Kosmo & Kosmo - [2008] FamCAFC 20

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KOSMO & KOSMO

[2008] FamCAFC 20

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – VALIDITY OF PRIOR ORDERS – Not established that the order made by a Magistrate acting as Registrar were invalid nor ineffective for want of jurisdiction. Commonwealth and State legislation gave validity and practical effect to orders previously made by consent by a registrar of the Family Court of Western Australia. Horne v Horne (1997) FLC ¶92-734; Family Court of Western Australia (Orders of Registrars) Act 1997 and Fauna Holdings Pty Ltd and McGillivray, BJ and McGillivray, JL and McGillivray, K J v Mitchell, PK (No 2) (2000) FLC ¶93-053 cited.

FAMILY LAW - JUSTICE AND EQUITY – Assertion that orders were unfair and unreasonable not established.

FAMILY LAW - CONFLICT OF INTEREST – Not established that conduct of trial Judge when Magistrate acting as Registrar involved conflict of interest.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Section 118
Family Court of Western Australia (Orders of Registrars) Act 1997

Horne v Horne (1997) FLC ¶92-734
Fauna Holdings Pty Ltd and McGillivray, BJ and McGillivray, JL and McGillivray, K J v Mitchell, PK (No 2) (2000) FLC ¶93-053

APPELLANT:

MRS KOSMO

RESPONDENT:

MR KOSMO

FILE NUMBER:

PTW

708

1990

APPEAL NUMBER:

2007

DATE DELIVERED:

29 February 2008

PLACE DELIVERED:

Parramatta

PLACE HEARD:

PERTH

JUDGMENT OF:

COLEMAN, WARNICK & PENNY JJ

HEARING DATE:

29 January 2008

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:

Family Court of Western Australia

LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE:

23 April 2007

LOWER COURT MNC:

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT:

Self represented litigant

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPELLANT:

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT:

No appearances

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Orders

That the appeal be dismissed.
That there be no order for costs.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Kosmo & Kosmo is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

THE FULL COURT OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PERTH

Appeal Number: WA 7L/07
File Number: PTW708 of 1990

MRS KOSMO

Appellant

And

MR KOSMO

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

By Notice of Appeal filed 5 July 2007 Mrs Kosmo (“the wife”) appealed against orders made by Martin J on 23 April 2007, the effect of which was to prevent the wife from bringing proceedings in the Court. On 25 June 2007 Penny J granted the wife leave to appeal and extended the time in which the wife could file her Form 20 by 14 days. There was no respondent to the wife’s application before the trial Judge. Unsurprisingly, nor was there any respondent to the Notice of Appeal filed in this Court, and only the wife appeared at the hearing of her appeal. The wife has at all material times been unrepresented. In the circumstances, although the matter may not be without uncertainty, we proceed on the basis that the trial Judge’s orders of 23 April 2007 were final orders and that, as such, no question of leave to appeal arises.
The orders of 23 April 2007 provided for the dismissal of an application filed by the wife on 23 March 2007. By that application the wife sought “leave of the Family Court to file an application to lift the Vexatious Litigant order against me by the Family Court on 14 August 2000”, and stated “I intend to file an application to lift the Vexatious Litigant order imposed on me by the Family Court on 14 August 2000” (Appeal Book, page 9, pars 1 and 2).
Having heard the wife’s submissions, we remain unclear as to whether the wife was seeking from the trial Judge an extension of time in which to appeal the order of 14 August 2000 by which she was declared a vexatious litigant, or seeking an order pursuant to s 118(c) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) discharging such order. As will be seen, nothing of practical significance turns on the distinction, but the literal wording of her application, and content of her material, suggests that the wife probably was seeking the latter relief.
Presumably on the basis that, by whatever process, she was able to bring a substantive application, the wife foreshadowed in her application her intention to file an application to the Family Court “to overturn the ‘purported’ family law matter 708 of 1990” on four stated grounds, one of which asserted that the Family Court of Western Australia lacked “legal authority to act in the matter” on 17 December 1990 in proceedings in the Court between the wife and the husband (Appeal Book page 9, par 3).
Despite repeated invitations to do so by members of the bench, the wife was unable to articulate in even the simplest terms what substantive relief she would seek from the Court were she able to bring an application for such relief. Beyond feeling aggrieved, and wishing, in some unspecified manner, to have the orders of 17 December 1990 declared invalid, we thus do not know what of potential practical significance the wife hopes to be able to seek by way of orders from a Court exercising original jurisdiction under the Act.

The proceedings before the trial Judge

For reasons which in the circumstances are unsurprising, the trial Judge did not produce formal reasons for her decision to dismiss the wife’s application of 23 March 2007. However, the reasons why her Honour dismissed that application are not in doubt having regard to the transcript of the proceedings before her on 23 April 2007.
Although the wife does not appear to complain about the adequacy of the trial Judge’s reasons for her decision, we record that we do not find such reasons inadequate. As the authorities make clear, the extent to which a trial judge is obliged to provide reasons for judgment varies according to the nature and complexity of the proceedings which he or she is determining.
Her Honour recorded that she had read the wife’s “documents”. We have referred to the wife’s application before her Honour. That application was supported by an affidavit which merely asserted:
I am the respondent wife in Western Australian Family Court proceedings 708 of 1990. I believe the ‘purported’ family law matter proceeded in the family court on false pretence, and under threat, following Agriculture WA workplace threats to the husband, and including a phone threat to me from [Ms W] that she was targeting our property.
Irrespective of West Australian Family Court efforts to cover-up this scandalous use of the Family Court, including the Vexatious Litigant order against me, the matter, of necessity needs to be brought to a proper lawful conclusion (Appeal Book, page 12).
On two occasions the trial Judge asked the wife whether there was anything more she wished to say in support of her application. The wife confirmed that she did not wish to say anything in addition to the matters referred to in her documentation.
Her Honour then stated:
I have read the material and to be blunt you haven’t filed anything to indicate that there’s really been any change at all or setting out any different reasons from the reasons that were brought before the court last time. Are there any different reasons? (Appeal Book page 15).
The wife replied:
It comes back to the fact that the Family Court never had authority in the first place to act in this matter and in so doing the Family Court actually legalised extortion. Now, that property that went to this third party is actually owed to the children who were minors at the time. That property remains outstanding. It was 212,000 in 1990 and that situation has never been resolved, among other things (Appeal Book page 15).
The wife made other submissions none of which could reasonably have advanced her case before the learned trial Judge, or advance her case before this Court.
Her Honour concluded the proceedings by recording:
I’m not satisfied that there are any grounds for variation of the order. I have read the material. I have also read the previous judgments in relation to this matter. The application will be dismissed. Sorry. Thank you, Mrs [Kosmo] (Appeal Book page 15).

Background

The material filed by the wife provides few clues with respect to the proceedings which this Court has to consider. The wife has not placed the 17 December 1990 orders before this Court, nor has she placed the orders before this Court of 14 August 2000, although the effect of the latter orders is not in doubt. There have apparently been orders made by the Court subsequent to August 2000, and reasons for such orders, none of which the wife has placed before the Court.
It is reasonably apparent that the orders of 17 December 1990 are asserted by the wife to have dealt, inter alia, with financial matters, including matters relating to settlement of property. In her outline of submissions the wife referred to a “79A property appeal that was terminated in the Family Court on 19 December 1994 because the property, the subject of the court proceedings, believed to be protected with a registered caveat was sold to the S P C for $380,000.” (Wife’s Legal Argument page 2, par 2). It is tempting to conclude that the property there referred to was property referred to in the December 1990 orders.
Elsewhere in her outline of argument, under the heading “Background Information”, the wife suggested that she and her former husband “separated on 11 October 1989”.
Other than to the extent indicated, we can provide nothing further by way of background to the proceedings by reference to the wife’s material. (Wife’s Legal Argument, page 6, par 4).
The absence of relevant documentation, and inability of the wife to articulate the substantive relief which she would seek if permitted to bring an application does little to either advance the wife’s cause or allow us to understand, much less evaluate, her complaints. In the interests of justice, we have obtained for ourselves from the Court file copies of orders which appear relevant and, where Reasons for Judgment have been transcribed, the reasons why such orders have been made. The “Chronology” which follows is based upon our review of the Court file.

Chronology

On 4 April 1990 orders were made in the Court of Petty Sessions, 45 St Georges Terrace Perth by way of interlocutory injunctive relief with respect to the proceeds of sale of premises situate at T Street S P in the State of Western Australia. That order provided for the payment of a number of specified liabilities and the payment from the balance of funds then remaining of $5000 to each of the parties. The proceedings between the parties commenced by an application filed by the husband on 22 March 1990 were otherwise transferred to the Family Court of Western Australia for further hearing.
On 4 May 1990, in the Family Court of Western Australia at Perth, a series of orders were made by consent. Those orders related to the two children of the parties who are now aged 32 and 31 years of age. Orders for child maintenance and ancillary expenses for the children were then made together with orders for settlement of property both real and personal. Pursuant to the orders the wife was to receive the transfer of a property situate at S Terrace S P.
The orders also provided that the wife transfer to the husband her interest in a property situate at E Street C together with chattels contained within those premises. In addition, the orders provided for the discharge of the orders of the Court of Petty Sessions of 4 April 1990, and for the payment of various expenses from the Cash Management Account referred to in those orders, the balance of such account being ordered to be divided equally between the parties.
We have been unable to locate any orders of the Court of 17 December 1990.
On 19 December 1990 further orders were made in the Family Court in relation to the children of the parties and child support. Those orders did not relate to settlement of property.
The matter again came before the Family Court on 8 May 1991 at which time it was adjourned to a date to be fixed for hearing. A Child Support matter came before the Court for hearing on 26 July 1991 at which time a declaration having no present significance was made, and the proceedings between the parties were otherwise adjourned generally.
On 19 August 1991 the wife was ordered to pay the husband’s costs of the proceedings which had been determined on 26 July 1991.
On 30 October 1991 an order was made on the ex parte application of the husband restraining the wife until further order from dealing with her interest in a property known as N Crescent W in the State of Western Australia. On 15 November 1991 the injunctive order was varied to permit the wife to encumber the property referred to in the order up to the sum of $4000. The husband’s application was ultimately withdrawn before the Court on 29 November 1991.
On 14 July 1992 an application filed by the wife on 6 July 1992 came before the Court of Petty Sessions, 45 St Georges Terrace Perth. Various procedural orders were made on that date and the proceedings were otherwise transferred to the Family Court of Western Australia for further hearing.
The wife’s application of 6 July 1992 was again before the Court of Petty Sessions on 16 September 1992 at which time further procedural orders were made.
On 2 November 1992 the wife’s application, together with an application filed by the husband on 26 November 1990 came before the Family Court of Western Australia. Orders in relation to the parties’ children were then made.
On 15 February 1993 an application filed by the wife on 1 December 1992 and an application filed by the husband on 26 January 1993 came before the Family Court. Procedural orders were made and the applications adjourned to 23 March 1993, on which date the proceedings were further adjourned to 5 April 1993.
On 5 April 1993 the wife’s application of 12 March 1993 was adjourned generally and the husband’s costs of that application were reserved.
On 19 September 1994 the wife’s application of 1 December 1992 as amended by her on 12 March 1993, the wife’s further application of 5 February 1993, and the husband’s application of 26 January 1993 came before the Family Court. On that date the wife was ordered to charge her property at N Crescent W in order to secure some $10 000 for the husband’s costs. A number of other ancillary and procedural orders were then made.
On 18 October 1994 an order was made by consent varying the terms of the orders of 19 September 1994.
On 19 December 1994 an application filed by the wife on 25 November 1994 was dismissed.
On 7 April 1995 a number of applications filed by each of the parties during 1992, 1993 and 1994 were by consent dismissed, and the wife ordered to pay the husband’s costs in the sum of $1500.
On 24 March 1999 an application filed by the wife on 2 March 1999 came before the Court of Petty Sessions, 150 Terrace Road Perth. A procedural order was made and the case was adjourned to the Family Court of Western Australia. On 5 May 1999 further procedural orders were made in the Court of Petty Sessions, together with the reservation of costs.
The wife’s application filed 24 March 1999 came before the Family Court of Western Australia on 31May 1999 and again on 8 June 1999. On 21 June 1999 the application was dismissed and the wife ordered to pay the husband’s costs of such application.
On 14 August 2000 the applications of the wife filed 18 July 2000 and response of the husband filed 11 August 2000 came before the Family Court of Western Australia. The Court then made an order restraining the wife from bringing any further proceedings in the Court without the leave of the Court and ordering the wife to pay a sum with respect to the husband’s costs. The application and response were otherwise dismissed.
The orders of 14 August 2000 were made by Tolcon J whose Reasons for Judgment we have read. It is clear from his Honour’s Reasons for Judgment that the application the wife filed on 18 July 2000 sought leave to appeal out of time the orders made by consent in the Family Court on 4 May 1990 (which related to settlement of property), and orders made as a result of a child support appeal on 26 July 1991.
In his Reasons for Judgment, Tolcon J recorded that:
At all times, in 1990 and 1991, the wife was represented by her solicitors. Orders which were made, were made at the time when the wife was separately represented. She has had in excess of 10 years in which to bring an appeal in respect of settlement of property. As previously mentioned, the earlier applications in that regard have been dismissed (Reasons for Judgment of Tolcon J, dated 14 August 2000 page 3, par 13).
For the reasons which his Honour further gave, leave to appeal out of time against the 1990 orders was refused. There has been no attempt to appeal against his Honour’s decision in that regard.
An order under s 118 of the Act restraining the wife from bringing further proceedings was then made. Tolcon J concluded that it was appropriate to make such an order, recording in his reasons that:
The wife has brought numerous applications of a similar nature to the current application. Previous applications have either been dismissed or withdrawn. The wife has made it clear that if she does not receive the orders which she seeks, then she intends to pursue the matter. She has exhausted her rights under the Act (Reasons for Judgment of Tolcon J, dated 14 August 2000, page 4, par 16).
Late in 2000 the husband commenced enforcement proceedings against the wife with respect to costs orders earlier made. Those proceedings were finalised in March 2001. Nothing arising from those proceedings advances present matters.
On 22 November 2002 the wife filed a further application. That application came before Penny J on 13 January 2003 and was dismissed, for reasons which her Honour then gave.
Penny J recorded that the application of the wife of 22 November 2002 which she dismissed on 13 January 2003 sought “leave from the court to discharge out of time Family Court Order 1 of 14 August 2000” and “To discharge Family Court Order 1 of 14 August 2000” (Reasons for Judgment of Penny J dated 13 January 2003, par 1). As her Honour recorded, the relevant order, there is no doubt, was that of Tolcon J restraining the wife from commencing further proceedings in the court without the leave of the court to which we have earlier referred.
Penny J recorded that she could “see nothing in the affidavit” (in support of the wife’s application) which would justify leave of the Court being granted to enable the wife to commence proceedings to attempt to set aside the orders of the Court, including the orders for settlement of property made by consent in 1990 which her Honour recorded the wife already unsuccessfully sought to have set aside. There was no appeal against Penny J’s order.
Before this Court, the wife confirmed that no previous involvement of Penny J in proceedings in which the wife was a party gave rise to any application that Penny J disqualify herself from hearing the current proceedings.

The Wife’s Complaints

Although not strictly necessary to do so, in order to determine the present proceedings, in the hope that our efforts will assist the wife to better understand the futility of seeking to proceed further, we propose dealing with the complaints contained in the Notice of Appeal, and the more wide ranging complaints agitated by the wife in her outline of submissions entitled “Legal Argument”.
The first matter complained of by the wife was that the trial Judge had a “substantial conflict of interest” in the proceedings. That assertion appears from other parts of the Grounds of Appeal to arise from the wife’s perception that the trial Judge on 18 and 19 April 1990 when a magistrate “acting as registrar erred by forcing a ‘settlement by consent’ without appeal, that was unlawful, unnecessary, highly prejudicial and biased against myself, and manifestly detrimental to the then minor children” (Appeal Book page 3, Part D Grounds of Appeal, numbers 2 & 3).

The wife further asserted:
4. On 17 and 19 December 1990, Martin, magistrate acknowledged in the family court that if [he] did not have authority and ought not to have acted in the matter on 18/19 April 1990. Martin retalaited (sic) with blatantly aggressive court action and ordered the subsequent sham trial and corrupt finding to protect the professional reputation of the [P F] lawyer, late [A,] then a magistrate in the family court (Appeal Book, page 4, Part D Grounds of appeal, number 4).
There appear to be two elements of this complaint, the first that the orders of December 1990 were invalid, the other relating to the alleged conduct of the trial Judge in 1990 when a “magistrate acting as registrar”.
We understand that, whenever they were made in 1990, the wife’s current complaints relate to orders for settlement of property. As the Chronology we have earlier pieced together and set out makes clear, there do not appear to have been any orders of December 1990, made by the trial Judge or anyone else, which impacted upon the wife’s property rights. The orders which had that effect appear from the record to have been made in May 1990. The orders for settlement of property made in 1990, on whatever date they were in fact made, may have been made by a judge. Although the record is less than entirely clear, it appears to us probable that the orders were in fact made by Anderson J, a judge of the Court.
If however as the wife contends, the orders were made by the trial judge when a magistrate acting as a registrar of the Family Court of Western Australia, other considerations potentially arise. Although she does not so articulate her complaint, it is likely that the wife asserts that the 1990 orders for property settlement made by the trial Judge when a magistrate acting as a registrar were invalid for want of jurisdiction. Such a complaint, subject to the factual matrix in which it is made, ought not be swept aside without consideration.
For abundance of caution, we approach the matter on the basis that the wife’s complaints relate to orders for property settlement made in 1990.

Invalidity of the Orders

In Horne v Horne (1997) FLC ¶92-734 the Full Court concluded that orders made by consent by a registrar of the Family Court of Western Australia in 1995 were invalid for want of jurisdiction. The decision of the Full Court was delivered on 13 February 1997. Later that year, the Parliament of Western Australia passed the Family Court of Western Australia (Orders of Registrars) Act 1997, and the Commonwealth Parliament enacted reciprocal and similarly title legislation. The State and Commonwealth Acts commenced operation on 17 October 1997.
Without referring in detail to the provisions of the Act, as the subsequent decision of the Full Court of this Court in Fauna Holdings Pty Ltd and McGillivray, BJ and McGillivray, JL and McGillivray, K J v Mitchell, PK (No 2) (2000) FLC ¶93-053 confirms beyond doubt, the 1997 Commonwealth and State legislation effectively provided that the rights and liabilities of the parties to “ineffective” orders previously made by registrars of the Family Court of Western Australia were the same as they would have been had the original consent orders been effective.
If, as the wife contends, the orders for property settlement made in 1990, on whatever date they were in fact made, were “ineffective” having been made by a Magistrate acting as a Registrar, there is no scope for arguing that they were not rendered effective for all practical purposes by the State and Commonwealth legislation to which we have referred. Thus, whatever inferences the wife might seek that this Court draw from the trial Judge having made “ineffective” orders for property settlement in 1990, they cannot advance her claim that the orders were invalid. Whatever their status may have been in 1990, or thereafter until 4 October 1997, the 1990 orders for property settlement are, and have been for more than a decade, valid and effective for all practical purposes.
To the extent therefore that the trial Judge was asserted to have had any conflict of interest in 2007 by virtue of defects in legislation pursuant to which when, as a magistrate acting as registrar she made consent orders in 1990, by no logical process could it be concluded that a conflict or potential conflict of interest arose.

Conflict of interest

So far as the wife’s complaints about the conduct of the trial Judge in 1990 when a magistrate acting as registrar conducting settlement negotiations or conciliation processes is concerned, we have been referred to nothing, beyond the assertions of the wife in that regard, which begins to establish the facts upon which this complaint appears to be based. In short, nothing done or not done by the learned trial Judge in 1990 as a magistrate acting as registrar of the Court has been shown to have given rise to any possibility of a conflict of interest or lack of impartiality in any relevant aspect of the proceedings which she determined 17 years later.
Significantly, the wife does not suggest that it was the trial Judge who made the order declaring the wife a vexatious litigant in August 2000. To the extent that the trial Judge may have dealt with subsequent applications in relation to that order her decisions in that regard do not appear to have been appealed against, either on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest or otherwise.
As the transcript of proceedings of 23 April 2007 makes clear, the wife said nothing to the trial Judge to indicate the slightest reluctance to have her Honour hear and determine the proceedings on that day, much less to raise any of the matters so colourfully articulated in her Grounds of Appeal.
To the extent that the wife complains about the conduct of the trial Judge in 1993 as a magistrate presiding over a s 79A application apparently brought by the wife at about that time, nothing asserted by the wife could possibly provide a basis for concluding that the trial Judge in 2007 had an actual or potential conflict of interest.
The wife complained in her Notice of Appeal that:
5. On 8 and 15 February 1993 Martin, then magistrate presided over my 79A hearing, that was terminated on 19 December 1994, when the court was told the property, the subject of the proceedings before the family court, and believed to be protected with a registered caveat had been sold, by request to the [S P C]. The registered caveat removed without notice to the caveator. After checking the property had been sold Anderson J terminated the 79A proceedings (Appeal Book, page 3, Part D, par 5).
As the wife’s own material makes clear, the reasons for the wife’s s 79A application being terminated were entirely unrelated to the trial Judge. Indeed on the wife’s own case another judge in fact made the order terminating such proceedings.
Nothing to which the wife has referred this Court substantiates the complaint that the trial Judge had a conflict of interest in the proceedings.

The wife’s final ground of appeal

The remaining ground articulated in the Notice of Appeal provided:
6. Martin’s J order is unfair and unreasonable. The matter is and remains a hoax on the family court, it is a flagrant abuse of family law process and needs to be corrected by the family court (Appeal Book page 1, Part D par 6).
Nothing to which the wife has referred the Court begins to establish that the orders made in 1990 (or on any other occasion) were “a flagrant abuse of family law process” or that any basis for appellate intervention has been established.
For the reasons which we have thus given no Ground of Appeal advanced by the wife can be considered to have substance.
Although not strictly necessary to do so, we have considered the 7-page “Legal Argument” and “Background Information” filed by the wife on 7 January 2008 in order to see whether any possible basis for appellate intervention is there revealed.

The Wife’s “Legal Argument” and “Background Information”

In her material the wife makes allegations about the conduct of a now deceased member of the legal profession, a third party with whom the wife’s former husband appears to have had some involvement, and the trial Judge. None of those claims is either established or relevant to the subject matter of the proceedings which the trial Judge determined on 23 April 2007.
We earlier referred to the wife’s rejection of the legislation pursuant to which possible defects in orders made prior to its commencement were addressed. In her “Legal Argument” the wife reiterated that “I do not accept the state government retrospective Registrars Orders 1997 legislation or the subsequent 2004 federal legislation as an ethical substitute for a hoax on a court of law or any ‘unreviewable’ settlement made in the West Australian Family Court” (Wife’s Legal Argument page 3).
As we have earlier noted, notwithstanding that the wife does not accept its effect, we are in no doubt that the legislation to which she alludes precludes the wife from asserting any invalidity in the 1990 orders. The wife having commenced proceedings under s 79A in circumstances which, on the wife’s own material, were unsupported, on what basis those orders might now be sought to be impugned is unclear, and nothing advanced by the wife removes such uncertainty.
To the extent that the wife complained that the trial Judge had in 1990 “violated my human rights”, nothing asserted by her establishes that such was the case (Wife’s Legal Argument, page 4 par 4).
The wife’s allegations with respect to dealings with CentreLink are similarly unsubstantiated. Nothing else referred to by the wife in her material could possibly provide a basis for this Court interfering with the trial Judge’s orders of 23 April 2007.

Conclusion

The wife having not demonstrated that any of her complaints, whether appearing in her Notice of Appeal or elsewhere, has substance, the orders of 23 April 2007 cannot be interfered with.
To the extent that we have been able to establish what the proceedings between the wife and her former husband have been about, or could conceivably be about in the future, it appears that orders for property settlement were made in 1990 by consent. In August 2000 Tolcon J found that the wife, and her former husband, were legally represented when the 1990 orders were made. To the extent that the validity of those orders may have been questionable, such potential invalidity was effectively removed on 17 October 1997 when the legislation to which we have earlier referred commenced operation.
The orders of May or December 1990 could thus not now be challenged on the basis of any alleged invalidity. Nothing done by the trial Judge in 1990 when a magistrate acting as registrar either changes that state of affairs, or provides a basis for impugning any aspect of the trial Judge’s conduct or determination of proceedings in April 2007.
To the extent that any substantive aspect of the May or December 1990 orders may have enlivened a basis for revisiting those orders, the withdrawal, before a judge other than the trial Judge, in 1994 of the wife’s s 79A application almost certainly removes the potential for arguing today that such orders may be able to be impugned pursuant to any provision of the Act. No basis for doing so is even hinted at in any event.
We recorded earlier in these Reasons; the inability of the wife to tell us in simple terms what she would seek by way of substantive relief or outcome precludes our saying more about this topic. In the circumstances, the trial Judge was justified in rejecting the wife’s endeavours to be able to commence further litigation in this Court. Indeed, on the material before the Court, to have made any order other than the order she made would have been to countenance and encourage an abuse of the court processes.
For the foregoing reasons, the wife’s Notice of Appeal will be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding eighty (80) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Full Court.

Associate:

Date: 29 February 2008