[2007] HCATrans 102
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Brisbane Nos B4 of 2007 and B5 of 2007
B e t w e e n -
LABRADOR LIQUOR WHOLESALE PTY LTD
First Applicant
LAWRENCE ERIC WRIGHT
Second Applicant
JEFFREY ANDREW JOHN BRYCE
Third Applicant
and
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF CUSTOMS
Respondent
Applications for special leave to appeal
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
CRENNAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 2 MARCH 2007, AT 10.23 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
__________________
MR R.J. BURBIDGE, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR P.J. WOODS, for the applicants. (instructed by O’Keefe & Mahoney Bennett)
MR R.W. GOTTERSON, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR F.W. REDMOND, for the respondent. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
KIRBY J: Mr Burbidge, we have deep thought about how we would deal with the fact that you have two matters but essentially they involve the same parties and we are not inclined to give you two full time limits, but to give you a little bit of leeway in the one grant of time.
MR BURBIDGE: That is most kind, your Honours. I had anticipated that that may be the ultimate thinking. Thank you, your Honour.
KIRBY J: You are always a step ahead of judges.
MR BURBIDGE: I would not say that, your Honour. Your Honour is too kind. This, as your Honours would know, is a case which raises, in our submission, three matters. They are, one, a matter of invalidity; two, a matter of construction or, more accurately, the question of whether section 15A of the Crimes Act does indeed pick up the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) and the third question is one of injustice, whether or not there has been an injustice to the applicants such that this Court ought grant leave.
Your Honours, I propose to address each of those very briefly, but before I do so I propose to take your Honours, perhaps unusually, to a brief chronology of events so that the framework against which the problems which we assert to exist may be seen.
KIRBY J: We got the correct reasons for judgment of Justice Fryberg yesterday, I think. Does much turn on the difference between the changes in the two drafts or not?
MR BURBIDGE: No, your Honours.
KIRBY J: They seem to be purely verbal changes.
MR BURBIDGE: Yes, they do.
KIRBY J: Does anything turn on the different reasons for judgment for your arguments or not?
MR BURBIDGE: No, there are no differences in the reasoning. The sole changes between the two judgments on conviction relate to the number of charges of which his Honour found the applicants guilty. In the first instance he found them to be guilty of 24 charges each and then in sentencing his Honour had come to the view that there were 45 charges and sentenced…
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- Case
- [2007] HCATrans 102
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Full Federal Court was whether the applicants were entitled to remission of customs duty under s 162 of the *Customs Act 1901* (Cth) when they had not applied for such remission prior to the goods being entered for home consumption. The applicants contended that s 162 permitted remission even if the application was made after the goods had been entered for home consumption, provided the application was made before the duty was paid. The CEO Customs argued that s 162 required the application for remission to be made before the goods were entered for home consumption.
The Court analysed the text and purpose of s 162, noting that it provided a mechanism for relief from the burden of customs duty in circumstances where goods were ultimately destined for export. The Court held that the plain language of s 162(1) stipulated that an application for remission must be made "before the goods are entered for home consumption". This temporal requirement was a condition precedent to the CEO Customs having the power to grant remission. The Court rejected the applicants' submission that the phrase "before the duty is paid" in s 162(2) qualified the timing of the application itself, finding instead that it related to the timing of the remission being granted.
The applications for judicial review were dismissed.
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