In the marriage of KUDELKA, P. and KUDELKA, P.I.,
(1986) FLC ¶91-719
Other publishers' citations: (1986) 10 FamLR 762 (1986) 85 FLR 22
Full Court of the Family Court of Australia at Melbourne.
Judgment delivered 10 April 1986.
Before: Asche, Fogarty and Baker JJ.
Asche J.: I refer to the judgment in this matter delivered by the Full Court on 17 February 1986.
The wife, who was the successful appellant, now seeks a certificate pursuant to sec. 9 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (hereinafter called ``the Federal Act'') stating that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under the Act to the appellant in respect of the costs incurred by her in relation to her appeal.
This Full Court allowed the wife's appeal on the basis that the discretion of the learned trial Judge miscarried in so far as the amount awarded to the wife in all the circumstances was ``unreasonable or plainly unjust''. The Full Court therefore substituted a higher amount than that awarded by the learned trial Judge.
The policy of the Federal Act and similar State legislation has been stated by Moffitt J. in respect of provisions in the New South Wales Suitors' Fund Act 1951 as proceeding ``on the assumption that the law is known so that if an error of law occurs in a court of first instance or an inferior appellate court, such error may ordinarily be attributed to a fault in the administration of justice rather than of the parties so that the costs of having the error rectified ought not ordinarily to lie on the unsuccessful respondent to the appeal, but to be paid from a fund contributed to by all litigants''. Acquilina v. Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co. Ltd. (No. 2) (1965) N.S.W.R. 772 at p. 773. See also Jansen v. Dewhurst (1969) V.R. 421 at p. 430 (Newton J.), Pickford v. Incorporated Nominal Defendant (1981) V.R. 583 at pp. 584-585 (Brooking J. with whose judgment Starke and Anderson JJ. concurred).
Although Moffitt J. was addressing his remarks to the case of an ``unsuccessful respondent'' I can see no difference in principle to the case of a successful appellant who succeeds because an error of law, not induced by the appellant, has been made in the Court below. The Federal Act contains both sec. 6 (which relates to unsuccessful respondents) and sec. 9 (which relates to successful appellants). In either case the object of the legislation seems clearly to provide for some amelioration of costs where a party (be he a respondent or an appellant) has suffered loss in costs through an error which ``may ordinarily be attributed to a fault in the administration of justice rather than of the parties''.
The only rider to sec. 9 of the Federal Act is that, because of the application of sec. 117 of the Family Law Act, costs of the successful appeal would not normally lie with the unsuccessful…
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- Case
- [1986] FamCA 5
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Full Court was whether the Commissioner had acted *ultra vires* in issuing the notice of assessment. This question turned on whether the Commissioner had properly exercised the discretion afforded to him under section 167 of the *Income Tax Assessment Act 1936* (Cth) to make an assessment in the absence of a return. The applicants argued that the Commissioner had failed to consider relevant material and had acted on irrelevant considerations when forming the belief that it was necessary to make an assessment under that section.
The Court reasoned that section 167 requires the Commissioner to form a genuine belief that it is necessary to make an assessment, and this belief must be based on reasonable grounds. The Court found that the evidence before it did not establish that the Commissioner had failed to consider relevant material or had acted on irrelevant considerations. The Court held that the Commissioner's belief was reasonably open on the material before him, and therefore, the notice of assessment was valid.
The appeal was dismissed.
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