KQKM and Secretary, Department of Education, Skills and Employment - [2022] AATA 296

KQKM and Secretary, Department of Education, Skills and Employment [2022] AATA 296 (14 January 2022)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2021/5468
Re:KQKM
APPLICANT

AndSecretary, Department of Education, Skills and Employment
RESPONDENT

REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member C. J. Furnell
Date:14 January 2022
Date of written reasons: 23 February 2022
Place:Melbourne

On 14 January 2022, the Tribunal dismissed the Applicant’s application without proceeding to review the decision of which the Applicant sought review, pursuant to s 42A(4) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). Following are the written reasons for that decision.
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Senior Member C. J. Furnell
Catchwords
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – jurisdiction – higher education – HECS-HELP balance – application for remission of HECS-HELP debt – where reconsideration request made outside of prescribed time frame – where university decided not to allow longer time for making of reconsideration request – whether decision confirmed, varied or set aside – university did not confirm, vary or set aside decision – Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in respect of application for review of decision
Legislation
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Deakin University Act 2009 (Vic)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
Higher Education Support Act 2003 (Cth)
Cases
Confidential and Child Support Registrar [2010] AATA 577
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Josway Hospitality Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 466
Dodd & Dodd Group Pty Ltd and Minister for the Environment [2021] AATA 215
Fancourt v Mercantile Credits (1983) 154 CLR 87
Flahive and Comcare (Compensation) [2020] AATA 3044
Hempel and Civil Aviation Authority [2006] AATA 188
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v EFX17 [2021] HCA 9
Scope Data Systems Pty Ltd v Goman (2007) 70 NSWLR 176
Swanton v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2017] FCA 1142
Thomson and Secretary, Department of Education, Skills and Employment [2020] AATA 4672
Vu and Secretary, Department of Education [2020] AATA 358
Wagner and National Disability Insurance Agency [2020] AATA 1775
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member C. J. Furnell
23 February 2022

On 17 and 21 January 2019, the applicant applied for remission of her “HECS-HELP” debt in relation to a number of units of study, with respect to each of which she had been enrolled as a Commonwealth supported student with Deakin University (the University).
The debt in relation to a unit of study would have been remitted if the University had determined that s 36-20 of the Higher Education Support Act 2003 (the Act) applied to the applicant.[1]
[1] Act, s 137-5(4).
On 1 February 2019, however, the University determined that s 36-20 of the Act did not so apply in relation to any of the relevant study units.[2]
[2] Attachment B to the respondent’s submission lodged with the Tribunal on 14 September 2021.
Notice of that determination was sent by prepaid mail to the postal address of the applicant on or around 1 February 2019.
Roughly two and a half years later, by email to the University dated 2 July 2021, the applicant stated that she “…would like to attempt the process of Remission of Debt again now that I am fully healed.”
The University treated that 2 July 2021 email as a request for reconsideration of the 1 February 2019 determination. It responded on 7 August 2021 by email, stating that:
“Unfortunately the 28 day appeal time limit has not been waived. Your remission applications for Trimester 2 2014, Trimester 1 2015, Trimester 3 2015, Trimester 1 2017 and Trimester 2 2017 were submitted in January 2019 and unfortunately were unsuccessful. The outcome letter was sent to you in February 2019 and advised you had 28 days to submit an appeal…If you wish to appeal this decision, you may apply in writing to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for a review.”
This led to the applicant lodging with the Tribunal on 7 August 2021 an application for review of a decision described as, amongst other things, a “refusal for remission of debt.”
On 16 August 2021, the applicant asked the Tribunal to extend the time for the making of an application for review of the relevant decision.
At the resumed hearing of this matter on 14 January 2022, I decided to refuse to grant the requested extension. I outlined my reasons for doing so orally, at the conclusion of that hearing. The respondent subsequently asked that I provide a written statement of those reasons, and I do so now.
Put shortly, the applicant’s request was refused because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review the University’s February 2019 determination that s 36-20 of the Act did not apply to her in relation to any of the relevant study units.
TRIBUNAL’S JURISDICTION
The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is a threshold issue in considering the applicant’s request for an extension of time in which to lodge her application for review of the University’s determination: “Where there is doubt that it has jurisdiction, resolution of that question must precede any consideration of the application for an extension of time…”.[3]
[3] Confidential and Child Support Registrar [2010] AATA 577 at [18]. See also Hempel and Civil Aviation Authority [2006] AATA 188 at [13].
The Tribunal does not have inherent jurisdiction. Any jurisdiction it does have is conferred by statute. Specifically, under s 25 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, an enactment may provide that an application may be made to the Tribunal for review of a decision made in exercise of a power conferred by that enactment.
The Act does provide that an application may be made to the Tribunal for review of a decision made in exercise of certain powers conferred by that enactment. In particular, under s 212-1 of the Act, such an application may be made in respect of a “reviewable decision that has been confirmed, varied or set aside under section 209-5 or 209-10.”
A decision that s 36-20 does not apply to a person is a reviewable decision.[4] Hence, in terms of jurisdiction, the only question in issue in this proceeding is whether the University’s decision of 1 February 2019 that s 36-20 does not apply to the applicant “has been confirmed, varied or set aside under section 209-5 or 209-10.” If it has not been so confirmed, varied or set aside, the decision would not be one which the Tribunal had jurisdiction to review.[5]
[4] Act, s 206-1.
[5] Vu and Secretary, Department of Education [2020] AATA 358 at [18].
Both sections 209-5 and 209-10 of the Act essentially provide for internal review of reviewable decisions, generally by the initial decision-maker (albeit subject to a change in the delegate involved, if applicable).[6] Section 209-5 provides for reviewer-instigated reconsideration of a reviewable decision. Section 209-10, on the other hand, provides for reconsideration of such decisions at the instigation of a person whose interests are affected.
[6] Act, s 209-1.
As mentioned earlier, the University treated the applicant’s 2 July 2021 email as a request for reconsideration of the reviewable decision it had made on 1 February 2019. Neither party contended that it ought not to have done so and I proceed on the basis that the email was such a request, made under s 209-10.
Consequent upon its receipt of such a request, the University would, in the normal course, have become bound to reconsider its decision of 1 February 2019 and to confirm it, vary it or set it aside and substitute a new decision,[7] with a failure to do any of these things within 45 days being deemed to be a decision to confirm the decision.[8]
[7] Act, s 209-10(4).
[8] Act, s 209-10(6).
Hence, given the reconsideration request of 2 July 2021, in the normal course, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to review the University’s 1 February 2019 decision would have been enlivened because the decision would have been “confirmed, varied or set aside” under s 209-10.
The respondent contended, however, that the 1 February 2019 decision was not confirmed, varied or set aside under s 209-10. According to the respondent, the applicant’s reconsideration request was not made in the time allowed under the section for the making of such a request. In this regard, s 209-10(2) of the Act provides that a reconsideration “…request must be made by written notice given to the reviewer within 28 days, or such longer period as the reviewer allows, after the day on which the person first received notice of the decision”.
Set out earlier is part of the text of the University’s email response of 7 August 2021 to the applicant’s reconsideration request of 2 July 2021. As is apparent from its terms, in it the University:
(a)implicitly concluded that it was not bound by s 209-10 to confirm, vary or set aside its 1 February 2019 reviewable decision absent a reconsideration request having been made within the prescribed time frame of 28 days (or such longer period as it may have allowed);
(b)expressly decided not to allow a longer period for the making of such a request; and
(c)implicitly concluded that the 28-day period allowed for the making of a reconsideration request had expired.
As contended by the respondent, I find that the University was right to conclude that it was not bound by s 209-10 to confirm, vary or set aside its 1 February 2019 reviewable decision absent a reconsideration request having been made within the prescribed time frame of 28 days (or such longer period as the University may have allowed). There would be little point in prescribing a time frame for the making of such requests were an obligation to deal with a reconsideration request to subsist whenever the request was made.[9]
[9] I note that this conclusion is consistent with that arrived at by Member Parker in Vu and Secretary, Department of Education [2020] AATA 358 at [18].
Also, as contended by the respondent, I find that the University’s decision not to allow a longer period for the making of a reconsideration request in the circumstances is not a reviewable decision and, hence, is not a decision which the Tribunal has jurisdiction to review.[10]
[10] See the list of reviewable decisions in s 206-1 of the Act.
DID THE APPLICANT RECEIVE NOTICE OF DECISION BY POST?
The essence of the dispute between the parties lay in the third aspect of the University’s response of 7 August 2021. As mentioned, the University implicitly concluded that the 28-day period for the making of a reconsideration request had expired before the applicant made her request on 2 July 2021.
When that period expired is a function of when it commenced. It commenced when the applicant first received notice of the 1 February 2019 decision.
The applicant’s position as to when she first received notice of that decision was unclear. She did, however, state that she had not received the University’s letter enclosing notice of the decision, a letter that had been sent on or around 1 February 2019 by prepaid mail to the postal address of the applicant.
The applicant sought to corroborate her statement by reference to material suggesting that there were problems with delivery of mail to her postal address at the relevant time. According to the applicant, the University’s letter was never received at her address:
“[n]o such letter was received due to postal errors and services as can be seen in Attachment A2 which clearly evidences a signed and dated acknowledgement of postal errors from Australia Post which prevented the Applicant from receiving any mailed communication in the postal service.”[11]
[11] The applicant’s undated submission lodged with the Tribunal on 5 January 2022.
The “signed and dated acknowledgement of postal errors from Australia Post” to which the applicant referred comprised a hand-written letter under the letterhead of a suburban post office. In it, an unidentified author had written that “…during the period 2018-2019 there were issues with the delivery of mail to … [the applicant’s postal address] resulting in unreceived mail.”
I do not accept that the University’s letter was not delivered to or received at the applicant’s postal address. Put in the positive, I find that the University’s letter advising of its decision of 1 February 2019 was delivered to and received at the applicant’s postal address.
Once it had considered the applicant’s applications for debt remission, the University became obliged to notify the applicant of its decision.[12] Section 28A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 identifies the manner in which that notification could be effected. Pursuant to that section, for the purposes of any Commonwealth Act (such as the Act):
“…that requires or permits a document to be served on a person, whether the expression “serve”, “give” or “send” or any other expression is used, then the document may be served…on a natural person…by sending it by pre‑paid post to, the address of the place of residence or business of the person last known to the person serving the document…”.
[12] Act, s 36-23.
Hence, by reason of s 28A, the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 authorised the giving of the University’s notification of its 1 February 2019 decision to the applicant by post.[13] As a result, the provision of that Act deeming service to have been effected (s 29), will apply “absent proof to the contrary.”
[13] Section 29 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 only has application where “…an Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post.”
The respondent described that provision as one which “… effectively operates to deem that a person has received a letter sent by pre-paid post to their last known address unless the contrary is proved…”. I do not agree that s 29 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 so operates. The section operates to deem service of a document to have been effected (and the document to have been given[14] and sent) “by properly addressing, prepaying and posting the document as a letter” and, absent proof to the contrary, to have been effected when the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of post.
[14] In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v EFX17 [2021] HCA 9 at [23], reference was made to the words “give and deliver” being the “exact equivalent” of the words “served on”.
Hence, in application of s 29 and absent proof to the contrary, the University’s letter of 1 February 2019 is deemed to have been delivered to (and received at[15]) the applicant’s postal address in the ordinary course of post. Absent specific evidence as to the ordinary course of the post and absent a capacity to rely on certain presumptions found in the Evidence Act 1995 (a point to which I will return), I nevertheless infer that, in the case of a letter dated 1 February 2019, delivery of it in the ordinary course would have been effected more than 28 days before the applicant’s reconsideration request of 2 July 2021.
[15] Scope Data Systems Pty Ltd v Goman (2007) 70 NSWLR 176 at [49], where it is said that there is no difference between delivery to an address and receipt at an address.
Section 29 addresses service (or delivery) of a document on (or to) a person at an address. It does not deal with receipt of the document by the person concerned.[16] Service of a document on (and delivery of a document to) a person can be effected pursuant to provisions such as s 29 absent the person’s receipt of the document.[17] The applicant’s statement that she did not receive the University’s letter of 1 February 2019 is not evidence contrary to application of the s 29 presumption.[18] The s 29 presumption can only be displaced by evidence of non-delivery or delay in delivery,[19] evidence which amounts to “proof to the contrary” in terms of applying the s 29 presumption.
[16] Cf Dodd & Dodd Group Pty Ltd and Minister for the Environment [2021] AATA 215 at [5], where it was said that a document is taken to have been received in the ordinary course of post by virtue of s 29 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901. This statement was made without the benefit of submissions on the point as “…none of the parties has raised the issue of whether the application was lodged within the time required…” (see [5]).
[17] Fancourt v Mercantile Credits (1983) 154 CLR 87, which addressed a provision in Queensland legislation analogous to s 29 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901. See also, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Josway Hospitality Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 466.
[18] Flahive and Comcare (Compensation) [2020] AATA 3044 at [38] citing Fancourt v Mercantile Credits (1983) 154 CLR 87 at [21].
[19] Ibid.
The hand-written letter referred to earlier suggesting that there were issues with the delivery of mail to the applicant’s postal address at the relevant time does not constitute such evidence.
The author of that hand-written letter is unidentified. His or her authority to write the letter on behalf of Australia Post and his or her knowledge of delivery issues to the applicant’s postal address is not specified and nor can that authority or knowledge be inferred simply because the letter was written on Australia Post letterhead.
These concerns affecting the probative value of the hand-written letter are amplified when regard is had to an email of 13 January 2021 from an Australia Post employee to a representative of the respondent. In it, it is said that:
(a)the letter was written by an employee of a licensee of Australia Post, without the authority of either Australia Post or the licensee; and
(b)the employee who wrote that letter had advised that it “…was written in error – without reference to whether any delivery issues involving the address in question were known to exist during or over the period stated in the letter.”
Moreover, I note that:
(a)consistent with its having been delivered effectively, the University’s letter of 1 February 2019 was not, according to the respondent, returned to the University; and
(b)after conducting some internal checks of its records, Australia Post identified no delivery issues in relation to the relevant postal address with respect to the relevant time frame.
Apart from s 29 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901, there are other statutory provisions that can sometimes be of assistance in deciding what constitutes the ordinary course of post in the context of Tribunal proceedings. I mention these provisions only to disregard them in the context of this proceeding.
In particular, s 160 of the Evidence Act 1995 allows for a presumption that mail is received at a postal address on the seventh working day after having been posted, while

s 163 of that Act allows for a presumption that certain letters are posted on the fifth business day after the date of their preparation. These provisions can sometimes assist in the context of Tribunal proceedings because (unlike most provisions of the Evidence Act 1995) they apply not only to proceedings in a federal court but also to proceedings in an “Australian court”, a concept defined in a way that encompasses the Tribunal.[20] Neither s 160 nor s 163 apply to the University’s letter of 1 February 2019, however. This is because both sections are relevantly limited to, in essence, letters from Commonwealth agencies.[21] The University, is not such an agency, having been established by a Victorian statute.[22]
[20] In the dictionary in the schedule to the Evidence Act 1995, “Australian court” is defined in a way that includes a body authorised by an Australian law to hear, receive and examine evidence: see, for example, Wagner and National Disability Insurance Agency [2020] AATA 1775 at [12]. In relation to s 163 of the Evidence Act 1995, see s 5 of that Act. In relation to s 160, see the combined effect of ss 5 and 182(4A) of the Evidence Act 1995. Note that while several Tribunal decisions doubt the potential for s 160 to apply to Tribunal proceedings, the members presiding were clearly not taken to s 182(4A): see, for instance, Wagner and National Disability Insurance Agency [2020] AATA 1775 at [15] and Flahive and Comcare (Compensation) [2020] AATA 3044 at [27]. Note that in Swanton v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2017] FCA 1142 at [26], Tracey J held that ss 160 and 163 apply to documents posted by the Tribunal.
[21] Section 163 of the Evidence Act 1995 is expressly so limited while the limit applies to s 160 insofar as its operation is expanded to Australian courts: see s 182(4A).
[22] See the dictionary to the Evidence Act 1995 and the Deakin University Act 2009 (Vic), s 4.

While I have found that the University’s letter of 1 February 2019 was delivered to and received at the applicant’s postal address, the 28-day period for the making of a request to reconsider the decision of which notice was given by that letter only commenced to run when the applicant first received notice of the decision. In this regard, as alluded to earlier, receipt of the letter at, and delivery of the letter to, the applicant’s postal address does not equate to her receipt of the letter:
“Clearly, there is a difference between the delivery of a postal article to a place and its receipt by a person. It is this distinction to which the High Court refers in Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd.”[23]
[23] Scope Data Systems Pty Ltd v Goman (2007) 70 NSWLR 176 at [49].
Despite this distinction, I am satisfied that the applicant received the 1 February 2019 letter or, at least, received notice of the 1 February 2019 decision more than 28 days before her reconsideration request of 2 July 2021.
First, as I have found, the 1 February 2019 letter was received at the applicant’s postal address. While receipt of a letter at her postal address does not equate to her receipt of the letter, it is probative of that receipt especially where, as here, the postal address was the applicant’s residential address and, apart from the applicant’s denial of receipt of the University’s letter, there is no material suggestive of mail going missing after its delivery to that address.
Second, in considering the applicant’s denial of receipt of the letter, I have had regard to other evidence from the applicant to the effect that she was unwell at the relevant time. Her condition at that time, as she described it, may well have affected her capacity to recall having received postal correspondence.
Third, it is apparent that, in August 2020, the applicant then knew or was notified of the outcome of her remission applications.
On 5 August 2020, the applicant emailed the University’s “Student Central” noting that she was refused a refund of credit for units undertaken in a particular course. She stated that “I also applied for refund of credit which was infuriatingly refused”.
When asked to explain her apparent knowledge in August 2020 that refund applications made by her had been refused, the applicant stated that she had made multiple remission applications and that she was in all likelihood referring to the results of applications other than those the subject of the University’s decision of 1 February 2019.
Even if that were the case and the applicant had made remission applications other than those the subject of the 1 February 2019 decision and was, in her 5 August 2020 email, referring to such other applications, the University’s response to that email made it clear that the University had refused the applications of relevance in this proceeding.
In particular, in a responding email of 6 August 2020 from the University’s Student Central, it was stated that “…as for grades received in 2015-2017” (which were all marked as a fail) the applicant’s fee remission application had been unsuccessful; “Judging by the outcome of your remission of debt application that this was unsuccessful”.
In that response, reference is made to the applicant’s grades in the 2015 to 2017 period. The remission applications made by the applicant of relevance in this proceeding relate to units of study in which she had enrolled in that period. In particular, they relate to two units of study in respect of each of trimester 1 and 3 of 2015, two units of study in trimester 1 of 2017 and three units of study in trimester 2 of 2017.
These represented all the units of study in which the applicant had enrolled in the 2015 to 2017 period other than one unit of study in trimester 1 of 2017 in respect of which no remission application was made.[24] Put another way, the applicant had made no remission application in respect of units of study in which she had enrolled in the 2015 to 2017 period other than the remission applications the subject of the University’s 1 February 2019 decision. Hence, when remission applications were described in the University’s 6 August 2020 email as having been unsuccessful, the University could only have been referring to applications the subject of the 1 February 2019 decision.
[24] Attachment 3 to respondent’s submission of 12 January 2022, being an Excel spreadsheet of units enrolled in and results achieved.
Accordingly, even if she had not been put on notice earlier, the applicant had notice in August 2020 that the remission applications she had made in January 2019 had been unsuccessful. Clearly, this was more than 28 days before her reconsideration request of

2 July 2021.
In finding that the applicant received the University’s letter of 1 February 2019 or, at least, received notice of the 1 February 2019 decision more than 28 days before her reconsideration request of 2 July 2021, I do not intend to call her credibility into question. Her denial of receipt of the University’s letter of 1 February 2019 is not inconsistent with the latter element of that finding (that is, that she received notice of the 1 February 2019 decision more than 28 days before her reconsideration request of 2 July 2021). Nor is it inconsistent with a finding that she received the letter insofar as her statement is, as I see it, more properly construed as one to the effect that she cannot recall receiving the letter. As mentioned earlier, the applicant’s condition, as she described it, may well have affected her capacity in February 2019 to recall having received postal correspondence.
SUMMARY
When she made her request for reconsideration of the decision of the University of

1 February 2019, the 28-day period allowed for the making of a reconsideration request had expired. The University’s decision in August 2021 to not allow a further period in which to make such a request is not reviewable by the Tribunal. Absent a reconsideration request within the 28-day period (or any further period, if it had been allowed), the University is not taken to have confirmed the decision by reason of its not having given notice of a decision in response to the reconsideration request.
As the University’s decision of 1 February 2019 has not been confirmed, varied or set aside consequent upon a reconsideration under the Act, the decision is not one which the Tribunal has jurisdiction to review.
SECTION 42B OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL ACT 1975
Given my conclusion about jurisdiction, I need not address an alternative submission made by the respondent to the effect that, if the Tribunal had jurisdiction, the applicant’s application ought nevertheless be dismissed under s 42B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 on the basis that it had no reasonable prospect of success.
The contentions underlying that submission reflected the rationale adopted by the University on 1 February 2019 in rejecting the applicant’s remission applications. In particular, it was contended that:
(a)the remission applications were not made within the 12-month time frame prescribed for the making of such applications by a combination of ss 36-20(1)(f)(i) and 36-22 of the Act;
(b)the requirement to make such an application within that time frame could only be waived by the respondent if it would not have been, or was not, possible for the application to have been made before the end of that prescribed period; and
(c)in the circumstances, it was not the case that it would not have been, or was not, possible for the applicant’s remission applications to have been made before the end of that prescribed period.
The applicant appeared to accept the first two of those contentions but submitted that, given her medical condition at the time as a result of events in July 2014, she developed “a state of fear...resulting in an inability to appeal decisions” and that “compounding trauma and ongoing harm made it impossible in the mind of the Applicant to appeal decisions against her…”.[25]
[25] The applicant’s undated submission lodged with the Tribunal on 5 January 2022.
The applicant’s assertions as to what her psychological condition rendered her unable to do, or made it impossible for her to do, at the relevant time are not significantly probative. In support of her submissions, however, the applicant lodged with the Tribunal a report of 16 December 2021 from a psychologist who is said to have been supporting the applicant since June 2021.
In the report, the psychologist opines that the “… severity of the PTSD symptoms and associated cognitive impairment reported by … [the applicant] would have likely significantly impaired her ability to complete administrative tasks necessary to function within a university.”
The hurdle represented by the requirement that it would not have been, or was not, possible for the applicant to have made her remission applications before the end of the relevant prescribed period is significant. In order for it to be overcome, the decision-maker would need to be satisfied that the “… application could not have been made because of some incapacity whether mental or physical, and not necessarily confined to medical conditions, to make the application at all.”[26]
[26] Thomson and Secretary, Department of Education, Skills and Employment [2020] AATA 4672 at [32].
As I see it, the psychologist’s report does not support a finding that, at the relevant time, the applicant was so incapacitated. As pointed out by the respondent, the psychologist only commenced treating the applicant a number of years after expiry of the 12-month periods of relevance.[27] He opines only as to a likely significant impairment to complete administrative tasks, based on symptoms and cognitive impairment reported by the applicant.
[27] The relevant 12-month period for a unit of study depended on the trimester in which the applicant was enrolled with respect to the unit. As submitted by the respondent, however, those 12-month periods would have ended in September 2015, June 2016, June 2018 and October 2018.
Moreover, the applicant clearly had some capacity to interact with the University at relevant times. In this regard, I note that:
(a)in November 2016, the applicant contacted the University updating address details and applying for a scholarship;
(b)in February 2017, she contacted the University to update contact details;
(c)in September and October 2018, she contacted the University a number of times, including by making an application for a scholarship in which she stated that she was now “fully recovered”; and
(d)as is apparent from her remission applications, the applicant enrolled in a number of units of study in 2015 and 2017.
While, as mentioned, I have no need to reach a conclusion with respect to the respondent’s alternative submission, on the material before me, I consider the prospect of the applicant being successful in a submission that it would not have been, or was not, possible for her to have made her remission applications before the end of that prescribed period to be remote.
CONCLUSION
The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review the University’s decision of 1 February 2019.

65. I certify that the preceding 64 sixty-four) paragraphs are a true copy of the written reasons for the decision of Senior Member C. J. Furnell.

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Associate
Dated: 23 February 2022

Date of Interlocutory Hearing: 14 January 2022

Applicant: Self-represented

Advocate for the Respondent:

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Ms Sonia Harris

Tertiary, Legislation and Litigation Coordination Legal Branch, Legal Division, Australian Government Department of Education, Skills and Employment