Kranz & Padmini - [2025] FedCFamC1F 45

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Kranz & Padmini [2025] FedCFamC1F 45

File number(s): MLC 6755 of 2022

Judgment of: GILL J

Date of judgment: 4 February 2025

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – International relocation – Where the wife seeks to relocate with the children to her country of birth – Where the parties and ICL agree the children will live with the wife and spend time with the husband – Where the parties and ICL agree the wife will hold sole parental responsibility – Where the husband has perpetrated family violence on the wife – Where the husband has failed to prioritise his relationship with the children – Where it is likely there will be strong parental conflict if the wife and children remain in Australia – Where international relocation would provide the wife access to family support and improved employment opportunities – Where the benefits to the children of international relocation outweigh the benefits of remaining in Australia – The wife is permitted to relocate to Country B with the children

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Dispute as to what property is held by the parties – Where the parties are in disagreement regarding the status of a number of alleged assets – Where the wife asserts the husband has hidden or disposed of various resources – Where the wife’s evidence was generally regarded as more credible than the husband’s – Where the parties’ contributions were 55 – 45 in favour of the husband – Where consideration of the parties’ future needs results in an overall split of 52.5 per cent to the wife and 47.5 per cent to the husband

Legislation:
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60CC, 75, and 79

Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment Bill 2023 (Cth)

Cases cited:
AB v CD (2019) 364 ALR 202; [2019] HCA 6

Bevan & Bevan (2013) FLC 93-545; [2013] FamCAFC

Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67

Dickons & Dickons (2012) 50 Fam LR 244; [2012] FamCAFC 154

Eastley & Eastley (2022) FLC 94-094; [2022] FedCFamC1A 101

Fitzwater v Fitzwater (2019) 60 Fam LR 212; [2019] FamCAFC 251

Grier v Malphas [2016] FamCAFC 84

Isles & Nelissen (2022) FLC 94-092; [2022] FedCFamC1A 97

Jollie & Dysart [2014] FamCAFC 149

M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69

Morgan & Miles (2007) FLC 93-343; [2007] FamCA 1230

Phillips & Hansford (No 2) (2019) FLC 93-917; [2019] FamCAFC 165

Stanford & Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108; [2012] HCA 52

Taylor and Barker (2007) FLC 93-345; [2007] FamCA 1246

U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238; [2002] HCA 36

Welch & Abney (2016) FLC 93-756; [2016] FamCAFC 271

Division: Division 1 First Instance

Number of paragraphs: 472

Date of hearing: 14-18 October 2024

Place: Heard in Melbourne, delivered in Canberra

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Howe

Solicitor for the Applicant: RRR Lawyers

Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Byrnes

Solicitor for the Respondent: Serein Family Law

Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Ms Treyvaud

Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Walters Family Law Pty Ltd
ORDERS

MLC 6755 of 2022

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

BETWEEN:
MR KRANZ

Applicant

AND:
MS PADMINI

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

GILL J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 FEBRUARY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Ms Padmini (“the wife”) have sole decision-making in relation to all major-long term issues for the children, X, born 2015 and Y, born 2018 (“the children”).
2.The children live with the wife.
3.The wife be permitted to relocate the children to live permanently in Country B on a date no earlier than 8 weeks after the making of these orders.
4.The children be permitted to leave the Commonwealth of Australia, and it is directed that the Australian Federal Police remove the names of the children from the Airport Watch List in force at all points of arrival and departure in the Commonwealth of Australia.
5.The solicitors for the wife be responsible for effecting service of a sealed copy of this Order upon the proper officer of the Australian Federal Police and it is requested that the Australian Federal Police give force and effect to this Order.
6.The solicitors for the wife forthwith release to the wife the children’s passports currently held in safe custody and the wife forthwith hold the children’s passports.
7.The wife be permitted to apply for and/or renew as required an Australian Passport (and, if required, a Country B passport) for each of the children to enable the children to travel internationally notwithstanding that the consent of the husband has not been obtained, and it is requested that the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Travel in Australia (and any equivalent body in Country B) issue such passports for the children on that basis.
8.Pending the relocation of the children to Country B, the children spend time with the husband in a fortnightly cycle as follows:
(a)In Week 1 – From after school (or 3.30pm if a non-school day) on Friday until the commencement of school (or 5.00pm if a non-school day) on Monday;
(b)In Week 2 – From after school (or 3.30pm if a non-school day) on Wednesday until commencement of school (or 5.00pm if a non-school day) on Thursday.
(c)At any other time as may be agreed between the parties in writing.

9.Upon the relocation of the children to Country B, the children spend time and communicate with the husband as follows:
(a)By telephone or video call as agreed between the parties and, in default of agreement:
(i)Each Wednesday and Saturday at 7.30pm (UTC-3) with the husband to initiate the call.
(ii)On all special occasions, including but not limited to the children’s birthdays, the husband’s birthday, Father’s Day and Christmas Day, at a time to be agreed between the parties in writing and with the husband to initiate the call.

(b)In order to facilitate the above order the wife is to maintain an operative telephone or video call facility for the children to use to have contact with the husband and is to keep the husband advised as to the relevant contact details.
(c)In 2025 (not earlier than 6 months after Final Parenting Orders are made) in Country B, over a 15 day period agreed between the parties (or, in default of agreement, as nominated by the husband upon giving the wife no less than 56 days’ notice in writing) as follows (unless otherwise agreed):
(i)On Days 1 - 2 – From 8.30am on Day 1 until 6.30pm on Day 2.
(ii)On Days 4 - 6 – From 8.30am on Day 4 until 6.30pm on Day 6.
(iii)On Days 8 – 10 – From 8.30am on Day 8 until 6.30pm on Day 10.
(iv)On Days 12 – 15 – From 8.30am on Day 12 until 8.30am on Day 15.

(d)In 2026 – in Australia, over a 15 day period agreed between the parties (or, in default of agreement, as nominated by the wife upon giving the husband no less than 56 days’ notice in writing) as follows (unless otherwise agreed):
(i)On Days 1 - 2 – From 8.30am on Day 1 until 6.30pm on Day 2.
(ii)On Days 4 - 6 – From 8.30am on Day 4 until 6.30pm on Day 6.
(iii)On Days 8 – 10 – From 8.30am on Day 8 until 6.30pm on Day 10
(iv)On Days 12 – 15 – From 8.30am on Day 12 until 8.30am on Day 15.

(e)In 2027 in Country B, over a 15 day period agreed between the parties (or, in default of agreement, as nominated by the husband upon giving the wife no less than 56 days’ notice in writing) as follows (unless otherwise agreed):
(i)On days 1 – 6 – from 8.30am on Day 1 until 6.30pm on Day 6.
(ii)On days 9 – 15 – from 8.30am on Day 9 until 6.30pm on Day 15.

(f)In 2028 in Australia, over a 15 day period agreed between the parties (or, in default of agreement, as nominated by the wife upon giving the husband no less than 56 days’ notice in writing) as follows (unless otherwise agreed):
(i)On days 1 – 6 – from 8.30am on Day 1 until 6.30pm on Day 6.
(ii)On days 9 – 15 – from 8.30am on Day 9 until 6.30pm on Day 15.

(g)In 2029 and each alternate years thereafter, in Country B over a 15 day period agreed between the parties (or, in default of agreement, as nominated by the husband upon giving the wife no less than 56 days’ notice in writing).
(h)In 2030 and each alternate year thereafter, in Australia, over a 15 day period agreed between the parties (or, in default of agreement, as nominated by the wife upon giving the husband no less than 56 days’ notice in writing).
(i)At the election of the husband, up to two further periods of time with the children in Country B each calendar year, being up to a 15 day period on each occasion as agreed between the parties (or, in default of agreement, as nominated by the husband upon giving the wife no less than 28 days’ notice in writing) with the pattern of such time to be in accordance with the pattern otherwise specified in these orders for time in that year, unless agreed otherwise by the parties in writing.
(j)In the event that the time that the husband spends with the children in Country B occurs during school term time the husband is to ensure that the children attend school as required by the school.
(k)Irrespective of any other Order, in the event that both parties are in the same country on any special occasion, and in the event that the children would not otherwise spend time with a parent for that special occasion, then the children shall spend time with that parent as follows:
(i)For the period from Christmas Eve to Boxing Day each year as follows:
A.In even years – With the wife from 3.00pm on Christmas Eve until 3.00pm on Christmas Day and with the husband from 3.00pm on Christmas Day until 3.00pm on Boxing Day.
B.In odd years - With the husband from 3.00pm on Christmas Eve until 3.00pm on Christmas Day and with the wife from 3.00pm on Christmas Day until 3.00pm on Boxing Day.

(ii)For the husband’s and wife’s birthdays respectively – For 3 hours by agreement in writing and failing agreement from 3.30pm until 6.30pm.
(iii)For Mother’s Day and Father’s Day respectively - From 9.00am until 5.00pm that day.
(iv)For each child’s birthday - For 3 hours by agreement in writing and failing agreement from 3.30pm until 6.30pm.

10.The husband shall pay the cost of his own return airfares and accommodation to travel to Country B to spend time with the children pursuant to these Orders.
11.The wife shall pay the cost of her own return airfares and accommodation to accompany the children to spend time with the husband in Australia pursuant to these Orders.
12.Each party pay one half of the cost of return economy airfares for the children to travel to Australia to spend time with the husband pursuant to these Orders, with the wife to purchase the tickets and the husband to reimburse his share within 14 days of the wife advising of the purchase.
13.Should the husband fail to reimburse the wife as provided for in the above order the wife is at liberty to cancel that visit to Australia.
14.Unless otherwise agreed in writing, all changeovers for the children which do not take place at the children’s school take place as follows:
(a)In Country B – At a public place nominated by the wife within 5 kilometres of the wife’s residence.
(b)In Australia – At McDonald's Suburb D.

15.The husband is restrained from consuming illicit substances for 24 hours prior to, and during any period in which the children are in his care.
16.Within seven days of the children commencing their attendance at school in Country B the wife provide to the school a copy of these Orders and authorise the school to forward to the husband all information ordinarily provided to parents, including access to any relevant school apps, copies of school newsletters and copies of school reports.
17.Both parties be permitted to attend all school functions/events and extra-curricular activities regardless of with whom the children are spending time with at that time, provided that the husband shall provide to the wife no less than 24 hours’ written notice of his intention to attend any such event or activity.
18.Each party forthwith inform the other of any serious illness or injury sustained by the children whilst in their care and further provide the other with:
(a)Full particulars of the name, address and telephone number of any doctor or medical or other health professional or hospital from whom or at which the children have received treatment or are to receive treatment; and
(b)Full particulars of diagnoses made, medications prescribed and proposed treatments.

19.Each party keep the other informed of their email address and mobile telephone number, and advise the other of any change of email address or mobile telephone number within 48 hours of such change.
20.Upon the request of either party in writing, both parties forthwith do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as may be required to seek mirror parenting orders by consent in Country B, with each party to bear their own legal costs.
21.In the event of any non-urgent dispute between the parties involving the implementation of these Orders, the parties attend International Family Mediation through C Social Services in the first instance.
22.Pursuant to ss 65DA and 62B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders and details of who can assist the parties to adjust to and comply with an order are set out in the Fact Sheet attached hereto and those particulars are included in these orders.

Property
23.From the net proceeds of sale from the real property situate at and known as E Street, Suburb F in the State of Victoria held in the wife’s solicitors’ trust account (and any interest thereon) the following sums be paid to the wife forthwith:
(a)$436,000 by way of property adjustment; and
(b)$20,000 for costs thrown away in April 2024.

24.The balance of the funds held in respect of the Suburb F property be paid to the husband.
25.Within 14 days of the date of these Orders, the wife do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as may be required, at the sole expense of the husband, to:
(a)Resign any officeholding she may hold in G Pty Ltd, the Kranz Family Trust and/or H Pty Ltd.
(b)Transfer any shares she may hold in G Pty Ltd to the husband.
(c)Renounce and/or relinquish any rights and/or entitlements she may have as a beneficiary of the Kranz Family Trust and Super Fund 1.

26.Within 14 days of the date of these Orders, the husband, at his sole expense, prepare and lodge amended tax returns for the Kranz Family Trust for FY2022, FY2023 and FY2024 as may be required to ensure that no trust income is distributed to the wife.
27.The husband otherwise retain to the exclusion of the wife, all of his right, title and interest in:
(a)All corporate entities and trusts in which he has an interest (“the Entities”), including but not limited to:
(i)J Pty Ltd.
(ii)G Pty Ltd.
(iii)Kranz Family Trust.
(iv)K Pty Ltd.
(v)H Pty Ltd.
(vi)Super Fund 1.
(vii)“L Company”.
(viii)“M Company”.
(ix)N Company.

(b)All cryptocurrency, digital assets and other investments held by him or for his benefit.
(c)All precious metals held by him or for his benefit.
(d)His jewellery (including luxury watches and other jewellery).
(e)Any interest in Motor Vehicle 1 motor vehicle registration number ….
(f)Any interest in the Motor Vehicle 2 registration number ….
(g)His personal bank accounts.
(h)Any loans outstanding to him and/or the Entities.
(i)All matrimonial assets and funds already distributed to him.
(j)All other assets currently in his possession.
(k)Any superannuation interest in his name.

28.The wife otherwise retain, to the exclusion of the husband, all of her right, title and interest in:
(a)Motor Vehicle 3 registration number ….
(b)Her bank accounts.
(c)Her cryptocurrency.
(d)All matrimonial assets and funds already distributed to her.
(e)All other assets currently in her possession.

29.The husband be liable for and indemnify, and forever hold indemnified, the wife against all payments and liability, whether past, present or future, in relation to:
(a)The Entities;
(b)Any loans owing by him to any other person or entity.
(c)Any hire purchase liability encumbering Motor Vehicle 1 attributable to him.
(d)Any Motor Vehicle 2 finance loan encumbering his vehicle attributable to him.
(e)His HELP debt.
(f)Any credit cards in his sole name.
(g)Any taxation liabilities in his sole name.
(h)Any taxation liability of the wife in respect of any income paid or distributed to her by the husband or his Entities since separation or otherwise arising pursuant to or as a result of these Orders.

30.The wife be liable for and indemnify, and forever hold indemnified, the husband against all payments and liability, whether past, present or future, in relation to:
(a)Her HELP debt.
(b)All loans owing by her to third parties.
(c)Any credit cards in her sole name.
(d)Any taxation liabilities in her sole name, save as otherwise provided by these Orders.

31.Unless otherwise specified in these Orders and save for the purpose of enforcing any monies due under these or any subsequent Orders:
(a)Each party by solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all other property (including choses-in-action) in the possession of such party as at the date of these Orders.
(b)Each party be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to these Orders.

Costs
32.The husband pay to the wife her costs of and associated with the 14 August 2024 contravention hearing as agreed or as assessed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under, Kranz & Padmini, a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GILL J

This case concerns both parenting arrangements and division of property following the breakdown of the marriage of the applicant husband, Mr Kranz, born in 1984, and respondent wife, Ms Padmini, born in 1988.
The parties began cohabitation in mid-2014, married in late 2018 and separated in late December 2021.
The husband was born in Country O and is an Australian citizen. The wife was born in Country B and is a dual Country B and Australian citizen.

There are two children of the marriage, X, born 2015, and Y, born 2018 (“the children”).
The children currently reside with the wife and spend time with the husband for one weekend each fortnight and after school on Wednesdays each week. The wife seeks to move with the children to Country B, a move opposed by the husband. The parties are in dispute as to whether the children should be able to travel overseas at all.
It is undisputed that the children will primarily live with the wife, although the time that they would spend with the husband is in dispute. This occurs against a background of the children spending limited time with the husband post separation and in a context of allegations that he has perpetrated family violence upon them and upon the wife.
The key issues in relation to the property dispute involve questions as to what property remains in the control of the parties, and the significance of the disposal and dissipation of property following the end of the relationship. In summary, the dispute involves questions as to the existence of holdings in cryptocurrency and precious metals, and the genuineness of transactions effected by the husband to his mother and other third parties. The dispute extends to the significance of partial property settlements paid to the wife.
ORDERS SOUGHT
In summary orders were sought as set out below. The full version of the orders ultimately pursued by the parties are annexed at the end of this judgment, noting that the husband ultimately relied upon the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s (“the ICL”) minute as to parenting orders and so his minute as to parenting orders is not attached.
The Independent Children’s Lawyer
The ICL sought that the wife have sole decision-making for long-term decisions concerning the children. The ICL sought that the wife be restrained from relocating the children from the Melbourne metropolitan area and that the children spend time with the husband for four nights each fortnight, with additional time allocated on special occasions. The ICL sought that the Airport Watchlist order be discharged.
If the wife is permitted to relocate to Country B, the ICL sought that the children spend time with the husband over a two week period agreed by the parties each year. This time is to occur in Country B and Australia in alternate years. The ICL’s proposed orders also provided for the husband to elect to spend further time with the children in Country B across a seven day period, twice each year.
The husband
The husband ultimately sought the parenting orders proposed by the ICL except in two respects. He sought that there be a five year restriction on the children travelling out of the country and to remove a 24 hour notice requirement for him to attend events.
In relation to property the husband sought a 60 per cent division of the non-superannuation pool and superannuation distribution with a base amount of $20,000. Although the husband sought that he receive all of the proceeds of the Suburb F property currently held on trust and additionally receive a cash payment to effect this split, his counsel indicated that he was prepared to forego the additional cash payment.
The wife
The wife sought sole decision-making in relation to major long-term decisions for the children, and that the children be permitted to relocate to Country B with her. The wife sought that the children’s time with the husband would continue roughly as it is at present, with an extra night, pending relocation to Country B. Following relocation, she sought that the children spend time with the husband on 12 days including eight nights across a 14 day school holiday period each year, with the time to be in Country B or Australia in alternating years. The wife’s orders provided for telephone or video calls between the children and the husband twice each week and on special occasions.
The wife also proposed orders for the time the children would spend with the husband if she remains in Australia, which roughly followed the current pattern of time with an extra overnight stay. This provided for the children to spend one evening after school and the weekend with the husband every second week and an overnight in the alternate week. The wife sought that the children spend time with the husband in lots of three consecutive nights during the school holidays.
In relation to property the wife sought that she receive the net proceeds from the sale of the Suburb F property currently held on trust, along with a $40,000 cash payment from the husband in lieu of a splitting of superannuation. In the event that no such payment is to be made the wife sought split of the husband’s superannuation in her favour using a base amount of $50,000. The husband would otherwise retain his various corporate, cryptocurrency and precious metals interests.
The wife further sought a Child Support departure order and various costs in respect of interlocutory steps in the proceedings.
DOCUMENTS RELIED UPON
The husband relied upon the following affidavits and responses:
(a)Further amended initiating application filed 23 September 2024;
(b)Husband’s affidavit filed 23 September 2024;
(c)Husband’s affidavit in reply filed 8 October 2024;
(d)Financial statement filed 23 September 2024;
(e)Affidavit of Mr P filed 3 April 2024;
(f)Affidavit of Mr P filed 15 April 2024;
(g)Affidavit of Mr Q filed 3 April 2024;
(h)Affidavit of Ms R filed 3 April 2024;
(i)Affidavit of Ms S filed 3 April 2024.
The wife relied upon the following affidavits and responses:
(a)Further amended response to initiating application filed 2 October 2024
(b)Wife’s affidavit filed 2 October 2024;
(c)Financial statement filed 2 October 2024;
(d)Affidavit of Mr T filed 10 April 2024;
(e)Affidavit of Ms U filed 10 April 2024;
(f)Affidavit of Ms W filed 10 April 2024;
(g)Affidavit of Mr V filed 10 April 2024;
(h)Affidavit of Ms Z filed 10 April 2024;
(i)Affidavit of Dr AA filed 10 April 2024;
(j)Affidavit of Ms CC filed 10 April 2024.
The ICL did not rely on any further documents beyond those relied upon by the parties.
THE PARENTING PROCEEDINGS
Principles
The paramount consideration in determining what parenting orders should be made for X and Y is their best interests.
The recently amended s 60CC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) sets out the considerations that, where applicable to the case[1] are to be examined and weighed to determine best interests. In this case, it is the considerations at s 60CC(2) that have general application. They are in the following terms:
[1] Phillips & Hansford (No 2) (2019) FLC 93-917 at [43]; Jollie & Dysart [2014] FamCAFC 149 at [45].
(2)For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a), the court must consider the following matters:
(a)what arrangements would promote the safety (including safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm) of:
(i)the child; and
(ii)each person who has care of the child (whether or not a person has parental responsibility for the child);
(b)any views expressed by the child;
(c)the developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child;
(d)the capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child’s developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs;
(e)the benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child’s parents, and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so;
(f)anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstances of the child.
As described in the Explanatory Memorandum,[2] the various considerations are designed to be non-hierarchical, non-exhaustive, able to allow different weight to be applied as appropriate to the individual child and, whilst guiding a court, permit flexible adaptation to each child’s specific circumstances.
[2] Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment Bill 2023 (Cth).
By their nature the considerations overlap and are entwined with each other. For example, issues of safety referred to at s 60CC(2)(a) can impact upon the capacity of a parent to provide for a child’s psychological needs (s 60CC(2)(d)), and in turn impact upon the benefits of having a relationship with that parent (s 60CC(2)(e)). Similarly, the views expressed by a child at s 60CC(2)(b) can be indicative of the emotional needs of the child (s 60CC(2)(c)).
The considerations may point in different directions. It is the synthesis of all of the applicable considerations that will determine the outcome.
In this case the joint position of the parties and the ICL is that the children should live primarily with the wife. This involved a tacit understanding, reflected in the evidence, that the children’s needs, and the wife’s capacity to provide for them, called for such a result.
The other considerations were also called into play, in determining whether the children should be able to live with the wife in Country B or Australia, the degree of risk of exposure to family violence and how safety from that might be secured, the parenting capacity of the wife in either Australia or Country B, the benefits to the children of a safe relationship with the husband, and his capacity to meet their needs.
Given the ages of the children, there was a lack of clear expression of views, other than what may be taken from their observed connection with the husband. To the extent that X expressed views regarding further time with the husband, some caution is required both due to the dated nature of the expression, and the manner and timing of the suggestion that suggested an exposure to the proceedings.
Issues of safety emerged at trial, and related primarily to allegations that the husband has perpetrated family violence in various forms upon the wife and children. Perhaps ultimately of lesser importance were previous concerns about exposure of the children to illicit drug use by the husband.
The reference to “safety” at s 60CC(2)(a) is to a term that is wide in nature, and bounded only by its object – to keep children, and those who care for them, safe from harm.
Although cogent examples of sources of harm are identified in the provision, that is, being subjected or exposed to family violence, abuse or neglect, these are not voiced in a manner to limit the scope of the term “safety”. They are voiced inclusively rather than exclusively, and sit in the company of the phrase “or other harm”.
The consideration of safety required by s 60CC(2)(a) and its corollary, risk of harm, demands no departure from the long standing approach set out by the High Court in M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69 (“M v M”), and recently expressed by the Full Court in Isles & Nelissen (2022) FLC 94-092 (“Isles & Nelissen”) and Eastley & Eastley (2022) FLC 94-094.
As identified in Isles & Nelissen at [50], quoting Austin J in Fitzwater v Fitzwater (2019) 60 Fam LR 212 at [138], the consideration of risk “is a predictive exercise and while it is, naturally enough, liable to be influenced by factual findings about past events, the contemplation of risk entails the foresight of possible harm”. The consideration involves the contemplation of both the potential harm, and the arrangements for the care of the child that are protective from such, as was required by M v M, (s 60CC(2)(a)).
A further reference to “safety” is made at s 60CC(2)(e). By that provision the court is required to consider the potential benefits for a child to be derived from having a relationship with a parent or other person of significance to the child “where it is safe to do so”. In the context of a set of considerations that are designed for the weighing of different factors to determine best interests, “safe” should not be taken to have a fixed content or standard. This is consistent with its use in another statutory context where the High Court observed that “safety is a protean conception which is certainly informed by the nature and gravity of apprehended harm and the risk of its occurrence”.[3]
[3] AB v CD (2019) 364 ALR 202 at 205.
Section 60CC(2)(e) requires the court to consider the risk of harm that accompanies the relationship, in whatever form it may take. The section does not contemplate consideration of the benefits of a relationship where such is not safe. It is consistent with longstanding case law that a child should not be exposed to an unacceptable risk of harm.
A primary matter of dispute in this case relates to whether the children should be permitted to move with the wife to Country B, or even to travel with her to Country B. This involves consideration not only of the effect of living in Country B on the relationship with the husband, but also the risk of retention in Country B and the effects on the children. It also involves consideration of the living arrangements available to the children in Country B and the benefits available to them of such, including secondary benefits related to the wife, as the primary carer, receiving the support of her family in that role.
Whilst there is no separate category for relocation cases, cases involving a proposal that a party will move with a child, and in particular cases, as here, that involve an international move pose hard questions with difficult consequences. The proposed relocation is of great importance to the wife, given Country B is her country of origin, but would result in fundamental changes in the way in which the children and husband would have a relationship.
The preferred approach is not to deal with the relocation as a discrete issue but, where possible, “as just one of the proposals for the child’s future living arrangements.”[4] In Morgan & Miles[5] Boland J observed at [80], in relation to a relocation issue, that:
It follows from my exposition of the legislation, that earlier core principles:
-that the child’s best interests remain the paramount but not sole consideration;
-that a parent wishing to move does not need to demonstrate “compelling” reasons;
-that a judicial officer must consider all proposals, and may himself or herself be required to formulate proposals in the child’s best interests; and
-the child’s best interests must be weighed and balanced with the “right” of the proposed relocating parent’s freedom of movement,
remain valid.
[4] Taylor and Barker (2007) FLC 93-345 at [53].
[5] (2007) FLC 93-343 at [80].
In dealing with the parties’ proposals, the comments of Gaudron J (although in dissent) in U v U[6] must be born in mind:
It must be acknowledged that it is likely that, in very many relocation cases, a mother will concede that, if she has to choose between relocation and having her child live with her, she will choose to have her child live with her. That being so, she runs the risk that her interests will not be properly taken into account. To avoid that possibility, it is essential that, in relocation cases, each competing proposal be separately evaluated. That is so whether it is the mother or the father who wishes to relocate. So much was made clear in AMS v AIF.
(Footnotes omitted)
[6] (2002) 211 CLR 238 at [37].
The wife’s position is that she would not move to Country B without the children.
The circumstances of the wife and children in the event of a move to Country B, including the impact on their relationships with the husband require careful consideration, as do the circumstances if the wife is to remain in Australia.
History
As noted above, the parties began cohabitation in mid-2014, married in late 2018 and separated in late December 2021.
They met in either 2009, or 2013 whilst the husband was on holidays in Country B, where the wife was studying to be, and then working as a professional. While the parties were in dispute as to whether their relationship commenced in 2009 or 2013 nothing seems to turn on this.
In 2014 the parties agreed to further pursue their relationship by the wife moving to Australia. Shortly before the move their relationship broke down, although the wife came to Australia to live in any event. They recommenced their relationship and moved in together in mid-2014.
The husband was dealt with for a number of criminal offences prior to cohabitation, including drug and alcohol, traffic, and violence offences, in 2005, 2007 and 2010. The age and nature of these matters means that they impact neither parenting capacity nor risk.
X was born in 2015, and Y in 2018.
The parties are in dispute over the nature of their parenting roles and efforts during the relationship, and also as to family violence.
The husband denies having been physically violent to the wife. Although he accepted that some incidents had occurred between them, he said that they were exaggerated by the wife, and that although there were heated arguments between them, they fell short of family violence. In his oral evidence he asserted that he accepted responsibility for this conduct. It was not clear what this meant.
The husband accepted that he would scream at the wife. He did not recall whether this was in the presence of X, asserting that he would always try to keep X away. The frequency and nature of this screaming was unclear. However, it provides context for other conduct engaged in by the husband, in assessing whether he exercised coercion and control over the wife.
The wife alleges that the husband hit her during an argument in late 2018, when they were due to travel to Brisbane for a holiday. She says that as a result they missed their flight. The husband denied this incident.
The husband either denied or did not recall using various terms of abuse against the wife, such as “dumb”, “loser”, and “spoilt brat.”
The wife accepts that the husband provided the finances for the family. The details of such are set out further under the property section of this judgment.
The wife asserted that the husband exercised financial control over her during the relationship. He denied exercising financial control, asserting in his oral evidence that the wife had an allowance of $2,500 per month for herself (his affidavit describing it as $2,000-$2,500 per month, pointing to some exaggeration).
The wife alleges that the husband had said that he would not place their home into joint names unless the wife changed her surname. The wife described that on the purchase of the home in Suburb F in 2019, the husband asserted that he would place the home into his name, as it was “his money” and that he wanted to teach the wife “a lesson.”
The husband denied this. The home was placed into joint names without the wife changing her name. However, as set out below, this was a matter raised by the wife with her psychologist prior to the breakdown of the relationship, giving some contemporaneity to her claims as to this incident. It should be accepted that the husband, even if unsuccessful in his attempt, used the purchase of the property as a means of exerting pressure over the wife.
Even accepting the husband’s contentions that he provided an allowance of $2,000 to $2,500 per month for the wife’s own use, this behaviour in relation to the purchase of the Suburb F property, reinforcing to the wife that it was his money to control, is an example of financial control. The impact of this conduct upon the wife can be seen in the fact that this experience of financial control was one of the matters that she raised with her psychologist. It was a matter that weighed upon the wife.
Further specific examples can be seen in the wife’s description that during discussion of separation the husband told her that she could go back to Country B in the same manner as she had come to Australia, with nothing. Similarly, on discussion of separation in 2019 the husband told the wife that he would transfer all of the bills into her name. Although it should be acknowledged that this was in the context where it was anticipated that the wife would continue to occupy the family home, it was also in circumstances where it was apparent that the husband had the income stream and the wife did not. On its face it is an example of the husband threatening to withdraw financial support in circumstances where the wife did not otherwise have financial or practical support (her family remaining in Country B).

The husband countered this by asserting in his oral evidence that he would have continued to pay her an allowance of $2,500 per month. This assertion did not appear in his affidavit material, but was first made in his oral evidence. There is no indication either that the wife understood this to be the case, or was told by the husband that he would do so, or that she could have security in such an arrangement.
The wife’s contention that the husband exercised financial control over her was grounded in the examples set out above. Whilst there is no allegation that the husband turned off the financial tap during or even immediately after the relationship, he had the control of the money coming into the home, and made it clear to the wife that it was both his to control, and his to deny her.
Although not an extreme example of the use of finances to reinforce power over an intimate partner, it nevertheless forms an aspect of coercion and control.
The husband described that they split the household duties. He says that the wife cleaned the bathroom and kitchen, he performed the vacuuming and mopping and gardening, and that they shared the cooking, he preparing breakfast, the wife dinner.
The wife asserts that she bore the burden of running the household whilst obtaining further qualifications to enable her to work professionally in Australia. She described undertaking all the major responsibilities for the children.
The parties’ descriptions were at odds with one another.
The husband’s claims as to the sharing of responsibility fall in the context that he was initially employed in 9-5 work at BB University. The wife describes the husband was also engaged in “side hustles” and that he attended sport training twice weekly, plus a game on a Saturday, involving than a further 5-6 hour absence. She described that he would also often go out with friends on a Saturday. The wife’s description was not the subject of any significant challenge.
The husband claimed heavy involvement in the children following Y’s birth. He described taking extended leave following Y’s birth and sharing homemaker and care responsibilities. However, this leave coincided with his development of J Pty Ltd, being his own business involved with cryptocurrency. The extent to which he was then available to offer further support is far from clear.
The wife described having little sleep and being often exhausted.
Despite the husband’s description (noting that in final submissions his counsel described him as the income earner, the wife as the homemaker), the parties were far from equal in terms of either the running of the household or the care of the children. Accepting that the husband had involvement in the care of the children, the responsibility generally fell upon the wife, as the husband both worked, developed his own business interests, and engaged in a most fulsome pursuit of his other interests.
The husband, like the wife, was of course free to pursue his interests. A strong parenting capacity does not demand that a parent abandon all outside interests. In that context the wife obtained a qualification. However, the fulsome manner in which the husband pursued his own interests in a way that significantly reduced his availability to the children reflects both a lack of priority given to the role of parenthood by the husband, and his engagement as a parent on his own terms. This is consistent with the family report writer’s assessment of the husband’s compartmentalised approach to parenting, observing the husband’s high engagement when spending time with the children, but otherwise, when not with the children, failing to think as a parent. The family report writer’s assessment is set out further below.
However, it should also be remembered that the husband was financially supporting the family. Although this reduced his availability to the children it marked significant commitment and contribution to the care and welfare of the children as it also freed up the wife to be able to do so.
The wife alleges drug use by the husband during the relationship. The husband denies such, other than to say that he had, “on occasion” used drugs recreationally.[7] He claimed that the wife had also done so. In his oral evidence he qualified this to say that he had used drugs once during the relationship. This qualification sat poorly with his affidavit evidence and was highly suggestive of minimisation by the husband of his drug use in his oral evidence.
[7] Husband’s affidavit filed 23 September 2024, paragraph 74.
Much of the wife’s assertion as to drug use by the husband was based upon inferences drawn by her from his behaviour and appearance. Whether or not the wife was correct as to this coming from the use of illicit substances, and even accepting the husband’s description of his drug use as “on occasion”, the wife’s description of the husband’s conduct points to reduced availability on his part to the children. That is, whether the husband’s presentation was as a result of drug ingestion or otherwise, it represented a decreased availability to the family and children. It also gave the wife a legitimate basis from which to be concerned that the husband did consume illicit drugs in a manner impacting his capacity to care for the children. Even if the wife was wrong about the husband’s presentation being caused by drug ingestion, it was not an unreasonable inference for her to draw, and accordingly a reasonable basis for her later concerns post separation.
In 2019, in response to X urinating on the floor the wife described that the husband screamed at X, causing him to be terrified and crying. The wife described that she threatened to call the police and was pushed by the husband. The husband, when cross-examined, described this as a misrepresentation, saying that he yelled X’s name because he had urinated on the floor. He accepted that the wife had told him to stop shouting at X as he was scaring him. The husband said that was the end of that incident. He denied that X was either crying or hysterical. The husband failed to address this incident in either his primary affidavit or his affidavit in reply. Where, as here, the husband challenges an account such as the above given by the wife, fairness, sometime described as the rule in Browne v Dunn,[8] requires that the challenge must be clearly made in either his affidavit evidence by the giving of a contradicting account, or by challenge of the wife in cross-examination. Neither course was adopted by the husband, leading to a more ready acceptance of the wife’s account.
[8] (1893) 6 R 67.
The wife’s description of this incident was persuasive. Her account should be accepted over the husband’s account of the incident.
In early 2019 the husband was dealt with by the criminal courts for an assault charge.
In July 2020, prior to the end of the relationship, but while there were significant difficulties in the relationship, the wife commenced attending upon a psychologist, Ms W. The wife has now attended in excess of 30 sessions with Ms W.
Ms W noted that the wife has made a lot of progress, but described that the wife will find it challenging if she is unable to move to Country B. She described that both during and the relationship and following separation the wife “continued to describe situations where she felt unsafe, threatened, bullied and abused ... often reported feeling afraid about what her ex-partner could do.”
Importantly, Ms W noted the following in her sessions with the wife:
(a)July 2020 - the wife was finding living in Australia difficult, with a limited social network, looking after two children, studying and struggling with her roles;
(b)October 2020 – the wife described difficulty in her intimate relationship, asserting that she had no income and that the husband was controlling her through finances. She further described him as being very angry and verbally aggressive, citing an example regarding her refusal to change her name.
(c)December 2020 – the wife again described difficulties in her intimate relationship, with finances and responsibilities at home.
(d)2021 - the wife described having been pushed by the husband (corresponding to the furniture incident set out below)
It may be observed that the accounts given by the wife to Ms W predate the end of the relationship and provide a degree of contemporaneity to a number of her complaints regarding the behaviour of the husband during the relationship. During the relationship the wife was describing to Ms W her experience of feeling unsafe, threatened, bullied and abused. During the relationship she described both physical violence and financial control. These descriptions predated the end of the relationship and the commencement of litigation. This contemporaneity lends credibility to the wife’s evidence about these matters.
In August 2021 the husband attended on his psychologist. He described having issues in the relationship, struggling with working at home a lot (during the COVID epidemic). He described tension in the marriage and that he can be irritable when fatigued. His psychologist described the husband was referred to him by his general practitioner “for the treatment of depressive affect and some symptoms of anger”.[9] The psychologist provided assistance to the husband to manage his emotional reactivity to marital conflict.
[9] Exhibit W2.
This again lends credence to the wife’s description of the husband’s aggression and anger. The husband commendably took steps to deal with such.
The parties agreed that in September 2021 a piece of furniture fell down in the home and the husband shouted at the wife, in a manner that he accepted may have been overheard by the children. He accepted that he raised his voice, blaming the wife for the accident associated with the furniture. The wife alleged that the husband came up to and pushed her in the arm. He denied this, alleging that she approached him and said “you think you’re a man?” She alleges that she threatened to call the police, and that the husband threatened to make the wife disabled before they arrived if she called. Although he did not challenge the wife’s account in his affidavit evidence, in his oral evidence he denied both. The husband accepted that the wife called his mother, and that his mother then came to the home. He denied that his mother witnessed screaming in front of the children, but rather removed the children’s cousins who were also at the home. The wife alleges that the husband did not speak to her for the following month. The husband said that he did not recall not speaking to the wife for a month, explaining that “maybe it wasn’t all lovey dovey” but as they lived together and had children it was impossible not to speak for a month.
Despite the husband’s denial under cross-examination, this forms an instance of the husband screaming at and assaulting the wife, and then withdrawing from communication with her following her involvement of his mother. The wife’s relatively contemporaneous report to her psychologist supports this. The acceptance that the wife called on the husband’s mother in response to the incident reinforces the seriousness of what had occurred. The wife was not challenged about this incident in cross-examination and her account was not contradicted by the husband’s affidavit. The instance is characterised by an amplification in the husband’s response to the wife, moving from screaming onto physical violence.
The acceptance of the wife, and corresponding rejection of the husband in relation to this incident, and also in relation to the urinating incident set out above, also gives reason for caution regarding his denials of other similar instances of violence. The wife’s accounts should generally be accepted over his.
The wife alleged that the husband engaged in physical chastisement of the children. The husband denied smacking either X or Y.
The wife asserted that the husband regularly grabbed X by the neck. He said that he never assaulted X.
The wife asserted that the husband punched a hole in his mother’s wall. The husband denied such.
In late 2021 the parents and children travelled to Country B to visit the wife’s family. They travelled via another country.
The wife alleges, and husband denies, that he struck her fingers whilst overseas, while they were in public and she sought to read from a map.
The husband accepts that he pulled X by the arm whilst they were in Country B, in order to get X to stop playing the Playstation and play outside. Some prevarication preceded this concession, the husband at first asserting that they did not own a Playstation, before conceding such an incident. He denied that this was a violent incident, explaining that he was leading X outside. This does not appear to be an incident of significance.
In late 2021 the husband left the family in Country B and travelled to Country VV on his own.
The parties argued on their wedding anniversary in late 2021. The husband alleges that the wife threatened to take everything away from him. This was not pursued with the wife in cross examination. The parties separated.
The parties returned to Australia and in early 2022 the husband moved into a serviced apartment. He describes that he then spent time with the children three nights per fortnight and on a Tuesday evening in the alternate week.
The wife described that the husband took keys to the home with him, and that he said to her that he would return whenever he wanted to. The wife described that this made her feel unsafe.
By this time the wife had been subjected to the husband’s screaming, sporadically leading into violence. The wife had been subjected to family violence in a manner that made her feelings of lack of safety reasonable. Accepting that the nature of the family violence was far from the upper end of the spectrum, it had the serious consequence of depriving the wife of feeling safe.
The wife says that the husband told her that she should leave the house within a month so it could be sold, and if she could not find a home, that the children should live with him. This did not occur, but again reflects financially threatening conduct by the husband, directed not only to housing for the wife, but also to whether she would be able to continue caring for the children.
The wife changed the locks on the family home. The husband described that he discovered the changed locks in early March, and, on confronting the wife about the changed locks was threatened by her with a knife. The wife denied that she had produced a knife. The husband’s narrative gave no indication for how this escalation by the wife took place. The wife was not asked about it in cross-examination. The wife described that the husband blocked her with his car until she said that she would call the police if he did not move. Both then attended the police station, the husband leaving and asking the police to attend the home. He said he arrived at the home and the wife was already outside with the children in her car, and so he left. His description of the incident, including his allegation that the wife threatened him with a knife should be rejected. Rather this formed a further example of an attempt to exercise control, blocking the wife from exit from the home following his failed attempt to enter the home on his whim. Accepting that there was no legal bar to entry into the home for the husband does not deprive the conduct of the character of being coercive and controlling.
In early 2022 the police took out an Interim Intervention Order against the husband, with the wife and the children listed as protected persons and he did not spend time with the children for about five weeks.
Later in early 2022 the wife proposed arrangements for the children to spend time with the husband. Following this, the husband recommenced spending time with the children, although the parties disagreed on the specifics of this.
The Interim Intervention Order was amended in early 2022.
The husband then consented to a Final Intervention Order in mid-2022, and was directed, by the court, to attend assessment for a Men’s Behaviour Change Program.
The husband describes then spending time with the children overnight on an alternate Saturday, overnight on an alternate Thursday, and alternate Tuesday evenings.
The husband accepted that, in May 2022 he pushed X. He said that he gently did this as X was standing on Y’s foot and was hurting her, and that he was not responsive to the husband’s repeated requests to get off her foot. This has not been established to constitute an episode of family violence.
The parties attended Family Dispute Resolution in May 2022. At about the same time the wife says that the police attended her home for a welfare check at the request of the husband’s sister.
The husband alleges that the wife, shortly after, suspended his time with the children on the basis that she had then found a fifty dollar note that appeared to have been used to consume an illicit drug. A photograph of such was tendered into evidence as Exhibit W13. However, the wife described in her affidavit that she had found this before separation.
In mid-2022 the husband messaged the wife alleging that she was neglecting the children, including failing to shower them for a week. The husband reported the wife to the police, alleging that she had kicked X in the back, on the basis, he said, that X had described such to him. This caused the police to attend the home to check on, and speak to X, and to interview the wife. Given the husband’s acceptance of the appropriateness of the children’s care by the wife during the final hearing, the calling of the police, and the alleging of neglect appears incongruous, and to constitute unjustified aggressive acts against the wife.
The wife alleged that the husband’s conduct breached the Intervention Order. The husband was not charged.
The husband commenced parenting proceedings on 23 June 2022.
The wife described that the children told her on multiple occasions at this time that the husband was saying to them that the wife should go back to Country B.
In July 2022 the wife requested, by correspondence from her solicitors, that the husband’s time be professionally supervised.
In August 2022 the husband agreed to use the supervision services offered by DD Family Services.
The parties entered into consent orders on 18 August 2022 that provided for the children to spend frequent professionally supervised time with the husband each Tuesday afternoon from 4pm until 7pm, and each Saturday from 10am until 2pm, and on X’s birthday. The husband was to meet the cost of the time.
Despite his consent to those arrangements, by October 2022 the husband had ceased the Tuesday time, explained on the basis that he was unable to afford the supervision.
The husband further reduced the time in October 2022 from each Saturday to each alternate Saturday, again asserted to be on the basis of cost.
In his affidavit material he explained that the cost of the supervision by Ms CC was $220 per week.[10] He did not make it clear whether this was for one visit, or two visits, or averaged out over the fortnight. It was put to the wife under cross-examination that the supervision cost $110 per hour, which added up to “nearly $700 per week” when the husband was spending six hours with the children, which she agreed with. It may be accepted that the supervision was expensive.
[10] Husband’s affidavit filed 23 September 2024, paragraph 19.
It was at about this time that the husband was in full time employment at about $120,000 per year with EE Company, until late 2022.[11] He was subsequently employed by FF Financial Services. He described this as being at the same level of remuneration.[12] He had also made significant payments of funds to his mother (which, as set out below in the property judgment, he was not obligated to do) and another associate, a Mr GG (which he has established he was required to do). It was also around this time that the husband paid his rent for a year in advance. The husband described that he sold his car in order to do this, and then had two other vehicles leased through his work. The husband gave evidence that received $68,000 for the car, spending $50,000 on the bond and advance payments of rent and the remaining $18,000 on furniture for the property. Each of these circumstances is set out in the property aspect of the judgment.
[11] Husband’s affidavit filed 23 September 2024, paragraph 24.
[12] Husband’s affidavit filed 23 September 2024, paragraph 21.

Although he described the cost of supervision as a heavy burden, it should not be accepted to have been so heavy as to have been impracticable for him to meet at that time. The consequence of this is that the reduction in frequency of time that he spent with the children was a choice by him that reflected poorly on his prioritisation and conception of parenting (as consistent with the observations of the family report writer).
In late 2022 the wife’s father travelled from Country B to support the wife, staying through to early 2023.
In late 2022 the husband returned a hair follicle drug screen positive for an illicit substance. The screen was not positive for metabolites, but was positive for an unmetabolised substance. The husband did not disclose this result to the wife for about six months. His explanations for withholding the results were inconsistent and unpersuasive.
How the husband came to return a positive test was not explained by him. Rather he claimed that the test represented a false positive, and indicative that whilst he may have been in contact with an illicit drug, he had not consumed it himself. This may well be the case. However, the failure to disclose the results in a timely fashion undermines a positive assessment of the candour of the husband. It also formed a reasonable basis for the wife, once aware of the test, to hold concerns as to the husband’s potential involvement with illicit drugs.
The wife alleges that in April 2023 the husband made X cry during a video call, by boasting that the husband was going overseas, but X would not be able to travel overseas. The husband accepted that, in the context of X asking to travel that he had said that “we wouldn’t be travelling for a while.” The husband denied that this discussion was about Country B. This appears to be innocuous.
The husband also accepted that he probably told X that he was unable to spend time with him because he could not afford the supervision. This was not true. X subsequently offered to do jobs to earn money for further time to occur. This illustrates the impact upon X of the husband’s choice to decrease his time with the children.
In June 2023 the husband was requested to undertake a further drug screen test. He did not do so. He denied that he failed to undertake the test from fear that it would be positive, rather explaining that it was because of the expense. He explained that the cost was $450.
On 9 August 2023 further parenting orders were made by consent. Those orders provided for regular increasing time for the husband with the children, without a supervision requirement. However, they required that the husband first produce a hair follicle test.
The husband was also required to provide hair follicle test results at four monthly intervals from the date of the orders.
The husband subsequently obtained a clear hair follicle test in September 2023, and his unsupervised time with the children recommenced, which allowed for the husband to spend time with the children each Wednesday and on alternate Saturdays and Sundays, along with some special occasions.
In accordance with the above orders, in December 2023 the time with the children became overnight.
In April 2024 the husband undertook a hair follicle test that returned a positive result for an illicit substance. Despite the orders obliging the husband to provide the results within 48 hours he did not do so.
On 1 May 2024 the wife’s application to extend and vary the Final Intervention Order against the husband was refused.
On 30 May 2024 the husband’s solicitors notified the wife’s solicitors both that they acted for the husband, and of his positive drug screen test of April 2024. The husband, in explanation for his non-production of the hair follicle results in a timely manner asserted that he had missed the email containing the results while self-represented.
The wife’s response was, not unreasonably, to cease to provide the children to the husband. She notified the husband’s solicitors of such and proposed professionally supervised time pending his return of a negative hair follicle test.
The husband immediately indicated that he rejected such an approach, asserting that he would explain in his trial affidavit how such a positive test had occurred. The husband’s trial affidavit was not filed until 23 September 2024, explaining there that he had unknowingly ingested a substance containing an illicit drug. Why the husband chose to wait until he filed his trial affidavit to offer such an exculpatory account remained unclear.
The husband contended that a positive hair follicle test did not act to suspend his time with the children. It may be accepted that the orders did not contain such a self-executing condition, although the implication of a requirement that there be a hair follicle test prior to time commencing, and of the ongoing obligation to obtain hair follicle tests, are suggestive that clear testing was a fundamental aspect of the scheme of the orders.
The husband asserted that he would collect the children from school despite the wife’s request that he not do so. In response the wife collected the children early from school on the relevant days.
The husband says that in June 2024 he performed a supervised urine test, which yielded clear results that he provided the following day. It should be noted that a supervised urine test did not form a part of the regime set out in the orders, and its efficacy to ensure that the children were not exposed to drug use on the part of the husband was not addressed.
The husband describes that he attempted to collect the children from school on 12 June 2024, but that the wife had removed them early.
In mid-2024 the husband obtained an IVO against the wife, he says to protect the children from coercive and controlling behaviour by the wife. It was not made clear in these proceedings what that behaviour was asserted to be. Perhaps it was in reference to the reasonable steps taken by the wife to ensure that the children were not collected by the husband, in relation to the apparent illicit substance use by the husband, about which he had chosen to defer any explanation.
In mid-2024 the husband contacted the police to ask them to perform a welfare check on the children who were not at school that day.
On 27 June 2024 the wife filed an application to support her withholding of the children, seeking to suspend the orders for children’s time with the husband unless professionally supervised, pending the husband returning a negative hair follicle test.
On 15 July 2024 the husband commenced contravention proceedings against the wife for her failure to provide the children. These were ultimately, sensibly, discontinued.
At the hearing of the matter on 14 August 2024 an ICL was appointed on the application of the husband, the husband withdrew his Contravention application, and by consent the husband’s time with the children was suspended unless supervised either by Ms R or Ms HH, pending a negative hair follicle test.
Observing that the husband’s time had moved to overnight time contingent upon his provision of a negative hair follicle test pursuant to orders of 9 August 2023, and that his ongoing time sat beside a requirement that he obtain and provide hair follicle tests to the wife, no significant criticism of the wife’s response to the positive test should be maintained.
It may be observed that, in response to the wife’s withholding of the children, the husband obtained an IVO, called on police to welfare check the children, and commenced contravention proceedings which were later discontinued, while deferring providing any explanation for his positive test.
The husband’s response to the wife, in the face of his positive hair follicle test, was unreasonable, aggressive and abusive of the wife.
The husband asserted[13] that the wife is sometimes under the influence of drugs when caring for the children. The basis for this allegation was unclear, as was the basis upon which he asked the wife to undertake a hair follicle test in January 2023 and June 2024. The use of illicit substances by the wife was not a matter that was ultimately pursued by him at trial. Rather he conceded, as to the wife’s care of the children, that she is a good mother who loves the children, takes them to school and gives them routine. He explicitly accepted that he had no complaint against the wife in her role as mother other then as to the conflict and impact upon his establishing/building a relationship with the children. That is, the complaint was as to support of his relationship with the children. No complaint was otherwise made as to risk or inadequacy of parenting on the wife’s part. On this basis the allegations as to ongoing drug use whilst caring for the children, and a need for the wife to undergo hair follicle testing were disingenuous. While there was reason for the husband to be subject to such requirements, there was no reason for the husband to seek such against the wife.
[13] Husband’s affidavit filed 23 September 2024, paragraph 75.
The welfare checks, obtaining of an IVO against the wife, the commencing of the contravention proceedings and the allegations of drug use against the wife all constitute the use of the legal system to exert illegitimate pressure upon the wife, in a context of the husband belatedly supplying the results of his positive hair follicle test and then declining to offer the exculpatory explanation that he has now proffered by his trial affidavit.
It may also be observed that the deferral of the explanation as to the illicit substance ingestion is not suggestive of candour. The explanation offered by the husband is not particularly persuasive, and its delay makes it less so.
The husband described[14] that the relationship between he and the wife deteriorated post separation. He described that this “was in part due to my own frustration with the parenting arrangements after separation and financial stress.” He asserts that the wife engaged in behaviour that she should not have, and that he engaged in behaviour that he should not have. The scope of the allegation against the wife was unclear, as was the scope of his concession as to his own conduct.
[14] Husband’s affidavit filed 23 September 2024, paragraph 72.
The husband has undertaken an anger management course, and Men’s Behaviour Change program and a Tuning into Kids program. It was not clear what the husband had derived from these various courses.
The husband is currently spending regular time with the children, the 9 August 2023 orders providing for the children to spend every second weekend and every Wednesday after school with him.
Having undertaken a hair follicle test in April 2024, the husband was due for another hair follicle test in August 2024. On 30 August 2024 the wife’s solicitors wrote to the husband requesting the test results. The husband wrote back asserting “financial difficulties” were a barrier to getting the tests, which he also described in his affidavit of 24 September 2024. This is difficult to understand in a context where he received a partial property settlement of $50,000 on or about 23 August 2024. On 18 September 2024, the husband produced a negative hair follicle test.
The husband requested additional time in the September 2024 school holidays approximately one month before the trial. The wife conceded in cross-examination that she had not responded and explained her reason for such was a belief that his requests were not genuine in a context where he had never requested additional time before. When it was put to the husband that he had not requested school holiday time until recently he explained that the previous year his time with the children had been supervised and he could not afford it. The husband’s time with the children had not been professionally supervised since about August 2023.
The Family Report
Two family reports were prepared by Ms Z, a clinical psychologist, the most recent on 7 July 2023.
Ms Z observed the wife to have a “nurturing and engaging relational style ... a deep and detailed knowledge of the children’s inner and outer worlds. She impressed as highly attuned to the children’s needs.” She observed that there was “good co-regulation” between the wife and the children.
The husband “impressed as stable, future focussed and keen to impress as a knowledgeable and committed parent seeking to avoid conflicts.” Perhaps this impression was not ultimately borne out given the husband’s conduct as set out above, a significant portion of which post-dated the report.
The report writer continued that “the [husband]’s style of engagement with the children was warm and generally responsive.” There was enthusiastic discussion between the husband and X regarding sport, and the husband’s communication with the children was “well pitched at their developmental needs.”
However, Ms Z observed a poor coparenting relationship, marked by the wife’s mistrust of the husband, and the husband’s view that the wife weaponizes the relationship between he and the children and fails to support it. She further observed that if the husband has behaved in a coercive and controlling manner toward the wife then, to the extent that she has engaged in gatekeeping of the relationship between the children and the husband, such could be viewed as protective in nature.
At the time of the first report, the report writer noted that the supervision report for the time the husband spent with the children “reflects well on the children’s ability to connect with the [husband] in a home-based setting,” the children displaying behaviours suggestive that they saw the husband as a reliable source of care.
At that point she noted the clear benefit for X with his father, but that Y’s relationship with him appeared to lack strength and security. Ms Z observed that Y and the wife share a close and secure bond. She further observed a close bond between X and Y, and that X adopts a “protective and nurturing role” in relation to Y.
On the issue of relocation, Ms Z observed that a move to Country B may improve the wife’s parental capacity and thereby benefit the children. The children would have access to, and the support of the maternal family. However, their relationship with the husband would likely diminish.
The report writer was subsequently provided with the updated trial material, but by the time of the trial had not observed the children or parents for some seventeen months.
In her oral evidence she observed that what she had previously seen in the interactions with the children was suggestive that their relationship had been compromised by the irregularity of their time with the husband. That irregularity was identified to have come from two sources, the first being the failure by the husband to take up all the time that was on offer, and second, the suspension of periods related to the drug testing issues.
If the responsibility for those interruptions lay with the husband, that is, for example, he was able to pay for the time but chose not to, then the report writer considered that this would be an indication of the husband’s “notion of what constitutes parenting” with such having resulted in disappointment for the children, a wondering of why they were not prioritised, and the basis of an insecure relationship. She considered that an absence of trust was difficult to restore.
The report writer described that she had started to see the husband as mature and starting to organise his life around parenting until she saw the positive illicit drug test and the explanation given. Following this, she describes that she started to form a view that the husband was “potentially immature” and “compartmentalises his parenting.” She explained her impression as being that the husband can be a parent when the children are with him but that he oscillates between that role and his life as a “single man with two kids and a former wife.” She described that he is not thinking like a parent when the children are not there. This compartmentalisation informed Ms Z’s “theory as to what is causing the instability” in time between the husband and the children.
Ms Z also identified the impact of the positive drug tests as “feeding into [the wife]’s concerns” and causes her to become stressed and protective,
She had not observed, at that point, the children to exhibit fear in relation to the husband. Rather she had observed a positive interaction, which was consistent with the wife’s description that the husband loves and plays with them. The interaction did not bear the hallmarks of the wife undermining the relationship between the husband and the children.
The report writer considered that if the children were to live in Country B, the relationship with the husband would diminish, and the likelihood of it diminishing would increase if it was already insecure. Particularly for Y, her memories as a basis to retain a relationship with the husband would fade. She considered that X will feel a loss, being at an age and stage where he idolises the husband. The effects on the children may be ameliorated by frequency of contact with the husband, but that two weeks each year spent with the husband would probably not be sufficient. The report writer emphasised the importance of electronic contact between the husband and the children as well as the face to face time. She observed that the adverse views of the husband held by the wife’s family were at risk of impacting the children.
Ms Z also identified developmental consequences of a breakdown in the relationship between the husband and the children following a move to Country B. She described that “broadly two parents are better than one” and that the loss of a relationship with one parent “makes the kids more vulnerable.”
If the children were to remain in Australia and spend five nights per fortnight with the husband as proposed by him, the report writer noted a problematic coparenting relationship, with the children being exposed to conflict between the parents. She considered that chronic conflict or exposure to family violence leads to poorer academic outcomes. For girls she considered a heightened risk of internalising the distress, and an increased likelihood of internalised disorders such as anxiety and depression. For boys there is a heightened risk of externalised behaviours, such as aggression and conduct problems.
That is, such children are at risk of compromise to their emotional well-being, and at significant risk of entering into relationships that mirror the same dynamic, of being either a victim or perpetrator of family violence, or otherwise engaging in dysfunctional relationships.
Further, if the unreliability was the product of the husband’s attitude rather than circumstances, and future unreliability ensued, the children would face the further problems associated with unstable, unreliable, inconsistent parenting. A resulting insecure relationship with the husband may have adverse effects on the children in social and school settings, and cause them to have an overwhelming desire to please the husband, an effect described by the report writer as where “things get turned around, everything gets skewed.”
However, the report writer considered that if there were not further difficulties, and provided that the arrangement was functional, that the time with the husband (if they live in Australia) should increase closer to what is sought by the husband.
The report writer noted the significance of Country B heritage, particularly to X. She further noted that the children face a loss in respect of the husband’s heritage (although the significance of this was not explored at the trial).
If the children live in Country B she recommended one to two occasions of two week contact blocks each year, with such time graduating from multiple periods with a break with the wife to eventually the full two week block with the husband.
Country B and the wife’s family

COSTS AND OTHER ORDERS
(19)That within 14 days:
(a)The Applicant Husband pay to the Respondent Wife her costs of and associated with the 20 April 2023 interim defended hearing fixed in the sum of $7,500.
(b)The Applicant Husband pay to the Respondent Wife her costs thrown away of the 22 April 2024 final hearing on an indemnity basis, fixed in the sum of $20,000.
(c)The Applicant Husband pay to the Respondent Wife her costs of and associated with the 14 August 2024 interim defended hearing on an indemnity basis, fixed in the sum of $10,000.
(d)The Applicant Husband reimburse the Respondent Wife the sum of $14,770 on account of the mortgage arrears accrued in breach of the Interim Orders made 20 April 2023.

(20)Such further and other orders as this Honourable Court deems appropriate.
(21)That the Applicant Husband otherwise pay the Respondent Wife’s costs of and associated with this application on an indemnity basis.

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER
(1)All previous Orders be discharged.
(2)That the children of the marriage, being X born 2015 and Y born 2018 live with the Wife.
(3)The Wife have sole decision making for long term decisions concerning the children.

In the event the Wife is not permitted to relocate the children to Country B:
(4)The wife be restrained from relocating the children from the Melbourne Metropolitan area.
(5)The husband spend time and communicate with the children:
(a)In a fortnightly cycle as follows:
(i)In Week 1 –from after school (or 3.30pm if a non-school day) on Friday until the commencement of school (or 5.00pm if a non- school day) on Monday;

(ii)In Week 2 – On Wednesday from after school / kindergarten (or 3.30pm if a non school day) until commencement of school (or 5.00pm if a non-school day) on Thursday.

(b)On Father’s Day from 5.00pm the evening prior until 5.00pm on Father’s Day;
(c)On each of the children’s birthdays and the Father’s birthday
(i)From the conclusion of school until 6.00pm if a school day;
(ii)If they fall on a weekend when the children are not otherwise spending time with the Father, for a four hour period as agreed between the parties and in default of agreement from 10.00am until 2.00pm.

(d)On Christmas Day for a period of 5 hours as agreed and in default of agreement, from 12.00pm until 5.00pm.
(e)From 12.00pm on New Years Eve until 12.00pm on New Years Day each alternate year commencing in 2024.
(f)From 12.00pm Easter Saturday until 12.00pm Easter Sunday in 2025 and each alternate year thereafter.
(g)Commencing in the Term 1 2025 school holidays, for half of all school term holidays, to be the first half in odd numbered years and the second half in even numbered years.
(h)For half of the long summer vacation with such time to be exercised on a week about basis in 2025 and 2026 and thereafter for half of the long summer holiday period, to be the first half in odd numbered years and the second half in even numbered years.
(i)Otherwise as agreed in writing between the parties.

(6)The Husband’s time with the children be subject to the following conditions:
(a)The Husband shall provide to the Wife in writing no less than 7 days’ notice of any intended travel by him which coincides with his time with the children pursuant to these Orders and, unless otherwise agreed, the children shall remain in the care of the Wife during all such periods of travel.
(b)If the Husband otherwise cannot care for, or be in substantial attendance with, the children during his time pursuant to these Orders, he provide the Wife with no less than 7 days’ written notice and give the Wife the first option to care for the children.
(c)The Husband be restrained by injunction from consuming alcohol to excess or illicit drugs within 24 hours prior to or during any time with the children pursuant to these Orders.

(7)The husband’s time with the children be suspended:
(a)From 5.00pm the evening prior to Mother’s Day and for the balance of that weekend;
(b)On the children’s birthdays and the Mother’s birthday in the event they fall on his weekend, for a four hour period as agreed and failing agreement, from 10am until 2pm.

(8)Each party is restrained from:
(a)Discussing the details of these proceedings, or any matters arising from these proceedings, with the children, save and except for advising the children about the next occasion that the child is going into the care of, or communicate with, the other parent, in accordance with Court orders.
(b)Making negative, derogatory or disparaging comments about the other parent or members of the other parent’s family or household in the presence or hearing of the children.
(c)Questioning the children about the other parent or their household.
(d)Inappropriately involving the children in adult issues.

(9)All changeovers which do not take place at the children’s school / kindergarten (or the children’s extra-curricular activities) occur inside the foyer at the entrance to a shopping centre.
(10)Both parties be permitted to attend all school functions/events and extra-curricular activities regardless of who the children are living with at that time, provided that the Husband shall provide to the Wife no less than 24 hours’ written notice of his intention to attend any such event or activity.
(11)That each party forthwith inform the other of any illness or injury sustained by any of the children whilst in their care and further provide the other with:
(a)full particulars of the name, address and telephone number of any doctor or medical or other health professional or hospital from whom or at which the children have received treatment or are to receive treatment; and
(b)full particulars of diagnoses made, medications prescribed and proposed treatments.

(12)The Airport Watch List Order be discharged.
(13)Pursuant to Section 65Y(2)(b) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) each party be at liberty to take the children from Australia to a place outside of Australia during the time that the children are living with or spending time with them, or for such other period as agreed between the parties from time to time in writing, provided that:
(a)The children are not taken to a country or jurisdiction that:
(i)Is not a Convention country listed in Schedule 2 of the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986; and
(ii)Has been classified by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade as ‘Level 2 - Exercise a high degree of caution’ or equivalent or higher at the date of departure;

(b)The travelling party provides to the other:
(i)Not less than six (6) weeks prior to the intended departure date, written notice of his or her intention to travel;
(ii)Not less than Four (4) weeks prior to the departure date, a detailed itinerary of the proposed travel, including details of departure and return dates, each destination, flight numbers, methods of travel, where the children will be staying, copies of documents sufficient to demonstrate that the children and the travelling party each have a paid return ticket; and
(iii)Not less than two (2) weeks prior to departure, copies of certificates of travel insurance which include medical cover for the children and the travelling party and which cover the children and the travelling party for each relevant destination and duration of travel.

(c)The travelling party ensures that the children are fully vaccinated as recommended by the children’s treating general medical practitioner for each travel destination.

(14)The wife be at liberty to extend her time with the children during the long summer vacation to a 4 week block period in each alternate year to enable travel to Region AJ provided she has given the husband notice of her intention to do so in accordance with Order 13 hereof and in the event she undertakes such travel, the husband may spend the whole of the subsequent first term holiday period with the children by way of make up time.
(15)The husband is to retain Y’s passport and the wife is to retain X’s passport with each parent to ensure that the other parent is provided with the passport they are holding no less than 4 weeks prior to any intended overseas travel.
(16)That all written communications between the parties pursuant to these Orders or otherwise in relation to the children occur by way of email or text message, unless an emergency, where they may communicate via telephone call.

In the event the Wife is permitted to relocate the children to Country B
(17)That the Wife forthwith be permitted to relocate the children to live permanently in Country B.
(18)That the children be permitted to leave the Commonwealth of Australia, AND IT IS DIRECTED that the Australian Federal Police remove the names of the children from the Airport Watch List in force at all points of arrival and departure in the Commonwealth of Australia.
(19)Solicitors for the Wife be responsible for effecting service of a sealed copy of this Order upon the proper officer of the Australian Federal Police AND IT IS REQUESTED that the Australian Federal Police give force and effect to this Order.
(20)That the solicitors for the Wife forthwith release to the Wife the children’s passports currently held in safe custody and the Wife forthwith hold the children’s passports.
(21)That the Wife be permitted to apply for and/or renew as required an Australian Passport (and, if required, an Country B passport) for each of the children to enable the children to travel internationally notwithstanding that the consent of the Husband has not been obtained, and IT IS REQUESTED that the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Travel in Australia (and any equivalent body in Country B) issue such passports for the children on that basis.
(22)That pending the relocation of the children to Country B, the children spend time with the Husband in a fortnightly cycle as follows:
(a)In Week 1 – From after school (or 3.30pm if a non-school day) on Friday until the commencement of school (or 5.00pm if a non- school day) on Monday;
(b)In Week 2 – From after school (or 3.30pm if a non-school day) on Wednesday until commencement of school (or 5.00pm if a non-school day) on Thursday.
(c)At any other time as may be agreed between the parties in writing.

(23)That upon the relocation of the children to Country B, the children spend time and communicate with the Husband as follows:
(a)By telephone or video call as agreed between the parties and, in default of agreement:
(i)Each Wednesday and Saturday at 7.30pm (UTC-3) with the Applicant Husband to initiate the call.
(ii)On all special occasions, including but not limited to the children’s birthdays, the Father’s birthday, Father’s Day and Christmas Day, at a time to be agreed between the parties in writing and with the Applicant Husband to initiate the call.

(b)In 2025 (not earlier than 6 months after Final Parenting Orders are made) and each alternate year thereafter in Country B, over a 14 day period agreed between the parties (or, in default of agreement, as nominated by the Husband upon giving the Wife no less than 28 days’ notice in writing) as follows (unless otherwise agreed):
(i)On Days 1 - 2 – From 8.30am on Day 1 until 6.30pm on Day 2.
(ii)On Days 4 - 6 – From 8.30am on Day 4 until 6.30pm on Day 6.
(iii)On Days 8 – 10 – From 8.30am on Day 8 until 6.30pm on Day 10.
(iv)On Days 12 – 15 – From 8.30am on Day 12 until 8.30am on Day 15.

(c)In 2026 and each alternate year thereafter – In Australia, over a 14 day period agreed between the parties (or, in default of agreement, as nominated by the Wife upon giving the Husband no less than 28 days’ notice in writing) as follows (unless otherwise agreed):
(i)On Days 1 - 2 – From 8.30am on Day 1 until 6.30pm on Day 2.
(ii)On Days 4 - 6 – From 8.30am on Day 4 until 6.30pm on Day 6.
(iii)On Days 8 – 10 – From 8.30am on Day 8 until 6.30pm on Day 1
(iv)On Days 12 – 15 – From 8.30am on Day 12 until 8.30am on Day 15.

(d)At the election of the Husband, two further periods of time with the children in Country B each calendar year, being over a 7 day period on each occasion as agreed between the parties (or, in default of agreement, as nominated by the Husband upon giving the Wife no less than 28 days’ notice in writing) as follows (unless otherwise agreed):
(i)If during school term, from 5.30pm Friday until 8.00pm Sunday and each other day from the conclusion of school until 8.00pm;
(ii)If during school holidays, for a 7 day block commencing at 9.00am the day after the husband’s arrival and concluding at 8.00pm 7 days thereafter, with the children to spend time with the wife from 10am until 5.00pm on day 3 of the 7 day block.

(24)That, for the purpose of Order 7(b) – (d) hereof:
(a)The Wife shall give the Husband at least 28 days’ notice in writing of any intended periods of travel by her with the children or any other sufficient reason as to why time cannot occur over a designated period, and the Husband shall not thereafter schedule any visit by him to Country B to spend time with the children during such designated period.
(b)The Wife be permitted to travel internationally with the children for the purpose of holidays only upon providing to the Husband at least 28 days’ written notice, along with copies of the children’s return airfares, itinerary and contact details for the children whilst they are away PROVIDED THAT the Wife shall not schedule any such travel with the children during periods already designated for the Husband to spend time with the children pursuant to these Orders.
(c)The Husband be restrained by himself, his servants and agents from removing the children from Region JJ, Country B during any period of time spent in Country B pursuant to these Orders without the prior written consent of the Wife.
(d)The Applicant Husband be restrained by himself, his servants and agents from removing the children from the Commonwealth of Australia during any period of time spent with them in Australia pursuant to these Orders without the prior written consent of the Respondent Wife.

(25)Commencing as of 2027 the time provided for in 7(b)and 7(c) be exercised on the following basis:
(a)On days 1-6 the children are to spend time with the husband from 8.30am on day 1 until 5.30pm on day 6;
(b)The children are to return to the wife from 5.30pm on day 6 until 12 noon on day 7;
(c)On days 7-14 the children are to spend time with the husband from 12 noon on day 7 until 5.30pm on day 14.

(26)Irrespective of any other Order, in the event that both parties are in the same country on any special occasion, and in the event that the children would not otherwise spend time with a parent for that special occasion, then the children shall spend time with that parent as follows:
(a)For the period from Christmas Eve to Boxing Day each year as follows:
(i)In even years: with the Wife from 3.00pm on Christmas Eve until 3.00pm on Christmas Day and with the Husband from 3.00pm on Christmas Day until 3.00pm on Boxing Day.
(ii)In odd years: with the Husband from 3.00pm on Christmas Eve until 3.00pm on Christmas Day and with the Wife from 3.00pm on Christmas Day until 3.00pm on Boxing Day.

(b)On each of the husband and wife’s birthdays for 3 hours by agreement in writing and failing agreement from 3.30pm until 6.30pm.
(c)For Mother’s Day and Father’s Day respectively, from 9.00am until 5.00pm that day.
(d)On each child’s birthday for 3 hours by agreement in writing and failing agreement from 3.30pm until 6.30pm.

(27)For the purposes of travel:
(a)The husband pay the cost of his own return airfares and accommodation to travel to Country B to spend time with the children pursuant to these Orders.
(b)The wife pay the cost of her own return airfares and accommodation to accompany the children to spend time with the husband in Australia pursuant to these Orders.
(c)Each party pay one half of the cost of return economy airfares for the children to travel to Australia to spend time with the husband pursuant to these Orders.

(28)That all changeovers for the children which do not take place at the children’s school take place as follows:
(a)In Country B – At a public place nominated by the Wife within 5 kilometres of the Wife’s residence.
(b)In Australia – At the entrance to a shopping centre.

(29)That both parties be permitted to attend all school functions/events and extra-curricular activities regardless of with whom the children are living at that time.
(30)That the children forthwith be enrolled in and upon their relocation to Country B attend AF School in Region JJ, Country B.
(31)That within 7 days of the children commencing their attendance at AF School the Wife provide to the school a copy of these Orders and authorise the school to forward to the Husband all information ordinarily provided to parents, including access to any relevant school apps, copies of school newsletters and copies of school reports.
(32)The Husband be restrained by injunction from consuming alcohol to excess or illicit drugs within 24 hours prior to or during any time with the children pursuant to these Orders.
(33)That if the Husband cannot be in substantial attendance with the children during his scheduled time pursuant to these Orders, he give the Wife the first option to care for the children by notice in writing at the earliest reasonable opportunity.
(34)Each party and their servants or agents are restrained from:
(a)Discussing the details of these proceedings, or any matters arising from these proceedings with the children, save and except for advising the children about the next occasion that the child is going into the care of, or communicate with, the other parent, in accordance with Court orders.
(b)Making negative, derogatory or disparaging comments about the other parent or members of the other parent’s family or household in the presence or hearing of the children.
(c)Questioning the children about the other parent or their household.
(d)Inappropriately involving the children in adult issues.

(35)That each party forthwith inform the other of any serious illness or injury sustained by the children whilst in their care and further provide the other with:
(a)Full particulars of the name, address and telephone number of any doctor or medical or other health professional or hospital from whom or at which the children have received treatment or are to receive treatment; and
(b)Full particulars of diagnoses made, medications prescribed and proposed treatments.

(36)That all communications between the parties pursuant to these Orders or otherwise in relation to the children occur in writing via a parenting app such as “Our Family Wizard” or “Two Houses”, email or text message, unless in emergency.
(37)That each party keep the other informed of their email address and mobile telephone number, and advise the other of any change of email address or mobile telephone number within 48 hours of such change.
(38)That upon the request of either party in writing, both parties forthwith do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as may be required to seek mirror parenting orders by consent in Country B, with each party to bear their own legal costs.

(39)In the event of any non-urgent dispute between the parties involving the implementation of these Orders, the parties attend International Family Mediation through C Social Services in the first instance.

File number(s):	MLC 6755 of 2022
Judgment of:	GILL J
Date of judgment:	4 February 2025
Catchwords:	FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – International relocation – Where the wife seeks to relocate with the children to her country of birth – Where the parties and ICL agree the children will live with the wife and spend time with the husband – Where the parties and ICL agree the wife will hold sole parental responsibility – Where the husband has perpetrated family violence on the wife – Where the husband has failed to prioritise his relationship with the children – Where it is likely there will be strong parental conflict if the wife and children remain in Australia – Where international relocation would provide the wife access to family support and improved employment opportunities – Where the benefits to the children of international relocation outweigh the benefits of remaining in Australia – The wife is permitted to relocate to Country B with the children FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Dispute as to what property is held by the parties – Where the parties are in disagreement regarding the status of a number of alleged assets – Where the wife asserts the husband has hidden or disposed of various resources – Where the wife’s evidence was generally regarded as more credible than the husband’s – Where the parties’ contributions were 55 – 45 in favour of the husband – Where consideration of the parties’ future needs results in an overall split of 52.5 per cent to the wife and 47.5 per cent to the husband
Legislation:	Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60CC, 75, and 79 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment Bill 2023 (Cth)
Cases cited:	AB v CD (2019) 364 ALR 202; [2019] HCA 6 Bevan & Bevan (2013) FLC 93-545; [2013] FamCAFC Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 Dickons & Dickons (2012) 50 Fam LR 244; [2012] FamCAFC 154 Eastley & Eastley (2022) FLC 94-094; [2022] FedCFamC1A 101 Fitzwater v Fitzwater (2019) 60 Fam LR 212; [2019] FamCAFC 251 Grier v Malphas [2016] FamCAFC 84 Isles & Nelissen (2022) FLC 94-092; [2022] FedCFamC1A 97 Jollie & Dysart [2014] FamCAFC 149 M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69 Morgan & Miles (2007) FLC 93-343; [2007] FamCA 1230 Phillips & Hansford (No 2) (2019) FLC 93-917; [2019] FamCAFC 165 Stanford & Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108; [2012] HCA 52 Taylor and Barker (2007) FLC 93-345; [2007] FamCA 1246 U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238; [2002] HCA 36 Welch & Abney (2016) FLC 93-756; [2016] FamCAFC 271
Division:	Division 1 First Instance
Number of paragraphs:	472
Date of hearing:	14-18 October 2024
Place:	Heard in Melbourne, delivered in Canberra
Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr Howe
Solicitor for the Applicant:	RRR Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent:	Ms Byrnes
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Serein Family Law
Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer:	Ms Treyvaud
Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer:	Walters Family Law Pty Ltd

MLC 6755 of 2022
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN:	MR KRANZ Applicant
AND:	MS PADMINI Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:	GILL J
DATE OF ORDER:	4 FEBRUARY 2025