Kristoff and Emerson

This matter concerned an application by Ms Kristoff for property division orders against Mr Emerson, with whom she alleged a de facto relationship existed from 2003 to late 2011. The application was brought under Part VIIIAB of the *Family Law Act*. The parties met in 1999, initially through Ms Kristoff's work as a sex worker, and developed a friendship with a shared interest in horses and country life. Their sexual relationship ceased to be commercial around 2000, and they travelled together and Ms Kristoff assisted with renovations on Mr Emerson's property. Ms Kristoff ceased working as a sex worker in late 2001 or early 2002. The relationship experienced a breakdown and reconciliation around late 2002 to early 2003, after which Ms Kristoff began spending most nights at Mr Emerson's property in Property G.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the parties had been in a de facto relationship within the meaning of the *Family Law Act* and, if so, whether the contributions made by Ms Kristoff warranted an alteration of Mr Emerson's property interests in her favour. The court was required to assess the nature and extent of their relationship, including cohabitation, financial interdependence, and the presence of children, to determine if the threshold for a de facto relationship was met and to evaluate the significance of Ms Kristoff's contributions.

Judge Brewster dismissed Ms Kristoff's application, finding that he was not satisfied that the parties had been in a de facto relationship. Even if he had been so satisfied, he found that Ms Kristoff's contributions, which included some domestic assistance and minor help with renovations, were not of a nature or significance to justify altering Mr Emerson's property interests. He noted the absence of significant financial interdependence and children of the relationship, and was not satisfied that Mr Emerson was responsible for Ms Kristoff leaving her employment or that she had been adversely affected financially by the relationship.

Consequently, the applicant's application was dismissed. The judge indicated that while the applicant had been wholly unsuccessful, which would normally weigh heavily in favour of an order for costs, he was inclined to refuse any application for costs due to the significant disparity in the parties' financial circumstances.