Kraus v Menzie (No 2)

[2012] FCA 84

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kraus v Menzie (No 2) [2012] FCA 84

Citation:		Kraus v Menzie (No 2) [2012] FCA 84
Parties:		JADE XAVIER KRAUS v MARK MENZIE and THE TRUCK FACTORY PTY LTD
File number:		SAD 209 of 2010
Judge:		MANSFIELD J
Date of judgment:		13 February 2012
Date of hearing:	Heard on the papers
Date of last submissions:	24 January 2012
Place:	Adelaide
Division:	GENERAL DIVISION
Category:	No catchwords
Number of paragraphs:	8
Counsel for the Applicant:	P Heywood Smith QC
Solicitor for the Applicant:	Duncan Basheer Hannon
Counsel for the Respondents:	S Cole
Solicitor for the Respondents:	Rossi Legal

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION	SAD 209 of 2010

BETWEEN:

JADE XAVIER KRAUS
Applicant

AND:

MARK MENZIE
First Respondent

THE TRUCK FACTORY PTY LTD
Second Respondent

JUDGE:	MANSFIELD J
DATE OF ORDER:	13 FEBRUARY 2012
WHERE MADE:	ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondents pay to the applicant 20% of her costs of the application.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION	SAD 209 of 2010

BETWEEN:

JADE XAVIER KRAUS
Applicant

AND:

MARK MENZIE
First Respondent

THE TRUCK FACTORY PTY LTD
Second Respondent

JUDGE:	MANSFIELD J
DATE:	13 FEBRUARY 2012
PLACE:	ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. I delivered judgment and made orders in this matter on 11 January 2012: Kraus v Menzie [2012] FCA 3. I made declaratory orders that the respondents sexually harassed the applicant contrary to s 28B of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (the SD Act) by five separate categories of conduct, and ordered the respondents to pay the applicant damages of $12,000. I reserved the question of costs.

2. The parties have now made their submissions on costs.  The applicant seeks costs of the application in the normal way.  The respondents say there should be no order for costs.

3. Notwithstanding that the applicant succeeded in establishing sexual harassment in the five respects referred to, she did not succeed in much of her claim.

4. Her claim included claims on unlawful discrimination in employment contrary to s 14(2) of the SD Act. That claim was put on the basis that the applicant brought her employment to an end because of discrimination in employment by reason of her sex. She claimed she was isolated at, and in, her work because she had resisted the first respondent’s advances towards her. It gave rise to a claim that she suffered significant psychological injury as a result, and she sought a considerable sum in damages. That claim failed. Her claim also included further instances of sexual harassment, ultimately contributing to the alleged unlawful discrimination, on seven other occasions. Those claims also failed. There was a significant issue as to the reliability of the evidence of the applicant and of the first respondent. In general terms, the instances of sexual harassment which I found to have occurred, in all but one case, did not…