Kyogle Shire Council v Muli Muli Local Aboriginal Land Council

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      Kyogle Shire Council v Muli Muli [2005]  NSWCA 4

FILE NUMBER(S):
40162/04

HEARING DATE(S):               Wednesday 19 January 2005

JUDGMENT DATE: 16/02/2005

PARTIES:
Kyogle Shire Council
Muli Muli Local Aboriginal Land Council

JUDGMENT OF:       Ipp JA Tobias JA Brownie AJA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Land & Environment Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          L&E 31053/03

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Cowdroy J

COUNSEL:
A: Mr T Robertson SC / Ms L Byrne / Mr Siva
R: Mr R Margo SC / Mr A McAvoy

SOLICITORS:
A: McInnes Legal Commercial Lawyers, Ballina
R: Zabow & Wise, Sydney

CATCHWORDS:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Service of council rates - Service by posting - Time at which service is effected - Whether s 710 Local Government Act 1993 provides for both the modes and time of service - Whether s 76(1) Interpretation Act 1987 applies to determine time of service
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION - "Contrary intention" - Interpretation Act 1987 s 5(2)  

LEGISLATION CITED:
Local Government Act 1993
Interpretation Act 1987
Interpretation Act 1897

DECISION:
(1) Appeal allowed
(2) Orders made by Cowdroy J on 6 February 2004 be set aside
(3) Declare that the respondent's appeal to the Land and Environment Court constituted by the filing of its Application on 3 September 2003 was made more than 30 days after service upon the respondent of the subject rates and charges notice
(4) Order that the Application filed on 3 September 2003 be dismissed
(5) Order the appellant pay the respondent's costs of the summons for leave to appeal and of the appeal

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40162/04
L&E 31053/03

IPP JA
TOBIAS JA
BROWNIE AJA

Wednesday 16 February 2005

KYOGLE SHIRE COUNCIL v MULI MULI LOCAL ABORIGINAL LAND COUNCIL

HEADNOTE

The appellant Council posted a rates notice on 31 July 2003 to the respondent Aboriginal Land Council at its post office box number. The operator of the Post Office placed the notice in the respondent's post office box on 1 August 2003. The respondent cleared its box and came into possession of the notice on 4 August 2003. If the date of service was 31 July or 1 August as the appellant Council contended the respondent was out of time in instituting an appeal to the Land and Environment Court pursuant to s 574 of the Local Government Act 1993 against the levying of the rate in respect of its land. If the date of service was 4 August 2003 or later, the respondent was within time.

Section 710 of the Local Government Act provided a number of modes of service of a rates notice, including "by posting the notice by prepaid letter addressed to ... the post office box of the person to be served" (s 710(2)(c)). The respondent's contention that service did not occur until 6 August 2003 was founded on s 76(1)(b) of the Interpretation Act 1987, which provided that if any Act required a document to be…

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Details
Case
[2005] NSWCA 4
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned the time at which service of rate notices was effected. The appellant, Kyogle Shire Council, had posted rate notices to the respondent, Muli Muli Local Aboriginal Land Council, on 31 July 2003. The respondent instituted an appeal to the Land and Environment Court on 3 September 2003, arguing that the land was not rateable. The appellant sought to dismiss this appeal, contending it was filed outside the 30-day time limit prescribed by section 574(3) of the *Local Government Act 1993* (NSW). The primary judge in the Land and Environment Court had found that service was effected on 6 August 2003, applying section 76(1)(b) of the *Interpretation Act 1987* (NSW), and dismissed the appellant's motion. The appellant appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal.

The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether section 710 of the *Local Government Act 1993* provided for both the mode and the time of service by post, and if not, whether section 76(1) of the *Interpretation Act 1987* applied to determine the time of service. The court also considered whether section 710 of the *Local Government Act 1993* expressed a "contrary intention" within the meaning of section 5(2) of the *Interpretation Act 1987*, which would exclude the operation of section 76(1).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. It reasoned that section 710(2)(c) of the *Local Government Act 1993* only prescribed the mode of service by post, not the time at which service was deemed to be effected. Consequently, section 76(1) of the *Interpretation Act 1987* was applicable. The court found that section 710 did not express a contrary intention to section 76(1), meaning the latter provision applied. Section 76(1)(b) presumes service is effected on the fourth working day after posting, unless evidence sufficient to raise doubt is adduced. The court held that the primary judge erred in his interpretation of when evidence sufficient to raise doubt could be relied upon, and that the facts established that the notices were received by the respondent on 4 August 2003, not 6 August.

The Court of Appeal set aside the orders of the primary judge. It declared that the respondent's appeal to the Land and Environment Court was made more than 30 days after service of the rates and charges notice. The court ordered that the respondent's application be dismissed and that the appellant pay the respondent's costs of the summons for leave to appeal and of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Appeal allowed

(2) Orders made by Cowdroy J on 6 February 2004 be set aside

(3) Declare that the respondent's appeal to the Land and Environment Court constituted by the filing of its Application on 3 September 2003 was made more than 30 days after service upon the respondent of the subject rates and charges notice

(4) Order that the Application filed on 3 September 2003 be dismissed

(5) Order the appellant pay the respondent's costs of the summons for leave to appeal and of the appeal

Background

Background to the litigation

Cowdroy J of the Land and Environment Court held that the notice was not served until 6 August 2003, applying the provisions of s 76(1)(b) of the Interpretation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act). It is against that decision that the appellant appeals to this Court.The facts The appellant issued a number of rate notices in the name of the respondent for the rating year 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004. It was common ground that those rate notices were posted on 31 July 2003 by delivering envelopes containing the notices to Kyogle Post Office. The address on the envelopes containing the notices was the respondent's post office box number at Wodenbong Post Office. All envelopes were prepaid. It is relevant to observe that the foregoing facts were established by the affidavit of Mr Arthur Piggott, Director of Corporate Services of the appellant, sworn 18 November 2003. It was further established by the affidavit evidence of Ms Sonia Hoffman, the licensee and operator of the Wodenbong Post Office, that the subject rate notices were received at the post office on 1 August 2003 and, on that date, placed in the respondent's post office box. However, the respondent did not clear its post office box until the following Monday, 4 August 2003, on which date it physically received the notices. On 3 September 2003 the respondent instituted an appeal to the Land and Environment Court purportedly pursuant to s 574(1) of the 1993 Act against the levying of one of the rates on the ground that its land was not rateable thereto. By notice of motion filed 20 November 2003, the appellant sought dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Part 13 rule 5(1) of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (which had been adopted by Part 6 rule 1 of the Land And Environment Court Rules) upon the ground that the appeal was instituted outside the 30 day period prescribed by s 574(3) of the 1993 Act. On 6 February 2004 the primary judge dismissed that notice of motion holding that the appeal had been instituted within time.The relevant statutory regime Pursuant to s 491 of the 1993 Act, a council may obtain income from, inter alia, rates that are either ordinary or special rates: s 492. Special rates are made and levied pursuant to s 495 of the 1993 Act although such a rate relating to water supply is levied pursuant to s 552. We were informed that in the present case the appeal was instituted against a special rate levied pursuant to s 495. However, as it appears that the rate in question was described as the "Muli Muli Water Supply Special Water Rate", it is more probable that it was levied pursuant to s 552. However, nothing turns upon this. Section 546(1) of the 1993 Act provides that:"[a] rate or charge is levied on the land specified in a rates and charges notice by the service of the notice." Section 560(1) provides that the owner for the time being of land on which a rate is levied is liable to pay the rate to the council. Accordingly, the respondent as the owner of the relevant land became liable to pay the subject rate. If the notice was served on or prior to 1 August, then s 552(3) provided that the first instalment of the rates was payable by 31 August whereas, if the notice was not served by 1 August, s 552(4) provided that the relevant instalments were payable by 30 November or "by the day that is 30 days after service of the notice, whichever is the later."

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The respondent's case before the primary judge was that service of the subject rate notice did not occur (to use a neutral term) until the expiration of the fourth working day after the letter containing the notice was posted on 31 July. That day was 6 August. This contention was founded on s 76(1) of the 1987 Act which I also set out in full:"(1)If an Act or instrument authorises or requires any document to be served by post (whether the word 'serve', 'give' or 'send' or any other word is used), service of the document:(a)may be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting a letter containing the document, and(b)in Australia or in an external Territory – is, unless evidence sufficient to raise doubt is adduced to the contrary, taken to have been effected on the fourth working day after the letter was posted, and(c)in another place – is, unless evidence sufficient to raise doubt is adduced to the contrary, taken to have been effected at the time when the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of post."The decision of the primary judge The primary judge held (at [24]) that s 710(2)(c) of the 1993 Act only made provision for service by post and not for the time at which service by that means was deemed or taken to have been effected. In other words, his Honour considered that s 710(2) and, in particular, sub-paragraph (c) thereof, was directed to the mode of service of notices and not to the time of service. Accordingly, it was necessary to look elsewhere in order to determine the date upon which service was effected. The primary judge resolved this issue by reference to s 76(1)(b) of the 1987 Act. Although he was conscious of the provisions of s 5(2) of that Act which provided for the application of the 1987 Act "except insofar as the contrary intention appears … in the Act … concerned", his Honour considered (at [30]) that"since s 710(2)(c) of the [1993] Act does not stipulate the time of service, its provisions do not express a contrary intention to the provisions of s 76(1)(b) of the [1987 Act]." Having found that there was no "contrary intention" within the meaning of s 5(2) of the 1987 Act, the primary judge turned his attention to whether "evidence sufficient to raise doubt [had been] adduced to the contrary"within the meaning of that expression in s 76(1)(b). Having considered that there was nothing in the 1987 Act which suggested the nature of the "doubt" to which reference is made in that expression, his Honour considered that he should draw the inference that the qualification to the presumption could be utilised in instances in which the posted rate notice was, in fact, never received. He thus expressed the view (at [29]) that:"[t]he words in s 76(1)(b) of the [1987] Act 'unless evidence sufficient to raise doubt is adduced to the contrary' is intended to apply to circumstances such as those prevailing before Denning M R." The reference to Lord Denning was to his Lordship's decision in Hewitt v Lester Corporation [1969] 1 WLR 855 where it was held that the presumption raised by the Interpretation Act 1889 (UK) which deemed service to be effected when the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of the post, was rebutted when a letter was returned and marked "gone away".

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established