Kunwar (Migration) [2021] AATA 3277 (20 August 2021)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
APPLICANTS: Ms Rupa Kunwar
Mr Ram Lal GurungCASE NUMBER: 2106579
HOME AFFAIRS REFERENCE(S): BCC2020/2530531
MEMBER:Antonio Dronjic
DATE:20 August 2021
PLACE OF DECISION: Melbourne
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision to cancel the first named applicant’s Subclass 482 – Temporary Skill Shortage visa.
The Tribunal has no jurisdiction with respect to the second named applicant.
Statement made on 20 August 2021 at 3:16pm
CATCHWORDS
MIGRATION – cancellation – Temporary Skill Shortage (Class GK) visa – Subclass 482 (Temporary Skill Shortage) – failure to commence employment within 90 days – death of father and mental health – no contact to sponsoring business or employment at any time – discretion to cancel visa – visa ceased in any case – possibility of applying for new visa – automatic cancellation of second applicant’s visa – decision under review affirmed for first applicant, no jurisdiction for second applicantLEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 116(1)(b), (3), 140(1), 348
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), r 2.12, Schedule 4, criterion 4013, Schedule 8, condition 8607(4)CASES
Alimi v Minister for Immigration [2007] FMCA 1520
Chow v MIMIA [2002] FCA 1459
Durzi v MIMIA [2006] FCA 1767
Lobo v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 168
Moller v MIAC [2007] FMCA 168
Rani v MIMA (1997) 80 FCR 379
Re Drake (No. 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634
Sakhno v MIAC [2007] FMCA 1492
Tien v MIMA (1998) 89 FCR 80
Vishnumolakala v Minister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 1209STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
This is an application for review of a decision dated 13 May 2021 made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs to cancel the first named applicant’s (the applicant) Subclass 482 – Temporary Skill Shortage visa under s 116 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
The delegate cancelled the visa under s 116(1)(b) on the basis that the applicant breached condition 8607(4) as she failed to commence employment at the sponsoring business within 90 days after she arrived in Australia. The issue in the present case is whether that ground for cancellation is made out, and if so, whether the visa should be cancelled.
For the purposes of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under s 348 of the Act, the only decision that is before the Tribunal is the decision with respect to the first named applicant. The second named applicant’s visa was automatically cancelled as a consequence of that cancellation, not by a decision but by force of the operation of s 140(1) of the Act which made the cancellation of the second named applicant’s visa self-executing on the cancellation of the first named applicant’s visa: see Rani & Ors v MIMA (1997) 80 FCR 379 at 385, 393, 400; Tien & Ors v MIMA (1998) 89 FCR 80 at 96. As no decision was involved in the visa cancellation under s 140(1), the Tribunal has no jurisdiction with respect to the second named applicant.
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether the ground for cancellation under section 116(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was made out, and if so, whether the discretion to cancel the visa should be exercised. Specifically, the Tribunal had to determine if the applicant had complied with condition 8607(4) of her visa, which required her to commence work within 90 days of arrival in Australia, given she was offshore when the visa was granted. The Tribunal also considered the applicant's submissions regarding her father's death and mental health challenges, and whether these circumstances warranted a decision not to cancel the visa.
The Tribunal found that the applicant had not complied with condition 8607(4) as she had not commenced employment with the sponsoring business by the time of the hearing, which was well over 90 days after her arrival. Consequently, the ground for cancellation under section 116(1)(b) was satisfied. In exercising its discretion, the Tribunal acknowledged the applicant's personal circumstances but found that the purpose of the visa was to work, and the applicant had not commenced employment despite being in Australia for almost two years. The Tribunal also noted that the visa would have ceased on 16 July 2021 in any event. The Tribunal concluded that the reasons for cancelling the visa outweighed the reasons for not cancelling it.
The Tribunal affirmed the decision to cancel the first applicant's Subclass 482 visa. The Tribunal further held that it had no jurisdiction with respect to the second applicant, whose visa cancellation was a self-executing consequence of the first applicant's visa cancellation under section 140(1) of the Act.
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Background
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Evidence
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For these reasons, the Tribunal is satisfied that the ground for cancellation in s 116(1)(b) exists. As that ground does not require mandatory cancellation under s 116(3), the Tribunal must proceed to consider whether the power to cancel the visa should be exercised.Consideration of discretion There are no matters specified in the Act or Regulations that must be considered in the exercise of this discretion. The Tribunal has had regard to the circumstances of this case, including matters raised by the applicant, and matters in the Department’s Procedures Advice Manual (PAM3) ‘General visa cancellation powers’. The Tribunal acknowledges that, whilst it may be guided by policy, it is not bound to follow it.[1] Specifically, the Courts have held that the PAM3 guidelines constitute no more than an administrative advisory guide to decision makers in relation to the application of the Act and Regulations and that they are incapable of being elevated into legally necessary or relevant considerations. Indeed, there is judicial authority to the effect that the policy guidelines in PAM3 cannot go beyond the wording of the legislation, even where they are favourable to an applicant.[2][1] See Brennan, J. in Re Drake (No. 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634.[2] See Chow v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1459; Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 168; Vishnumolakala v Minister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 1209; Alimi v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2007] FMCA 1520; Durzi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 1767 at [49]; Moller v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 168 at [14]; and Sakhno v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 1492 at [55]. Nevertheless, the Tribunal considers that the policy guidelines in PAM3 provide a useful starting point in respect of the exercise of its discretion. In considering this matter, the Tribunal has also taken into account the submissions and evidence it received from the applicant.The purpose of the visa holder’s travel to and stay in Australia The Tribunal finds that the purpose of the applicant’s stay in Australia was to work as a software engineer on a temporary basis. The applicant never commenced employment at the sponsoring business. She remained in Australia for almost two years since arriving in September 2019. Despite not being prevented to do so, she did not work in Australia. Based on the evidence before it, including the applicant’s oral evidence, the Tribunal finds that, as of the day of the Tribunal’s hearing, the applicant is not employed by an Australian business which is an approved standard business sponsor and which has successfully nominated the applicant for a position within the business. The Tribunal further finds that the applicant’s Subclass 482 visa would, but for the cancellation, have ceased on 16 July 2021 in any case. It follows that it is no longer possible to reinstate her Subclass 482 visa.