Kothe and Telstra Corporation Limited (Compensation) [2024] AATA 2412 (9 July 2024)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2024/1105
Re:Marie Kothe
APPLICANT
AndTelstra Corporation Limited
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member D. J. Morris
Date of decision: 9 July 2024
Date of written reasons: 12 July 2024
Place:Hobart
For the reasons given orally at the conclusion of the interlocutory hearing of this matter on 9 July 2024, the application lodged on 19 February 2024 is dismissed pursuant to s 42B(1)(c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 because I am satisfied the application is an abuse of the process of the Tribunal.
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Senior Member D. J. Morris
Catchwords
COMPENSATION – applicant is a former employee of the respondent – applicant applied to tribunal for review of reconsideration decision which declined liability to pay compensation – history of matter – tribunal made decision by consent – applicant lodges further claim for workers’ compensation – respondent denies claim as matter already resolved by consent decision – respondent seeks dismissal – matter already dealt with by decision following consent agreement cannot be revisited – tribunal dismisses matter as an abuse of process
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)
Cases
Bogaards v McMahon (1988) 15 ALD 313
Kondylas and Comcare; Re: [2014] AATA 553Negri v Secretary, Department of Social Services (2016) 70 AAR 103
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member D. J. Morris
12 July 2024
WRITTEN REASONS
The Tribunal held an interlocutory hearing on 9 July 2024 to consider a request by the Respondent to dismiss the Applicant’s application. At the conclusion of that interlocutory hearing, the Tribunal dismissed the application under s 42B of the Administrative AppealsTribunal Act 1975 (‘the AAT Act’), and said it would provide short written reasons to the parties.
In Negri v Secretary, Department of Social Services (2016) 70 AAR 103 (‘Negri’), Bromberg J considered a matter before the Tribunal where an oral decision has been given and a statement of written reasons subsequently provided. In considering the extent to which the Tribunal could edit or elaborate its oral reasons when producing written reasons, His Honour said, at [27]:
…as long as the reasoning remains consistent, there can be no objection to the provision of a more-elaborate exposition of the same reasoning that was orally explained. What is not permissible is altered or new reasoning. The Tribunal is not permitted to substantially divert from the reasoning upon which its decision was made, but is permitted to explain that reasoning differently and, in doing so, is required to address the matters specified in s 43(2B).
Although this is not a decision under s 43(2B), the Tribunal is satisfied that these written reasons reflect the oral decision given at the interlocutory hearing. Consistent with the reasoning in Negri, new reasoning has not been introduced but there is a more detailed explanation as to why the matter was dismissed, which might assist the parties.
BACKGROUND
The history of…
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- Case
- [2024] AATA 2412
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Tribunal were whether Ms. Kothe's further claim for workers' compensation was an abuse of process, given a prior consent decision made by the Tribunal in 2009. Specifically, the Tribunal had to determine if the current claim, alleging a different psychiatric condition with an onset in January 2005 and a confirmed diagnosis in July 2005, could be pursued when the 2009 consent agreement stipulated that Ms. Kothe had recovered from her compensable injury by 30 November 2007 and had not suffered from the injury or any compensable sequelae thereafter.
The Tribunal reasoned that while it was not disputed that Ms. Kothe suffered from a psychiatric condition contributed to by her employer, the critical factor was the binding nature of the 2009 consent agreement. This agreement, made under section 42C of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, was signed by both parties and approved by the Tribunal. The Tribunal was satisfied that the terms of this agreement, including the cessation of injury and sequelae by November 2007, were within its powers and that Ms. Kothe, through her legal representatives, had agreed to these terms. Despite Ms. Kothe's assertion of not recalling the precise terms due to medication, there was no satisfactory evidence of her being overborne or induced to agree to an unreasonable decision.
Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed Ms. Kothe's application lodged on 19 February 2024, finding it to be an abuse of the Tribunal's process under section 42B(1)(c) of the AAT Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Tribunal explained that there were other avenues for her to pursue any claims of racism in the workplace, if she felt discriminated against, but that such claims were not included in the 2009 agreement because they would be outside the scope of the compensable ‘injury’ under the SRC Act.CONSIDERATION In this matter, it is not disputed that Ms Kothe suffered from a psychiatric condition, and that condition was contributed to by her employer. That was conceded by the Respondent in its submission to the terms submitted to the Tribunal, jointly signed by Telstra Corporation Limited and the Applicant’s solicitor, in 2009, which was the subject of the decision made by Deputy President Hotop on 26 October 2009. The problem for the Applicant, now, is that she is seeking to re-open a matter that has already been dealt with by the Tribunal. She submits that this is a different condition, and that she is entitled to pursue a claim for compensation. However, as can be seen from the terms of the agreement made by consent by the Tribunal, exercising the powers under s 42C of the AAT Act in October 2009, the parties (including the Applicant) agreed at that time that she had recovered from the compensable injury by 30 November 2007 and – and this is important to note – that she had not suffered from the injury or any compensable sequelae of the injury thereafter. The Tribunal may accept that Ms Kothe remains aggrieved at what she perceives was her treatment while she worked at the Perth office of the Respondent. She has furnished a Christmas card from a colleague who apparently worked with her at that time, commiserating for what the colleague suggests are failures of management towards Ms Kothe. The Applicant has also provided a written statement from a retired police officer who was a colleague of her husband and a friend who had a broad understanding of Ms Kothe’s employment background. I accept that these people are well-intentioned and wanting to support the Applicant. However, the fact is that the Applicant, through her legal representatives, agreed to the terms of the s 42C consent agreement made by the Tribunal in October 2009. Although she said she was on medication and did not remember the precise terms of the agreement, there is no satisfactory evidence before me that she was being overborne at the time or being induced to agree to an unreasonable or inappropriate decision. Where the Tribunal makes a decision under s 42C of the AAT Act, it is important to keep in mind that the Member who makes the decision does not do so as an automaton. The Tribunal is required to satisfy itself of a number of things. First, it must have an agreement before it as to the terms of a decision that is acceptable to the parties (s 42C(1)(a)). Second, the agreement must be in writing and signed by or on behalf of the parties and lodged with the Tribunal (s 42C(1)(b)). Third, the Tribunal must be satisfied that a decision in the terms the parties suggest or consistent with those terms would be within the powers of the Tribunal (s 42C(1)(c)) – and finally, at the end of s 42C(1) – there is an additional onus on the Tribunal Member, that he or she has a discretion to make a decision relevant to the suggested terms, if it appears to him or her to be appropriate so to do. It is always open to a Tribunal member to refuse to accept terms of agreement and to insist that the matter proceed to substantive hearing.