Kramer & Anor v Stone - [2024] HCATrans 63

[2024] HCATrans 063

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Sydney No S53 of 2024

B e t w e e n -
HILARY LORRAINE KRAMER
First Appellant
JAIME FERRAR
Second Appellant
and
DAVID LINDSAY STONE
Respondent

GAGELER CJ
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
GLEESON J
BEECH‑JONES J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT HOBART ON WEDNESDAY, 11 SEPTEMBER 2024, AT 10.04 AM

MR N.C. HUTLEY, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friends MR S.H. HARTFORD DAVIS and MR M.O. PULSFORD for the appellants. (instructed by Walker & White)

MR P.D. HERZFELD, SC: Your Honours, I appear with MS H. BENNETT and MR S.D.D. PUTTICK for the respondent. (instructed by Lane Associates : Lawyers)

GAGELER CJ: Thank you, Mr Herzfeld. Mr Hutley.

MR HUTLEY: Thank you, your Honour. Essentially, this appeal involves two propositions which might be described as cascading. Firstly, in the field of proprietary estoppel by encouragement, the equity arises in favour of an intended donee, but from the conduct of the donor after the making of the voluntary promise by the donor, it is that conduct by encouraging the donee to act upon the promise which makes it unconscionable for the donor to resile from his or her promise.

This ground is 1(a) of the notice of appeal. It mirrors the formulation of Chief Justice Mason and Justice McHugh in Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540. That is in the joint book at volume 1, tab 4, the relevant page is page 139 citing Olsson v Dyson. The second proposition is, in a case where the only conduct of the donor after making the voluntary promise is said to be knowledge of detrimental reliance. Constructive knowledge is not sufficient to satisfy that requirement – that is ground 1(b).

We propose to firstly address the facts as found by the trial judge in the relevant analysis undertaken by the Court of Appeal before turning to the two grounds. Can I take your Honours shortly through the facts. As your Honours will appreciate, the case concerns a property of approximately 100 acres in the Colo River in New South Wales. I will use the convention adopted at trial in naming the parties by their Christian names.

Under a will of 1 November 2011, Dame Leonie left that property to the first appellant, her daughter Hilary. Dame Leonie died in April 2016. She provided by that will a legacy of $200,000 in favour of David. That was, of course, subject to CPI increments. The proceedings were commenced in 2007 by David alleging, as your Honours appreciate, that Dame Leonie acted unconscionably in failing to leave in her will the property to him.

Background – as your Honours appreciate – is a share farming agreement. If your Honours go to the core appeal book at page 9, your Honours will see at paragraph 10 that the:

share farming agreement –

was:

made between Dr Harry…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Kramer & Anor v Stone

Details

AGLC: Kramer & Anor v Stone [2024] HCATrans 63
Case: [2024] HCATrans 63
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered a dispute between Kramer and another party (the appellants) and Stone (the respondent). The case concerned the interpretation and application of certain provisions within the *Corporations Act 2001* (Cth) and the *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001* (Cth) in relation to alleged contraventions by the respondent.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the respondent had contravened specific sections of the *Corporations Act* and the *ASIC Act*, and if so, what the appropriate consequences or remedies should be. This involved a detailed examination of the statutory language and its intended scope, particularly concerning duties and prohibitions imposed on individuals operating within the corporate sphere.

The Court's reasoning focused on the proper construction of the relevant legislative provisions, considering their purpose and the established principles of statutory interpretation. The judges analysed the factual matrix presented and applied these principles to determine whether the respondent's conduct met the threshold for contravention. The decision underscored the importance of precise statutory language in defining corporate obligations and the High Court's role in clarifying such matters.

Orders