Krysiak v Hodgson
[2009] WASC 16
•16 JANUARY 2009
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: KRYSIAK -v- HODGSON [2009] WASC 16
CORAM: McKECHNIE J
HEARD: 16 JANUARY 2009
DELIVERED : 16 JANUARY 2009
FILE NO/S: SJA 1096 of 2008
BETWEEN: TADEUSZ EDMUND KRYSIAK
Appellant
AND
PAUL RICHARD HODGSON
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :MAGISTRATE B A LANE
File No :PE 37358 of 2008
Catchwords:
Courts and judges - Incomprehensible grounds of appeal - Vexatious grounds challenging the authority of the magistrate - Dangers of self-litigation
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Application for leave to appeal refused
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: No appearance
Respondent: No appearance
Solicitors:
Appellant: No appearance
Respondent: No appearance
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Glew v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260
Shaw v Jim McGinty in his capacity as Attorney General for Western Australia [2006] WASCA 231
McKECHNIE J: The appellant was charged that on 2 September 2007, at Shelley, he drove a vehicle 7 kilometres in excess of the stipulated speed limit which was 70 kilometres. He had gone through a speed camera. At my direction the application for leave to appeal was listed for argument and the appellant notified. The appellant has not appeared.
The appellant sought to challenge the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court on the prosecution notice before another Magistrate but was unsuccessful. When he tried to challenge jurisdiction again before the presiding Magistrate, she correctly pointed out that the matter had been ruled upon and the trial then proceeded.
The police called the Multanova operator who gave evidence as to the conduct in relation to the car and the photograph taken. The Magistrate correctly identified the legal principles and the burden of standard of proof and convicted the appellant who was then fined $75 together with costs. It is from that conviction that he seeks leave to appeal.
The grounds of appeal number 33, and the application for relief number 7. Ground 1 is simply incomprehensible.
Grounds 2 to 10 are vexatious. They seek in broad terms to advance an argument that there is some defect in the Court because the magistrates did not swear allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II and presided over a 'Star Chamber'.
Arguments identical to this have been raised from time to time in the last few years and the Court of Appeal on each occasion has ruled against the argument: Shaw v Jim McGinty in his capacity as Attorney General for Western Australia [2006] WASCA 231; Glew v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260. Any future appeals on the same grounds should be regarded as vexatious because the Court of Appeal's decision is final.
The grounds, in any event, have no reasonable prospects of success having regard to the law. The law is not as the appellant would advance it. The balance of the grounds display marked confusion as to the law, are vexatious and have no reasonable prospects of success.
I will not refer to all of them but, as an example, ground 17 says:
Both disregarded ['both' being the magistrates] and interfered with my right to contract by ignoring my demands that I had no wish to do so, in direct contravention of the affidavit filed into the matter, and continued to attempt to apparently enforce a non‑consensual adhesion 'contract' upon me with the entity 'State of Western Australia' despite my protestations.
That ground is simply gibberish.
Ground 25 says:
Both [again referring to each magistrate] failed in their fiducial duty to me both as a Subject of Her Majesty and by appointment (I had appointed each my fiduciary in the document lodged with the 'Magistrates Court') and neither rebutted this action.
Again, it is gibberish. A magistrate does not stand in a position of fiduciary to a litigant.
That is just a flavour of the grounds, all of which are similar, all of which are incomprehensible, none of which have reasonable prospects of success.
The application is accompanied by an affidavit which (for reasons that escape me) also bears a fingerprint; I presume that of the appellant. The jurat is not in the correct terms. The affidavits are irrelevant except insofar as the affidavit of service purports to note that the appeal notice and documents were served on the police.
This appeal highlights the dangers of self‑litigation. The appellant has made reference to a number of legal principles and authorities without apparently the slightest knowledge of their applicability. I would stay the whole proceedings as an abuse of process in the inherent powers of the Court and, in any event, I find that there is no reasonably arguable prospect of success on any ground. The application for leave to appeal is refused.
5
2
1