Kremastos v Councillor Conduct Tribunal - [2022] QCAT 319

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:

Kremastos v Councillor Conduct Tribunal & Anor [2022] QCAT 319

PARTIES:

john kremastos

(applicant)

v

councillor conduct Tribunal

(first respondent)

THE INDEPENDENT ASSESSOR
(second respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

GAR055-21

MATTER TYPE:

General administrative review matters

DELIVERED ON:

15 August 2022

HEARING DATE:

On the papers

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Member Deane

ORDERS:

The Application for miscellaneous matters filed 4 August 2021 is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION AND OF PARTIES – PARTIES – where an application for review of a decision – whether persons referred to in decision should be joined or given leave to intervene or are otherwise able to seek orders to make submissions directly to the Tribunal

Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), s 25

Local Government Act 2009 (Qld), s 150O, s 150P, s 150R,
s 150T, s 150W, s 150AI, s 150AJ, s 150AL, s 150AM,
s 150AN, s 150AO, s 150AP, s 150AQ, s 150AR,
s 150AS, s 150AT

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 3, s 17, s 18, s 19, s 20, s 21, s 24, s 28, s 40, s 41, s 42, s 62, s 95

A B Hill Constructions Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2015] QCAT 46

Assistant Commissioner Wilson v Chapman and Anor; Chapman v Assistant Commissioner Wilson and Anor [2012] QCATA 110
Body Corporate for the Sun Apartments Building v Commissioner for Liquor and Gaming Regulation & Anor [2017] QCAT 417
Coral Homes (Qld) Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority [2012] QCATA 241
Darryl Hathway Painting and Decorating v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2019] QCAT 4
Kehl v Board of Professional Engineers of Queensland [2010] QCATA 58
Levy v State of Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579
Oliver v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission [2017] QCAT 50
Re Ludeke; Ex Parte Customs Officers’ Association of Australia (1985) 155 CLR 513
Taouk v Queensland Building Services Authority [2013] QCAT 96

Trojan Resorts Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for The Reserve (No. 2) [2018] QCAT 366

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld)

REASONS FOR DECISION

Former Councillor Kremastos sought review of a decision of the Councillor Conduct Tribunal (CCT) reference F19/9836, which substantiated a finding of misconduct (Decision).[1]
[1]Filed 19 January 2021.
Steven Paul and Julianne Toogood, who are not currently parties to these review proceedings and were not parties to the CCT proceedings, filed an Application for miscellaneous matters seeking leave to file an application requesting orders that the Tribunal ‘consider attached submissions and attached documents’ (AMM).[2] Leave was said to be necessary in view of an undertaking given by them in Supreme Court proceedings on 20 November 2019 to seek leave prior to filing or commencing proceedings.
[2]Filed 4 August 2021.
The Tribunal directed the Toogoods to serve the AMM on the parties to these proceedings, directed that submissions be filed and served in respect of the AMM and for the AMM to be determined on the papers.[3] Submissions have been received.[4] I now proceed to decide the AMM only and not the review proceedings.
[3]Directions 14 September 2021; 18 July 2022.
[4]Toogood submissions filed 21 September 2021 and 6 October 2021, IA’s submissions filed 5 October 2021, Mr Kremastos’ submissions filed 5 October 2021. The CCT did not file submissions.
Submissions filed by the Toogoods[5] set out the orders being sought by them as follows:
(a)An order pursuant to section 42(1)(b) or (c) of the QCAT Act that they be added as parties;
(b)An order pursuant to section 20(2) of the QCAT Act that material provided by the Toogoods be considered in reviewing the decision in this matter.
(c)Alternatively,
(i) an order pursuant to section 21(3) of the QCAT Act that the Tribunal direct the Respondents to provide the material provided to them by the Toogoods in relation to Mr Kremastos;
(ii) An order pursuant to section 20(2) of the QCAT Act that material provided to the Respondents by the Toogoods be considered in reviewing the decision in this matter.
(d)Alternatively, an order pursuant to section 3(b) of the QCAT Act that the Tribunal considered the written submissions filed by the Toogoods in this matter.
[5]Filed electronically 21 September 2021.
The AMM contends that the CCT made errors in fact and law and their submissions are to correct those errors. They contend they were denied natural justice as the Decision made extensive references to them and ‘had direct legal implications’ for them but they were not given an opportunity to be heard. They refer to Levy v State of Victoria[6] in respect of a right to intervene where a person has the necessary legal interest.
[6](1997) 189 CLR 579.
The 21 September 2021 Submissions set out ‘the reasons for the orders sought’. They set out various bases ‘that could provide a basis’ for them filing or the CCT providing and the Tribunal considering their submissions in the absence of being a party and in the absence of those being accepted the Toogoods apply to be joined.[7]
[7]Submissions filed 21 September 2021, [8].
I am not satisfied that the Toogoods sufficiently address the basis on which it is contended that a non-party, as distinct from a party, is entitled to apply for orders in a Tribunal proceeding (apart from a non-party seeking to be joined as a party or for leave to intervene). I consider the question of joinder first.
I accept that if the Toogoods are joined as a party to review proceedings then the Tribunal would ordinarily make directions allowing them an opportunity to file submissions and, where appropriate, evidence in the proceedings upon which they intend to rely at the hearing.
The Toogoods refer to various decisions of the CCT. The only decision the subject of this review is the Decision. I disregard the references to other CCT decisions, with which they also take issue.

Should the Toogoods be joined as parties?

I find the Toogoods should not be joined as parties to this review proceeding.
QCAT Practice Direction No 8 of 2013 provides a person making an application for joinder must specify the capacity in which the person is sought to be joined as a party to the proceeding i.e. whether the person is to be joined as an applicant or as a respondent. The present joinder application does not comply with the requirements of the Practice Direction.
Parties to a proceeding in the tribunal’s review jurisdiction are the applicant, the decision-maker for the reviewable decision, an intervener under section 41 of the QCAT Act, a party joined under section 42 of the QCAT Act or someone else an enabling Act states is a party to the proceeding.[8]
[8]QCAT Act, s 40.
The Toogoods contend that their interests are ‘directly affected both in law and reputation as are our legislated human rights which have not been considered.’[9] They refer to the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (HRA).
[9]Submissions filed 21 September 2021, [10].
They contend that the CCT breached their human rights in relation to privacy and reputation.[10] Section 25 of the HRA provides:
A person has the right—
(a) not to have the person’s privacy, family, home or correspondence unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with; and
(b) not to have the person’s reputation unlawfully attacked.
[10]Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), s 25.
They contend the CCT accepted and published defamatory and false information naming them without a right of response or comment such that they were denied natural justice. They say until they read the Decision, they were unaware of the submissions and evidence before the CCT.
They say they are aggrieved by the Decision and that they are mentioned on 14 out of 21 pages of the Decision. They say that there is a substantial benefit to them of having a correct decision but do not set out clearly what that benefit is said to be.
They say there is a substantial injustice to them in allowing the Decision to be published as it contains defamatory and untrue allegations. It is apparent that not all of the allegations, which they contend are untrue relate directly to them. They say they have an interest in maintaining the finding of misconduct as the relevant council resolution ‘will be ultra vires’ and that the resolution involved legal proceedings commenced against them in the District Court.
They believe the Decision is incorrect in a number of respects, including that a harsher penalty ought to be imposed, and say they were not given an opportunity to provide additional evidence to the CCT, which they say is relevant to the issues and should be received by the Tribunal to allow it to arrive at the correct and preferable decision on a fresh hearing of the merits.
The Tribunal may make an order joining a party if it considers the person should be bound by, or have the benefit of, the decision; the person’s interests may be affected; or for another reason, it is desirable that the person be joined.[11]
[11]QCAT Act, s 42(1).
The Tribunal has accepted that section 42 of the QCAT Act confers a discretion, which is not enlivened unless the Tribunal is satisfied that one or more of the criteria set out in section 42(1) is satisfied.[12] In addition to meeting the threshold test, the Tribunal has accepted that there must be utility and purpose in joining the proposed party.[13]
[12]Coral Homes (Qld) Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority [2012] QCATA 241, [6].
[13]A B Hill Constructions Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2015] QCAT 46, [20].
The Toogoods say they should be joined as their interests may be affected or for another reason it is desirable that they are joined.
Mr Kremastos objects to the joinder. The Independent Assessor (IA) submits that providing one of the categories in s 40(2)(sic) of the QCAT Act is satisfied it is a matter for the Tribunal’s discretion whether the Toogoods should be joined.[14] The CCT did not file any submissions.
[14]IA Submissions, [25].
The nature of the proceedings and the orders, which are available to be made, are relevant to the exercise of the discretion to join.
The Decision is a decision under the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld) (LGA). The LGA sets out a mechanism for dealing with complaints and allegations about inappropriate conduct and misconduct by councillors. Complaints may be made or referred to the IA.[15] The IA investigates the conduct of the councillor[16] and if reasonably satisfied that the councillor’s conduct is misconduct, IA may apply to the CCT,[17] which then conducts a hearing to decide whether the councillor has engaged in misconduct and, if so, what action should be taken to discipline the councillor .[18] The IA is a party to the CCT proceedings and in the CCT proceedings bears the onus of proving the councillor engaged in misconduct or inappropriate conduct.[19]
[15]LGA, s150O, s150P, s150R.
[16]Ibid, s150T.
[17]Ibid, s150W.
[18]Ibid, s150AI, s150AJ, s150AL, s150AM, s150AN, s150AO, s150AP, s150AQ, s150AR.
[19]Ibid, s150AN.
The LGA provides that the IA, the councillor, the local government and the complainant, if the CCT has their contact details, are entitled to be given notice of the CCT decision[20] and that a notice about a decision, other than a decision to recommend the councillor’s suspension or dismissal, given to the IA or councillor under subsection (2)(b) must be a ‘QCAT information notice for the decision’.[21]
[20]Ibid, s 150AS(2)(b).
[21]Ibid, s 150AS(3).
The only persons entitled to apply to the Tribunal for a review of the CCT decision are the IA or the councillor as they are the only persons entitled to be given a ‘QCAT information notice for a decision’ under section 150 AS(3).[22]
[22]Ibid, s 150AT.
This is to be distinguished from the wider group of recipients of notice of the decision under section 150 AS(2)(b), all of which are not granted the right to seek review in the Tribunal. Even if I am wrong about this limitation on the right to review, I note that the Toogoods, who on the evidence before me were not the complainants, were not persons entitled to receive notice of the Decision under section 150 AS(2) of the LGA.
The express limitation in the LGA as to the persons entitled to seek review is a factor against joinder of the Toogoods.
Section 17 of the QCAT Act provides:
The Tribunal’s review jurisdiction is the jurisdiction conferred on the tribunal by an enabling Act to review a decision made or taken to have been made by another entity under that Act.
Section 18 of the QCAT Act provides:
The Tribunal may exercise its review jurisdiction if a person has, under this Act, applied to the tribunal to exercise its review jurisdiction for a reviewable decision.
Section 19 of the QCAT Act provides that the Tribunal must decide the review in accordance with the QCAT Act and the enabling Act under which the Decision was made, may perform the functions conferred on the Tribunal by the QCAT Act and the enabling Act and the Tribunal has all the functions of the decision-maker for the Decision.
It is uncontroversial that the relevant enabling Act is the LGA.
In conducting the review, the Tribunal may confirm or amend the decision, set aside the decision and substitute its own or set aside the decision and return the matter to the decision maker for reconsideration.[23] The Tribunal’s function is to reach the correct and preferable decision after a fresh hearing on the merits.[24]
[23]QCAT Act, s 24.
[24]Ibid, s 20.
There is no presumption that the decision under review is correct.[25] In such a merits review it is not necessary to establish an error in the process or the reasoning of the Decision.[26]
[25]Kehl v Board of Professional Engineers of Queensland [2010] QCATA 58, [9].
[26]Oliver v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission [2017] QCAT 50, [11].
The Tribunal stands in the shoes of the CCT and may make any relevant order under section 150AR of the LGA.
Although these are merits review proceedings they are in the nature of disciplinary proceedings. The issues before the Tribunal are whether Mr Kremastos has engaged in misconduct and if so what disciplinary action, if any, should be taken under section 150AR of the LGA.
Although there is no express requirement for a party to such review proceedings to seek leave of the Tribunal to present further evidence, the joining of persons who were not parties to the CCT proceeding, who would ordinarily be entitled to file further evidence, has the potential to significantly add to the length and complexity of the proceeding.
The increase in the length of a proceeding and the complexity of it, and the prospect of minimising the need for any further related proceeding, are often two opposing factors which need to be balanced. I accept that any additional party will add to the length and complexity of the proceeding and hearing. That is a factor which weighs against joinder of the Toogoods.
Another factor against joinder is that no relief is sought or could be sought by or against the Toogoods in these review proceedings.[27]
[27]Taouk v Queensland Building Services Authority [2013] QCAT 96, [9]; QCAT Act, s 24(1).
The Toogoods take issue with various paragraphs of the Decision, including in many instances where the CCT identify contentions made by the parties or the contents of statements filed in the CCT proceedings. The Toogoods’ submit that the CCT has accepted such contentions. A review of the Decision reveals that the CCT does not clearly make such findings.
The Toogoods’ submissions and attached documents seek to dispute the submissions and evidence before the CCT. They also take issue with the CCT’s characterisation of their relationship with the relevant local government. They assert reputational damage as a consequence of matters set out in the Decision.
It is, of course, a matter for the Tribunal at the final hearing to weigh the evidence before the CCT and any further evidence filed in this Tribunal and make its own findings.
This is not a proceeding against the CCT for breach of the HRA. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction in respect of any claim for damages arising from alleged defamation of the Toogoods. As observed earlier in these reasons, the Toogoods do not have a right under section 150AT of the LGA to seek review of the Decision in this Tribunal. For this reason, it appears the Toogoods seek to be joined as respondents.
This is not a case where there is the possibility, if the Toogoods are not parties to these proceedings, that separate Tribunal review proceedings may be required addressing substantially the same factual and legal questions, giving rise to the possibility of inconsistent findings and an extended timeframe for the resolution of all the issues. The Toogoods do not have a direct interest in the outcome of these proceedings unlike the parties, sought to be joined and which were joined, in the cases to which they referred.[28]
[28]Darryl Hathway Painting and Decorating v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2019] QCAT 4; Body Corporate for the Sun Apartments Building v Commissioner for Liquor and Gaming Regulation & Anor [2017] QCAT 417.
Whilst I accept that the Toogoods are referred to in the Decision I am not persuaded that equates to them having ‘interests which may be affected’ or is ‘a reason why it is desirable that they be joined.’
Natural justice does not require the Tribunal to extend to a person who may suffer an indirect detriment as a result of the outcome of proceedings the right to be heard.[29]
[29]Re Ludeke; Ex Parte Customs Officers’ Association of Australia (1985) 155 CLR 513, 520; Trojan Resorts Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for The Reserve (No. 2) [2018] QCAT 366.
Even if I was satisfied that the Toogoods’ interest was sufficient to enliven section 42(1)(b) of the QCAT Act or the circumstances constitute another reason it is desirable to enliven section 42(1)(c) of the QCAT Act, I am not satisfied that there is any utility in them being joined as parties.
I find that joinder would result in unnecessary delays and costs to the parties without utility and would be contrary to the objects of the QCAT Act, which include having the tribunal deal with matters in a way that is accessible, fair, just, economical, informal and quick.[30]
[30]QCAT Act, s 3(b).

Should the Toogoods be given leave to intervene?

I find that the Toogoods should not be given leave to intervene.
Although the Toogoods’ submissions in response to the Tribunal’s directions do not expressly refer to seeking leave to intervene, the AMM referred to such an order being sought.[31] Understandably, Mr Kremastos and the IA did not expressly make submissions on this question.
[31]Part C2.
The tribunal may at any time give leave for a person to intervene in a proceeding subject to the conditions the tribunal considers appropriate.[32]
[32]QCAT Act, s 41(2).
The Appeal Tribunal in Assistant Commissioner Wilson v Chapman and Anor; Chapman v Assistant Commissioner Wilson and Anor,[33] in the context of the tribunal’s review jurisdiction, considered the power of the tribunal to permit a person to intervene and whilst refusing the application for leave to intervene held:
[46] In my view, s 41(2) of the QCAT Act preserves an important discretion that enables the Tribunal to permit another entity to join review proceedings wherever the circumstances warrant such an intervention, unrestrained by the usual time constraints for joinder arising under either the QCAT Act or an enabling Act; and without the strict need to establish interest criteria for a joining party under s 42(1) of the QCAT Act.
[47] Although not joined as a party, an intervener is nonetheless still a “party” and thus has appeal rights pursuant to s 142 of the QCAT Act. The discretion to allow an intervener is “at large”, and will be restrained only by regard to the overall objects of the QCAT Act…
[33][2012] QCATA 110.

I note that once leave is granted an intervener is a party.[34]
[34]QCAT Act, s 40(1)(c).
The Tribunal has previously considered that the principles set out by Brennan CJ in Levy v State of Victoria[35] are relevant to a consideration under section 41 of the QCAT Act although clearly the source of power for the Tribunal to make such an order is different to that of the High Court.[36]
[35](1997) 189 CLR 579.
[36]Trojan Resorts Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for The Reserve (No. 2) [2018] QCAT 366, [ 35].
The granting of leave to intervene is to be exercised sparingly or as Kirby J in Levy’s case stated the court ‘should maintain a tight rein on interventions’ and is to protect the ‘primacy of the parties’.[37]
[37](1997) 189 CLR 579, 650 - 651.
Brennan CJ held, in considering an application for a grant of leave to intervene in High Court proceedings:[38]
.. a non-party whose interests would be affected directly by a decision in the proceeding - that is, one who would be bound by the decision albeit not a party - must be entitled to intervene to protect the interest liable to be affected. ……. But the legal interests of a person may be affected in more indirect ways than by being bound by a decision. They may be affected by operation of precedent - especially a precedent of this Court - or by the doctrine of stare decisis……
Jurisdiction to grant leave to intervene to persons whose legal interests are likely to be substantially affected by a judgment exists in order to avoid a judicial affection of such a person's legal interests without that person being given an opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless, an indirect affection of legal interests enlivens no absolute right to intervene. The assumption is that the Court will determine the law correctly, so that the indirect affection of an applicant's legal interest is simply the inevitable consequence of the exercise by this Court of its jurisdiction as the final Court in the Australian hierarchy. On that assumption, no undue prejudice is suffered by a person whose interests will be affected by the decision. The exercise of this Court's jurisdiction to determine controversies between parties is not, and could not be, conditioned on allowing intervention by all those whose interests are susceptible to affection by the Court's judgments. Such a condition would virtually paralyse the exercise of that jurisdiction. The principles of natural justice which control the exercise of curial power must take account of the nature of the jurisdiction to be exercised. However, where a person having the necessary legal interest to apply for leave to intervene can show that the parties to the particular proceeding may not present fully the submissions on a particular issue, being submissions which the Court should have to assist it to reach a correct determination, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction by granting leave to intervene. The grant may be limited, if appropriate, to particular issues and subject to such conditions, as to costs or otherwise, as will do justice as between all parties. In that situation, intervention may prevent an error that would affect the interests of the intervener. Of course, if the intervener's submission is merely repetitive of the submission of one or other of the parties, efficiency would require that intervention be denied.
[38](1997) 189 CLR 579, 601-604 (references omitted).
Brennan J (as he then was) stated in Ludeke: [39]
There can be no universal criterion by which to determine whether a repository of a statutory power is bound to hear a person who is not directly involved in its proceedings before making an order that indirectly affects that person's interests: see de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th ed. (1980), p. 196. Regard must be had to all the circumstances of the case, including the language of the statute, the nature of the power and of the body in which the power is reposed, the nature of the proceedings, the procedural rules that govern the proceedings (especially any provision for intervention by a person not directly involved in them), the interests which are likely to be affected, directly or indirectly, by the exercise of the power and the stage the proceedings have reached when the repository of the power learns of those interests. Generally speaking, a decision that will affect adversely a person's legal rights or his proprietary or financial interests or his reputation ought not to be taken without first giving him an opportunity to be heard provided such an opportunity can be reasonably given (F.A./. Insurances Ltd. v. Winneke (19)), even if that person is not directly involved in the proceedings which lead to the making of the decision: cf. Reg. v. Town and Country Planning Commissioner; Ex parte Scott (20). But that is not an absolute rule.
[39](1985) 155 CLR 513, 528.
Deane J stated in relation to the nature of the interest required by a non-party for the granting of an application to intervene:[40]
A non-party has a direct interest in the proceedings in the sense that the non-party will be directly affected by an order which is being sought or which it is proposed to make.
[40]Ibid, p 531.
I accept that section 41 of the QCAT Act empowers the Tribunal to grant leave to intervene to a person, subject to appropriate conditions and that the power is to be construed in the context of the overall objects of the QCAT Act, which include having the tribunal deal with matters in a way that is accessible, fair, just, economical, informal and quick[41] and having regard to the obligation that the tribunal must act fairly and according to the substantial merits of the case.[42]
[41]QCAT Act, s 3(b),
[42]Ibid, s 28(2).
Having regard to the language of the LGA and in particular the regime for investigation of complaints and the prosecution of complaints in the CCT by the IA, the language of the QCAT Act, the nature of the Tribunal and the disciplinary nature of the merits review proceedings, I am not satisfied, on the material before me, that the Toogoods have established that a decision in these review proceedings as to whether or not Mr Kremastos has engaged in misconduct and if so, what disciplinary action, if any, should be taken will affect adversely the Toogoods' legal rights or proprietary or financial interests or their reputation.
I am also not satisfied that the Toogoods have established that their direct interests are likely to be substantially affected by an order, which the Tribunal may make in these proceedings.
Further, I am not satisfied that the CCT or the IA, both of which are parties to this review, will not make submissions or where appropriate file further relevant evidence for the Tribunal’s consideration such that the Toogoods ought to be given leave to intervene in these proceedings. I note that the Decision lists in a non-exhaustive way the documents filed in the CCT and that the documents in the possession or control of the CCT have not yet been filed in these proceedings.

Should the CCT be directed to provide the Toogoods’ submissions to the Tribunal or provide an additional statement of reasons or should an order pursuant to section 3(b) of the QCAT Act be made that the Tribunal consider the written submissions filed by the Toogoods?

I am not satisfied that the Toogoods, as non-parties, have standing to seek such orders in these proceedings.
I accept that, if the Tribunal considers there are additional documents in the decision-maker’s possession or control that may be relevant to the tribunal’s review it may require the decision-maker to provide them.[43] The Toogoods say that they provided a copy of the documents to the CCT’s lawyers and that the Tribunal should compel the CCT to provide them.
[43]Ibid, s 21(3).
Alternatively, they say that the Tribunal should require the CCT to provide an additional statement.
I accept that, if the Tribunal considers the statement of reasons is not adequate it may require the decision-maker to give an additional statement containing further particulars.[44]
[44]Ibid, s 21(4).
I also accept as set out earlier in these reasons, one of the objects is to have the tribunal deal with matters in a way that is accessible, fair, just, economical, informal and quick.[45]
[45]Ibid, s 3(b).
Section 3 does not provide a power for the Tribunal to make an order that the Tribunal consider the submissions filed by the Toogoods.
Importantly, the Toogoods do not address the basis on which it is contended that a non-party, as distinct from a party, is entitled to apply for any such orders in a Tribunal proceeding.
Section 62(1) of the QCAT Act provides that the Tribunal may give a direction at any time in a proceeding and do whatever is necessary for the speedy and fair conduct of the proceeding. A party may apply for such directions.[46] A non-party is not given the right to apply for directions.
[46]Ibid, s 62(6).
Mr Kremastos says that the review is to be conducted as a fresh hearing on the merits which can proceed on the material before the CCT and any further evidence upon which the parties propose to rely. He says, and I agree, that there is no basis for any ‘further evidence’ to be received from the Toogoods as non-parties. He further says, and I accept, subject to the Tribunal’s power to refuse to allow a party to call evidence on a matter if the Tribunal considers there is already sufficient evidence about the matter before the Tribunal,[47] that to the extent the IA considers the material provided by the Toogoods is relevant to the review the IA may choose to rely upon such further evidence.
[47]Ibid, s 95(2)(a).
In my view it is contrary to the objects of the QCAT Act to allow non-parties to apply for such orders because it causes delay to the proceedings between the parties.

Summary

I am not satisfied that any orders sought by the Toogoods should be made. The AMM should be dismissed.