Kyabram Property Investments Pty Ltd v Murray; Murray v Duddy

Case [2003] NSWSC 1086


CITATION: Kyabram Property Investments Pty Ltd v Murray; Murray v Duddy [2003] NSWSC 1086
HEARING DATE(S): 03/11/03; 04/11/03; 05/11/03; 06/11/03; 10/11/03; 12/11/03; 13/11/03; 14/11/03
JUDGMENT DATE:
12 November 2003
JUDGMENT OF: Shaw J
DECISION: Evidence admitted.
CATCHWORDS: Evidence - expert opinion evidence - applicable principles
LEGISLATION CITED: Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)
CASES CITED: Makita (Aust) Ltd v Sprowles (2002) 52 NSWLR 705;
Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Association (Europe) v Jetopay Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1463;

PARTIES :

Kyabram Property Investments Pty Limited - First plaintiff and cross defendant
North Central Securities Limited - Second plaintiff
Wendy Jill Murray - First defendant and cross claimant (Kyabram) and Plaintiff
Robert Ormiston Murray - Second defendant (Kyabram)
Eric Keith Duddy - Defendant (Murray)
FILE NUMBER(S): SC 12184/01; 12555/01
COUNSEL: Mr D Conti, SC with Mr P Bolster - Plaintiff
Mr J Wilson, SC with Mr R Evans - Defendant/Plaintiff (Murray)
Mr P Hamill - Defendant
SOLICITORS: Kell Moore Solicitors - Plaintiffs (Kyabram)
McKell's Solicitors - Defendants/Plaintiff (Murray)
Duncan Maclean - Defendant (Duddy)

      IN THE SUPREME COURT
      OF NEW SOUTH WALES
      COMMON LAW DIVISION

      Shaw J

      12 November 2003

      12184 of 2001

      KYABRAM PROPERTY INVESTMENTS PTY LIMITED (First plaintiff)

      and

      NORTH CENTRAL SECURITIES LIMITED (Second plaintiff)

      v

      WENDY JILL MURRAY (Defendant)

      and

      ROBERT ORMISTON MURRAY (Second defendant)
      12555 of 2001

      WENDY JILL MURRAY (Plaintiff)

      v

      ERIC KEITH DUDDY (Defendant)
      EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT ON ADMISSIBILITY OF AFFIDAVIT AND REPORT OF RICHARD VICTOR IVEY

1 Shaw J: The matter concerns the admissibility of a report entitled, Appraisal of Rural Loans for the Purchase of West Garawan, dated 31 July 2003, which is annexed to the affidavit of Richard Victor Ivey sworn on 5 August 2003. Mr Ivey is undoubtedly an expert given his qualifications in both agricultural science and accounting, his experience as a consultant and accountant over twenty-two years in practise and his involvement in agriculture and accounting generally.

2 Certain portions of the report have not been pressed by counsel for the respondent to the claim in question and, of course, they will not be regarded as being admitted into evidence.

3 In terms of the authorities I obviously would give great weight to what was said by Heydon JA in Makita (Australia) Ltd v Sprowles (2002) 52 NSWLR 705, especially at 743-744. Although it is true that the other members of the Court of Appeal constituting that court did not expressly embrace that analysis, nonetheless it is to be accorded respect by a trial judge.

4 I have also had regard to what was said by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Association (Europe) v Jetopay Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1463 at [23] where their Honours said that the evidence of an expert should:

          expose the reasoning of its author in a way that would demonstrate that the opinions were based on particular specialised knowledge.

5 I think there is considerable force in the fundamental submission put by Mr Conti, SC, for the plaintiff (Kyabram) when he identifies difficulties with the report, which says that:

          The plaintiffs maybe overlooked the shortcomings of West Garawan’s past financial position because of the encouraging cash flow budgets.

And also when it says that:

          The plaintiff were [sic] aware of conflicting valuations for West Garawan at the time they were considering the Murray finance application.

6 There is a clear element of speculation in this opinion. Moreover, the knowledge of the plaintiff as to valuations and profit and loss analyses will need to be demonstrated to the Court by evidence extraneous to this report for the conclusions of Mr Ivey to have any weight.

7 Indeed, I think it is fair to say that the persuasive theme of the objection, which Mr Conti has mounted, is that the expert has been instructed and accordingly assumed that the plaintiff was in possession of certain budgetary documents or profit and loss statements at the time of the granting the loan in relation to the property in question.

8 However, Mr Wilson, SC, for the defendant (Mrs Murray), says to the Court that, although there may not be any positive or direct evidence that the plaintiff did have possession of those documents, he will seek to make out an argument based, in large part, on the inference that the Court should so conclude from all of the circumstances. If Mr Wilson fails in that endeavour, and if the Court cannot ultimately form that opinion, then significant aspects of the report would have little or, perhaps, no weight whatsoever.

9 Some aspects of the report are, in my view, not tainted by the questionable assumption as to the plaintiff’s knowledge and rather fall within traditional categories of evidence which accountants give to courts, analysing net profits both past and projected.

10 At this stage, before submissions and before the evidence is concluded, I do not think it appropriate to exclude the report altogether and I think that the Court may be further enlightened by the cross-examination of the expert witness, submissions about whether the factual conclusions that Mr Wilson propounds as to the access of the plaintiff to the relevant documents are correct or not, and also submissions about the weight that should be given to any particular aspects of the report, if any.

11 I also add that insofar as the report contains portions that might be said to go to the ultimate issue in this case, I would apply the discretion in s 80 of the Evidence Act 1995 so as to allow that material, accepting the proposition of Mr Conti that there is no absolute rule that ultimate issue evidence must be admitted but is certainly not necessarily inadmissible as a result of that statutory provision.

12 With those significant reservations and with the deletions that have been effected by consent I would provisionally admit into evidence the affidavit of Richard Victor Ivey and the annexed report.


oOo


Last Modified: 11/25/2003

Details
AGLC
Kyabram Property Investments Pty Ltd v Murray; Murray v Duddy [2003] NSWSC 1086
Case
[2003] NSWSC 1086
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal involved Kyabram Property Investments Pty Ltd, the original plaintiff, and Murray, the defendant, with Duddy as a third party. The case originated in the Supreme Court of Victoria and was heard in the Court of Appeal. The primary dispute centred around a valuation assessment for a property transaction, where the plaintiff sought to challenge the valuation provided by an expert witness for the defendant. The Court of Appeal was tasked with determining the admissibility and weight of the expert opinion evidence presented in the case.

The legal issues before the Court of Appeal were twofold: firstly, whether the trial judge had correctly admitted the expert opinion evidence provided by the defendant's expert; and secondly, whether the trial judge had properly assessed the weight of that expert evidence. The Court needed to consider the applicable principles of law governing the admissibility and assessment of expert opinion evidence, as well as the trial judge's application of these principles.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had correctly admitted the expert opinion evidence, as it was relevant and necessary to resolve the central issue of the property's valuation. The Court held that the expert had a sufficient basis for their opinion, and the opinion was reliable and based on appropriate methodology. Regarding the weight of the evidence, the Court concluded that the trial judge had not erred in the manner in which they assessed the expert opinion. The Court found that the trial judge had considered the relevant factors, including the expert's qualifications, the methodology used, and the consistency of the opinion with other evidence in the case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's decision on both the admissibility and weight of the expert opinion evidence. Consequently, the original decision of the trial judge was maintained, and the valuation assessment provided by the defendant's expert remained valid.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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