Kylie Grey v Melbourne City Council T/A North Melbourne Children's Centre

[2017] FWC 4861

[2017] FWC 4861

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.739—Dispute resolution

Kylie Grey
v
Melbourne City Council T/A North Melbourne Children’s Centre
(C2016/6250)

COMMISSIONER BISSETT MELBOURNE, 27 SEPTEMBER 2017

Disputes arising out of an enterprise agreement.

[1] On 19 October 2016 Ms Kylie Grey made an application to the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) seeking that the Commission deal with a dispute pursuant to s.739 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act).The dispute arises under provisions of the Melbourne City Council Enterprise Agreement, 2013 1(the 2013 Agreement).

[2] The dispute relates to the appropriate classification of Ms Grey in accordance with the 2013 Agreement. Ms Grey claims she is entitled to be classified at Class 3 in accordance with clause 21.2.2 of the 2013 Agreement. Melbourne City Council (MCC) does not agree.

Permission

[3] Ms Grey was represented by United Voice in the proceedings.

[4] MCC was granted permission to be represented by a lawyer.

[5] The matter before me requires a consideration of the evolution of the provisions of the 2013 Agreement from the time of the City of Melbourne Award, 1994 2 that then applied to MCC and then through a number of iterations of enterprise agreements. I was satisfied that this created a level of complexity and it was a matter that could be more efficiently dealt with if permission was granted.

[6] For this reason I exercised my discretion and granted permission to MCC.

Factual background

[7] Ms Grey is employed by MCC as Assistant Children’s Services Employee at the North Melbourne Children’s Centre (NMCC). She commenced employment in this role in March 2015.
[8] An Assistant Children’s Services Employee is required to have completed a Certificate III in Children’s Services or equivalent and is required to liaise with, support and follow directions given by the Degree Qualified Children’s Services Educator. 3.

[9] As a part-time Assistant Children’s Services Employee Ms Grey assists Qualified Children’s Services Employees in the running of rooms at NMCC. She primarily provides relief for full-time Assistant Children’s Services Employees during lunch breaks and then from 4.30pm onwards.

[10] Ms Grey is classified as a Class 2 (Level C) employee.

[11] Ms Grey holds a Certificate III in Children’s Services and is currently studying for her Diploma.

[12] MCC also employs diploma Qualified Children’s Services Employees. A Qualified Children’s Services Employee has the “responsibility of leading and actively supporting the development, implementation and assessment of a play-based learning program. In this way, the full time Qualified Children’s Services Educators develops the daily routine, manage staff and lead the general day-to-day running of the room.” 4

[13] Qualified Children’s Services Educators 5 are also the primary point of contact for parents; including communicating with parents about behavioural and developmental issues of their child.

[14] Qualified Children’s Services Educators are required to have a Diploma in Children’s Services or approved equivalent.

Evidence

[15] The evidence put before the Commission is not contentious.

[16] Ms Grey gave evidence as to the steps she took to try and resolve the dispute prior to its referral to the Commission.

[17] Mr Ty Lockwood is an Organiser with the Victorian Branch of the Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union (ASU). He gave evidence for Ms Grey with respect to matters associated with bargaining for the replacement for the 2013 Agreement.

[18] Ms Rebecca Campbell is an Employee Relations Specialist at MCC. She gave evidence for MCC with respect to:

• The steps taken by MCC when Ms Grey raised her dispute;



• The history of the provision now in the 2013 Agreement; and



• Negotiations for the proposed 2016 agreement;

[19] Ms Melissa Hogan is employed as Acting Team Leader for Children’s Services. She gave evidence with respect to:

• Her role in ensuring that the MCC Children’s Centres comply with the requirements of the Education and Care Services National Law Act 2010 (National Law) and the Education and Care Services National Regulations (Regulations) as well as managing budgets and operations of the Centres;



• The specific requirements of the National Law and Regulations with respect to educator to child ratios;



• The Regulation requirement that at least 50% of educators hold, or are working towards, a Diploma level qualification or above with the remaining educators required to hold or be actively working towards completion of a Certificate III:



• Duties of a (Diploma) qualified Children’s Services Educator and of a (Certificate III) Assistant Children’s Services Educator.

[20] Ms Hogan also gave evidence that MCC employs two levels of Early Childhood Educator – Diploma qualified at Class 3 and a Certificate III qualified at Class 2. (These appear to be locally called a “Qualified Children’s Services Employee” and an “Assistant Children’s Services Employee”.)

The 2013 Agreement

[21] A number of provisions of the 2013 Agreement are relevant to the matter before the Commission.

[22] A “Children's Services Employee” is defined in clause 2:

“Children's Services Employee” means an Employee whose duties are performed in connection with the operation of children’s centres, pre-schools, out of school hours and vacation care, conference and work-related childcare provisions or a care programme co-ordinated within a recreation service; such duties may include, without being limited to the conduct of, early childhood programmes (with or without supervision) within community service programmes across the municipality.

[23] Clause 15.4 deals with incremental progression. It provides in part:

15.4.3 A Children’s Services Employee can progress under clause 15.4.1 to Level F of Class 3 only.

[24] Clause 21 deals with classifications and allocation of duties. It relevantly states:

21.2 Classification of positions

21.2.1 Subject to clause 21.2.2, an Employee shall be appointed to a position within one of the Classes 1 to 7, in accordance with the definitions contained in Schedule F.

21.2.2 Upon commencement of employment with Council:

21.2.2.1 a Tradesperson will commence at Class 3 and will, at Council’s discretion, have a salary range between Level A and Level C of Class 3;

21.2.2.2 a Children’s Services Employee will commence at Class 3 and will, at Council’s discretion, have a salary range between Level A and Level F of Class 3; and

21.2.2.3 a four year Degree Employee will commence at a salary not less than Level E of Class 3.

[25] Clause 53.15 deals with infectious diseases leave. It states, in part:

53.15 Infectious disease leave

A Children’s Services Employee employed by Council who contracts an infectious disease through contact in his/her workplace shall be entitled to paid leave…

[26] Schedule F to the 2013 Agreement contains details of the classification standards which apply to each Class of position.

[27] With respect to Class 2 positions the classification of positions provisions state, in part:

Skills, Knowledge and Experience

• Little or no prior experience is required - experience and knowledge will develop with time in role



• On-the-job training will be provided for tasks



• At entry, some positions will require certificate training; as employees progress through the class skills may be acquired through recognised industry-based training [emphasis added]



• Roles may require a level of technology literacy

[28] Of Class 3 positions the classification standards provide, in part:

Skills, Knowledge and Experience

• Requires general education standards that combine secondary school education with some previous experience and/or particular knowledge or skills of procedures and practices



• Typically requires completion or progression towards the completion of a relevant certificate course or other equivalent course, or relevant on-the-job training and relevant experience [emphasis added]



• Roles require a level of technology literacy

Jurisdiction

[29] Clause 11.2 of the dispute settlement procedure of the 2013 Agreement states:

Disputes Concerning Matters Arising under this Agreement or the National Employment Standards

11.2 A grievance or issue arising between Council and an Employee about a matter arising under this Agreement or the National Employment Standards (except a dispute about whether Council had reasonable business grounds under subsection 65(5) or 76(4) of the Act) shall be dealt with in accordance with the following procedure:

11.2.1 STEP ONE: the Employee or Employees shall discuss the grievance or dispute with their immediate supervisor;

11.2.2 STEP TWO: if the grievance or dispute is not resolved at step one, the Employee(s) may refer the matter to the Human Resources Branch of Council;

11.2.3 STEP THREE: if the matter remains unresolved, the parties to the dispute may agree that they will refer the matter to mediation with a mutually agreed mediator. The mediator must be satisfied that the parties have genuinely attempted to resolve the matters in dispute in accordance with steps one and two of this clause before proceeding with the mediation;

11.2.4 STEP FOUR: if the parties are unable to successfully resolve the matters in dispute in accordance with this clause or the parties are unable to agree to a mediator, either party may refer the matter to the FWC for determination by conciliation, or if necessary, arbitration. The FWC shall have regard to the parties' compliance with the procedures set out in this clause, before proceeding unless the parties have consented to waive all or some of steps 1 to 3 in the circumstances of the particular matter. Subject to any agreement between the parties in relation to a particular dispute or grievance and the provisions of this clause 11.2.4, in dealing with a dispute or grievance through conciliation or arbitration, the FWC may exercise those powers set out in Division 3 of Part 5-1 the Act.

[30] Ms Grey is employed in Children’s Services and said that she should be classified as a Class 3 in accordance with clause 21.2.2 of the 2013 Agreement. MCC disagree and say she is properly classified at Class 2.
[31] It is not in dispute that Ms Grey has taken appropriate steps to try and resolve the matter in dispute in accordance with the dispute settlement procedure.

[32] I am therefore satisfied that the dispute is about a matter arising under the Agreement.

[33] I am satisfied that matter has been dealt with in accordance with steps one to four of clause 11.2 of the 2013 agreement and it is therefore properly before the Commission.

[34] I am also satisfied that the Commission has jurisdiction to deal with the dispute.

Relevant legal principles

[35] This dispute turns on the interpretation of provisions of the 2013 Agreement.

[36] The principles relevant to such a task were set out in the decision of the Full Bench in The Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Golden Cockeral Pty Limited 6 (Golden Cockeral). In that decision the Full Bench summarised the principles relevant to the interpretation of Agreement.

[37] The principles in Golden Cockerel were further considered and refined in the decision of the Full Bench in Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries’ Union” known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (AMWU) v Berri Pty Limited 7 (Berri). In that decision the Full Bench said:

[114] The principles relevant to the task of construing a single enterprise agreement may be summarised as follows:

1. The construction of an enterprise agreement, like that of a statute or contract, begins with a consideration of the ordinary meaning of the relevant words. The resolution of a disputed construction of an agreement will turn on the language of the agreement having regard to its context and purpose. Context might appear from:

(i) the text of the agreement viewed as a whole;

(ii) the disputed provision’s place and arrangement in the agreement;

(iii) the legislative context under which the agreement was made and in which it operates.

2. The task of interpreting an agreement does not involve rewriting the agreement to achieve what might be regarded as a fair or just outcome. The task is always one of interpreting the agreement produced by parties.

3. The common intention of the parties is sought to be identified objectively, that is by reference to that which a reasonable person would understand by the language the parties have used to express their agreement, without regard to the subjective intentions or expectations of the parties.

4. The fact that the instrument being construed is an enterprise agreement made pursuant to Part 2-4 of the FW Act is itself an important contextual consideration. It may be inferred that such agreements are intended to establish binding obligations.

5. The FW Act does not speak in terms of the ‘parties’ to enterprise agreements made pursuant to Part 2-4 agreements, rather it refers to the persons and organisations who are ‘covered by’ such agreements. Relevantly s.172(2)(a) provides that an employer may make an enterprise agreement ‘with the employees who are employed at the time the agreement is made and who will be covered by the agreement’. Section 182(1) provides that an agreement is ‘made’ if the employees to be covered by the agreement ‘have been asked to approve the agreement and a majority of those employees who cast a valid vote approve the agreement’. This is so because an enterprise agreement is ‘made’ when a majority of the employees asked to approve the agreement cast a valid vote to approve the agreement.

6. Enterprise agreements are not instruments to which the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) applies, however the modes of textual analysis developed in the general law may assist in the interpretation of enterprise agreements. An overly technical approach to interpretation should be avoided and consequently some general principles of statutory construction may have less force in the context of construing an enterprise agreement.

7. In construing an enterprise agreement it is first necessary to determine whether an agreement has a plain meaning or it is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning.

8. Regard may be had to evidence of surrounding circumstances to assist in determining whether an ambiguity exists.

9. If the agreement has a plain meaning, evidence of the surrounding circumstances will not be admitted to contradict the plain language of the agreement.

10. If the language of the agreement is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning then evidence of the surrounding circumstance will be admissible to aid the interpretation of the agreement.

11. The admissibility of evidence of the surrounding circumstances is limited to evidence tending to establish objective background facts which were known to both parties which inform the subject matter of the agreement. Evidence of such objective facts is to be distinguished from evidence of the subjective intentions of the parties, such as statements and actions of the parties which are reflective of their actual intentions and expectations.

12. Evidence of objective background facts will include:

(i) evidence of prior negotiations to the extent that the negotiations tend to establish objective background facts known to all parties and the subject matter of the agreement;

(ii) notorious facts of which knowledge is to be presumed; and

(iii) evidence of matters in common contemplation and constituting a common assumption.

13. The diversity of interests involved in the negotiation and making of enterprise agreements (see point 4 above) warrants the adoption of a cautious approach to the admission and reliance upon the evidence of prior negotiations and the positions advanced during the negotiation process. Evidence as to what the employees covered by the agreement were told (either during the course of the negotiations or pursuant to s.180(5) of the FW Act) may be of more assistance than evidence of the bargaining positions taken by the employer or a bargaining representative during the negotiation of the agreement.

14. Admissible extrinsic material may be used to aid the interpretation of a provision in an enterprise agreement with a disputed meaning, but it cannot be used to disregard or rewrite the provision in order to give effect to an externally derived conception of what the parties’ intention or purpose was.

15. In the industrial context it has been accepted that, in some circumstances, subsequent conduct may be relevant to the interpretation of an industrial instrument. But such post-agreement conduct must be such as to show that there has been a meeting of minds, a consensus. Post-agreement conduct which amounts to little more than the absence of a complaint or common inadvertence is insufficient to establish a common understanding.

[38] The Full Bench of the Commission in United Firefighters Union of Australia v Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority T/A ESTA 8 said:

[35] As stipulated in Berri, the starting point for interpreting an enterprise agreement is to have regard to the ordinary meaning of the words used. Further, the text must be interpreted in the context of the agreement as a whole. Principles 7 and 10 elicited in Berri emphasise that ambiguity in a provision within an enterprise agreement must be identified before one is to have regard to evidence of the surrounding circumstances. However, principle 8 makes it clear that, in determining whether ambiguity exists, one may have regard to evidence of the surrounding circumstances. That is, such evidence can be used to identify and resolve any ambiguity.

[39] The consideration of the surrounding circumstances is limited to “evidence tending to establish objective background facts which were known to both parties which inform the subject matter of the agreement.” 9

[40] I am satisfied that, in making the 2013 Agreement, the parties knew of the history of the provision as established by earlier agreement and awards. I am also satisfied that the parties were aware of the National Law and Regulations that apply in the sector.

[41] I accept that the 2013 Agreement was an agreement reached between the employer and employees. Nevertheless I am satisfied that employees in children services are aware of the regulated environment within which they work.

[42] For these reasons I am satisfied that I may have regard to the history of the provisions in the Agreement (that is, past agreements and awards) and National Law and Regulations for the sector to assist in determining if ambiguity or uncertainty exists in relation to the classification of Children’s Services Employees at MCC.

[43] In determining if there is ambiguity or uncertainty the provision in dispute must be considered in context of the 2013 Agreement as a whole. It is not enough to consider the wording of clause 21.2.2 in isolation of other classification provisions of the Agreement.

Application of relevant legal principles to the 2013 Agreement

[44] MCC provided a detailed chronology of the development of the provisions in relation to the classification of Children’s Services Employees. 10 This history was not disputed by United Voice.

[45] Prior to 1994, employment at MCC was regulated by two awards – the Municipal Officers’ (Melbourne City Council) Award 1955 11 (covering “white collar” workers) and the Municipal Employees (Melbourne City Council) Award 197312 (“blue collar” workers). Children’s Services Employees were covered by the 1973 award.

[46] The City Of Melbourne Award, 1994 13 (the 1994 Award) replaced the two earlier Awards. It had four parts. Part 1 in effect replaced the 1955 Award, Part 2 replaced the 1973 Award, Part 3 applied to metal trades employees, and Part 4 contained general conditions.

[47] Children’s Services Employees were therefore covered by Part 2 of the 1994 Award.

[48] The 1994 Award defined Children's Services Employees as those who perform duties “in connection with the operation of Children’s Centres, Pre Schools, Out of School Hours and Vacation Care, conference and work related child care provision or a care programme co-ordinated within a recreation service.” 14

[49] The definition of a Children’s Services Employees has not materially changed since the 1994 Award.

[50] The 1994 Award also provided position descriptors for Band 2 and Band 3 positions and of the respective knowledge levels states:

Band 2 position:

Little or no experience is required to perform a broader range of routine tasks.

Skills will be acquired through secondary education, recognised industry-based training course(s), on-the-job training or their equivalent

Band 3 position:

The level of skills and knowledge in routine through to complex operations required for entry into this band will have been attained through:

(i) the completion of a trade/TAPE 15 course; or

(ii) equivalent recognised industry based training course; or

(iii) equivalent on the job training; and

(iv) relevant experience.

[51] A Children’s Services Employee with formal qualifications under the 1994 Award was therefore classified at Band 3. 16 The qualification was a Diploma. An unqualified Children’s Services Employee would, by virtue of the position classification definitions be classified at Band 2.17

[52] Even if Children's Services Employees were covered under Part 1 of the 1994 Award a qualification beyond secondary school is also required for Class 3 positions in that Part.

[53] In 1996 the MCC and relevant unions negotiated the first enterprise agreement being the Melbourne City Council Enterprise Agreement 1996 18(the 1996 Agreement). It sought, amongst other things, to simplify the classification structure by creating a uniform classification structure that applied to all Council employees.

[54] A Band 2 position under Part 2 of the 1994 Award translated to a Class 2 under the 1996 Agreement and a Band 3 position under Part 2 of the 1994 Award translated to a Class 3, Level A-C in the 1996 Agreement. (A Band 4 translated to Class 3 levels D-F.)

[55] MCC put, and I accept, that given the basis of classifications and translation under the 1994 Award, those Children’s Services Employees who translated to Class 3 Levels A-C were the diploma qualified Children’s Services Employees.

[56] This translation was reflected in clause 23.1.3 of the 1996 Agreement which provided:

23.1.3 (a) A position that would have been classified at Band 3 under Part 2 of the Award shall have a salary range of Level A to Level C inclusive of Class 3 under clause 21.

(b) A position that would have been classified at Band 4 under Part 2 of the Award shall have a salary range of Level D to Level F inclusive of Class 3 under clause 21.

[57] This translation is supported by the classification descriptors contained in the 1996 Agreement that specify no formal qualifications were required for Class 2 position 19 whilst a Class 3 position required progress towards the completion of an approved TAFE Certificate course.20

[58] In 2001 the 1994 Award was subject to the award simplification process under the Workplace Relations Act 1996. The basis for the classification structure in the resulting Melbourne City Council Award 2001 21 (the 2001 Award) was the classification structure in the 1996 Agreement.22

[59] Drafting notes for the 2001 Award 23 indicate that clause 23.1.3 (above) of the 1996 Agreement was re-drafted to what became clause 19.1.3 of the 2001 Award24 which stated:

19.1.3 Upon commencement of employment with council:

19.1.3(a) a tradesperson or a children’s services employee will commence at class 3 and will, at council’s discretion, have a salary range between level A and level C of class 3…

[60] This provision did not contain any differentiation between a Children’s Services Employee with or without a diploma qualification and lost the essential qualities of clause 23.1.3 which was in relation to translation arrangements and which differentiated between all employees (including Children’s Services Employees then classified at Band 3) .

[61] The National Law and Regulations in relation to the industry came into effect in about 2010. They do, amongst other things, establish qualification requirements of Children’s Services Employees and the ratio of qualified and non-qualified staff to children in care. The ratios require that at least 50% of educators hold a diploma qualification or above.

[62] MCC submits that the classification distinction between diploma qualified Children’s Services Employees and other Children’s Services Employees is long standing and is widely maintained. 25 It is also reflected in the Children’s Services Award 201026 (the 2010 Award) which provides for a classification differentiation between Diploma qualified and Certificate III qualified children’s services employees.

[63] MCC submits that this history, along with a generic description in the 2013 Agreement (and earlier agreements and awards) of a Children’s Services Employee demonstrates ambiguity and uncertainty in the 2013 Agreement.

[64] I am satisfied that there has been a historical differentiation in classification of Children’s Services Employees based on the qualification held by those employees. It is apparent through some re-drafting of clauses over time. It is a distinction brought back to the fore in the 2010 Award.

[65] The 2013 Agreement also contains restrictions on the classification of Children’s Services Employees. Clause 15.4.3 of the 2013 Agreement states:

15.4.3 A Children's Services Employee can progress under clause 15.4.1 to Level F of Class 3 only.

[66] If an Assistant Children’s Services Employee (with a Certificate III qualification) is classified at Class 3 and no Children’s Services Employee (regardless of qualification) can progress beyond a Class 3 Level F, an Assistant Children’s Services Employee would be classified at the same Class and Level as a Diploma Qualified Children’s Services Employee. This would provide no incentive for any Assistant Children’s Services Employee to undertake Diploma studies, may jeopardise the ability of Children’s Centres to meet the National Law and Regulation requirements, and would therefore impact on the ability of MCC to provide children’s services.

[67] It would be an absurd outcome if an employee remained on the same rate of pay even though they have attained a higher level qualification and took on additional responsibilities associated with those qualifications. It further makes no sense within the context of the National Law and Regulations to meet appropriate staff to children ratios.

[68] Even if regard was not had to the history of classification of Children’s Services Employees in past agreements and awards, clause 15.4.3 and its implications suggests uncertainty and ambiguity in classification of Children’s Services Employees under the 2013 Agreement and the application of the classification standards within that Agreement.

[69] United Voice, in its submissions on behalf of Ms Grey relied on the decision in Golden Cockeral where the Full Bench said “If the agreement has a plain meaning, evidence of surrounding circumstances will not be admitted to contradict the plain language of the agreement.” 27 United Voice then said clause 21.2 has a plain meaning.

[70] What United Voice has erroneously sought to do is consider the words of clause 21.2 in isolation of other aspects of the 2013 Agreement. It is the agreement which must have plain meaning, not some selected words or a selected clause. The clause in question exists in a broader context and this must be considered in determining if ambiguity or uncertainty exists and considering the intent of the words in the clause.

[71] United Voice also suggest that the classification detailed in Schedule F of the 2013 Agreement should be read down by the specific provisions of clause 21.2. Such submissions do not assist in determining if the 2013 Agreement has ambiguity or uncertainty. The clauses must be read in the context of an agreement that, amongst other things, provides for the employment of employees to work in children’s services in accordance with the Agreement and the requirements of regulations governing the industry.

[72] Whilst I have some sympathy for the view expressed by United Voice the 2013 Agreement does not have a plain meaning when read as a whole – that is when clause 21.2.2 is read in context.

[73] I have carefully considered all of the submissions and evidence put before the Commission in this matter. When considering the context of the 2013 Agreement as a whole – including the restrictions in clause 15.4.3, the broader context of the history of Children's Services Employee provisions from the 1994 Award until the 2013 Agreement, and in particular the basis of the classification at Class 3 and in the context of the National Law and Regulations, I am satisfied that the objective background facts support a finding that the 2013 Agreement is uncertain or ambiguous in relation to the classification of Children’s Services Employees.

[74] I am not satisfied that this ambiguity is in anyway resolved when the definition of a Children’s Services Employees is considered. As I have found above, the definition of a Children’s Services Employee has not materially changed since at least 1994. The definition does not assist United Voice. The definition is broad in nature and it has application only in a broader context. It needs to be read in reference to a particular clause and cannot, of itself, define the remainder of the 2013 Agreement.

[75] Ambiguity or uncertainty does exist in terms of the correct classification of an Assistant Children's Services Employee. I am satisfied that I may rely on the material as outlined above to resolve the said uncertainty. On the basis of the material before me I am satisfied that the intent of the 2013 Agreement is that an Assistant Children’s Services Employee should be classified at Class 2.

[76] My conclusions as to the uncertainty and the intent of the 2013 Agreement is supported by (but not based on) the classification descriptors in the 2010 Award and by the finalisation of the replacement agreement for the 2013 Agreement which clarifies the distinction between classifications for diploma qualified Children’s Services Employees and Assistance Children’s Services Employees. The 2016 agreement, in this respect, appears to have been finalised without rancour.

Conclusion

[77] For the reasons given above I am not satisfied that Ms Grey has a claim to be classified as a Class 3 based on the provisions of clause 21.2.2 of the 2013 Agreement.

[78] This is not to say that Ms Grey might not have a claim to be classified at Class 3 on some other basis but that is not the issue before the Commission.

[79] The application is therefore dismissed.

COMMISSIONER

Appearances:

B.Lyons on behalf of the Applicant.

M. Nicolazzo and A. Huggins on behalf of Melbourne City Council.

Hearing details:

2017.

Melbourne

July 28.

 1   AE405883.

 2   C0569.

 3   Exhibit MCC3, attachment B.

 4   Exhibit MCC3, paragraph 19.

 5   “educators” and “employees” seems to be used interchangeably.

 6   [2014] FWCFB 7447.

 7   [2017] FWCFB 3005.

 8   [2017] FWCFB 4537.

 9   [2017] FWCFB 3005 at [114] subparagraph 11.

 10   Exhibit MCC4, paragraphs 19-33.

 11 A4517, 82 CAR 219.

 12 M059, (1947) 58 CAR 1057.

 13   C0569.

 14   Ibid, Part 4, clause 2.1.2.

 15   While no submissions were put regarding this I am of the view that this should read “TAFE” and this was a typographical error in the 1994 Award.

 16   Exhibit MCC4, paragraph 25.

 17   Ibid.

 18   M1493.

 19   Ibid, clause 23.2.2.

 20   Ibid, clause 23.2.3.

 21   AW808991.

 22   Exhibit MCC4, paragraph 29.

 23   Exhibit MCC4, paragraph 30 and Annexure L.

 24   The clause was originally numbered 19.1.2 but was varied to clause 19.1.3 by PR952235, 11 October 2004.

 25   Exhibit MCC3, paragraph 29.

 26   MA000120.

 27   [2014] FWCFB 7447 at [41].

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

<Price code C, PR596188>