La Rosa v The Queen - [2019] VSCA 152

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S APCR 2018 0225

SKYE CAMRON LA ROSA	Applicant
v
THE QUEEN	Respondent

---

JUDGES:	PRIEST and BEACH JJA
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	26 June 2019
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	26 June 2019
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2019] VSCA 152
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM:	[2018] VCC 1593 (Judge Chettle)

---

CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence – Application for leave to appeal against sentence – Extortion with threat to inflict injury, aggravated burglary, theft, multiple dishonesty offences and associated summary offences – Whether judge erred in classifying extortion offence as ‘mid to upper-mid level’ – Whether individual sentences or total effective sentence of 4 years and 9 months, with non-parole period of 3 years, manifestly excessive – Error contended for not reasonably arguable – Complaints of manifest excess not reasonably arguable – Sentences well within available sentencing ranges – Application for leave to appeal refused.

APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Applicant	Ms G Connelly	Paul Vale Criminal Law
For the Respondent	Ms M Mahady	Mr J Cain, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

PRIEST JA
BEACH JA:

On 13 September 2018, following a trial on indictment (‘the trial indictment’) in the County Court, the applicant was convicted of one charge of extortion with threat to inflict injury, one charge of aggravated burglary and one charge of theft. She subsequently pleaded guilty to three summary offences, namely: one charge of driving whilst disqualified, and two charges of dealing with property suspected to be the proceeds of crime.

Prior to the final directions hearing in relation to the charges that went to trial, the applicant offered to plead guilty to charges on a separate indictment (‘the plea indictment’) and, pursuant to that offer, the applicant subsequently pleaded guilty to five charges of obtaining a financial advantage by deception, five charges of attempting to obtain a financial advantage by deception, one charge of obtaining property by deception, one charge of possession of identification information and one charge of possession of a drug of dependence.

On 27 September 2018, the applicant was sentenced as follows:

Indictment No: C1611014A (the trial indictment)

Charge

Offence

Maximum

Sentence

Cumulation

1 Extortion with a threat to inflict injury 15 years 2 years Base

6 Aggravated burglary 25 years 2 years 12 months

7 Theft 10 years 12 months 6 months

Summary charges 4 and 11 Dealing with property suspected of being proceeds of crime 2 years 6 months (aggregate sentence) 3 months

Summary charge 5 Driving whilst disqualified 2 years or 240 penalty units 1 month -

Indictment No: G12075709 (the plea indictment)

Charge

Offence

Maximum

Sentence

Cumulation

1, 4, 8, 12 and 13 Obtaining a financial advantage by deception 10 years 2 years (aggregate sentence) 12 months on the sentences imposed on Indictment No: C1611014A

2, 3, 5, 6, 9 Attempting to obtain a financial advantage by deception 5 years

7 Obtaining property by deception 10 years

10 Possession of identification information 3 years

11 Possession of a drug of dependence 1 year or…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read La Rosa v The Queen and more:

Read every judgment in full
Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
Download judgments as PDF or Word

Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details

Case: [2019] VSCA 152
Decision Date: 26 June 2019

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of La Rosa v The Queen involves the appellant, who has been convicted of multiple criminal offences, including extortion with a threat to inflict injury, aggravated burglary, theft, and several dishonesty offences, along with associated summary charges. The appellant applied for leave to appeal against the sentence imposed by the lower court, which totalled four years and nine months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of three years. The central issue before the court was whether the trial judge had erred in classifying the extortion offence as being of 'mid to upper-mid level' and whether the sentences imposed, both individually and cumulatively, were manifestly excessive.

The court examined the classification of the extortion offence and found that it was not reasonably arguable that the judge had erred in this regard. The court considered the gravity and circumstances of the offence, including the threat of physical injury, and determined that the classification was appropriate. Regarding the individual sentences, the court assessed whether they were within the available sentencing ranges and found that they were not excessive. The cumulative sentence was also reviewed, and the court concluded that it was not manifestly excessive, as the total sentence was well within the appropriate range for the combined offences.

The court held that the appellant's complaints about the manifest excess of the sentences were not reasonably arguable. The sentences imposed were deemed appropriate and consistent with the applicable legal principles. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was refused, and the lower court's sentencing decision was upheld.

Orders