Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 18 min read

Supreme Court of South Australia

(Full Court)

KOWALSKI v MITSUBISHI MOTORS AUSTRALIA LTD

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Acting Chief Justice Perry, The Honourable Justice Duggan and The Honourable Justice Anderson)

22 November 2005

EQUITY - EQUITABLE REMEDIES - INJUNCTIONS - INJUNCTIONS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSES - TO RESTRAIN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

The appellant appealed against an order made pursuant to s 39 of the Supreme Court Act prohibiting him from instituting further proceedings in any prescribed court without leave - the order followed a finding that he had "persistently instituted vexatious proceedings" - held that the foundation for the order had clearly been made out and there were no grounds to interfere - appeal dismissed.

Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 39; Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) s 42 and s 119, referred to.
Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski (unreported, 24 September 2004, judgment no. [2004] SASC 302; Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481; Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Weston [2004] VCS 312; Brogden v Attorney-General [2001] NZCA 208; Mitsubishi v Kowalski [2001] SAWCT 93, considered.

KOWALSKI v MITSUBISHI MOTORS AUSTRALIA LTD
[2005] SASC 433

Full Court:  Perry ACJ, Duggan and Anderson JJ

  1. PERRY ACJ: This is an appeal from an order of a judge of this Court that the appellant be prohibited from instituting further proceedings, whether civil or criminal, in a prescribed court as defined in s 39(6) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (“the Act”) against the respondent Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (“Mitsubishi”) “or any corporation related to … [Mitsubishi] … or any former or present employee or agent of … [Mitsubishi] … without leave of the court”.

  2. The order followed a finding by the trial judge that the appellant had “persistently instituted vexatious proceedings” within the meaning of s 39(1) of the Act.

  3. In the order under appeal, the trial judge also stayed certain proceedings instituted by the appellant which were in train in the Workers Compensation Tribunal (“the Tribunal”).

  4. At one time the appellant was employed by Mitsubishi. He alleges that during the course of or arising out of his employment, he suffered a number of injuries. They include an eye injury in December 1986; a right middle finger injury in May 1988; a back injury in May 1989; emotional distress in August 1991; a heart attack in December 1997; and bi-lateral carpal tunnel syndrome in December 2003.

  5. The last two alleged injuries occurred after the appellant had ceased working for Mitsubishi.

  6. From about 1989 onwards, in a large number of proceedings mainly in the Tribunal, the appellant sought compensation and other forms of relief with respect to the alleged injuries.

  7. Many of the proceedings were outstanding as at October 1998, when the appellant and Mitsubishi entered into a formal mediation conducted by a Queen’s Counsel. As a result of the mediation, heads of agreement (“the settlement agreement”) were drawn up and signed by both parties which, on Mitsubishi’s case, put an end to all…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2005] SASC 433
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Kowalski, the appellant, brought an appeal against an order made by Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd, the respondent, pursuant to s 39 of the Supreme Court Act. The order was made to prohibit Kowalski from instituting further proceedings in any prescribed court without leave. The prohibition followed a finding that Kowalski had "persistently instituted vexatious proceedings." The primary concern of the appeal was the validity and justification of the order made against Kowalski, and whether there were any grounds to interfere with the order.

The court was required to decide whether the foundation for the order had been clearly established and if there were any valid grounds for Kowalski to challenge the order. The court had to evaluate the evidence and arguments presented by both parties to determine if the order was justified and appropriate. Furthermore, the court had to consider the appellant's conduct and whether it warranted the imposition of such an order.

The court held that the foundation for the order had clearly been made out and there were no grounds to interfere. The court found that none of the grounds of appeal were substantiated, and the manner in which Kowalski had pursued the appeal and presented his arguments fully supported the propriety of the order under appeal. The court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed and agreed with the reasons provided by Perry ACJ. The appeal was dismissed for the reasons given by Perry ACJ.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

DUGGAN J (dissent) ANDERSON J (dissent)
As for ground 9, there is simply no evidence to substantiate the suggestion that the trial judge in any way accepted statements made by Mitsubishi’s counsel as evidence.Conclusion In my view, none of the grounds of appeal are made out. On the contrary, the manner in which the appellant has pursued the appeal and presented his arguments fully supports the propriety of the order under appeal. I would dismiss the appeal. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed. I also agree with the reasons prepared by Perry ACJ. I would dismiss the appeal for the reasons given by Perry ACJ.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: