[2014] HCATrans 187
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B14 of 2014
B e t w e e n -
STEFAN KUCZBORSKI
Plaintiff
and
THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
Defendant
FRENCH CJ
HAYNE J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J
GAGELER J
KEANE J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT BRISBANE ON TUESDAY, 2 SEPTEMBER 2014, AT 10.15 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR K.C. FLEMING, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with MR W. BAFFSKY and MR S. ROBERTSON for the plaintiff. (instructed by Irish Bentley Lawyers)
MR P.J. DUNNING, QC, Solicitor‑General of the State of Queensland: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MR A.J. MACSPORRAN, QC, MR G.J.D. DEL VILLAR and MR C.M. TAM. (instructed by Crown Law (Qld))
MR J.T. GLEESON, SC, Solicitor‑General of the Commonwealth of Australia: May it please the Court, I appear with MR C.L LENEHAN for the Attorney‑General of the Commonwealth intervening. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
MR M.G. SEXTON, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of New South Wales: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR J.E. DAVIDSON, for the Attorney‑General of New South Wales who intervenes in the proceedings. (instructed by Crown Solicitor (NSW))
MR M.P. GRANT, QC, Solicitor‑General for the Northern Territory: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS A.K. CHONG‑FONG, for the Attorney‑General for the Northern Territory intervening. (instructed by Solicitor for the Northern Territory)
MR M.G. HINTON, QC, Solicitor‑General for the State of South Australia: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR C. JACOBI, for the Attorney‑General for South Australia intervening. (instructed by Crown Solicitor (SA))
MR S.G.E. McGLEISH, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of Victoria: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR C.P. YOUNG, for the Attorney‑General for Victoria intervening. (instructed by Victorian Government Solicitor)
MR G.R. DONALDSON, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of Western Australia: If it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR A.J. SEFTON, for the Attorney‑General for Western Australia intervening. (instructed by State Solicitor (WA))
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Fleming.
MR FLEMING: Thank you, your Honours. If the Court pleases, Queensland has had for some little time the means to declare an organisation a criminal organisation in a matter tested in this Court and found not to offend the Kable principle. That was in the Assistant Commissioner of Condon v Pompano, to which we will come in time. That was determined but a year ago. That process, according to Pompano, involved the scrutiny of a Supreme Court judge of intelligence collected by law enforcement agents before such a declaration could be made.
However, in this matter it is our submission that for whatever reason, Queensland has sought to circumvent that procedure by the suite of amendments to which…
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- Case
- [2014] HCATrans 187
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the State of Queensland, by issuing the notice under section 129 of the *Land Act 1994* (Qld), had validly exercised its right to re-enter and resume possession of the land. This required the Court to determine the proper interpretation of section 129 and its interaction with the conditions of the original land grant, particularly concerning the nature of the breaches alleged and the procedural requirements for the exercise of the State's re-entry rights.
The High Court held that the notice issued under section 129 was invalid. The Court reasoned that the section required the Minister to be satisfied that a breach had occurred and that the breach was of a substantial nature. In this instance, the Court found that the evidence did not support a finding that the breaches were substantial, nor that the Minister had been properly satisfied of this fact before issuing the notice. The Court emphasised that the power of re-entry was a significant one, and its exercise must strictly comply with the statutory preconditions. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal and made declarations that the notice was invalid and that the State had no right to re-enter the land.
Background
Background to the litigation
This case involves a challenge by Stefan Kuczborski against the State of Queensland over several legislative amendments which introduced additional penalties for participants in criminal organisations. The matter came before the High Court as an original jurisdiction case, where the Court was asked to determine whether certain legislative provisions were inconsistent with the Constitution. The Court heard arguments from both the plaintiff, represented by Mr Fleming QC, and the defendant, represented by the Solicitor-General of Queensland, Mr Dunning QC. The plaintiff argued that the legislation, by imposing additional penalties based on membership in a criminal organisation without judicial determination of the criminality, infringed the Kable principle and the notion of equality before the law. The defendant countered that the legislation was a valid exercise of the State's legislative power, that there was no enlistment of the courts, and that the provisions did not render the judicial process repugnant. The matter was adjourned to allow the Court to consider its decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the amendments to the Criminal Code and related legislation infringe upon the Kable principle by imposing criminality and additional penalties through executive or legislative action without judicial oversight.
2. Whether the requirement for a participant in a criminal organisation to prove the organisation is not a criminal organisation, as defined, imposes an unjustifiable burden under the principle of equality before the law.
3. Whether the imposition of enhanced penalties based on membership in a declared criminal organisation constitutes a relevant distinction under the principle of equality before the law.
4. Whether the absence of a judicial determination regarding the criminality of an organisation violates the principles of equal justice and personal guilt.
5. Whether the legislative framework for declaring criminal organisations and assigning enhanced penalties is repugnant to the traditional judicial process.
6. Whether the provisions of the Violent Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013 (Qld) and related legislation are laws of general application or if they discriminate on impermissible grounds.
7. Whether the bail provisions under the Bail Act Amendment (Violent Lawless Associations) Act 2013 (Qld) are consistent with the exercise of judicial power and do not unjustifiably restrict the right to bail.
8. Whether the provisions in question enlist the courts to achieve legislative or executive objectives in a manner that contravenes the Kable principle.
9. Whether the declaration of criminal organisations by the Executive and the incorporation of these declarations into criminal offences constitutes an enlistment or conscription of the courts under the Kable principle.
10. Whether the challenged provisions are repugnant to the traditional judicial process by precluding the court from acting fairly and impartially in their application.
Held
1. Whether the amendments to the Criminal Code and related legislation infringe upon the Kable principle by imposing criminality and additional penalties through executive or legislative action without judicial oversight.
The court concluded that the legislative and executive imposition of criminality and penalties, without judicial oversight, did infringe upon the Kable principle.
2. Whether the requirement for a participant in a criminal organisation to prove the organisation is not a criminal organisation, as defined, imposes an unjustifiable burden under the principle of equality before the law.
The court concluded that the burden on the participant to prove the organisation is not a criminal organisation constituted an unjustifiable burden under the principle of equality before the law.
3. Whether the imposition of enhanced penalties based on membership in a declared criminal organisation constitutes a relevant distinction under the principle of equality before the law.
The court concluded that the imposition of enhanced penalties based on membership in a declared criminal organisation did not constitute a relevant distinction under the principle of equality before the law.
4. Whether the absence of a judicial determination regarding the criminality of an organisation violates the principles of equal justice and personal guilt.
The court concluded that the absence of a judicial determination regarding the criminality of an organisation did violate the principles of equal justice and personal guilt.
5. Whether the legislative framework for declaring criminal organisations and assigning enhanced penalties is repugnant to the traditional judicial process.
The court concluded that the legislative framework was not repugnant to the traditional judicial process.
6. Whether the provisions of the Violent Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013 (Qld) and related legislation are laws of general application or if they discriminate on impermissible grounds.
The court concluded that the provisions were laws of general application and did not discriminate on impermissible grounds.
7. Whether the bail provisions under the Bail Act Amendment (Violent Lawless Associations) Act 2013 (Qld) are consistent with the exercise of judicial power and do not unjustifiably restrict the right to bail.
The court concluded that the bail provisions were consistent with the exercise of judicial power and did not unjustifiably restrict the right to bail.
8. Whether the provisions in question enlist the courts to achieve legislative or executive objectives in a manner that contravenes the Kable principle.
The court concluded that the provisions did not enlist the courts to achieve legislative or executive objectives in a manner that contravened the Kable principle.
9. Whether the declaration of criminal organisations by the Executive and the incorporation of these declarations into criminal offences constitutes an enlistment or conscription of the courts under the Kable principle.
The court concluded that the declaration of criminal organisations by the Executive and the incorporation of these declarations into criminal offences did not constitute an enlistment or conscription of the courts under the Kable principle.
10. Whether the challenged provisions are repugnant to the traditional judicial process by precluding the court from acting fairly and impartially in their application.
The court concluded that the challenged provisions were not repugnant to the traditional judicial process by precluding the court from acting fairly and impartially in their application.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered whether the amendments to the Criminal Code and related legislation infringe upon the Kable principle by imposing criminality and additional penalties through executive or legislative action without judicial oversight. The plaintiff argued that the amendments were unconstitutional as they imposed penalties based on participation in a declared criminal organisation without any judicial determination of the criminality of the organisation. The court, however, rejected this argument, finding that the provisions were laws of general application and did not contravene the principle of equality before the law. The court held that the legislation allowed for judicial inquiry into the criminality of the organisation through the available defences.
The court also addressed whether the requirement for a participant in a criminal organisation to prove that the organisation is not a criminal organisation imposed an unjustifiable burden under the principle of equality before the law. The court found that the onus of proof on the accused did not render the legislation unconstitutional as it provided a mechanism for judicial inquiry into the criminality of the organisation.
The court examined whether the imposition of enhanced penalties based on membership in a declared criminal organisation constituted a relevant distinction under the principle of equality before the law. The court held that the differentiation in penalties was a relevant distinction as it was based on the objective of disrupting criminal organisations, which was a legitimate legislative purpose.
The court considered whether the absence of a judicial determination regarding the criminality of an organisation violated the principles of equal justice and personal guilt. The court found that the availability of a defence allowing the accused to prove that the organisation was not a criminal organisation satisfied the principles of equal justice and personal guilt.
Regarding whether the legislative framework for declaring criminal organisations and assigning enhanced penalties was repugnant to the traditional judicial process, the court held that the legislation did not preclude the court from acting fairly and impartially in its application. The court found that the provisions allowed for judicial inquiry and did not prevent the court from imposing penalties in a fair and impartial manner.
The court also examined whether the provisions of the Violent Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013 (Qld) and related legislation were laws of general application or if they discriminated on impermissible grounds. The court held that the provisions were laws of general application as they applied to all members of the public who participated in criminal organisations.
The court considered whether the bail provisions under the Bail Act Amendment (Violent Lawless Associations) Act 2013 (Qld) were consistent with the exercise of judicial power and did not unjustifiably restrict the right to bail. The court found that the provisions were consistent with the exercise of judicial power and did not breach any constitutional principle protecting or compelling equality before the law.
The court examined whether the provisions enlisted the courts to achieve legislative or executive objectives in a manner that contravened the Kable principle. The court held that the provisions did not enlist the courts to achieve legislative or executive objectives and that the court's role was limited to applying the law as prescribed by the legislature.
The court considered whether the declaration of criminal organisations by the Executive and the incorporation of these declarations into criminal offences constituted an enlistment or conscription of the courts under the Kable principle. The court found that the declaration of criminal organisations by the Executive did not amount to an enlistment or conscription of the courts as it was an orthodox exercise of executive or legislative authority.
Finally, the court examined whether the challenged provisions were repugnant to the traditional judicial process by precluding the court from acting fairly and impartially in their application. The court held that the provisions did not preclude the court from acting fairly and impartially and allowed for judicial inquiry into the criminality of the organisations.
In summary, the court found that the challenged provisions did not infringe upon the Kable principle, did not contravene the principle of equality before the law, and were consistent with the principles of equal justice, personal guilt, and the traditional judicial process. The court upheld the constitutionality of the legislation.