Kuek v Woodman

Case

[2025] VCC 1113

8 August 2025

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA

AT MELBOURNE

COMMERCIAL DIVISION

Revised
Not Restricted
Suitable for Publication

GENERAL LIST

Case No. CI-24-00041

GABRIEL KUEK (ABN 60 329 592 928) TRADING AS ACCESS LAW Plaintiff
v
JOHN WOODMAN Defendant

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JUDGE:

HER HONOUR JUDGE MARKS

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

9 July 2025

DATE OF RULING:

8 August 2025

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

Kuek v Woodman

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2025] VCC 1113

REASONS FOR RULING
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COST AGREEMENT – whether law practice provided client with an ‘estimate of the total legal costs’ as required by s174(1) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (Schedule 1 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014) – where the purported estimate said ‘you can expect legal costs to be several hundred thousand dollars. They may be even more than one million dollars’ – no complying estimate provided – stay of proceeding required under s178 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law until costs are assessed – proceeding stayed.

Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014: s174(1); s178 - Wellington v Metcalf (No 2) [2025] VSC 243 - ACN 627 087 030 Pty Ltd atf YBL Trust v Elisabeth Theodore; ACN 627 087 030 Pty Ltd atf YBL Trust v Price [2024] NSWDC 592.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Plaintiff Mr D Perkins Rigby & Bear
For the Defendant Mr J Woodman (Self-Represented)

HER HONOUR:

Contents

Introduction

The purported ‘estimate’

The Uniform Law

Analysis

Introduction

1The plaintiff sues for legal fees in this matter. 

2When it came on before me for trial on 9 July 2025, I identified a preliminary question as to whether or not the disclosure obligations regarding legal costs set out in s174 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (being Schedule 1 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014) (the Uniform Law) had been complied with by the plaintiff.

3If they had not been, then I considered that the proceeding needed to be stayed whilst the plaintiff’s legal fees were assessed, under s178 of the Uniform Law. I adjourned the trial so that written submissions on this point could be provided.

4I made orders as follows:

OTHER MATTERS:

A.    The plaintiff sues for legal fees in this matter.

B. S174 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (being Schedule 1 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014) imposes disclosure obligations regarding costs, including that ‘an estimate of the total legal costs’ is given (s174(1)).

C. There is a preliminary question as to whether the Costs Disclosure the plaintiff gave the defendant dated 20 February 2023 (CB 125-137) includes an estimate of total legal costs. If it does not, then under s178 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law, the costs agreement between the parties is void; the defendant is not required to pay the legal costs until they have been assessed or any costs dispute has been determined by the designated local regulatory authority; and the plaintiff must not maintain proceedings for the recovery of any or all of the legal costs until they have been assessed or any costs dispute has been determined by the designated local regulatory authority or under jurisdictional legislation.

D.    Orders are made for the filing of submissions on this point. A Ruling will be given on the papers (without requiring further appearances) unless the Court considers it necessary to hear further from the parties.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. By 4 pm on 23 July 2025, the plaintiff file and serve any submissions (limited to 6 pages), as to whether the Costs Disclosure dated 20 February 2023 (CB 125-137) provides an estimate of the total legal costs as required by s174 of the Uniform Law.

2. By 4 pm on 6 August 2025, the defendant file and serve any submissions (limited to 6 pages), as to whether the Costs Disclosure dated 20 February 2023 (CB 125-137) provides an estimate of the total legal costs as required by s174 of the Uniform Law.

3.     The parties file and serve a copy of any legal authorities they rely on in their submissions at the same time as the submissions.

4.     The above submissions and legal authorities also be emailed to [email protected].

5.     The trial is adjourned to a date to be fixed.

5The plaintiff filed submissions on 23 July 2025. On 1 August 2025, the plaintiff provided the decision of ACN 627 087 030 Pty Ltd atf YBL Trust v Elisabeth Theodore; ACN 627 087 030 Pty Ltd atf YBL Trust v Price [2024] NSWDC 592 (the YBL Trust Case), to the Court and the defendant. I directed the plaintiff to file further submissions to address how this authority supports its claims. I also extended the time for the defendant to file his submissions.

6The plaintiff filed further submissions on 5 August 2025, and the defendant filed submissions on 6 August 2025.

The purported ‘estimate’

7The purported ‘estimate’ in question that the plaintiff gave the defendant is contained in a costs disclosure letter dated 20 February 2023, at Court Book (CB) [125-137].  Within that letter (which otherwise includes standard details such as hourly rates to be charged and so forth), the relevant part is as follows:

Our estimated total legal costs – section 174(1)(a)

It is not possible to tell you what the total costs of the proceedings will be. That would depend on a number of things including:

(a)   the amount of work we have to undertake

(b)   the issues raised in the case

(c)   the attitude taken by the other side

(d)   if the matter involves attendance at a court, tribunal or other venue, the number of days the hearing takes

(e)   if a barrister is briefed, the seniority of the barrister briefed to represent you and the fees that barrister charges.

Therefore, the best we can do is to provide an estimate of the total legal expenses you are likely to be charged at various stages of the case.

The costs estimate is as set out in Mr. Kuek’s email of 15 February 2023. In short, if legal proceedings are commenced, you can expect legal costs to be several hundred thousand dollars. They may even be more than one million dollars if the matter proceeds all the way to a contested trial and along the way, the State of Victoria engages in a guerrilla campaign with multiple objections and interlocutory/satellite applications.

(bold emphasis added)

8The plaintiff had sent an email on 15 February 2023 to the defendant (referenced in this purported estimate) which said the same thing as highlighted in the extract above (that is, from ‘in short’ to ‘interlocutory/satellite applications’).

9According to the plaintiff, on 17 March 2023 the defendant adopted the costs estimate by signing the costs disclosure letter.

The Uniform Law

10The Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 includes the Legal Profession Uniform Law set out in Schedule 1. By s4, the Legal Profession Uniform Law applies as a law of the State of Victoria, and as so applying may be referred to as the Legal Profession Uniform Law (Vic).

11The objectives of the Uniform Law are set out at Clause 3. They include:

3     Objectives

The objectives of this Law are to promote the administration of justice and an efficient and effective Australian legal profession, by—

(b)   ensuring lawyers are competent and maintain high ethical and professional standards in the provision of legal services; and

(c)   enhancing the protection of clients of law practices and the protection of the public generally; and

(d)   empowering clients of law practices to make informed choices about the services they access and the costs involved; and ...

12S169 of the Uniform Law states:

169 Objectives

The objectives of this Part are—

(a)   to ensure that clients of law practices are able to make informed choices about their legal options and the costs associated with pursuing those options; and

(b) to provide that law practices must not charge more than fair and reasonable amounts for legal costs; and

(c)to provide a framework for assessment of legal costs.

13Division 2 of the Uniform Law deals with legal costs generally.

14It provides at s172(4):

A costs agreement is prima facie evidence that legal costs disclosed in the agreement are fair and reasonable if—

(a) the provisions of Division 3 relating to costs disclosure have been complied with; and

(b)   the costs agreement does not contravene, and was not entered into in contravention of, any provision of Division 4.

15Division 3 relates to costs disclosure.

16It states at s174(1):

174    Disclosure obligations of law practice regarding clients

(1)     Main disclosure requirement

A law practice—

(a)     must, when or as soon as practicable after instructions are initially given in a matter, provide the client with information disclosing the basis on which legal costs will be calculated in the matter and an estimate of the total legal costs; and

(b)     must, when or as soon as practicable after there is any significant change to anything previously disclosed under this subsection, provide the client with information disclosing the change, including information about any significant change to the legal costs that will be payable by the client—

together with the information referred to in subsection (2).

17It sets out additional information to be provided at s174(2). This is not relevant to the issue I am considering here.

18At s174(3) it provides:

(3)   Client’s consent and understanding

If a disclosure is made under subsection (1), the law practice must take all reasonable steps to satisfy itself that the client has understood and given consent to the proposed course of action for the conduct of the matter and the proposed costs.

19It provides for an exception where the legal costs are below a particular threshold That is set out in s174(4). Clause 18 of Schedule 4 to the Uniform Law provides that the lower threshold is $750. The exception does not apply.

20S174(6) provides that the disclosure must be in writing.

(6)   Disclosure to be written

A disclosure under this section must be made in writing, but the requirement for writing does not affect the law practice's obligations under subsection (3).

21S178(1) then deals with what happens if there is non-compliance with these obligations:

178    Non-compliance with disclosure obligations

(1)     If a law practice contravenes the disclosure obligations of this Part—

(a)the costs agreement concerned (if any) is void; and

(b)the client or an associated third party payer is not required to pay the legal costs until they have been assessed or any costs dispute has been determined by the designated local regulatory authority; and

(c)the law practice must not commence or maintain proceedings for the recovery of any or all of the legal costs until they have been assessed or any costs dispute has been determined by the designated local regulatory authority or under jurisdictional legislation; and

(d)the contravention is capable of constituting unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct on the part of any principal of the law practice or any legal practitioner associate or foreign lawyer associate involved in the contravention.

[Bold emphasis added]

22Subsections 178(2) and (3) are irrelevant to the issue I am considering.

Analysis

23The purported estimate given by the plaintiff in this case on 20 February 2023 did not comply with the requirements of s174(1)(a) because it was not in fact an estimate of the total legal costs. Rather, it first gave a figure which could have been anything from $300,000 to around $700,000 (several hundred thousand dollars). It then went on to say legal costs could be more than one million dollars with no upper limit, but this did not give the client an estimate of total legal costs. Rather, the client was left with considering that in the most general of ways, the proceeding might cost anything from $300,000 to an unspecified amount of more than $1,000,000.

24According to the Macquarie Dictionary [Macquarie Dictionary (online at 5 August 2025) ‘several’ (def 1)], ‘several’ means:

1. being more than two or three, but not many.

25On that basis the first part of this sentence (‘several hundred thousand dollars’) could have involved legal costs of anything from $300,000 to $700,000 or so.

26According to the Macquarie Dictionary [Macquarie Dictionary (online at 5 August 2025) ‘Estimate’ (def 4, 6)], an estimate is:

4. an approximate judgement or calculation, as of the value, amount, etc., of something.

6. an approximate statement of what would be charged for certain work to be done, submitted by one ready to undertake the work.

27S174(b) requires that a law practice later provide information about significant changes ‘to the legal costs that will be payable by the client’ by way of updates, if necessary. No update could be given to the purported estimate the plaintiff gave here as there is no upper limit stated.

28The plaintiff’s submissions raise the following matters.

29The plaintiff submits at [6] of its submissions:

…the reference made by the Court to s.178 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law and its effect, is not applicable within the State of Victoria, particularly where – as in the present scenario – all the legal services contemplated and arranged were performed within the State of Victoria.

30The plaintiff submits at [11] of its submissions that ss 178(1) and (2) of the Uniform Law do not apply to the plaintiff’s claim:

(ii)  The rule provides – [emphasis – bolding – added]:

72ANon-compliance with disclosure obligations—disapplication of section 178(1) and (2) of the Uniform Law

(1)This rule applies where a law practice has contravened the disclosure obligations of Part 4.3 of the Uniform Law in relation to a particular matter.

(2)Section 178(1) and (2) of the Uniform Law do not apply in relation to the law practice (so far as they would otherwise apply to the matter concerned) in circumstances where the relevant authority, a costs assessor, a court or a tribunal is satisfied that—

(a)the law practice took reasonable steps to comply with the disclosure obligations of Part 4.3 of the Uniform Law before becoming aware of the contravention, and

(b)the law practice, no later than 14 days after the date on which it became aware of the contravention, rectified the contravention, as far as practicable, by providing the client with the necessary information required to be disclosed under Division 3 of Part 4.3 of the Uniform Law (including, where relevant, an estimate or revised estimate of the costs), and

(c)the contravention was not substantial and it would not be reasonable to expect that the client would have made a different decision in any relevant respect.

(3)Subrule (2)(b) applies even though the information or estimate is not provided at the times required by the disclosure obligations of Part 4.3 of the Uniform Law.

(4)In this rule—

client includes (where relevant) an associated third party payer.

relevant authority means the designated local regulatory authority for section 178 of the Uniform Law.

(iii) As to Rule 72A it is submitted –

(a)There has been neither a relevant failure nor any “contravention” of the statutory disclosure obligation.

(b)If, contrary to the submission in (a), the obligation was not met, the plaintiff maintains that the Court must provide the opportunity to the plaintiff to satisfy the Court – by evidence - concerning the matters set forth in paragraphs 2(a) through 2(c), so as to invoke the disapplication contemplated.

31Rule 72A comes into play where an estimate was not given initially, but is given, no more than 14 days after the date on which a law practice becomes aware of the fact it has not given an estimate.

32On the facts of this case, nothing amounting to an estimate as required under the legislation was given at any point.

33At [29] of its submissions, the plaintiff submits:

As to Rule 72A(2)(b), the plaintiff did not consider the estimate he provided to the defendant contravened the Uniform Law until the subject was raised by the Court on 9 July 2025. By then, he had sent his Tax Invoices to the defendant. The Tax Invoices listed all of the work the plaintiff performed and the exact amounts he charged for them. Those amounts applied the rates quoted. They were more than “estimates”. They were actual costs. On any view, the plaintiff rectified the contravention, as far as practicable, by providing the client with the necessary information required to be disclosed under Division 3 of Part 4.3 of the Uniform Law and did so even before he became aware of the “contravention”.

34Providing tax invoices after work is done is in no way a substitute for giving the required estimate before it is done, nor does it amount to an estimate under s174. This does not amount to rectifying the contravention.

35The plaintiff then argues that the contravention was not substantial under Rule 72A(2)(c) and it would not be reasonable to expect the client would have made a different decision in any relevant respect. He submits this for various reasons, including the fact that the terms of the retainer letter were accepted, and other updates of costs were given on 20 March 2023 and 23 March 2023.  The plaintiff also refers to the fact that the plaintiff and Counsel were complimented on particular work, and continued to give instructions.

36The contravention was substantial.  No estimate was given for work that according the disclosure letter could exceed $1 million, at any point. Rule 72A is not engaged in the circumstances.

37The plaintiff submits, at [11A(3)(b)] of his submissions that:

iii)    As to Rule 72A it is submitted –

(a)   There has been neither a relevant failure nor any “contravention” of the statutory disclosure obligation.

(b)   If, contrary to the submission in (a), the obligation was not met, the plaintiff maintains that the Court must provide the opportunity to the plaintiff to satisfy the Court – by evidence - concerning the matters set forth in paragraphs 2(a) through 2(c), so as to invoke the disapplication contemplated.

38In circumstances where an estimate which complied with the legislation was not provided, no evidence of other matters can stop s178 taking effect.

39A court book of relevant documents has been filed. The purported estimate (relied on by the plaintiff) did not amount to an estimate under the legislation. Providing evidence of discussions or actions (as suggested by the plaintiff at the hearing on 9 July 2025) will not fix this.

40The plaintiff submits it provided an ‘update’ on costs on 20 March 2023, and relies on that:  [CB 154].  That update provides as follows:

From: Gabriel Kuek <[email address included]>
Sent: Monday, 20 March 2023 4:34 PM
To: John Woodman <[email address included]

Subject: Re: Moving Forward

Dear John,

Thank you for your email of 8 March 2023, the memo attached to it and the parcel of bound materials you posted to my P.O. Box.

You asked, in the last sentence of your memo, that I provide the estimated cost of the necessary perusal of the documents you posted to me.

Since 15 February 2023, I have undertaken $20,000 work of work. Mr. Nash may have reached that limit as well. Therefore, the estimate of $40,000 has been reached and further work in the matter will involve more costs to you.

Doing the best I can, I think I will have to perform a further $10,000 worth of work. This includes perusing the materials you have provided and attending to further revisions of the Statement of Claim.

Gabriel Kuek

41It will be seen that this ‘update’ says that $20,000 worth of work has already been received, and that Counsel may have reached that limit as well.  It goes on to refer to an estimate of $40,000 (which must have been given for a specific stage of work, orally, as there is no written estimate about this in evidence) as having been reached, and continues, ‘and further work in the matter will involve more costs to you’.

42This does not affect, in any way, the fact that the plaintiff did not provide the required written estimate, complying with s174(1) of the Uniform Law for the legal costs now sued for, at the outset of the proceeding or subsequently.

43The plaintiff submitted the following about Wellington v Metcalf [2025] VSC 243:

32.The judgment of Associate Justice Ierodiaconou in Wellington v. Metcalf [2025] VSC 243 is directly on point. In her reasons, Ierodiaconou AsJ recited:

(a) Section 174 of the Uniform Law at paragraph [30],

(b) Section 178 of the Uniform Law at paragraph [32], and –

(c)   Rule 72A of the Uniform Rules at paragraph [42].

33.Her Honour continued:

43. Rule 72A was inserted into the Uniform Rules in 2016. A media release issued by the Legal Services Council at the time said that ‘new Rule 72A will remove a concern of some law practices that their costs agreements will be void if they contravene a costs disclosure requirement of the Uniform Law’. Wood AsJ has referred to subsection 178(3) and r 72A as constituting a basis to ‘ameliorate the draconian effect of s 178(1)(a)’.

67. If the applicant decides to challenge outstanding legal fees, she may seek an assessment under div 7 of pt 4.3 of the LPUL. In that case, she will be liable for legal costs that are fair and reasonable in all the circumstances, proportionately and reasonably incurred, and of a reasonable amount.

68.   There was an additional issue raised by the respondent: whether or not the initial costs agreement was void because of later non-disclosures by the applicant’s solicitors to her. There is a divergence in the authorities about whether a cost agreement is void ab initio or in futuro. It is unnecessary to resolve that issue, given that I find the applicant remained liable to her solicitors for costs throughout the retainer.

73.   However, the applicant is liable to pay legal costs to Verduci Lawyers. That liability arises because she continued to retain Verduci Lawyers, and they performed work on her behalf. Accordingly, the liability arises on a contractual or quantum meruit basis.

75.   The respondent says that the taxation should be stayed until a costs assessor undertakes a costs assessment. I reject that submission for the following reasons.

76. Neither the applicant nor Verduci Lawyers has applied to have costs assessed. As discussed above, s 198 of LPUL does not permit the respondent to make such an application. There is no basis to stay the taxation until an assessment is conducted. The applicant has not challenged her costs agreements with Verduci Lawyers.

77. Moreover, for the same reasons, I decline to conduct an assessment per s 199 of the LPUL to determine whether the amount the applicant owes to her legal practitioners is fair and reasonable.

78.   The taxation should proceed because the applicant is liable for legal fees. As for quantum, because she has not challenged the legal fees, the taxation should proceed on the basis she is liable for the amount of legal fees per the costs agreements between her and Verduci Lawyers.

44However, Wellington involved a written estimate given where there was then a failure by the law practice to comply with ongoing costs disclosure.

45At Wellington [7], the estimate in that case is set out:

2. Our fees and disbursements

Fees

In this instance it is impractical to quote a fixed fee in advance because, it is impossible to tell with any degree of certainty what work is going to be involved.  However, we estimate our fees and disbursements will be in the order of $50,000 plus GST (if proceedings are issued).  This is broken down to $25,000 for our fees and $25,000 for disbursements.  Whilst this estimate is not binding on us it is based on our experience of similar matters.  Should the scope of work change significantly we will keep you informed of the likely effect on our costs and on disbursements and update our estimate.

46I note that in my view the estimate that was given in Wellington complied with s174. Saying something will be ‘in the order of’ a figure gives sufficient notification of costs anticipated, and total legal costs could thus be determined. In any event it does not appear that the question of whether it was a compliant estimate under s174 was raised before the learned associate judge.

47Later, a further written estimate of $317,000 was sent (see Wellington [11]).

48The proceeding in Wellington commenced via a summons for taxation and a bill of costs (see [19] of the judgment).  At [27], her Honour said:

It is common ground that there was a costs retainer between the applicant and her solicitors but that any oral costs agreement is void per the LPUL. The dispute between the parties centred on the effect of this. The respondent contends that the applicant has no liability for costs to her solicitors, or alternatively, there is no liability from about the time the initial costs estimate was exceeded, or about the time of the oral costs agreement.

49Her Honour set out relevant provisions of the Uniform Law concerning costs assessments:

[38] Division 7 of pt 4.3 of the LPUL concerns costs assessment. Section 196 states it ‘applies to legal costs payable on a solicitor-client basis.’ Section 198 provides that applications for costs assessment may be made by a client, a third party payer (who has paid or is liable), the law practice, or another law practice retained by the primary law practice. Section 198 does not allow the respondent to apply for the costs between the applicant and her solicitors to be assessed.

[39]    Section 199(1) relevantly provides that costs assessors will conduct legal cost assessments. Section 199(2) states that on a costs assessment, the costs assessor must:

(a)determine whether or not a valid costs agreement exists; and

(b)determine whether legal costs are fair and reasonable and, to the extent they are not fair and reasonable, determine the amount of legal costs (if any) that are to be payable.

50Her Honour goes on to refer to Rule 72A:

[42] The Uniform Rules are made under pt 9.2 of the LPUL by the Legal Services Council. Rule 72A provides:

Non-compliance with disclosure obligations—disapplication of section 178(1) and (2) of the Uniform Law

(1)This rule applies where a law practice has contravened the disclosure obligations of Part 4.3 of the Uniform Law in relation to a particular matter.

(2)Section 178(1) and (2) of the Uniform Law do not apply in relation to the law practice (so far as they would otherwise apply to the matter concerned) in circumstances where the relevant authority, a costs assessor, a court or a tribunal is satisfied that—

(a)the law practice took reasonable steps to comply with the disclosure obligations of Part 4.3 of the Uniform Law before becoming aware of the contravention, and

(b)the law practice, no later than 14 days after the date on which it became aware of the contravention, rectified the contravention, as far as practicable, by providing the client with the necessary information required to be disclosed under Division 3 of Part 4.3 of the Uniform Law (including, where relevant, an estimate or revised estimate of the costs), and

(c)the contravention was not substantial and it would not be reasonable to expect that the client would have made a different decision in any relevant respect.

(3)Subrule (2)(b) applies even though the information or estimate is not provided at the times required by the disclosure obligations of Part 4.3 of the Uniform Law.

(4)In this rule—

client includes (where relevant) an associated third party payer.

relevant authority means the designated local regulatory authority for section 178 of the Uniform Law.

[Footnotes omitted]

51Her Honour then said, at [59]:

[59]    In Wills v Woolworths (‘Wills v Woolworths’), Beach J noted that even if a costs agreement is found to be void due to a failure to comply with disclosure obligations, the law practice is still entitled to be paid fair and reasonable legal costs per s 199(2) of the LPUL. Similarly, in Johnston v Dimos Lawyers (‘Johnston’), Wood AsJ held that irrespective of whether or not there is a costs agreement, the Court must still determine what is fair, reasonable and proportionate per s 172(1) of the LPUL. In that case, costs were still to be assessed based on the cost agreement, even though it was void. In Bennett (A Pseudonym) v Farrar Gesini Dunn Pty Ltd, Wood AsJ held that although two costs agreements were void, as a general principle costs were to be assessed based on the hourly rates specified in them.  His Honour observed that regardless of whether there was a costs agreement, or a valid or void one, ‘the obligation on the Costs Court remains the same, namely to assess what is fair and reasonable (ss 172(1) and 200(1)).

[Footnotes omitted]

52[67] provides:

[67] If the applicant decides to challenge outstanding legal fees, she may seek an assessment under div 7 of pt 4.3 of the LPUL. In that case, she will be liable for legal costs that are fair and reasonable in all the circumstances, proportionately and reasonably incurred, and of a reasonable amount. In at least two instances, the Costs Court has used the hourly rates in a void costs agreement as the starting point for the basis of assessment.

[Footnotes omitted]

53I agree with this. When the plaintiff’s costs are assessed in a taxation, the other parts of the costs disclosure letter sent by the plaintiff in this case will be relevant to the necessary assessment to be carried out for those costs, such as the hourly rates quoted. However, all this is to do with what occurs when the Costs Court assesses costs (taxes them), as provided for under s178 of the Uniform Law.

54It has no bearing on the fact no complying estimate was given in the present case.

55On 1 August 2025, the plaintiff provided the YBL Trust Case to the Court and the defendant (as discussed at [6] of these reasons). 

56The YBL Trust Case does not assist the plaintiff here.

57That decision was made in circumstances where:

[2] Under the LPULAA, as between solicitor and client, there is a regime designed to allow a client to make an informed choice as to whether they wish to retain a legal practitioner, and at what rates – this is achieved by requiring legal practitioners to issue what are known as costs estimates: see s 174(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW) (“LPUL”). If a cost estimate/disclosure document that complies with the statutory requirements is provided and updated from time to time as required by the legislation, the rates disclosed in that estimate become, for the purpose of any subsequent assessment of those costs, "prima facie" evidence that the rates are reasonable.

[3] Upon an invoice being issued by a legal practitioner for legal services, it is open to a person liable to pay those fees to seek to have the fees assessed. This assessment takes place before a Costs Assessor with a right of appeal to the Costs Assessment Review Panel (“the Review Panel”).

58Importantly, the costs disclosure in question included some ranges of estimated figures for different stages of the proceeding.

59In part 7 of the costs disclosure letter in the YBL Trust Case, the following was included (see [63]):

We estimate our professional fees for undertaking the work will range between:

(a) Review instructing materials and provide advice on an ongoing basis throughout matter: $25,000.00 plus GST.

(b) Urgent Application to the Family Court for Asset Preservation and return of property: $30,000 to $40,000 plus GST.

(c) Defend or prosecute dissolution of property interests:

i. Early resolution: up to $75,000 plus GST.

ii. Resolution after filing of evidence up to $150,000 plus GST.

iii. Fully contested hearing: up to $250,000 plus GST If you fail in the proceedings, you may suffer costs orders against you by your opponent for similar sums.

60The learned judge found at [96] that an estimate can be given ‘by way of a range’, and that ‘an estimate’ may be ‘provided by way of a series of figures made up of different components’. He found there did not have to be a ‘single ultimate figure’ if addition could be performed on the figures given to arrive at the estimate (and see [104]).

61In the case before me, there is no range – and no amount of addition could have allowed the defendant to understand an ‘estimate of the total’.

62I agree with his Honour’s comments at [97]:

In Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR355, the High Court directed that statutes must be construed by reference to their text, purpose, and context. As I have said, I do not regard the text as supportive of the Review Panel's construction. As to context and purpose, the context of s 174 is that it is found in the part of the legislation that deals with the requirement for there to be cost estimates to be given to clients, for the obvious purpose of allowing the clients to make an informed choice as to the use of lawyers or perhaps as to the pursuit of any piece of legal work. It is protective legislation, so as to arm people who are not familiar with the legal process with as much information as possible so as to allow them to make informed decisions. However, the provision of estimates is, in the context of legal work and most particularly in the context of litigation, an inexact science. Indeed, to describe it as a science at all is to overstate things. It is at best a “guesstimate" based on a lawyer’s expectations learned from experience. Any estimate given by a lawyer before litigation commences will almost inevitably be proved wrong because the lawyer is operating with such limited information as to what might happen in the future

63Giving an estimate is an inexact science. But it is required under the legislation.

64Finally, I note that his Honour considered that sending a costs estimate with a final invoice is not consistent with the purpose of the legislation, saying describing something then as an ‘estimate’ is nonsensical’ (see [112]).

65I agree. Similarly, here, the plaintiff’s submission that sending its invoices, after the work was done, amounted to an estimate, is nonsensical.

66As no estimate was sent in compliance with s174(1), under s178 the costs agreement is void.

67In its statement of claim, after setting out a claim based on the tax invoices that it sent to the plaintiff and the amount remaining outstanding from those, the plaintiff pleaded:

6.     In the alternative to paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5, the plaintiff seeks payment for the reasonable value of the work and labour done.

Particulars

(a)The work and labour done and their reasonable values are set out in the documents referred to in paragraphs 3(b), (c) and (d) herein, copies of which may be inspected at the plaintiff’s office, ...

(b)The reasonable value of the work and labour done, totalled $219,782.29 (more if a loading for skill care and attention is added).

7.     By reason of the aforesaid, the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $219,782.29 ...

68Paragraph 7 set out specific interest amounts said to be due.

69The plaintiff seeks to press its claim in quantum meruit, in the alternative, if its costs agreement is found to be void. 

70However, a quantum meruit claim is not available to be pressed at this stage in the circumstances. S178 makes clear that costs must be assessed where there is a void costs agreement.

71The plaintiff has clearly set out its hourly rate and other relevant amounts in the costs disclosure agreement it sent.  As indicated above, this will enable the assessor to assess the appropriate amount that the defendant is to be assessed as owing the plaintiff for the work that was done.

72In the circumstances, I will order that the proceeding is stayed pursuant to s178 of the Uniform Law.

73Once those costs have been assessed, in accordance with the Uniform Law, the plaintiff may apply to lift the stay.

74I will reserve costs of the proceeding to date as no submissions have been made about these. It is my preliminary view that no order for costs should be made for the proceeding so far, as it should not have been commenced by the plaintiff in the circumstances, prior to costs being assessed.

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Certificate

I certify that these 17 pages are a true copy of the reasons for ruling of Her Honour Judge Marks, delivered on 8 August 2025.

Dated: 8 August 2025

Felicia Mitropoulos

Associate to Her Honour Judge Marks