Kristoffersen & Sticamas (No 2)
[2025] FedCFamC1F 203
•27 March 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Kristoffersen & Sticamas (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 203
File number(s): CAC 2171 of 2024 Judgment of: GILL J Date of judgment: 27 March 2025 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – INTERIM HEARING – Where the father seeks supervised time with the child – Where final consent orders have been made in a foreign jurisdiction for the child to live with the mother in Australia and spend time with the father – Where such orders are registered – Where the circumstances of the case and best interests of the child warrant the reconsideration of final orders – Where there is jurisdiction to hear this matter – Where the child has not spent time with the father since September 2023 – Where the father withheld the child in a foreign jurisdiction from approximately early 2023 to late 2023 – Where the child has made a number of allegations against the father which suggest he is at risk of psychological and sexual harm in the father’s care – Where the mother is also a potential source of psychological risk to the child – Where the evidence is unable to be tested at this stage in proceedings – Child to live with the mother and spend no time with the father – Parties to do all things necessary to secure professional supervised time such that it will be available if time is ordered at a later date Legislation: Family Law Act 1975(Cth) – ss 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 60CG, 65DAAA, 70G and 70J
Family Law (Child Protection Convention) Regulations 2003 (Cth) – reg 12 and reg 15
Cases cited: Eaby & Speelman (2015) FLC 93-654; [2015] FamCAFC 104
Fitzwater v Fitzwater (2019) 60 Fam LR 212; [2019] FamCAFC 251
Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286; [2006] FamCA 1346
Isles & Nelissen (2022) FLC 94-092; [2022] FedCFamC1A 97
Salah & Salah (2016) FLC 93-713; [2016] FamCAFC 100
SS v AH [2010] FamCAFC 13
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 82 Date of hearing: 14 and 16 March 2025 Place: Canberra Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Berger, KC Solicitor for the Applicant: Farrar Gesini Dunn Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Haddock on 14 March 2025, litigant in person on 16 March 2025 Solicitor for the Respondent: Infinity Legal on 14 March 2025, litigant in person on 16 March 2025 Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Ms Cruise, Legal Aid ORDERS
CAC 2171 of 2024 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR KRISTOFFERSEN
Applicant
AND: MS STICAMAS
Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER
ORDER MADE BY:
GILL J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 MARCH 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Final parenting orders in force for X, born 2014 (X), may be the subject of reconsideration.
THE COURT ORDERS UNTIL FURTHER ORDER THAT:
2.The Foreign Measure, being the orders of the City B Local Court in proceedings numbered … and … made in early 2023 and as registered in mid-2024 are varied by their suspension.
3.X shall live with Ms Sticamas (the mother).
4.Subject to orders for the preparation of, and directions given by a Court Child Expert in relation to the preparation of a Family Report prepared pursuant to s 62G of the Family Law Act 1975, Mr Kristoffersen (the father) shall spend no time with X.
5.The mother and father shall forthwith take all steps necessary, including executing all documents necessary and completing all intake processes that are necessary, to cause themselves and X to be registered with D Family Services for the purposes of the professional supervision of the father’s time with X.
6.Pursuant to s 62G(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the parties and X attend upon a Court Child Expert (practicing under their appointment as a family consultant) for the purposes of a preparation of Family Report (“the Report”), such Report to be released at the next available opportunity and that the Report address:
(a)Any views expressed by X and any matters that may affect the weight to be placed upon those views, whether by virtue of X’s maturity, or level of understanding, or X being subject to influence or otherwise;
(b)X’s developmental, psychological emotional and cultural needs;
(c)The nature and characteristics of the relationships between X and the father and X and the mother;
(d)The capacity of the mother and father to provide for X’s needs, including as to their insight into X’s needs;
(e)The effect upon, and any benefits for X of:
(i)Spending time with the father either in person or by electronic means; and
(ii)Spending no time and having no contact with the father;
(f)The arrangements that may promote X’s safety should he have contact with or spend time with the father, in particular, but not limited to safety from emotional or psychological harm or trauma; and
(g)Any other matters that the Court Child Expert considers important to the welfare and best interests of X.
7.Not later than 4.00 pm on 6 May 2025 the parties must provide their contact telephone numbers and email addresses to …@....
8.Subject to a written direction by the Court Child Expert to the contrary, the mother and father shall attend in person upon, and shall cause X to attend in person upon, the Court Child Expert at the Registry of Division 1 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia on 13 May 2025, for the purposes of the preparation of the Family Report.
9.The mother and father shall otherwise attend upon, and cause X to attend upon the Court Child Expert at such times, places and in such manner as directed by the Court Child Expert.
10.The Court Child Expert shall be at liberty to inspect any material filed by the parties, and otherwise the following:
(a)Any section 67ZBD or 67ZBE, or subpoena material produced in these proceedings.
(b)Any other relevant material presently before the Court in admissible form.
11.Upon the Report being provided to the Court, the Court will release the Report and provide a copy to each party (or if represented, the party’s lawyer) and to any Independent Children’s Lawyer in the proceedings.
12.Unless a party objects in writing within 14 days of the date of releasing the Report, a copy of the Report may further be provided to the following, if the Court is requested to do so for a purpose related to the care, welfare or development of the child/ren:
(a)a Children’s Court;
(b)a child protection authority;
(c)a State or Territory legal aid authority; and
(d)a convener of any legal dispute resolution conference.
13.Unless otherwise ordered, no person shall release the Report, or provide access to the Report to any other person.
AND
14.It is directed that a Judicial Registrar of Division 1 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia send to the competent authority of Country E the documents identified by Regulation 17 of the Family Law (Child Protection) Regulations 2003 (Cth).
15.Either party, the Independent Children’s Lawyer and the Court Child Expert are at liberty to seek the urgent relisting of this matter for further orders and directions.
AND
16.The matter is listed for further directions at 2:00 pm on 23 April 2025.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GILL J:
The applicant father, Mr Kristoffersen, born in 1987, and the respondent mother, Ms Sticamas, born in 1987, married in mid-2014.
The judgment concerns an application by the father for contact with the child, X (“X”), in circumstances where he has not spent any time with, or spoken to him, since September 2023.
In the interim the initial contest between the parents is as to whether the father will have professionally supervised time with X, or no time, or no time pending further assessment. The Independent Children’s Lawyer (the ICL) was cautiously supportive of orders supporting a relationship between X and the father.
DOCUMENTS RELIED UPON:
The father relied upon the following documents:
(1)Initiating Application filed 14 November 2024
(2)Affidavit of the father filed 5 March 2025
(3)Notice of Child Abuse, Family Violence or Risk filed 14 November 2024
(4)Case outline document and minute of orders sought filed 7 March 2025.
The mother relied upon the following documents:
(1)Response to Initiating Application filed 17 February 2025
(2)Affidavit of the mother filed 17 February 2025
(3)Notice of Child Abuse, Family Violence or Risk filed 17 February 2025
(4)Case outline document filed 6 March 2025.
The ICL relied upon the following documents:
(1)Initiating Application filed 14 November 2024
(2)Affidavit of the father filed 5 March 2025
(3)Response to Initiating Application filed 17 February 2025
(4)Affidavit of the mother filed 17 February 2025
(5)Case outline document filed 7 March 2025.
Jurisdictional issues
The parties each identified jurisdictional issues arising from the registration in Australia of orders made by a court in City B in early 2023. Before embarking upon limited analysis of this issue, on either of the parties’ approaches, the Court has jurisdiction to determine the substantive dispute between the parties.
It was uncontroversial that the orders were registered in mid-2024 pursuant to Regulation 12 of the Family Law (Child Protection Convention) Regulations 2003 (Cth). By their registration the orders became a recognised foreign measure with the same effect as a Commonwealth measure, being a Commonwealth personal protection measure.
The mother styles her application as pursuant to Regulation 15, for the cancellation of the foreign measure, on the basis that the registration is contrary to public policy as it is contrary to the child's best interests in the current circumstances, as identified below.
The father styles his application on the basis that the registration is pursuant to s 70G of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”), and where, pursuant to s 70J, each party seeks that jurisdiction now be exercised, and that the exercise is required for the child’s welfare.
On either basis jurisdiction is made out.
To the extent that s 65DAAA has application, as seen below, a significant change in circumstances has occurred that necessitates the reconsideration of orders for X. Such reconsideration is in the best interests of X.
BACKGROUND
The parties met in Country C in 2011 and were married in mid-2014. Their son, X, was born in Country C in 2014. In 2018 the parties moved to Country E. They separated on a final basis in February 2020 and were divorced in mid-2020 in City F. The mother alleges that the father has harassed and threatened her since January 2020. The father denies this.
The mother has since remarried to Mr G. She has had two further children, H, born 2021, and J, born 2023.
The father is a citizen of Country C and Country L whilst the mother is a Country C citizen who was born in Country E. The father currently resides in Country L whilst the mother has relocated to Australia with her current husband who is an Australian citizen.
During their marriage, the parties lived in a number of overseas cities, with the husband generally returning from his career position in City M to wherever the mother had been able to find employment in education. The father describes a period of time when he had the primary care of X while the mother was undertaking study for multiple degrees.
Following separation, the mother moved with X to City F. In mid-2020 the parties signed a divorce agreement wherein they both agreed to live in City F. It was also agreed that they would share parental responsibility, and that X would spend time with the father during the second and fourth weekend of each month and half of school holidays. The father complains that immediately after these orders, in mid-2020, the mother relocated with X to City N in Country E.
Two months later in mid-2020, the mother commenced proceedings in City N, Country E, effectively seeking sole custody and sole parental responsibility. The father commenced proceedings in City F, seeking that the mother and X return to City F. The Country C Court determined that the City N Court was the appropriate forum to hear the dispute.
In late 2020 the City N Court made interim orders suspending the father’s time with X. The mother alleges that she raised allegations of sexual violence against the father in respect of X in the Country E proceedings, and that the father was prohibited from entering Country E territory due to threats to abduct X.
The father contends that this was related to COVID-19 restrictions, given his residence in Country C. He accepts that the mother had raised concerns that the father may abduct X. He says that the court ultimately did not accept these concerns. The father disputes that the mother raised sexual concerns with the Country E court.
In late 2020 the City N Court made orders for X to spend time with the father and for the increase of that time.
The father accepts that in February 2021 the mother wrote to him asking him not to sleep in the same bed as X. Accepting that he and X had shared a king bed when he visited, the father asserts that he accepted the mother’s request and agreed to book accommodation with twin beds. The mother alleges that the Country E Court had to intervene for the bed-sharing to cease.
The parents agree that in mid-2021 orders were made by the Court in City N permitting the mother to relocate to City B with X. The father says that these orders were made with his agreement. He further describes that attached to the orders were notes as to assurances given that the parents would not migrate to either Country L or Australia with X in the future.
Further court events took place in City B. In late 2022, the father says the mother raised the prospect of X moving to Australia via correspondence from her lawyer and the following month in late 2022 the mother raised this proposal in court.
In late 2022 the wife’s husband relocated to Australia.
In early 2023, the parties entered into consent parenting orders made by the City B Local Court in Country E (“the City B Orders”). The orders provided for the mother to move to Australia with X, and for time between X and the father in both Country C and Australia. These Orders were registered with the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia on 10 July 2024.
The father says that in early 2023 the mother, in anticipation of an imminent move to Australia, removed X from school. However, she was unable to secure a prompt visa for X.
In 2023 the wife, then eight months pregnant, moved to Australia with H. She had been unable to obtain a visa for X, despite the father having executed all relevant documents. The parties agreed that X would stay with the father while they waited for a visa. X entered into the father’s care in early 2023.
The mother contends that the father otherwise undermined her attempt to obtain a visa for X. The father accepts that he did not complete forms in a manner that supported the assertions made by the mother to the visa authority, such as submitting that X was not travelling there as a tourist, but rather to live permanently.
X remained with the father. The mother further contends that the father alleged to Country E authorities that she had abandoned X. The father denies such.
The parties agreed that the father would travel with X to Australia in early 2023. The father says that X’s visa was refused. They did not travel to Australia. The father explains that this was due to the lack of a long-term visa for X and that it was his intention to comply with the orders.
The mother, having given birth to J in Australia in 2023, commenced proceedings under the Hague Convention in Country C in mid-2023.
The father contends that the mother misrepresented both her own and X’s visa status to the Country C Court. The mother contends that despite orders that the father travel to Australia with X prior to the resolution of those proceedings, the father did not do so. The father appeared to accept this, explaining that he considered that the mother’s visa was non-compliant with the orders. The father accepted in these proceedings that he was not justified in retaining X. It appears that the court in Country C concluded similarly.
The mother further alleges that X “was more than often crying” when having calls with her during this period, and that X “suggested to me that he had experienced sexual violence.” The mother says that X sent secret messages via WhatsApp to the mother. In late 2023, the mother made a report to Country C police, formally making a complaint to the Country C police in late 2023, including as to sexual and psychological abuse.
The father denies having either sexually or psychologically abused X. Whilst he appeared to accept that X sent messages to the mother, including on 27 August 2023, that “(h)e’s started again. He put his hand in my pants”, he denied having done so.
The father produced photographs and videos of his time with X suggestive of a warm and enjoyable relationship between them. This included a video of X playing a piano piece, purportedly composed for the father by X, and explained as a gift for the father “because I love you. And, I just wanted to show you that I love you and yes, so I did this for you, it’s from me, only for you...”
The father says that he facilitated electronic contact between X and the mother. Meanwhile the father travelled with X to and from Country L to visit family. The mother alleges that the trip was traumatic for X, the father concealing their destination in circumstances where X expected to travel to Australia. Whilst the father accepted that he concealed the destination from X, he explained that he had made it clear to X that they were not going to Australia, and the concealing of the destination was a game between them similar to a TV show that they watched together that operated on a similar premise. He says that at the airport he revealed that they were travelling to City O.
The proceedings continued before the Country C Court in late 2023, with judgment delivered in favour of the mother a short time later. The mother retained X from late 2023, when the father offered for her to spend four hours with X in Country C. She did not return him. X has not spent time with the father since.
Following judgment the mother brought X to Australia.
The mother further contends that during a telephone call with the father on 1 December 2023, the father threatened that if the mother did not permit the father to see X that he would come to the mother’s home and kill the mother and her children. The mother says that she reported such to the AFP, and that she was granted an interim family violence order in early 2024, which was subsequently withdrawn. The father denies ever making such a threat or being the author of a document the mother contends constitutes a threat.
Between February 2024 to August 2024, the parties unsuccessfully engaged in mediation.
The mother says that X refused telephone contact with the father. The mother further describes that X has been attending upon a child psychiatrist twice monthly since this time. She provided an assessment, that she describes as a psychiatric assessment from a purported child psychologist, Mr P. The report from Mr P indicates therapeutic support and describes post-traumatic stress disorder.
The father expresses doubt as to the genuineness of Mr P, noting that in response to his request from the mother for details, he received an email address and advice that he practices out of City F. He further asserted that searches had revealed no such person.
The father further contends that the mother has relied upon purported orders of a Country C court that are a fabrication.
The mother tendered a document purporting to be a curriculum vitae for Mr P, describing him as a Child Psychiatrist, conducting an online practice with Country C speaking children.
In June the father reported the mother to the local welfare agency, on the basis that the mother was harming X through the lack of contact between X and the father.
The mother alleges that the father sent a death threat to her home address in mid-2024, with a number of threats being made in the period leading up to late 2024. The mother and her husband have relocated their address. The father denies having done so. Whilst he accepts that his handwriting appears on the envelope of the document sent, he denies that the threat is either in his writing or that he is responsible for it.
The mother has obtained a further interim family violence order from late 2024.
The mother describes that X has said “Dad is a monster,” “Dad is a psycho’” “Dad is a paedophile,” and “I never want to see Dad ever.” She says that X described that the father had put his hands dunder X’s pants often, and everywhere, when doing sports activity in the house, and that the father washed all of X’s body including his body parts, as well as watching X bathe. The father denied such conduct, observing that he and the mother assisted X to bathe until he was aged about 5 years, after which he accorded X privacy.
The parties tendered various documents in support of their cases.
The mother at Exhibit M1 tendered material produced by the Region Q welfare agency. That document contained some departmental assessment of the father, asserting that he pursued legal remedies without recognition of the psychological costs of restoring contact with X, that he lacked insight into child development, and that he blamed the mother.
The father is recorded as making allegations against the mother. He is recorded as having expressed himself strongly to the agency, describing the situation as torture, accusing the mother of having lied to the Country C court and engaging in the brainwashing of X. Particularly in the context of the father not being a native English speaker, and of being from another culture, it is premature to place emphasis on the tone of his responses to the agency.
The mother alleged to the agency that the father adopted a religious radical lifestyle and expressed prejudiced views against homosexuals and particular groups of people and people of a particular ethnicity.
Of greater significance in these interim proceedings, the mother described comments made by X while in the care of the father being potentially suggestive of sexual abuse. She described X as refusing to speak with the father, and produced a drawing attributed to X depicting the father as a devil.
X participated in what was described as a “free narrative account” with an officer of the agency, describing the father as having engaged in “weird stuff” constituted by watching X shower, putting his hands down the front of X’s underpants in his genital region, and expressing that the father had caused him significant distress and fear.
The mother also tendered purported reports from Mr P, from 14 December 2023 and from 5 July 2024. Almost no information was provided as to how Mr P engaged with X, nor how he was briefed, and the manner in which he used the assertions made by the mother in relation to examining X’s experience with the father.
The first report identified a background of wrongful retention for six months by the father, and described the use of various tests. X was described as displaying “significant anxiety and emotional withdrawal” during the interview. It was reported by X that he had failed to recognise his mother on reunification with her, describing his time with the father as a “nightmare.” Mr P concluded that the “evidence suggests that [X] may have experienced psychological trauma, potentially involving psychological violence.” X was reported to have elevated anxiety and depression, and to show clear signs of PTSD. Treatment was recommended.
The second report referred to having engaged in cognitive behavioural therapy with X, and the use of assessments via clinical interviews and the use of psychological tools. Mr P reported that X exhibited anxiety “when discussing his past traumatic experiences.” It asserted that he gave specific accounts of violence he observed and experienced, and distress. X was recorded as refusing to engage with the father, and was reported to have recounted “uncomfortable experiences involving the father's intrusive behaviours during bathing routines.” The second report assessed X as continuing to meet criteria for PTSD related to traumatic experiences of abduction.
Conduct of recent Australian proceedings
Part-way through the first, and only listed, day of interim hearing, the mother’s counsel and solicitor made a verbal application seeking leave to withdraw. Neither the father’s counsel nor the ICL objected to this occurring, so the mother then became self-represented. At this stage, both counsel for the father and for the mother had concluded their final submissions, with the ICL at the commencement of hers.
The mother sought that the hearing be adjourned for two days, so that she have time to instruct new legal representation. At the resumption of proceedings on 14 March 2025, the mother once again appeared self-represented, explaining that she had been unable to find a lawyer who was willing to represent her given the complexity of the issues and the short-time available to become familiar with the matter. The mother then sought that the proceedings be adjourned for a further 28 days. This adjournment application was ultimately refused, with reasons for such provided in an ex-tempore judgment.
No explanation was proffered by the mother as to why she had lost her legal representation.
PRINCIPLES
The paramount consideration in determining what parenting order should be made is, pursuant to s 60CA of the Act, the best interests of each child. Those best interests are to be determined on consideration of the matters set out at s 60CC of the Act, in the legislative context of the objects and principles set out in s 60B of the Act and, pursuant to s 60CG, in a manner that does not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family violence. Further, where applicable, s 65DAAA sets out a reasoning pathway to be followed.
Given the interim nature of the proceedings, there are significant limits that are imposed upon the manner of dealing with the s 60CC considerations in determining best interests. Such limitations were identified by the Full Court in cases such as Salah & Salah, where it was observed that “[i]t is very common in interim parenting proceedings to see factual disputes which cannot be determined without the evidence being tested in the context of a trial.”[1] Reflecting the earlier case of Goode & Goode, it was accepted that the court in interim proceedings should not be drawn into:
…issues of fact or matters relating to the merits of the substantive case where findings are not possible. The Court also looks to the less contentious matters, such as the agreed facts and issues not in dispute...[2]
[1] Salah & Salah (2016) FLC 93-713 at [37].
[2] Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 at [68].
Importantly, however, it was accepted, as identified in Eaby & Speelman, that such an approach “does not mean that merely because the facts are in dispute the evidence on the topic must be disregarded, and the case determined solely by reference to the agreed facts.”[3]
[3] Eaby & Speelman (2015) FLC 93-654 at [18].
That is, the court, despite the limitations on testing the evidence, and the inability to make concrete findings, is still required to give consideration to issues raised, such as those of risk and, as SS v AH identified:
…weigh the probabilities of competing claims and the likely impact on children in the event that a controversial assertion is acted upon or rejected. It is not always feasible when dealing with the immediate welfare of children simply to ignore an assertion because its accuracy has been put in issue.[4]
[4] SS v AH [2010] FamCAFC 13 at [100].
Given that the key issue raised to justify the departure from the current orders is that of risk, it is important to recognise the nature of the court’s function in assessing such, even in the context of the limitations imposed by the interim nature of the proceedings. In Isles & Nelissen,[5] the approach to risk was adopted (at [50]) from Fitzwater as:
[A] predictive exercise and while it is, naturally enough, liable to be influenced by factual findings about past events, the contemplation of risk entails the foresight of possible harm.[6]
(Emphasis in original)
[5] Isles & Nelissen (2022) FLC 94-092.
[6] Fitzwater v Fitzwater (2019) 60 Fam LR 212 at [138] (“Fitzwater v Fitzwater”).
It was accepted that this is an exercise to be undertaken even where the underlying facts cannot necessarily be determined one way or another. For example, the court accepted from Fitzwater in a different, but analogous, context of risk of sexual abuse that:
It cannot be correct that the unacceptable risk of a child’s sufferance of harm through future sexual abuse can only ever be established if it is proven a fact, on the balance of probabilities, that the child (or another) has already been sexually abused in the past. Depending upon the strength of the evidence placed before the court, the possibility of past sexual abuse may of itself be sufficient to establish the chance of future sexual abuse. That has long been accepted as true (Nikolakis & Nikolakis [2010] FamCAFC 52 at [41], [44], [49]-[53], [96]; Partington & Cade (No.2) (2009) FLC 93-422 at [56]-[61]; Johnson and Page at [68], [71], [76], [77]).[7]
(Emphasis in original)
[7] Fitzwater v Fitzwater at [140].
The limitations inherent to interim proceedings necessarily form a part of the consideration of risk.
CONSIDERATION
These interim proceedings occur against a background of multiple iterations of consent orders entered into in Country E and Country C that did not appear to be directed to the issues that are prominent in the current proceedings.
Those previous orders accepted that X would live with the mother, but also that he would spend significant time with the father, even if X was to live in Australia. Those provide a strong reason to accede to the father’s application.
Since that time there have been disruptions in X’s contact and living arrangements with each of the parents. The first was by unjustified retention of X overseas by the father contrary to the orders. The second has been the cessation of time between the father and X since X’s move to Australia in late 2023, again contrary to the orders.
There is reasonable evidence pointing to, as asserted by the father, a warm, important and appropriate relationship between the father and X, exemplified during the period of retention overseas.
There is evidence that sets out a reasonable basis to consider that X was traumatised in that period with the father, and subjected to potential sexual acts by the father, such that he is now highly resistant to any contact with the father.
There is evidence suggestive that the father otherwise poses a risk to the mother and her family, evidenced by purported threats.
Each of these matters is highly contested, but not susceptible to factual resolution on an interim basis.
On the facts as posed by each parent the other is a potential source of at least psychological harm to X.
These matters point to the case being accorded priority within the list to allow the resolution of these important factual contests promptly.
In the meantime, interim orders are required to regulate X’s living arrangements pending further resolution.
X’s comments to the local welfare agency are sufficient to give priority to the protection of X from potential trauma and risk posed by any contact with the father pending further assessment.
Whilst the father has only proposed professionally supervised time, there is not a sufficient basis to consider such as adequate to protect X from exposure to trauma, or from other physical risks that may arise.
This should not be thought of as a conclusion at this stage that the father does in fact pose such risks to X, but rather that the risks raised by the untested evidence require temporary protective steps.
CONCLUSION
The appropriate suite of arrangements is to require the parties to do all things necessary to secure professionally supervised time so that such may be in place promptly should it be determined to be the appropriate arrangement for X. Further a family report should be prepared pursuant to s 60G of the Act to provide a better evidential basis to determine X’s best interests. Such a report can be prepared promptly, to then allow either further interim or final determination of the matter.
I certify that the preceding eighty-two (82) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Gill. Associate:
Dated: 27 March 2025
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