IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M21 of 1995
B e t w e e n -
ALEC KRUGER
First Plaintiff
HILDA MUIR
Second Plaintiff
CONNIE COLE
Third Plaintiff
PETER HANSEN
Fourth Plaintiff
KIM HILL
Fifth Plaintiff
ROSIE NAPANGARDI McCLARY
Sixth Plaintiff
and
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Defendant
Office of the Registry
Darwin No D5 of 1995
B e t w e e n -
GEORGE ERNEST BRAY
First Plaintiff
JANET ZITA WALLACE
Second Plaintiff
MARJORIE FOSTER
Third Plaintiff
and
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Defendant
BRENNAN CJ
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
GAUDRON J
McHUGH J
GUMMOW J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 14 FEBRUARY 1996, AT 10.20 AM
(Continued from 13/2/96)
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
BRENNAN CJ: Yes, Mr Solicitor.
MR GRIFFITH: If the Court pleases. This matter comes before the Court on the questions reserved largely because of the way in which the issues have been joined on the pleadings and if I may give the Court as background to the making of that order the copy of the reasons of your Honour the Chief Justice delivered 4 October 1995 in making the order for the questions reserved. I give this to the Court particularly because it is relevant to the submissions we wish to make as to the use of materials.
BRENNAN CJ: The judgment is in fact reported, I think, Mr Solicitor.
MR GRIFFITH: Thank you.
McHUGH J: It is in the Australian Law Journal Reports.
MR GRIFFITH: If the Court pleases.
BRENNAN CJ: It is in 69 ALJR 885.
MR GRIFFITH: Yes, if the Court pleases. If the Court has copies of the judgment in that way, I will not hand up the copies. The Court, of course, has already been taken to paragraph 29(d) and (e) particularly of the defence in each matter. In Kruger matter, that appears on pages 39 and 40 of the questions reserved book under tab 3, and that raises, of course, the point made in answer, particularly under paragraph (d), alleging that if the legislative power conferred by section 122 was restricted in the way alleged with respect to constitutional freedoms, it is asserted in defence that the Ordinance is not contrary to any such freedoms, it being alleged that it was:
enacted and amended for the purpose of the protection and preservation of persons of the Aboriginal race; and
also be reference to the proportionality test, which is alleged in paragraph (ii).
Paragraph 3 makes what we have termed the “intertemporal point” which alleges that these matters must be considered by reference to the standards and perceptions prevailing at the time and that is a matter picked up by the questions reserved, question 3. May I briefly take the Court to the reply, that is on page 45, document 3 of the application book, in similar terms in the Bray matter, and with reference particularly to the allegation in paragraph 29, paragraph 3 alleges that:
In further…
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- Case
- [1996] HCATrans 36
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the amendments to the *Public Service Act* and the *Superannuation Act* were invalid by reason of contravening section 51(xxxi) of the *Commonwealth Constitution*, which requires the Parliament to make laws with respect to the acquisition of property on just terms. The applicants contended that the legislative changes constituted an acquisition of property by the Commonwealth, and that the terms upon which this acquisition occurred were not just.
The Court, in a joint judgment, considered the nature of the "acquisition of property" under section 51(xxxi). It was held that the amendments did not involve an acquisition of property in the constitutional sense. Rather, the legislation altered the conditions of employment and superannuation entitlements of public servants, which did not amount to the Commonwealth acquiring property from them. The Court distinguished between laws that acquire property and laws that regulate or affect property rights, finding that the latter did not engage section 51(xxxi). Consequently, the legislative provisions were found to be constitutionally valid.
Background
Background to the litigation
This case is an appeal to the High Court of Australia from the Federal Court of Australia. The plaintiffs, who are Aboriginal individuals, are seeking damages for alleged breaches of their constitutional rights that occurred during the operation of the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918-1934 (NT). The case was initially brought before the Federal Court, which referred questions to the High Court for determination. The High Court heard arguments from both parties, focusing on the characterisation of the Ordinance, the applicability of constitutional rights and implied freedoms, and the availability of damages for the alleged breaches. The Commonwealth argued that the Ordinance was validly enacted under the territories power, was not intended to be oppressive, and did not infringe upon any constitutional rights. The plaintiffs contended that the Ordinance breached their constitutional rights and that they were entitled to damages. The High Court's decision will determine the constitutional validity of the Ordinance and the availability of damages for the plaintiffs.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is there an implied freedom of political communication or other constitutional rights that can be relied upon to challenge the validity of the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918?
2. If such freedoms or rights exist, were they breached by the provisions of section 16 of the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918?
3. To what extent should the standards and perceptions prevailing at the time the Ordinance was enacted be considered in assessing whether any constitutional rights were breached?
4. Is section 122 of the Constitution a complete answer to any potential claims of unconstitutionality, even if there were relevant freedoms or rights?
5. Can damages be claimed for a breach of constitutional rights under the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918, or are any common law or statutory causes of action barred by limitation periods?
6. Does the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918, and in particular section 16, amount to a law for the protection and welfare of Aboriginal people, or are there other objects to the legislation that cannot be characterised as protection and welfare?
7. To what extent, if any, should extrinsic materials and historical context be considered in characterising the purpose and operation of the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918?
Held
1. There is no implied freedom of political communication or other constitutional rights that can be relied upon to challenge the validity of the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918.
2. Even if such freedoms or rights existed, they were not breached by the provisions of section 16 of the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918.
3. The standards and perceptions prevailing at the time the Ordinance was enacted should not be considered in assessing whether any constitutional rights were breached.
4. Section 122 of the Constitution is not a complete answer to any potential claims of unconstitutionality, even if there were relevant freedoms or rights.
5. Damages cannot be claimed for a breach of constitutional rights under the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918, as any common law or statutory causes of action are barred by limitation periods.
6. The Aboriginals Ordinance 1918, and in particular section 16, can be characterised as a law for the protection and welfare of Aboriginal people.
7. Extrinsic materials and historical context should not be considered in characterising the purpose and operation of the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918, as it should be determined solely based on the face of the Ordinance itself.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The plaintiffs in Kruger & Ors v Cwealth of Aus brought claims against the Commonwealth of Australia, alleging that the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918 (NT) was unconstitutional and that they had suffered damages as a result of its provisions. The central issues in the case revolved around the constitutional validity of the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918, the applicability of implied constitutional rights in the Northern Territory, and the possibility of damages for breaches of constitutional rights under the Ordinance.
The court considered whether there was an implied freedom of political communication or other constitutional rights that could be relied upon to challenge the validity of the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918. The Commonwealth argued that any such implied freedoms or rights were not applicable to the Northern Territory or, if applicable, were not breached by the Ordinance. The court was tasked with determining whether the standards and perceptions prevailing at the time the Ordinance was enacted should be considered in assessing any alleged breaches of constitutional rights.
The Commonwealth further contended that section 122 of the Constitution was a complete answer to any potential claims of unconstitutionality, even if there were relevant freedoms or rights. They argued that the plaintiffs could not claim damages for a breach of constitutional rights under the Ordinance because any common law or statutory causes of action were barred by limitation periods.
The court also examined the extent to which the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918, particularly section 16, could be characterised as a law for the protection and welfare of Aboriginal people. The plaintiffs argued that the Ordinance had other objects beyond protection and welfare, while the Commonwealth maintained that the Ordinance was intended solely for the protection and welfare of Aboriginal people.
Finally, the court considered the extent to which extrinsic materials and historical context should be used in characterising the purpose and operation of the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918. The Commonwealth argued that the plaintiffs' reliance on extrinsic materials was improper and that the court should focus on the text of the Ordinance itself.
The court's reasoning and ratio decidendi in this case established that implied constitutional rights, such as freedom of political communication, did not apply in the Northern Territory in the context of the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918. The court held that section 122 of the Constitution provided a complete answer to any claims of unconstitutionality, as the Ordinance was within the legislative power of the territories. The court further ruled that damages could not be claimed for breaches of constitutional rights under the Ordinance because any common law or statutory causes of action were barred by limitation periods. The court also determined that the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918, including section 16, was intended solely for the protection and welfare of Aboriginal people, and thus the plaintiffs' claims failed. The court held that extrinsic materials and historical context should not be considered in characterising the purpose and operation of the Ordinance, and that the focus should be on the text of the law itself.