Kostov v The Society of St. Vincent de Paul Pty Limited
[2019] ACTSC 232
•28 August 2019
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | Kostov v The Society of St. Vincent de Paul Pty Limited (No 2) |
Citation: | [2019] ACTSC 232 |
Hearing Date: | 16 August 2019 |
DecisionDate: | 28 August 2019 |
Before: | Crowe AJ |
Decision: | See [64] |
Catchwords: | PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for summary judgment – strike out |
Legislation Cited: | Court Procedures Act 2004 (ACT) s 5A Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT) rr 425, 1147 Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) ss 11, 91, 93, 190 |
Cases Cited: | Cox v Journeaux (No 2) (1935) 52 CLR 713 Galovac Pty Limited v Australian Capital Territory [2010] ACTSC 132 Van Der Lee v New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 286 |
Parties: | Adriana Kostov (Plaintiff) The Society of St. Vincent de Paul Pty Limited (Defendant) |
Representation: | Counsel Self-represented (Plaintiff) C O’Neill (Defendant) |
| Solicitors Self-represented (Plaintiff) Peterson Haines (Defendant) | |
File Number: | SC 162 of 2019 |
Crowe AJ
Procedural history
The plaintiff commenced proceedings in this Court against the defendant by Originating Claim filed on 27 March 2019. After requisition the claim had attached to it a Form 2.6 Statement of Claim dated 4 April 2019.
In that Statement of Claim the plaintiff pleaded that she had become a “client” of the defendant in its supported accommodation in Pyrmont, New South Wales in or about July 2017. It was alleged that the plaintiff was locked out of the accommodation on or about 1 June 2018. The circumstances of the lock-out were said to have caused the plaintiff to become unwell.
It is further alleged that the defendant, by its employee Ms Rachel Carney, contracted with Kennards Storage to take the plaintiff’s property (which had been inside the Pyrmont property) and place it in storage. The plaintiff was not informed of this and was not provided with a complete copy of the contract documentation. The plaintiff says that the contract entered into by Ms Carney was fraudulent as she purported to enter into it on her own account, as if the property was hers.
The plaintiff then alleges that she brought the matters summarised in [3] above to the attention of the Board of the defendant who failed to conduct a review.
It is then asserted that the matters summarised at [2]-[4] above constituted negligence, which caused the plaintiff loss and damage.
The pleading particularises two duties of care said to have been breached by the defendant. The first relates to the failure to provide the plaintiff with safe accommodation. This breach occurred when she was locked out. The second is said to be owed by the Board of the defendant. This breach is claimed to be their failure to act on her request for a review.
The harm pleaded by the plaintiff includes the costs of storage of her property, and “stress, illness and shock”.
On 16 May 2019 the defendant filed a conditional notice of intention to respond.
The matter first came before the court for directions (before the Deputy Registrar) on 28 May 2019. The plaintiff did not appear, possibly due to some confusion over the date. The directions hearing was adjourned to 11 June 2019.
At the hearing on 11 June 2019 the plaintiff appeared by telephone. Mr O’Neill of counsel appeared for the defendant. Directions were made for the defendant to file a proposed application in proceeding within 7 days. The hearing was adjourned for further directions to 8 July 2019.
On 12 June 2019 the defendant filed an Application in Proceeding raising a jurisdictional issue and seeking orders that the Statement of Claim be struck out (and other relief in the alternative). That application was made returnable on 5 July 2019.
On 27 June 2019 the plaintiff filed an Application in Proceeding seeking orders that the defendant identify the person who transported her personal property to storage and the method by which it was done. The plaintiff also challenged the retainer of the defendant’s solicitor and sought to have two other persons appointed as “legal contact” for the defendant. That application was made returnable on 19 July 2019.
On 5 July 2019 the defendant appeared before me by its counsel Mr S Onitiri. The plaintiff was telephoned on the number which she had previously provided. However, the Court was unable to make contact.
The defendant applied for leave to amend its application. After hearing counsel I made the following orders and directions:
(1) The defendant have leave to amend its application in proceeding, to be filed and served by 19 July 2019.
(2) The plaintiff is to file and serve any evidence relevant to the application by 2 August 2019.
(3) The defendant is to file and serve any submissions relating to the orders sought in the application by 19 July 2019.
(4) The plaintiff is to file and serve any submissions in reply by 2 August 2019.
The matter came back before the Deputy Registrar on 8 July. Mr Onitiri appeared for the defendant. The plaintiff did not appear. The Deputy Registrar adjourned the hearing to 16 August 2019.
On 19 July 2019 the defendant filed its Amended Application in Proceeding. It no longer sought to challenge the jurisdiction of the court. Instead, it now seeks summary judgment, or, in the alternative, that the statement of claim be struck out.
The substantive hearing
Preliminary matters
On 16 August 2019 the plaintiff appeared by telephone and Mr O’Neill appeared in person for the defendant. The plaintiff applied for an adjournment to allow her to appear in person. She relied upon three medical certificates in making this application (marked Exhibit “P1”). The first of these stated that the plaintiff had attended an unnamed NSW Health facility on 10 July 2019. It certified that she would be unfit for “work/… usual activities” from 10 July 2019 to 16 July 2019. The next certificate, chronologically, was dated 21 July 2019. It was issued by Dr L Wallace. It stated that the plaintiff was unable to attend court for participation in proceedings from 21 July 2019 to 26 July 2019 inclusive due to a medical condition. The next certificate was dated 29 July 2019, issued by Dr N Bodsworth, provided in similar terms for the dates 29 July 2019 to
12 August 2019 inclusive.
The defendant opposed any adjournment. It argued:
(a) The plaintiff failed to provide an adequate explanation as to why she needed to attend personally, or as to why she needed an adjournment;
(b) The plaintiff is an undischarged bankrupt, meaning the defendant would suffer significant prejudice in having to appear on a future occasion (no costs could be recovered, assuming that a costs order was made in its favour).
(c) The plaintiff had a long history of vexatious litigation. Indeed, she had been declared a vexatious litigant in NSW.
In the course of submissions the plaintiff advised that she “forgot” about the hearing on 16 August 2019.
Having regard to the submissions of the defendant I ruled against the plaintiff’s adjournment application.
Mr O’Neill tendered the affidavit of Carrie Nicole Peterson sworn on
11 June 2019. I asked the plaintiff if there was objection to any part of the affidavit. In response, the plaintiff embarked on a series of lengthy submissions which appeared to assert facts contrary to those stated in the affidavit of Ms Peterson. She did not formulate any proper objection and I admitted the affidavit as Exhibit “D1”.
In the course of those submissions the plaintiff sought to challenge the retainer of the defendant’s solicitors. I advised that I would not be dealing with that matter at that stage and I proceeded to hear the defendant’s Application in Proceeding.
At that point the plaintiff indicated that she wished to rely on some evidence of her own. She said that she would be able to file and serve it by close business on
20 August 2019.
The plaintiff then insisted that she be informed of the matters related to the transport of her property to storage raised in her Application in Proceeding (see [12] above). I again advised the plaintiff that I proposed to continue hearing the defendant’s application.
The plaintiff at that stage asked me to recuse myself. She asserted that I was causing her prejudice by not requiring the defendant to inform her of the identity of the person who removed her property. I could see no basis for not proceeding to hear the application which was before the Court. I declined to disqualify myself. The plaintiff informed me that she would make another, formal, application that I recuse myself. I advised her that I proposed to continue hearing the defendant’s Application in Proceeding. Shortly after this the plaintiff terminated the telephone connection.
The defendant’s submissions
Mr O’Neill proceeded to take me to the contents of the folder exhibited to
Ms Peterson’s affidavit. It contained copies of numerous decisions of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) and also the
NSW Supreme Court. These decisions related to litigation between the plaintiff and other parties regarding the plaintiff’s eviction from the Pyrmont premises and the storage of her personal property, which was removed from her temporary accommodation.
Having regard to the nature of the plaintiff’s claim and the potential relevance of these decisions to the application before me I considered the potential impact of s 91 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) (the Evidence Act) on their admissibility. Mr O’Neill submitted that the defendant was not seeking to rely on the decisions to prove certain facts in this case, but instead sought to put them before the court to provide evidence of the plaintiff’s litigation history. It is possible that the decisions, or some of them, might fall within the exception under sub-s 93(c) of the Evidence Act, insofar as there is an available issue estoppel point open to the defendant (it is, however, apparent that the defendant was not a party to any of those proceedings). More fundamentally, s 11 of the Evidence Act provides:
S 11General powers of a court
(1)The power of a court to control the conduct of a proceeding is not affected by this Act, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment.
(2)In particular, the powers of a court in relation to abuse of process in a proceeding are not affected.
Having regard to the general principle set out in Van Der Lee v New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 286 at [62], noting that this case was concerned with a different exclusion contained in the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), I decided to admit the decisions without the restrictions imposed by s 91 of the Evidence Act (ACT). For more abundant caution, I also made an order under sub-s 190(3)(b) that s 91 should not apply to the decisions.
Previous litigation
The decisions contained in “D1” establish an extraordinary record of litigation by the plaintiff against various St Vincent de Paul entities in NSW. A summary of that litigation appears in the reasons for decision of Johnson J in Kostov v St Vincent de Paul Housing trading as Amelie Housing [2018] NSWSC 1581 at [30]-[47]. It confirms the account given in Ms Peterson’s affidavit. The issue of the correct defendant to the plaintiff’s claims arising from her tenancy of the Pyrmont premises was squarely raised before Johnson J. His Honour said:
[10] To the extent that a considerable amount of paper has been generated by the Plaintiff in recent times about the question of the correct Defendant in these proceedings, I make the following observations.
…
[19] With respect to the application for leave to appeal from NCAT, the Defendant in those proceedings was Ecclesia Housing Limited. The evidence makes clear that on 31 August 2019 a resolution was passed to change the name of “Ecclesia Housing” to “Amelie Housing”. Accordingly, the proper First Defendant to these proceedings should be “Amelie Housing” with the appropriate CAN number.
[20] It is quite clear that St Vincent de Paul Housing is not a proper party to these proceedings. The affidavit of Mr Kell, read together with the affidavit of Ms Peterson, makes that clear.
His Honour went on to order as follows:
[57] I make an order in each proceeding that there be substituted for the present Defendant, "St Vincent de Paul Housing, trading as Amelie Housing ACN 158167483", the Defendant "Amelie Housing ACN 103181700".
In the NCAT proceedings, which the plaintiff sought to challenge in the proceedings which ended up before Johnson J, the Tribunal had at first instance and upon internal appeal ruled against the plaintiff on the issue of whether there was any impropriety in relation to her eviction.
The plaintiff’s challenge to the NCAT proceedings was eventually dismissed on
1 February 2019 by Fagan J who, in his decision, had regard to the plaintiff having been declared bankrupt on 18 July 2018 (see Kostov v Amelie Housing (NCAT Appeal) [2019] NSWSC 16 (Amelie Housing NCAT Appeal).
At the same time the proceedings mentioned above were underway in the
Supreme Court. On 24 October 2018 the plaintiff filed another application in NCAT seeking, amongst other things, “compensation, the payment of money and the restraining of breaches” in relation to the eviction and removal/storage of her goods. In those proceedings the plaintiff proceeded against “Amelie Housing” (see the decision of Principal Member Titterton in Kostov v Amelie Housing [2018] NSWCAT, handed down on 27 November 2018 at pp 375-387 of the folder “CNP 1” forming part of Exhibit “D1”).
The plaintiff’s substantive claim was dismissed by the Principal Member having regard to the plaintiff’s bankruptcy. He did not accept that the plaintiff’s application fell within one of the exceptions under ss 58 or 116 of the Bankruptcy Act 1996 (Cth) (the Bankruptcy Act).
It should also be noted that upon application by the State of NSW, on
19 November 2018 Fagan J found the plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW). His Honour made orders which included, amongst other things, preventing Ms Kostov from instituting proceedings in NSW (Kostov v State of New South Wales (Vexatious Proceedings) [2018] NSWSC 1794). The plaintiff advised that she has received leave to appeal this decision.
At the completion of the review of the evidence Mr O’Neill referred me to the written submissions of the defendant filed on 19 July 2019 and made brief oral submissions. At the completion of those I made the following directions:
(1) The plaintiff is to file and serve any affidavit on which she seeks to rely by close of business on 20 August 2019.
(2) That the plaintiff is to file and serve any written submissions by close of business on 20 August 2019.
(3) The defendant has until close of business on 23 August 2019 to file and serve any affidavit evidence and written submissions by way of reply.
(4) His Honour grants the defendant liberty to apply by email should they seek to re-list the matter for any further hearing, by close of business on 23 August 2019.
Matters raised in correspondence post-hearing
On the afternoon of Tuesday 20 August 2019 the plaintiff sent an email to my associate attaching a number of documents. The email went beyond simply providing evidence or submissions in relation to the defendant’s Application in Proceeding.
Insofar as the plaintiff sought by the email to re-litigate her adjournment application, her recusal application and her insistence that the defendant’s solicitor acted without instructions, I note that these matters are well outside the ambit of the directions permitting the plaintiff to file submissions and evidence. Although the defendant’s representatives were sent a copy of the email, they have not consented to the plaintiff re-opening these applications. It is not appropriate for any litigant to make applications in proceedings by unilateral email communications to the Court (see John Holland Rail Pty Ltd v Comcare [2011] FCAFC 34; 276 ALR 221 at [22]-[23]). The plaintiff is a trained lawyer and should be well aware of the formalities required by the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) (the Rules).
In relation to the documents sent under cover of the emails referred to above, I have admitted these, and the covering email chain, into evidence as Exhibit “P2”. In ordinary circumstances I would expect that the defendant might have taken objection to some of these documents on the grounds of relevance. Bearing in mind the contents of s 5A of the Court Procedures Act 2004 (ACT), I determined to admit the documents without hearing further argument.
Exhibit “P2” consists of the following categories of documents, in addition to the covering emails:
(1) A series of emails about the Kennards storage arrangement and the copy of the Kennards agreement originally provided to the plaintiff which had Rachel Carney’s name and contact details redacted;
(2) A series of emails in relation to whether the defendant’s solicitor had instructions;
(3) An extract from a bank record showing payments apparently made by the plaintiff to Kennards for storage of her belongings;
(4) A letter from the plaintiff to “St Vincent’s Counsel”, with a copy to “St Vincent’s Housing” claiming the costs and expenses incurred by the plaintiff since her eviction. The letter attaches various invoices and receipts said to support that claim;
(5) Several references and awards received by the plaintiff, including a copy of her law degree which was conferred on 15 September 2005; and,
(6) A series of screen shots of SMS messages from the plaintiff. These relate to the Kennards storage arrangement and the issue of whether the defendant’s solicitor has instructions.
A copy of the Standard Form Residential Tenancy Agreement entered into by the plaintiff on 27 July 2017 in relation to the Pyrmont premises is at pages 1-9 of “CNP 1”. The landlord is identified as “Ecclesia Housing Ltd”.
At pages 434-5 of “CNP 1” a copy of ASIC search records is provided, showing that Ecclesia Housing Ltd was a public company limited by guarantee. It carried that name between 15 November 2010 and 18 June 2018. From 19 June 2018 to
16 September 2018 the name of the company was Ecclesia Housing. Since
17 September 2018 its name has been Amelie Housing. Notwithstanding the various name changes the corporate entity has remained the same.
I also note that as part of one of the NSW Supreme Court proceedings, the plaintiff filed documents in support of her argument that the correct defendant should be “St Vincent’s Housing trading as Amelie Housing” (see pages 97-105 of “CNP 1”). Pages 103-105 appear to consist of extracts from the St Vincent de Paul website. This document suggests that the overall charitable work of the Society in NSW is conducted under a structure in which the ultimate holding company is The Trustees of the Society of St Vincent de Paul (NSW). In November 2012 the Trustees formed a public company named St Vincent de Paul NSW. The rights and obligations of the Trustees were transferred to that company on 1 July 2013, although it seems that the Trustees maintained ownership of the real property. In May 2012, St Vincent de Paul Housing was also set up as a public company. There is some confusion between the functions carried out by that company and Amelie Housing, with reference to it as “trading as” Amelie Housing. No doubt that description is what caused the plaintiff to sue in that name.
Be that as it may, once reference is made to the ASIC search it can be seen that the decision of Johnson J is undoubtedly correct. Moreover, I can see no basis for the assertion that the current defendant has any relevant involvement with the the plaintiff’s eviction, nor the storage of her property.
Abuse of process
McCallum J reviewed the law relating to abuse of process at some length in O’Shane v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 315; 85 NSWLR 698 (O’Shane) at [99]-[111]. Those comments were referred to with approval by French CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ in Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 28; 256 CLR 507 (Tomlinson) where their Honours said:
[26] …it has been recognised that making a claim or raising an issue which was made or raised and determined in an earlier proceeding, or which ought reasonably to have been made or raised for determination in that earlier proceeding, can constitute an abuse of process even where the earlier proceeding might not have given rise to an estoppel. Similarly, it has been recognised that making such a claim or raising such an issue can constitute an abuse of process where the party seeking to make the claim or to raise the issue in the later proceeding was neither a party to that earlier proceeding, nor the privy of a party to that earlier proceeding, and therefore could not be precluded by an estoppel.
[References omitted.]
One of the authorities referred to in O’Shane, and also by the plurality in Tomlinson, was Reichel v Magrath (1889) 14 App Cas 665 at 668, where Lord Halsbury said:
…it would be a scandal to the administration of justice if, the same question having been disposed of by one case, the litigant were to be permitted by changing the form of the proceedings to set up the same case again…There must be an inherent jurisdiction in every Court of Justice to prevent such an abuse of its procedure…
I recognise the caution required in making an order which will prevent the plaintiff from litigating her claim (see O’Shane at [111]). However, the claim being pursued by the plaintiff clearly falls within that which Lord Halsbury described as a scandal to the administration of justice. The plaintiff has sought to reframe her case against a different party to litigate the matters which have already been determined against her in NSW. If this claim, were to be allowed to proceed, and were the plaintiff to succeed in her claim there would necessarily be two inconsistent superior court judgments on that issue.
Moreover, there is much force in the submission by the defendant that the plaintiff’s claim, insofar as it can be understood, is truly a claim with respect to her property rights rather than a claim for a “personal injury or wrong” (see
sub-s 116(2)(g)(i) of the Bankruptcy Act, and Cox v Journeaux (No 2) (1935) 52 CLR 713 at 721 per Dixon J. The essence of the claim still arises from the circumstances of the plaintiff’s eviction and the removal of her personal property to storage. The claim that the circumstances of those events caused “stress illness and shock” do not change the claim into one for personal injury damages. Paragraph [21] of the plaintiff’s claim clearly pleads a financial loss said to be attributable to the storage of her property. Paragraph [22] seemingly does the same, although it is less clear.
The effect of s 58(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act is that as at the time of the sequestration order (18 July 2018) any right of action for damages she had in relation to the removal and storage of her property vested in the Trustee in Bankruptcy. Thereafter, the plaintiff had no standing to pursue such right on her own behalf.
The plaintiff informed the Court that she had applied to have the sequestration order set aside. That may be so, but until an order in those terms is made the plaintiff has no standing to pursue damages for the removal and storage of her property.
The defendant also submits that the statement of claim itself is seriously defective. It fails to plead the facts said to give rise to a cause of action in a clear and intelligible way so as to put the defendant on notice of the case it is required to answer. I accept that submission. Although the plaintiff is self-represented she has legal training and considerable litigation experience in her own matters. It is not an unreasonable expectation that she would be able to firstly consider whether there is an arguable cause of action against the defendant, and then to clearly set this out in her pleading. The plaintiff has clearly failed to do this. The facts as pleaded do not justify the claim of a duty of care to keep the plaintiff “safe from harm and provide her reasonable accommodation”. Moreover, the claim as framed against the Board of the defendant is completely misconceived. The Board is not an entity. It cannot, in its own right, owe the plaintiff a duty of care, let alone one which relates to the way in which it manages the defendant.
Considering the relief sought by the defendant
Having regard to the background to the case, including the outcome of the numerous decisions in which tribunals and courts have dealt with the plaintiff’s claims, it becomes abundantly clear that her claims against the defendant are “so untenable (they) cannot possible succeed” (see General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 130 per Barwick CJ.
The contents of Exhibit “P2” do not provide any basis for resisting the relief sought by the defendant. Indeed, they simply confirm the vexatious nature of the plaintiff’s claim.
Rule 425 of the Rules provides:
r 425Pleadings – striking out
(1)The court may, at any stage of a proceeding, order that a pleading or part of a pleading be struck out if the pleading -
(a)discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence appropriate to the nature of the pleading; or
(b)may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the proceeding; or
(c)is frivolous, scandalous, unnecessary or vexatious; or
(d)is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
(2)The court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application for an order under this rule.
(3)If the court makes an order under this rule, it may also make any other order it considers appropriate, including, for example –
(a)if the court makes an order under subrule (1)(a) – an order staying or dismissing the proceeding or entering judgment; and
(b)an order about the future conduct of the proceeding.
I have concluded that the statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action. Moreover, insofar as it can be understood, it seeks to raise matters which have been the subject of considerable litigation in NSW in circumstances where pursuit of the current action is an abuse of the process of this Court. Indeed, it is hard to resist the impression that the plaintiff has only commenced proceedings in the ACT for the purpose of avoiding the vexatious proceedings orders made by Fagan J.
The defendant also relies upon r 1147 of the Rules. That rule is set out in the following terms:
r 1147Summary judgment – for defendant
(1)A defendant may apply to the court for summary judgment against a plaintiff at any time after filing a notice of intention to respond or defence.
(2)The court may give judgment for the defendant against the plaintiff for the plaintiff’s claim for relief (or part of it) if satisfied—
(a)that the claim (or part of it) is frivolous or vexatious; or
(b)that there is a good defence to the claim (or part of it) on the merits; or
(c)that the proceeding should be finally disposed of summarily or without pleadings.
(3)The court may make any other order it considers appropriate.
I have taken into account the principles stated by Jagot J in this Court in Galovac Pty Limited v Australian Capital Territory [2010] ACTSC 132 at [5].
The usual remedy for proceedings which amount to an abuse of process is an order dismissing or staying those proceedings. However, having regard to the history of litigation conducted by the plaintiff against various St Vincent de Paul entities, and the fact that the plaintiff has sought to proceed against the incorrect entity in this matter, I have concluded that the defendant has a good defence on the merits. Moreover, the claim is vexatious and the preferable course is therefore to dispose of it. I therefore propose to enter judgment for the defendant.
In the light of the above, I do not propose to deal with the plaintiff’s Application in Proceeding filed on 27 June 2019, other than to say that I consider it misconceived and vexatious. There is no basis for imposing an order on a corporate entity which had no involvement in the plaintiff’s eviction to disclose information about the removal of her goods. Furthermore, I see no proper basis at all for the attempt to challenge Ms Peterson’s retainer.
Costs
The defendant has sought an order for indemnity costs. It relies upon the statement made by the NCAT Appeals Board in Kostov v Ecclesia Housing (No. 2) NSWCATAP 215 at [39] and quoted by Fagan J in Amelie Housing NCAT Appeal at [5], to the following effect:
There is simply no basis upon which the applicant can claim that the order for possession which was made had no proper basis. That order is unassailable, and any attempt by the applicant to contend otherwise before this Tribunal is doomed to failure and is futile.
The defendant says that the plaintiff must have been aware that her attempt to re-litigate the issue of whether her eviction was unlawful was bound to fail. That same eviction underpins the case which the plaintiff has sought to bring in these proceedings.
Having regard to the extraordinary history of the litigation brought by the plaintiff and the abuse of the process of this Court involved in the attempt to litigate the claim in the Territory I consider that it is appropriate that costs be awarded against the plaintiff on an indemnity basis.
Post Script
After I had drafted this judgment I became aware that the plaintiff was seeking a hearing date for the further recusal application which she foreshadowed on 16 August 2019. Having regard to the conclusions to which I have come as to the abuse of process constituted by the current proceedings, and the vexatious nature of the plaintiff’s litigation against St Vincent de Paul entities, including the defendant, I determined that it is not in the interests of justice to delay the delivery of judgment to accommodate the plaintiff’s further application.
Conclusion
The Orders of the Court are as follows:
(1) Judgment is entered for the defendant in accordance with r 1147 of the Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT).
(2) The plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of the action, including Applications in Proceeding brought in the action, on an indemnity basis.
| I certify that the preceding sixty-four [64] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Acting Justice Crowe Associate: Date: |
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