lump sum payment falls clearly within section 17(2) of the Act, and is ‘compensation’ for the purposes of the legislation.
38. I accept that the amount of $20,000.00 attributed to future economic loss is a small portion of the settlement sum, but to dissect the lump sum is not appropriate. This issue was also considered in the matter of Secretary, Department of Social Security v McFetrish [1998] AATA 12920 in which Senior Member Purcell followed the decision of O’Loughlin J in Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hulls and Others 22 ALD 570 at 578 where it said:
Once the mischief at which the amending legislation was aimed has been so clearly identified, it becomes apparent that the legislation prevents any dissection of the ‘lump sum’. Although those words are not defined, I respectfully agree with what Von Doussa J said of them in Banks case: ‘They are not words of art. In the Macquarie Dictionary, a lump sum is defined as a sum including a number of items taken together or in the lump’.
39. Mrs Lajmanovska has been financially disadvantaged by the application of the legislation, but I do not consider that these circumstances are special circumstances which would warrant the exercise of discretion in Mrs Lajmanovska’s favour, in accordance with section 1184K(1) of the Act. The applicant’s solicitor drew my attention to several cases about restitution and unjust enrichment where there has been a mistake of fact or law. See, for example, David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1992] and Pavey and Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul [1987]. The court in David, found that if, under a mistake, money is paid to and unjustly enriches a payee, the payer's right to recover the amount paid accrues at the moment when the payee received the money. I can find no case made out that there has been a payment to Centrelink under a mistake of either fact or law in the present case.
40. On balance, I am satisfied that Mrs Lajmanovska’s circumstances are not sufficiently exceptional or unusual to warrant the exercise of the discretion in accordance with section 1184K of the Act.
Decision
41. The decision under review is affirmed.
I certify that the 41 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member R Hunt
Signed: Talaishia Collis
AssociateDate/s of Hearing 1 June 2007
Date of Decision 10 August 2007
Counsel for the Applicant Mr William Carney
Solicitor for the Applicant Mr Gary Koutzoumis – Koutzoumis LawyersSolicitor for the Respondent Mr Ken Bullock – Centrelink Legal Services
1
9
0