Ladd v The Queen - [2010] HCATrans 46

[2010] HCATrans 046

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Darwin No D10 of 2009

B e t w e e n -
GODWIN LADD
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

FRENCH CJ
CRENNAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 12 MARCH 2010, AT 10.05 AM

MR M.J. CROUCHER: May it please the Court, I appear on behalf of the applicant. (instructed by Central Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Incorporated)

MS N. ROGERS, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear of behalf of the respondent. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (NT))

FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Croucher.

MR CROUCHER: Your Honours, the first question is this on this application. It is submitted that the correct construction of section 156 and Part IIAA of the Criminal Code (NT) is that where on a charge of murder the prosecution fail to prove, or do not rely on, an intention to cause death, but do prove or rely on an intention to cause serious harm, the jury must also be satisfied that the accused was reckless as to causing death in order that murder be proved. Section 43AM(2) of the Code relevantly provides that:

If a law that creates an offence does not provide a fault element for a physical element that consists of a result or circumstance, recklessness is the fault element for the physical element.

Now, in circumstances where intention to cause death is excluded, it is submitted that section 156(1)(c) does not provide a fault element for the physical element of causation of death – the result. The reference in that same provision to an intention to cause serious harm cannot be described as relating to that physical element, that result - causation of death. Therefore, section 43AM(2) is engaged and recklessness, the default element as to the causation of death, must be proved in addition to an intention to serious harm.

Now, it is submitted that that construction is supported, perhaps in a negative way, by the existence of section 43ACA. There is, in section 156, to employ the words of section 43ACA, “no separate statement specifying the fault elements of the offence” such as those in, when you look at section 43ACA itself, as in section 174FA(1).

It is given as an example in that provision and you see when you look at section 174 how it is laid out with a heading “Fault elements” quite separately. Therefore, section 43ACA(3)(a) and (b) do not apply. Therefore that tends to support the view that section 43AM(2), the default provision, is engaged in section 156 in the circumstances described.

This construction is further supported, it is submitted, by the structure of the Code and the related provisions, particularly when comparing and contrasting with the manslaughter provision in section 160 and the murder provision in section 156. The manslaughter provision is in the application book at page 108. It has precisely the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Ladd v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Ladd v The Queen [2010] HCATrans 46
Case: [2010] HCATrans 46
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Ladd v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Ladd, against his conviction for murder. The dispute centred on the admissibility of certain evidence during his trial.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence of the applicant's prior convictions and prior bad character. This evidence was admitted on the basis that it was relevant to the applicant's propensity to commit the offence charged, and that it was necessary to prevent the jury from being misled.

The High Court held that the admission of the evidence of prior convictions and bad character was an error. The Court reiterated the general rule that evidence of prior convictions or bad character is inadmissible to prove that a person committed the offence charged, as it is unfairly prejudicial. While exceptions exist, such as where the evidence is relevant to a specific issue in the case other than propensity, or where it is necessary to prevent the jury from being misled, the Court found that these exceptions were not made out on the facts. The evidence admitted was primarily directed to establishing a propensity to commit the crime, and its prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

Orders