Krajniw v Brisbane City Council
[2010] QPEC 33
•31 March 2010
PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Krajniw v Brisbane City Council & Anor [2010] QPEC 33
PARTIES: TONY KRAJNIW
(applicant)
v
BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
(first respondent)and
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (PREVIOUSLY ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY & DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND WATER)
(second and third respondents)
and
DEPARTMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND PLANNING
(fourth respondent)
FILE NO/S: 3672 of 2009
3673 of 2009
ORIGINATING COURT: Brisbane
DELIVERED ON: 31 March 2010
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
JUDGE: Rackemann DCJ
ORDER: Insofar as they relate to Section 89 of the Nature Conservation Act 1992 and Section 332 of the Nature Conservation (Wildlife Management) Regulation 2006, the applications are adjourned to 11 June 2010 for further review. The applications are otherwise dismissed.
CATCHWORDS: PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT – Originating applications for declaration and enforcement orders – lawfulness of proposed stage 2 of bikeway / pedestrian path – whether development permit was valid and sufficient – whether further approvals required – whether offences would be committed.
Integrated Planning Act 1997
Sustainable Planning Act 2009
Vegetation Management Act 1999
Coastal Protection and Management Act 1995
Water Act 2000
Nature Conservation Act 1992
Nature Conservation (Protected Areas) Regulation 1994
Nature Conservation (Wildlife Management) Regulation 2006
Nature Conservation (Wildlife) Regulation 2006
Nature Conservation (Protected Plants) Conservation Plan 2000
Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservationy Act 1999Krajniw v. BCC and Others [2009] QPELR 244
COUNSEL:Mr Krajniw (self-represented) for the applicant
Mr Trotter for the respondent
Mr Peate and Ms Wilson for the second and third respondents
HIS HONOUR: Mr Krajniw lives near the Minnippi Parklands at Cannon Hill. He has a sincere and deeply held concern for local wildlife and, in particular, the local squirrel glider population. He is opposed to development which he perceives will adversely impact upon local wildlife. He has previously brought unsuccessful proceedings (the stage 1 proceedings) in an attempt to prevent the construction, by the Council, of stage 1 of a bikeway/pedestrian path through the park (see Krajniw v. BCC and Others [2009] QPELR 244). Stage 1 is now complete and the Council intends to proceed with stage 2. By these proceedings Mr Krajniw now challenges the lawfulness of stage 2 and seeks declarations and enforcement orders pursuant to the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (IPA) and the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (NCA).
Stage 2 is to:
(a)feature a path of approximately 3 metres in width extending for approximately 1,554 metres in length;
(b)involve clearing some 73 tree, turf or weed species, including native vegetation;
(c)be constructed on freehold land and reserve land described as:
(i) Lot 3 on RP141525 (Lot 3)
(ii) Lot 2 on SP224771 (Lot 2)
(iii)Lots 166 and 167 on RP207897 (Lots 166 and 167)
(iv)Lot 50 on RP160209 (Lot 50)
(v)Lot 6 on RP806629 (Lot 6)
(vi)Part of the road reserve of Stanton Road;
(d)be constructed on land within the following area designations under City Plan:
(i)Parkland (Lots 3 and 50)
(ii)General industry (Lot 2)
(iii)Sport and recreation (Lots 6, 166 and 167);
(e)not be within the conservation, environmental protection or rural areas. In this respect the report of the assessment manager's delegate (Exhibit 5) which claimed that Lots 50 and 3 were identified in the scheme as 'conservation/non-urban' appears to be mistaken;
(f)not be within any water course;
(g)follow, if least to some extent, an existing four-wheel drive track and be generally located in an area designated for a 'bikeway/walkway' within 'open space' in the Cannon Hill District Local Plan;
(h)be clear of an area designated in the Local Plan for protection of squirrel glider habitat;
be constructed in accordance with an environmental management plan (EMP); and
(j)form part of the eastern arterial cycle corridor which is identified as a network priority in the Brisbane active transport strategy: Walking and Cycling Plan 2005/2010.
In October 2009 the Council made a development application for operational works to authorise clearing of native vegetation for the purposes of constructing stage 2. The application was treated as one requiring code assessment only and was approved subject to conditions by the chief executive administering the Vegetation Management Act 1999, as assessment manager. The decision notice for granting a development permit was dated 19 February 2010 and was sent to the Council a few days later. That permit purports to authorise clearing of native vegetation on Lots 3, 6 and 50 in accordance with plans attached to the decision notice. While the proposed vegetation clearing is not limited to those lots, the assessment manager had apparently taken the view that those three lots were the only ones in respect of which an approval was required.
It may be noted that the Council's application was referred to the fourth respondent as a concurrence agency under the South East Queensland Koala State Planning Regulatory Provisions, which were in force at the time the application was made. The concurrence agency's response was that it had no requirements.
The Council initially contended that the development permit it received is the only one that it needs. Indeed, it contended that the approval goes beyond what it requires, since it submits that no approval was required for Lots 3 or 50. Mr Krajniw contends to the contrary. Mr Krajniw's principal concern is for that part of stage 2 which is to traverse lots 3 and 50 in a relatively narrow area which runs parallel to Bulimba Creek.
The originating applications set out, in identical terms, some 96 pages of grounds upon which Mr Krajniw relies. He also handed up a 30 page written outline of argument. The written contentions contained therein are, to an extent, variously repetitive, irrelevant, not supported in the evidence and are, at times, scandalous. The central issues, however, are whether the development permit is valid and effectual, whether stage 2 requires further or other approvals and whether the development would involve the commission of an offence.
Mr Krajniw elected not to file any material in support of his applications, nor did he give or call oral evidence. The evidence before the Court is that contained in the affidavit material filed by the respondents, together with the exhibits tendered upon the hearing and the oral evidence of Ms Fraser, an environmental scientist employed by the Council, whom Mr Krajniw cross-examined.
Mr Krajniw, who represented himself, also asked the respondents to make their submissions first. While they obliged him in that way, they did not thereby assume the onus in these proceedings. As was explained to Mr Krajniw, it is he who bears the onus.
Mr Krajniw relies on the following Acts and statutory instruments:
City Plan;
The Integrated Planning Act 1997 (IPA);
The Vegetation Management Act 1999 (VMA);
The Coastal Protection and Management Act 1995;
The Water Act 2000;
The Nature Conservation Act 1992; and
The Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act).
City Plan
Mr Krajniw contends that stage 2 constitutes a material change of use. As I held in the stage 1 proceedings, the construction of a bicycle/pedestrian path is exempt development for the purposes of City Plan, even if it is assumed that it constitutes a material change of use. It falls within the definition of a ‘road.' City Plan identifies development involving the construction, maintenance or operation of roads by or on behalf of, or under contract with, the Council as exempt development.
The IPA, SPA and VMA
Although stage 2 is exempt development for the purposes of City Plan, it may nevertheless be assessable by reason of the relevant statute. Under the IPA, operational work that is clearing of native vegetation on freehold land, was assessable unless it fell within certain exemptions (see item 1A of Table 4 of Schedule 8).
One of those exemptions was where the clearing is of vegetation to which the VMA does not apply. It was not suggested that the clearing, as a whole, falls within that exemption. The relevant land contains remnant vegetation that is 'of concern' and 'least concern' regional ecosystems under the VMA.
Another exemption is where development is 'for urban purposes in an urban area' and where the vegetation falls within certain categories (which it does in this case). That is what the Council says applies in this case, at least with respect to most of the land upon which stage 2 is to be developed.
The IPA has now been superseded by the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (SPA), however the regulations under the SPA (the SPRs) also contain essentially the same exemptions of relevance (see SPRs Table 4, item 1 in Schedule 24, part 2, section 2(a)(g)).
In the stage 1 proceedings I found that the development of stage 1 on part of Lot 50 was for 'urban purposes in an urban area.' Mr Krajniw sought to re-argue that in the context of stage 2. In doing so he relied upon various designations which acknowledged certain values, including environmental values of the area. That does not, however, disqualify Lots 50 or 3 from being properly described as within an 'urban area.' Insofar as those lots are concerned I am satisfied the development is for urban purposes within an urban area, essentially for the same reasons that I gave in the stage 1 proceedings (see paragraphs 26 to 36 of the reasons). The SPR contains the same definition of 'urban purposes', but a different definition of 'urban area.' The difference would not alter my conclusion in this case.
It is for this reason the Council contends that the approval goes beyond what it required. The result in this case does not, however, turn on the correctness of that conclusion, because the Council has obtained an approval for clearing on those lots.
Mr Krajniw was concerned that the development would result in clearing on those lots, beyond the approved areas. The evidence does not justify a conclusion that that is either proposed or would inevitably occur. Indeed, the Council appears to have gone to some trouble to identify the vegetation which will be cleared.
Mr Krajniw contended that without further clearing, the pathway would not be consistent with the principles for Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). Public safety is one of the considerations referred to in the relevant Regional Vegetation Management Code (See PRP.1(c) of Exhibit 1), but the evidence does not justify a conclusion that further clearing will be involved or that there will be conflict with the relevant code in this respect.
There is other freehold land over which stage 2 is to be constructed. That falls within the general industry (Lot 2) and sport and recreation (Lots 167 and 167) areas. The conclusion that stage 2 involves urban development in an urban area is all the stronger in those cases, having regard to the provisions of CityPlan relating to those area designations. Clearing on those lots is not assessable under item 1 table 4 of schedule 8 of the IPA, nor under the SPR equivalent.
Lot 6 is not freehold. It is held by the council on trust for park and recreation purposes. The council concedes that clearing native vegetation on that lot is assessable. The assessment manager was the Chief Executive administering the VMA (item 2 of table 3 of schedule 8A of IPA). The application was code assessable with the relevant regional vegetation management code being the applicable code (item 1 of table 4 of schedule 1 of the Integrated Planning Regulation 1998). In this case the applicable code was the Regional Vegetation Management Code for the South-East Queensland Bio Region. Part P of that code sets out the requirements of clearing for public safety and infrastructure. The application was approved and the evidence does not justify a finding that clearing of native vegetation on lot 6 beyond the area approved is planned or will inevitably occur.
Mr Krajniw contended that the decision to grant a development permit was defective because, amongst other things, it failed to have regard to advancing the purpose of the IPA, which is to seek to achieve ecological sustainability. He pointed out that, in accordance with section 1.2.2(1) of the IPA, there is a duty to advance the Act's purpose but he failed to acknowledge that the duty does not apply to code assessment (see section 1.2.2(2)). In any event, the evidence does not establish that the development, or the decision upon the development application, fails to advance the purpose of the Act.
Mr Krajniw also contended that the approval was inconsistent with the purpose of the VMA and with other documents, including various codes and other provisions of CityPlan. His contentions were not supported in the evidence and extended beyond the provisions of the applicable code.
Mr Krajniw also alleged conflict between the development and the applicable code. The code is a performance-based document. Accordingly it sets out performance requirements and acceptable solutions. Acceptable solutions are not mandatory. Applicants can propose an alternative solution to meet the performance requirement. The relevant performance requirements involve matters of assessment and judgment. The application was decided under delegated authority. The decision maker's report (Exhibit 5) sets out the findings and conclusions with respect to each relevant aspect of the code.
The ultimate conclusion was that, subject to the imposition of conditions, the development would satisfy the performance requirements of the code, even though it did not meet all of the acceptable solutions.
One particular example of that to which I should refer is the findings in relation to PR P.8 which relates to essential habitat. The relevant performance requirement and acceptable solutions are as follows:
PR P.8: Essential habitat
To regulate the clearing of vegetation in a way that prevents the loss of biodiversity - maintain the current extent of essential habitat.
AS P.8
P.8.1
Clearing does not occur in an area shown as essential habitat on the essential habitat map.
It is clear that, in this case, clearing is to occur in an area which is shown as being essential habitat. However, the delegate was satisfied that the relevant performance requirement was met because, notwithstanding that clearing, the current extent of the essential habitat would be maintained.
In that regard the assessment manager considered the limited extent of clearing in terms of its width, the proposal to retain all vegetation not required to construct the bikeway, the measures that will be taken to ensure the proper identification of the only trees that are to be removed, that the floristic composition would not be impacted, that the retained vegetation is consistent with the prescribed regional eco system, that the linear clearing would not, in the delegate's opinion, be associated with edge effects due to the minimal clearing of vegetation required, and that, in the delegate's opinion, the species composition would remain the same as prior to clearing.
Whilst one may debate the correctness or otherwise of that conclusion, it was a matter which fell for the determination of the delegate. It is not this Court's role, in these proceedings, to assume a role of a merits reviewer. The evidence does not establish that it was beyond the assessment manager, properly instructed and acting reasonably, to have concluded that, subject to the imposition of conditions, the development would satisfy the performance requirements of the code and should be approved.
Stage 2 intrudes into the road reserve off Stanton Road but the evidence does not establish that there will be any clearing of native vegetation in that area. As Mr Trotter pointed out on behalf of the council, item 1D(a)(i) of table 4 of schedule 8 of the IPA (in schedule 24 part 2 section 5(a)(i) of the SPR) would appear to apply to exclude any such clearing from being assessable in any event.
Mr Krajniw contended that the development as also assessable under the IPA by reason of falling within item 8 of table 4 of schedule 4 (see also table 4 section 8 of SPR) which relates to the removal, destruction or damage of marine plants. Section 10 of the IPA defines a "marine plant" by reference to section 8 of the Fisheries Act 1994 which in turn defines a marine plant as follows:
8. Meaning of 'marine plant'
(1) Marine plant includes the following –
(a) a plant (a tidal plant) that usually grows on, or adjacent to, tidal land, whether it is living, dead, standing or fallen;
(b)material of a tidal plant, or other plant material on tidal land;
(e)a plant, or material of a plant, prescribed under a regulation or management plan to be a marine plant;
(2)A marine plant does not include a plant that is a declared pest under the Land Protection (Pest and Stock Work Management) Act 2002."
The council's Environmental Management Plan (EMP) specifies the plants which are to be cleared, but states that removal, damage or destruction of marine plants is not proposed. Mr Krajniw did not establish that any of the plants to be cleared fall within the definition of a "marine plant."
Mr Krajniw submitted that the council was required to go through the EIS process in part A of chapter 5 of the IPA. Section 5.8.1, however, provides that part A only applies to a development prescribed under a regulation. Part 2A of the IPR, prescribes matters for environmental impact statements. Section 14B deals with development to which the EIS process in section 5.8.1 applies. It provides as follows:
14B Development for which EIS process applies- Act, s 5.8.1
(1) Development is prescribed for section 5.8.1 of the Act if-
(a) the Commonwealth Minister has, under the Commonwealth Environment Act;
(i) decided the approach for assessing the relevant impacts of the development is assessment by an accredited assessment process; and
(ii) given notice of the decision; or
(b) the relevant impacts of the development are to be assessed under a bilateral agreement.
(2) However, the development must be development for which the chief executive decides an EIS is required.
(3) Any steps or actions taken in the EIS process before the action mention in subsection (1)(a) happens are taken to have complied with this part.
(4) In this section –
bilateral agreement has the meaning given by the Commonwealth Environment Act, section 45(2).
It was not established that any EIS was required in this instance, having regard to that provision. Mr Krajniw was not able to otherwise identify any regulation which prescribed the subject development for the purposes of section 5.8.1.
There were other provisions of the IPA which Mr Krajniw also referred to, but none have any real significance for present purposes. I am not particularly critical of Mr Krajniw in that regard. The provisions of the IPA (and for that matter, the SPA) are not always easy to comprehend, particularly for a lay person.
The Coastal Protection and Management Act
Stage 2 involves operational work within a coastal management district, namely, the South-East Queensland Coastal Management District (see the Coastal Protection and Management (Coastal Management Districts) Regulation 2003). Operational work, other than excluded work of the kind referred to in item 5, of table 4 of schedule 8 of the IPA (see also item 5 of table 4 of the SPR) is assessable.
In the stage 1 proceedings, Mr Krajniw contended that the development was within item 5(b)(i) which refers to, "Interfering with quarry material on State coastal land above the high water mark," where that is carried out completely or partly within the coastal management district. State coastal land is defined by reference to section 17 of the CPMA. That, in turn, defines the expression to mean land in a coastal management district other than certain kinds of land, one of which is freehold land.
In the stage 1 proceedings, it was common ground that the relevant part of lot 50 was within the coastal management district, but I found that it was not State coastal land because it was freehold land. It has already been noted that much of the land to which stage 2 applies is also freehold land, but that lot 6 is not. That lot is also not State coastal land, however, because it is not in a coastal management district (see Exhibit 6). There is no other category specified in item 5 of the schedule which is applicable. Development is not accessible on that basis.
Mr Krajniw also made reference to section 69 of the CPMA, which creates the offence of damaging vegetation on State coastal land without an approval or lawful authority, justification or excuse. The development would not involve the commission of that offence, because of vegetation which is to be damaged is not on State coastal land.
The Water Act
Mr Krajniw made some reference to the Water Act 2000 but he did not articulate any sufficient basis to conclude that stage 2 requires any further approval on that account or would involve the commission of any offence under that Act.
The Nature Conservation Act
Mr Krajniw relies on a number of provisions of the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (NCA), which had not been raised in a stage 1 proceedings. In so far as those provisions are concerned:
(a) Sections 61 and 62: Section 61 deals with property in cultural and natural resources, while section 62 creates an offence of taking, using, keeping or interfering with the cultural or natural resource of a protected area. Section 14 sets out classes of protected areas. Places falling within these classes are set out in the Nature Conservation (Protected Areas) Regulation 1994. Mr Krajniw did not establish the stage two falls within a protected area.
(b) Sections 72 and 73: Section 72 sets out the basic concepts for the management of wildlife, while section 73 sets out management principles for protected wildlife. The EMP contains provisions for the management of wildlife. Subject to the issues concerning section 89 of the NCA and section 332 of the Nature Conservation (Wildlife Management) Regulation 2006, which I will discuss later, there is no sufficient basis in the evidence to conclude that stage two offends the relevant principles, or that the development is unlawful or requires any further approval on that basis.
(c) Section 88: This creates offences for taking a protected animal other than in a protected area. The evidence does not justify a finding that stage 2 is proposed to, or would inevitably involve, the taking of a protected animal. I note that the EMP provides for qualified fauna spotter/catcher to be present during the removal of vegetation (Exhibit 35 of Exhibit KRJ-2 of the affidavit of Johnston).
(d) Section 89: This creates offences for taking a protected plant that is in the wild. Protected plants are defined to be those which are prescribed under the NCA as threatened, rare, near threatened or least concerned, subject to certain exemptions which are not presently relevant. The prescription of plants that fall within those various categories is set out in the Nature Conservation (Wildlife) Regulation 2006. Oddly, and unsatisfactorily, that Regulation uses categories which are somewhat different than those used in the definition in the Act. Those different categories are then carried forward into the definition of a protected plant under the Nature Conservation (Protected Plants) Conservation Plan 2000. The reason for that difference is unclear.
Under the Nature Conservation (Wildlife) Regulation all plants which are indigenous to Australia, other than those which are listed as extinct in the wild, endangered, vulnerable, rare or near-threatened wildlife, are least concern wildlife. Accordingly, any plant which is indigenous to Australia falls within the definition of a protected plant, at least on the basis that it is "least concern wildlife," although it may fall within one of the higher designations.
In this case the plant species to be removed are listed in the EMP. Of those plant species only two are noted to be exotic. The rest are indigenous to Australia. The descriptions of the plants is not complete in all respects, and so it is not possible, at the moment, to accurately determine how many of those fall within the "least concern" category and how many fall into higher categories. But, as the Council now concedes, the stage 2 development will involve the taking of protected plants that are in the wild.
By reason of section 89 an offence would be committed unless the taking is under:
(a) A conservation plan applicable to the plant; or
(b)A licence, permit or other authority issued or given under a regulation; or
(c) An exemption under a regulation.
The relevant conservation plan is the Nature Conservation (Protected Plants) Conservation Plan 2000. Part 4 of that conservation plan provides for authorisations and exemptions under sections 89 and 90 of the NCA. The Council did not contend that the taking in this case fell within any of the authorisations which are listed in Division 3 of Part 4. Exemptions are provided for in Division 2. The only potentially available relevant exemption is that provided for in section 41.
It provides, in part, as follows:
(1)That a clearing permit is not needed for taking a protected plant if:
(a)the taking happens in the course of an activity under an authority made, granted or given under another Act by-
(i)the Governor in Council; or
(ii)someone else and the Chief Executive approves the taking in the course of the activity; or
(b)for a least concern plant on private land - the person taking the plant is the landholder of the land.
The expression "private land" is defined to mean as follows:
(a) freehold land; or
(b)land the subject of a lease under any Act containing an entitlement to a deed of grant and fee simple.
Those provisions do not currently provide an exemption to the Council because:-
(a)even if the development permit, which has already been issued, is one referred to in Section 41(1)(a), the Chief Executive has not given any approval of the kind referred to in subsection (2); and
(b) not all of the land the subject of stage 2 is freehold land and it is not yet been established that the plants to be removed fall only in the "least concern" category.
Ultimately the Council conceded, quite properly, that it has a difficulty in this respect at the minute. The fact of that difficulty is something which emerged in the course of the case and, in particular, in response to questions by me. Whilst Mr Krajniw had mentioned Section 89 of the NCA, he had not particularised his argument nor did he enunciate the basis upon which a problem has ultimately been discovered.
The Council, by its counsel, has given the Court an undertaking that it will not conduct any clearing for the purposes of stage two unless and until it has either met the terms of the exemption or has obtained the necessary licence, permit or other authority.
(e) Section 97: This creates an offence for taking, using or interfering with wildlife, except in certain circumstances. The section only applies to native wildlife other than protected wildlife (which are dealt with in sections 88 and 89), in an area that is identified under a conservation plan as including a critical habitat or an area of major interest (section 79(1)). Mr Krajniw did not establish that the area in which stage two is to be developed answers that description.
(f) Sections 122 and 123: Section 122 provides that a conservation plan, or regulation giving effect to a management plan, prevails in the event of conflict with the planning scheme. Section 123 provides that, where land is in a protected area for which a regulation gives effect to a management plan, or in an area identified under a conservation plan, or as including a critical habitat or an area of major interest, the local government must not issue or give approval, consent or permission which is inconsistent with the regulation or plan. The development permit in this case was issued to, rather than by, the local government. In any event, Mr Krajniw did not establish that these provisions otherwise would have complied to invalidate the development permit.
(g) Sections 4 and 5: Section 4 states the object of the Act, while section 5 provides for how that object is to be achieved. Reference to this does not further the argument in relation to the relief which Mr Krajniw seeks.
(h) The Nature Conservation (Wildlife Management) Regulation 2006: This regulation was not raised by Mr Krajniw in his outline. However, the solicitor for the second and third respondents drew the Court's attention to section 332, which creates an offence where a person, without reasonable excuse, tampers with an animal breeding place that is being used by a protected animal to incubate or rear the animal's offspring.
The Council, quite properly, did not take issue about the existence of that provision being brought to the Court's attention. Counsel for the Council undertook that his client would not conduct any clearing until it had ascertained whether an offence against that provision would be involved and obtaining any necessary approval. The evidence, at the minute, does not establish that such an offence is inevitable.
The EPBC Act
The grounds in Mr Krajniw's originating application refer, at some length, to the EPBC Act. He referred to the objects and to a litany of provisions in support of a contention that, in the absence of an approval under that Act, the development would not be lawful and there would be scope for criminal prosecution and the application for civil penalties. He did not call any evidence or advance any significant further oral argument in support of those contentions.
It is unnecessary to deal with the various provisions to which Mr Krajniw refers in turn, because they are essentially irrelevant to the relief which he seeks under the IPA and the NCA. As was pointed out by Mr Trotter for the Council, if a person has engaged, or engages, or proposes to engage in conduct which would constitute an offence or other contravention of the EPBC, then the Minister, an interested person, or a person acting on behalf of an organisation that is an interested person may apply to the Federal Court for an injunction under section 475 of EPBC Act. The same section permits that Court to grant interlocutory relief, but the jurisdiction under that section does not extend to this Court.
Conclusion
Accordingly, Mr Krajniw has been able to establish that the Council needs more than the development permit it currently has if it wishes to undertake clearing for the purposes of stage two. In particular, it needs to deal with the issues raised by section 89 of the NCA. It has also undertaken to investigate the issues surrounding section 332 of the Nature Conservation (Wildlife Management) Regulation 2006.
The other grounds raised by Mr Krajniw, however, have not been made out and, accordingly, I otherwise dismiss the applications, insofar as they relate to those grounds. I will, however, keep the proceedings on foot, for the time being, for the purposes of the Council dealing with those outstanding issues.
In the light of the undertakings which counsel for the Council has given, it is unnecessary for me, at this stage, to make any interim enforcement orders. I will simply adjourn the further hearing of the proceedings to a later date to allow the Council to attend to those outstanding issues
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