Kuhn and Repatriation Commission (Veterans' entitlements) [2022] AATA 2151 (5 July 2022)
AppID: Kuhn and Repatriation Commission
MatterType: Veterans’ entitlements
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2020/3297
Re:Glenda Kuhn
APPLICANT
AndRepatriation Commission
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Deputy President J Sosso
Date:5 July 2022
Place:Brisbane
The Tribunal finds that the Applicant did not enter into a de facto relationship after the death of the Veteran, and is not precluded by the operation of s 13(8) of the Veterans’ Entitlement Act 1986 (Cth) from seeking a review of the reviewable decision.
.................SGD.......................................................
Deputy President J Sosso
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS’ AFFAIRS — war widow’s pension — eligibility — whether Applicant is a dependant — whether Applicant entered into a de facto relationship after Veteran’s death — Applicant did not enter into a de facto relationship after death of Veteran
LEGISLATION
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth)
Veterans’ Entitlement Act 1986 (Cth)
War Pensions Act 1914 (Cth)
CASES
Alirezai and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011] AATA 655
Bruce and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 39 ALD 473
Dietman and Repatriation Commission [2019] AATA 4428
Pelka v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2006) 151 FCR 546
Reid and Secretary, Department of Social Security [1995] AATA 304
Secretary, Department of Social Security and Marshall [1991] AATA 91
Staunton-Smith v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1991) 32 FCR 164
Ward and Secretary, Department of Social Security [1985] AATA 385
Zablotsky and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2020] AATA 374
REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President J Sosso
5 July 2022
INTRODUCTION
Ms Glenda Kuhn (the Applicant) applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) for a review of a decision of the Veterans’ Review Board (the Board) of 17 March 2020, which affirmed an earlier decision of the Repatriation Commission (the Commission) of 3 September 2019, that the death of Mr Anthony Kuhn (the Veteran) was not war-caused, and that accordingly, the Applicant was not eligible for be paid the war widow’s pension under the Veterans’ Entitlement Act 1986 (Cth) (the Act).
The Veteran served in the Royal Australian Air Force from 15 April 1966 to 2 April 1971 and rendered operational service in Vietnam between 20 April 1968 until 16 April 1969 – Exhibit 11 ST01 214 – 215.
The Applicant married the Veteran on 12 December 1970.
On 17 April 1988, the Veteran was killed in a fatal aeroplane accident in Brisbane. Two other persons were also killed in the accident.
The Applicant lodged a claim for the war widow’s pension on 9 August 2019.
A Hearing to determine the claim was convened in Brisbane on 11 May 2022. The Applicant appeared and gave testimony. During cross-examination by Ms Kate Slack of Counsel, appearing on behalf of the Commission, questions were asked about the Applicant’s relationship with men following the death of the Veteran.
When questioned about the relevance of this line of questioning, Ms Slack drew the Tribunal’s attention to s 13(8) of the Act, which relevantly…
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- Case
- [2022] AATA 2151
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the Tribunal was to determine whether the Applicant and KB were in a de facto relationship during the period they resided together in KB's home. This determination required the Tribunal to consider the indicia outlined in section 11A of the relevant legislation, while also delving into the subjective reality and perception of the relationship between the parties.
The Tribunal reasoned that while several factors pointed towards a de facto relationship, including cohabitation for a prolonged period, sharing a bedroom, a sexual relationship, shared meals, joint holidays, and the joint purchase of a vehicle, these were not determinative in isolation. Crucially, the Tribunal found no evidence of a significant pooling of financial resources, noting that the Applicant and KB operated independently financially. Furthermore, the Applicant's testimony indicated that KB had made it clear he was not seeking a committed relationship and had not discussed his financial affairs with her. The Tribunal placed significant weight on the Applicant's candid and credible testimony, concluding that neither party perceived themselves as being in a de facto relationship.
Ultimately, the Tribunal concluded that the evidence did not establish that the Applicant and KB were in a de facto relationship. Consequently, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to proceed with the substantive application for the war widow's pension.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
With respect to the Tribunal’s task in weighing the evidence, Counsel referred to the following statement of law in Dietman and Repatriation Commission [2019] AATA 4428 (Dietman) at [129]:“In reaching a conclusion as to whether two people are living together in a de facto relationship a decision-maker has to consider, inter alia, the matters outlined in s 11A. Those matters have been discussed earlier. However, there is an important ingredient that must be factored into the weighing exercise in each and every instance. A decision-maker is not just dealing with indicia per se, but also the subjective reality of human beings. Just as the presence or absence of a sexual relationship is not determinative of the existence (or lack thereof) of a de facto relationship, the empathetic relations between the relevant parties and how that empathy is manifested in goods and deeds is often of critical importance. So too is how the parties perceive themselves and each other. In short, in engaging in a weighing exercise, a decision-maker is faced with the difficult task of attempting to glean the true nature of the emotional relationship between two persons and how this is manifested in reality, both in terms of the parties themselves and the wider world.”CONSIDERATIONIntroduction In this matter, the task of the Tribunal is a relatively narrow, but focused, inquiry. It is to determine if the Applicant and KB were in a de facto relationship during the time that they resided at the same house in Coorparoo. In reaching a decision on this question, the Tribunal will need to focus on the indicia contained in s 11A.(a) The financial aspects of the relationship(i) Joint ownership of assets and joint liabilities There is no evidence before the Tribunal that the Applicant and KB jointly owned any real estate or any other major assets other than a car they had jointly purchased to accommodate their respective children – Exhibit 17 p. 13 paras 56, 59; Tr. 15.6.2022 p. 33(ii) Significant pooling of financial resources It will be noted that the decision-maker’s attention is drawn to a significant pooling of financial resources. The fact that there may be some minor intermingling does not meet the requirement of significant pooling. What constitutes pooling was explained by French J in Pelka at [52] as quoted above. As his Honour pointed out, pooling requires more than financial cooperation or separate contributions to different elements of household expenses. Mr Dillon submitted that there was a pooling of resources insofar as the Applicant lived in KB’s home rent free for six or seven years. It was also submitted that, as the Applicant was not required to contribute to the outgoings of the Coorparoo property, this constituted a significant subsidy and allowed her to spend her salary as she chose – Tr. 15.6.2002 p. 34. The Tribunal does not accept this arrangement constituted pooling. As French J explained, financial cooperation per se does not amount to pooling. The evidence before the Tribunal suggests that, from a financial point of view, the Applicant and KB operated independently and separately. It was not even as if there was a barter system in place, which, as French J explained, does not constitute pooling. It would appear that the Applicant and KB, over time and by osmosis, developed a financial relationship which could be characterised as separate and independent. As the Applicant explained, she and KB never sat down and agreed on the financial arrangements for their cohabitation. They “just did things when they needed to be done” – Exhibit 17 p. 8 para 31.