L. Grollo & Co. Pty Ltd v Palmdale Insurance Ltd

Case

[1986] FCA 429

22 Sep 1986

No judgment structure available for this case.

BETGEEN :

L. GROLLO .5 CO. PTY. LTD. ,

REBLCO PTY. LTD. ,

GROFAM FTY

. LTD. ,

L . GROLLO CON3TRUCTION3 FTY. LTD. ,

L. GROLLO EQUIFMENT FTY. LTD. ,

L . GROLLO dDMINISTRATION PT'I. LTD. ,

L.

GWLLO

FRE-MIX

Fri. LTD. ,

L . GROLLO (d.1Z.T. I XJMINISTRATI~?J

FT?. LTD.,

L .

GRQLLG

\DAFihli!i>

~ M I N I ~ T R A T I O K

FT[.

LTI j . ,

L.

G k O L i G

I DI.Ij.lUN I

f+iA.IjAGEE.ENT FTY. LTD,

L . GROLLd NGMINEE:" FT?. LTD. ana

L. ZROLi.0 :ALES

FT';.

LTD.

ard

m: NOHTHROP J.

DATE:

22 SEPTEMBER 19a6

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

EX TEMPIJRE RWSONS F O R JUIjGMENT

Its

motlon,

1s seeking an oraer

rhat

thls

appllcatlan

commenced by G r o l l o

I n December 13Y5

be stayed pendlng

the

The proceedlngs In the Supreme Court

xere

brought

by Falmdale seeklng orders under contt-acts of insurance

isr

lndrrnnlty I n relatron to

worksrs

cnmpenaaclcn I n ',':ctoria

xlth respect to

persons cmployed by Gr4:llo.

Gns of

zhsse

actlons relates

C D

thi-ee insLrancE

years,

1'37G,'77,

1 3 7 7 , 7 Z

and

1373/79 r e s p s c t l v e l y ,

w n ~ l e the

0tii2r

actls.r,

l a ~ G L - rtz

lnzuranse year 1973/E0. in brlef, -

d L k = e

.--

c z a actlons are

similar In

nature and ar15e from

the fact chac

uncier the

alleged

agreements

and

reicvant

statucor;- regulaclons,

premlums are based

on

antlcipaced salarrea

pald

by

the

znsured to lts employees, but at the end of each year, any necessary rectlilcatlon 1 s made to the amount of the

prem~ums,

having regard to

the vages actually

pald by

the

employer durlng the relevant lnsurance yehr.

In each of

those actlons Palmdale

1 s

seeklng rellei based

upon

the

those years. By Its pleadings I n rhe Supreme Court acc:1ons, Grollo has raised a large number of defences bassd upon

various common lax

andfor equlty clalms.

Those defences

include

dsr'ences

based

upon

non-compllance wlth the autharlzatlsn requlrernents of the Commonwealth Insurarxe Act 1373, non-compllancs zlth the

Workers Uompensatlon hegulatlcns I n v l z t o r l a , special

- _

?rEmlum aqieements betxeen i r o l l o and Falmaale y lvmq rlze t o

aac:siacklon, and accord and satxafast:on, n o n - a l s c l o z u r e or'

macerLa1 facts by

the Insurer, Fairmale, Irnplld

c ~ n z l c i o n s

of the ayrerrnenc, mls-atacemenc zf fact, defences under che Instruments Act and absence of proper demands to Inspect: the records of Grollo. I n addition, Grollo raises by way of

defence clalms based upon

55.52

and

5 8 of

the Trade F r a c t l c e s

Act 1974.

Insofar as 5.52 1 s concerned. the conduct whcn 1 5

alleged was mlsleadlng ot- deceptlvr or was llkely to mlslead to deceive, must, of necessity, have arisen before each contract was entered Into. The 5.58 defence, however. 1s of

a different nature. That sectlon reads as follows:-

"A corporatlon shaii not,

LL trade ot- sosmerce,

accept payment or other tzonaldet-aclon for gl;ods or services xlnere at the cime of the acceptance It lt-ttsnds -

(a) not t o supply the gssds or ser-acss; or

Ib) C O supply goods or

set-v1ces materlally

different from the goods or set-vices m respact o f xhlch t h e payment o r other consl2eratlon 1s accepted."

In the grssenz case, Falmdale 1s lr. llyuldatlcn arid

It 1s slleqed

at the least

tiiat 1r 1s

~ n a r s l r , ,

r

:

does

n o t

lntsnd, c c makc any saymenta h:;

;ay

~f Indernnlty xltn

s r f e c t

to xorksrs c~mpenaaclon

c l a m s nadz b>- emplcyess cf

IGrcilo.

Some of

these clalms may

exten8i for many

Tears

Into the

future. Triet-efore, if

Palmdale doe;

I n fart succeea ln lts

action In the Supreme Court and mmey l a ordered to be

pald

to Palmdale, then Palmdale

would be acceptlng that money

at a

time when It lntended not to

s u p p l y

the servlces

or

xas

unable to supply the

services of the kind arlslng under the

contract.

In thelr reply

In the Supreme Court proceedlnqs,

Palmdale

has

alleged

that

the

Supreme

Court

has

no

~urlsdict~on

to hear and determlne those defences

based upun

the Trade Practlces Act.

In SesEmber 1935. (Groll~ commenced

the

presenc

proceedings I n the Federal C.aut-t and, by Its amendd Statement of Clam, 1s settxny out facts whlch colnclde with the clalms ralsed by xay of aefance in Its pleadlngs In ths

Supreme Court actlons. Stated shortly, Grollo

1s

seeking

rellef based upon

ss.52 and

58 of the

Trade Practlces Act

and, pursuant to the accrued jurisdlctlon concept, is seeking

rellef based upon the other matters raised in its defence In

the Supreme Court proceedings, but

m

the Federal Court

1 s

rasing those as causes a€ a z t i o n .

It is

seeking

declarations under s.163A oE

the Trade Fractlces Act; it

1 s

seeklnq inlunctlons under

5 . 8 0

of the

Trade Practlces

Act

and, Insofar as

1 s wcessary , 1s

seeking orders based upon

s.37 t

f

:

the Trade Pracclcea Act. I do not: need to develr;?

tnose orders for

relief further, except t o bay that f o r

present

purposes, I am

assumlng

that

no

que5,tlon

of

llmltatlon of actlons

arlses In the

proceedlngs

~n the

Federal <-‘.JUKt.

In May uf thls

year, m the case of Carlton

and

Unlted Erewerles Llmltsd v. Castlcmalne TGG%VS Llmltzd,

the

Hlgh Court announced

Its ludgment

ln

a n appeal

from th2

Supreme Court US New South Waiss on matters almllar to

those

presently

beisre me and publlshed Its rea50ns for thac

~udgment

on 30 July 1986. In that case, In proceedlngs In

the Supreme Court

of

New

South Wales,

claims were made

arising from

an agreement. Carlton

and Unxted Brswrries,

being the defendants, ralsed

m thelr defence a claLm that

the agreement

was

contrary

to pruvlslons of

the

T r a d e

Practices Bit, Part

IV, and therefore could not be

enforced.

In Its reply, the plaintlfl ralsed the question whether the

Supreme Court had jurlsdictim CO determlne the defences r a s e d by Carlton and Unlted Erewerles. Later, there was a

separate hearlng llmlted to the

question

of whether the

Supreme Court had

~urlsdicc~on

tu determlne chat defence and

same othsr relatscl matters.

The Supreme C o u r t ,

constltuted

by a slngle Judgs, determlned that questlun In ths form

thar,

the Supreme Court

had lurlsdlctlon and, as a macter of

dlscretlon, ought not

to refuse or

decllne to exerclse its

~urlsdiction. Carlton

and ITnlted Ereweries, by speclal

leave,

appealed

to the High Court, which dismissed the

appeal.

I do

not need to go

through In detarl the reasons

Trade F r a c t l c r s

.b.rt, xhlch

refet- tG

actzons belng

brouylit

under the Trade

Fractlces

Act

as dlstln,:r: from matters

arlslng under

the Trade

Practlces

Act.

In my opznlon,

slmllar types of reasons should apply

m the present case.

Counsel

for

Grollo

has

urged

that

there

are

differences m the matter presently before the Court

m that

Grollo has commenced these proceedings in the Federal Court, xhereas m the Carlton and Unlted Breweries case, there were

no concurrent

proceedings zn the Federal Court. Counsel

referred to

iiilcta

tu the effect chat that

m i ? i i r :

make

a

matrrlal d l f f e r snce to che jurlsdlctlon of the Supreme Court.

i do not see how that could a t - l s e , having regard to what the

tilgh Court sald in Its reasons for ludgment. Has-lnq regard

also to tnne fact that t h e proczeaznqs in the Supreme Court

have been pendlng f o r a long tlme, in fact a number of years,

that there have been a number of separate hearmg U S matters

arising in those proceedings,

and to the posslblllty that the

hearing of that matter

might start In the not too far dlstant

future, it seems, prima

iacle, deslrable that the Supreme

Court should continue with the hearlng

of that mattsr.

It is argued further that the questlon

of

5 . 5 8

w a s

a matter which should

be heard PT the Federal Court because

of the fact tliat It applies

to pres'int facts, receipts for

money, as opposed to matters oczurrlng In the past.

Caunsel

argued chat thls matter

coulsi be ljolated from the &ale mass

'4

of the fasts

qlvlng r:se

to the Supreme Court asclon, ana

.

that lf the 5.58 clalm was faund to be

a qood causs of actlon

by Grolla

In

the

Federal

Court

artlon,

~t xould, of

necessity, save a large

amount of costs

In

unnecessary

;upreme Court

procesdlngs

becauze

the

Supk-emr

Court

proceedlngs would

no longer be of

any lmportance

~f

5 . 5 3

prevented Palmdale from rrcelvlng any or' che monies

slalmed

by

l t .

That is

a persuasive

arqumene and one whlch the

Court, ln th? appropriate case, would

Le dlspossd to accept.

But looklng at

all the facts and the hlstory of the matter

and the decisln of the Hlgh Court in the Carlton and United

Brewerles Limlted matter and the fact that In

law there 1 s no

reason, If lt is appropriate, why this

question of the

~urlsdictlon

of the Supreme Court could not

be

trled as a

separate issue a5 It was ln the New South Wale5

proceedings,

It seems to me that

thz best course to adopc 1s to rzfrain

from maklng any order preventlng Paimdale from proceeding

wltn Its actions In

the Supreme Court.

In order to avoid dupllcatlon

of proceedlngs, it 1 s

desirable that the proceedlngs In the Federal Court should be

stayed pendlng the hearlng and determlnatlon of the

actions

In the Supreme Court or untll further order. I make the order in that form because It may well be that other thlngs

may arise whlch require this Court

to cisntinue the hearlng of

the proceedlngs by Grollo even before the Ilnal determlnation

of the Supreme Court pruceedings. Accordlngly, the motlon

on

*

beha:f

zf Grollo IS refused dt ti.z

present tlme but l ?avz

1 5

L

given to Grollo to renew che rnotlon un

notlce 1s ths

clrcumstancss d o warrant.

on the motlon by Palmdale.

lt 1 s ordered that the

appllcatlon be stayed pending the heat-mg and determinatlun

of action number 1503 of 1981 In the Supreme Court of

Vlctorla and actlon number 2733 of 1985 In the Supreme Court

of Victorla or until further

order, and llberty to apply

16

granted ~n that rnotlon also.

In the clrcumstancs

S there has been at this staq

'e a

substantial success f o r Palmdale

on Its motlon and I see

no

reason to depart

from

the normal course

oi orliermg that

Grollo pay Palmdale's costs

of its motion. But lnsofar

as

the motlon by

Grollo 1 s concerned, to some extent It

rnlght

arise again and

I merely reserve costs of that

mutmn.

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